People v. J.B. CA4/1

CourtListener 10856431Calctapp8 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/8/26 P. v. J.B. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087147

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. FELJS18000118)
J.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Kawika Smith, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
J.B. suffers from severe mental illness. In 2014, following a successful
not guilty by reason of insanity defense (NGI), the trial court sent J.B. to the
Department of State Hospitals at Patton (Patton). Based on the how the law
was interpreted at the time, the People brought timely recommitment
petitions every two years to keep J.B. in treatment due to his continued
mental illness and danger to the public. J.B. is still at Patton. He appeals
his continued placement there, arguing that under a new interpretation of
the law, all the People’s petitions to keep J.B. in Patton, dating back to 2014,
have been untimely, requiring J.B.’s immediate release from the state
hospital system.
J.B. asserts four arguments to support this position. First, he contends

the court erred in denying him Penal Code1 section 4019 conduct credits for
his precommitment jail time, his postcommitment jail time before being
transferred to Patton, and, more recently, the time he spent in jail after being

removed from the conditional release program (CONREP).2 This means the
original recommitment petition, as well as all subsequent extensions, were
filed too late, the court lacked jurisdiction to recommit him, and he must be
released immediately. Second, he argues the recommitment order must be
reversed because the prosecution failed to prove he had been found NGI in a
felony case. Third, he asserts the recommitment order was not supported by
substantial evidence of his future dangerousness. He also contends he
established the medication defense as a matter of law. Finally, J.B.
maintains the trial court violated his constitutional and statutory rights to
represent himself during the recommitment proceedings.
As we will discuss, although we agree with People v. Superior Court
(Frezier) (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, which entitled NGI acquittees like J.B.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 See Welfare and Institutions Code section 4360, subdivision (a).
CONREP’s purpose is to “provide mental health treatment and supervision in
the community” for person judicially committed to the state’s mental health
hospital system. (Ibid.)

2
to precommitment conduct credits, we conclude the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider J.B.’s belated claim to conduct credits at his third
recommitment trial. Furthermore, we conclude that once committed to the
state hospital system (Patton and CONREP), J.B. could not receive
section 4019 conduct credits. This includes for the period when J.B. was
housed in jail between CONREP and Patton assignments.
We also are unpersuaded by J.B.’s remaining claims. We agree with
the People that J.B. forfeited his argument that they failed to prove he had
been found NGI in a felony case. And, regardless, we conclude the doctrine of
collateral estoppel bars J.B. from relitigating this issue. Our review of the
record indicates substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that J.B.
remained a substantial danger of physical harm to others and that
medication did not effectively control his behavior. The record also reveals
that J.B. abandoned his equivocal request to represent himself. Accordingly,
we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 7, 2013, while off his psychiatric medications and using
methamphetamine, J.B. threatened his neighbor with a pickaxe inside the
neighbor’s garage. J.B. was arrested later that day and placed in county jail.
Between April and July 2013, the court suspended criminal proceedings
against J.B. while he underwent a competency evaluation. J.B. was returned
to the trial court and, on July 3, 2014, he was found guilty of assault with a

deadly weapon,3 but not guilty by reason of insanity. That day, J.B. was
committed to the Department of State Hospitals. As required, the trial court
announced J.B.’s maximum term of commitment (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1)); the

3 The maximum prison sentence allowed for this conviction is four years.
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4).)

3
trial court included in that calculation 542 days of section 2900.5 custody
credits and 451 days of section 4019 conduct credits for a total of 993 days

against his maximum term.4 On October 10, 2014, about 14 weeks after
being committed to Patton, authorities transported J.B. from jail to the
hospital.
In January 2015, Patton sent a letter to the trial court stating that it
recalculated J.B.’s maximum commitment term by eliminating the 451 days
of conduct credits the trial court awarded under section 4019. Patton’s letter
cited several cases to support its approach: People v. Mord (1988) 197
Cal.App.3d 1090 (Mord); People v. Superior Court (Waitley) (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d 39; People v. Wasley (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 344; and People v.
Smith (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 817 (Smith). These cases each held that
persons committed to a state treatment facility were not entitled to
section 4019 conduct credits.
On February 27, 2015, the trial court held a hearing regarding Patton’s
custody credit recalculation letter. J.B.’s attorney and the People agreed with
the trial court that Patton’s calculations were correct, and that J.B.’s new
maximum commitment date was January 6, 2017. This was about seven
months beyond the originally determined maximum commitment date.
Given the recalculated maximum commitment term, on June 20, 2016,
the People filed their first petition seeking extension of J.B.’s hospital term.

4 The 91-day difference between the section 2900.5 actual day credits
and the section 4019 conduct credits is likely because of the time during
which criminal proceedings were suspended pursuant to section 1367 et seq.
The above credit calculation left about 15 months to serve on the maximum
term. With the additional 100 days of credits awarded him by Patton for the
time he awaited transport to Patton, J.B.’s maximum commitment term
would expire in early July 2015.

4
On December 14, 2016, the court ordered his commitment extended by two
years. The People filed another recommitment petition on July 3, 2018. On
March 18, 2019, the court again extended J.B.’s commitment for two years
after he withdrew his opposition to the petition based on the parties’

agreement that he would be released to CONREP.5 He was placed at a
CONREP facility on May 21, 2019. His CONREP commitment was renewed
twice.
On January 27, 2022, during the second recommitment to CONREP,
the owner of the room and board facility where J.B. lived as part of his
CONREP placement, reported that J.B. was yelling about “ ‘a war,’ ” openly
watching pornography while masturbating, and playing loud music. J.B. was
observed to be hyper-focused on his cell phone and making delusional
comments about being at war and the missiles doing something to his eyes.
He explained that he was watching pornography in order to pilot planes. His
urinalysis test was positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines; at a
later court hearing he admitted the CONREP violations. Pending placement
in a more restrictive facility, J.B. was housed at a local jail. While there he
was not provided with psychotropic medication or other treatment.
On July 14, 2022, J.B. was transferred from jail to Sylmar Health and
Rehabilitation Center (Sylmar). This facility provided greater oversight than
the previous CONREP placement. J.B.’s situation at Sylmar deteriorated
within a week. A mental health worker from Sylmar testified that, “[h]e was
outside of his bedroom masturbating while staring at me” and that his lower
area was fully exposed. He went back into his room and then came back out
and did it again. Before being transferred back to Patton a week later, he

5 The 2018 hospital report to the court recommended a CONREP
placement for J.B.

5
also touched a female patient inappropriately and refused all psychotropic
medications.
The court subsequently revoked J.B.’s CONREP status. On April 27,
2023, the People filed a petition to extend J.B.’s hospital commitment for
another two years. In preparation for that hearing, to secure conduct credits
for time spent during his most recent jail stay, J.B. requested that Patton
provide a copy of its current custody credit calculation. Patton provided a
copy of the most recent credits report, which included all time earned from
2013 to the present.
At the recommitment trial on September 11, 2023, J.B. waived his right
to a jury so the court held a bench trial. The prosecution presented its case
through exhibits, and J.B. testified in his own defense. On November 16,
2023, after taking the matter under submission, the court found J.B. still
suffered from a mental disease disorder or defect and that, because of that
disorder, he would have serious difficulty controlling his behavior and
represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (See In re
Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 132 [an extended detention scheme must
contain a requirement of serious difficulty in controlling dangerous
behavior].)
The court then set a further hearing to address additional reports and
the issue of conduct credits for J.B.’s jail time while awaiting placement at
Sylmar. On December 18, 2023, the trial court ruled that J.B. was not
entitled to conduct credit for time spent in custody while waiting for his
transfer back to a more restrictive level of care.

6
DISCUSSION
A. California’s NGI Scheme
Prior to 1978, an NGI committee was sent to a state hospital for an
indeterminate term, even if the underlying offense was punishable by a
determinate sentence. (In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 461 (Moye).) In
Moye, after a bench trial, a judge convicted a defendant of felony “hit and
run” driving but also found the defendant insane. At the time, the maximum
punishment for that crime was five years. (Ibid.) The trial court committed
the defendant to the state hospital system until “ ‘his sanity [was] restored.’ ”
(Ibid.) After seven years, the defendant petitioned for release saying he could
not be held in actual or constructive custody of the hospital for any time in
excess of five years. (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court held that “principles of equal protection
require . . . that persons committed to a state institution following acquittal
of a criminal offense on the ground of their insanity cannot be retained in
institutional confinement beyond the maximum term of punishment for the
underlying offense of which, but for their insanity, they would have been
convicted.” (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 467.) The court further held,
however, “[a]s in the case of . . . other dangerous offenders, persons [found
NGI] . . . may be subjected to a period of extended commitment once the
maximum term of punishment has expired. . . .” (Ibid.)
Lawmakers responded by codifying Moye the following year. (Stats.
1979, ch. 1114, §§ 1–3, pp. 4049–4053.) The new law amended section 1026,

modified and expanded section 1026a, renumbered it as 1026.2,6 and added

6 Section 1026.2 describes the sanity restoration process.

7
section 1026.5. Among other changes, the Legislature required that a trial
court set a maximum term of commitment to a state hospital that would be
identical to the most a committee would receive if sent to prison, including
applicable credits. (See §§ 1026, subd. (e)(2), 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).)
Currently, as a result of the changes Moye initiated, when a defendant
is found NGI, section 1026 provides that the court “shall direct that the
defendant be committed to the State Department of State Hospitals for the
care and treatment of persons with mental health disorders . . . .” (§ 1026,
subd. (a).) NGI defendants “may be released from a state hospital: (1) upon
restoration of sanity pursuant to the provisions of section 1026.2; (2) upon
expiration of the maximum term of commitment under section 1026.5, except
as such term may be extended under the provisions of subdivision (b) of
section 1026.5; or (3) upon approval of outpatient status pursuant to the
provisions of section 1600 et seq.” (People v. Barner (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
642, 658.)
The maximum term of commitment means “the longest term of
imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of
which the person was convicted, including the upper term of the base offense
and any additional terms for enhancements and consecutive sentences which
could have been imposed less any applicable credits as defined by
Section 2900.5, and disregarding any credits which could have been earned
pursuant to Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title
1 of Part 3.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) Section 2900.5 provides that, “[i]n all
felony and misdemeanor convictions . . . when the defendant has been in
custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail, . . . all days of
custody of the defendant, including days . . . credited to the period of
confinement pursuant to Section 4019, . . . shall be credited upon his or her

8
term of imprisonment . . . .” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a), italics added.) Relevant
here, section 4019 applies “[w]hen a prisoner is confined in a county
jail . . . following arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence for a felony
conviction.” (§ 4019, subd. (a)(4).) For each four-day period a prisoner is
confined to jail, “one day shall be deducted from the prisoner’s period of
confinement unless it appears by the record that the prisoner has refused to
satisfactorily perform labor as assigned by the sheriff” and “one day shall be
deducted from the prisoner’s period of confinement unless it appears by the
record that the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with the reasonable
rules and regulations established by the sheriff.” (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c).) We
refer to these additional credits as “conduct credits.”
A commitment may be extended for two years if the court or a jury
finds “the person has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony and by
reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial
danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), (8).) A petition to
extend the commitment is to be filed by the district attorney no later than 90
days before the expiration of the commitment unless good cause is shown.
(Ibid., subd. (b)(2).)
B. The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Retroactively Award J.B.
Precommitment Conduct Credits
J.B. contends the trial court erred by denying him section 4019 conduct
credits for his precommitment time between 2013 and 2014, postcommitment
time in jail prior to placement at Patton, and his 2022 post-CONREP jail
time. In his view, this court should follow its prior decision in Frezier to
conclude he was entitled to these conduct credits, retroactively recalculate his
maximum commitment date to include the additional conduct credits, find
that the People filed their recommitment petition after the court’s jurisdiction

9
to hear it expired, and order J.B. immediately released. The People respond
that J.B. forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s denial of precommitment
credits by failing to raise it in the trial court or in an earlier appeal, and by
not presenting an adequate record for review.
We need not address the People’s forfeiture arguments because, even
considering J.B.’s arguments on the merits, we conclude the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to retroactively grant the relief he seeks.
1. Applicability of Conduct Credits to NGI Detainees

The proper interpretation of the statutes governing the maximum term
of commitment for individuals found NGI is a question of law we review de
novo. (Frezier, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 659.)
In any case of statutory interpretation, our task is to determine the
Legislature’s intent and effectuate the law’s purpose. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) We begin with the language of the statute itself. (Ibid.)
We give the words their plain and commonsense meaning, while also
considering the context and framework of the entire statutory scheme,
keeping in mind its nature and purpose. (Ibid.) “If the words in the statute
do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent,
‘[s]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in
which the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves
to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes.’ ” (People v.
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126.) We may also “consider a variety of
extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public
policy.” (Ibid.)
a. Precommitment Conduct Credits

As discussed, courts calculate the maximum commitment term for an
NGI detainee by determining “the longest term of imprisonment which could

10
have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was
convicted” and then subtracting “any applicable credits as defined by
Section 2900.5.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) J.B., relying on Frezier, seeks credit
for actual custody days served, precommitment conduct credits, and for any
time spent housed in a jail facility when he was transferred from one
treatment environment to another.
In response, the People echo the same arguments as the respondent in
Frezier, citing to the same legal authority. (E.g., Mord, supra, 197
Cal.App.3d 1090; Smith, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 81; People v. Campos-Castillo
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 926, 930–931; and People v. Bodis (1985) 174
Cal.App.3d 435 (Bodis).) Supported by those cases, the People argue the
plain language of section 4019 does not apply to J.B. (See Frezier, supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 666.)
We reject the People’s analysis, finding instead that the most
reasonable interpretation of the law is that NGI acquittees are entitled to
precommitment conduct credits. And, as in Frezier, we are unconvinced by
the authority cited by the People to support their position. For instance, in
Frezier we observed that Smith involved a felony conviction underlying an
NGI finding. The Smith court looked to section 4019 and its applicability to
the NGI setting, but the early version of section 4019 before the Smith court
did not allow conduct credits in felony cases. (Frezier, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 663–664.) Given that fact, we explained the appellate court in Smith
had no occasion to consider whether conduct credits were statutorily
authorized for felons who were found NGI. (Ibid.) Smith instead looked to
the equal protection analysis in People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 that
found it was unconstitutional to award conduct credits against prison or jail
sentences to misdemeanants, but not felons. (See Smith, supra, 120

11
Cal.App.3d at pp. 825–826; Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 507–508.) Smith
concluded that persons found NGI were differently situated than either felons
or misdemeanants and, therefore, no constitutional infirmity existed by
denying conduct credits to NGI acquittees. (Smith, at p. 826.)
We found Bodis unpersuasive because, though the defendant in Bodis
sought precommitment conduct credits, Bodis’s analysis relied on statutes
governing postcommitment conduct credits. (Frezier, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th
at p. 664.) This appeared to us to be an error in the Bodis analysis and,
therefore, unconvincing.
We found Mord flawed because it relied on Smith’s statutory analysis
which, as we explained above, was tethered to a then-outdated version of
section 4019. Based on that approach, Mord turned to and “reject[ed] an
equal protection claim to the right of [NGI detainees] to earn
[precommitment custody credits].” (Frezier, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 665.)
Finally, we rejected the reasoning in Campos-Castillo because that case
simply relied on Smith without giving any further reasoning. (Id. at p. 667,
fn. 7.)
The People make two other arguments to support their position. First,
in the decades since Mord, Smith, Bodis, and Campos-Castillo, the
Legislature has taken no action to amend sections 2900.5 or 4019 to insulate
those statutes from the holdings in those cases. We are unpersuaded.
Frezier is six years old, and the Legislature has not responded to it either.
Little is revealed here by legislative inaction to either set of cases.
Second, the People point to language in sections 2900.5 and 4019 that
would appear to exclude NGIs from precommitment conduct credit,
specifically, references to “conviction” and “sentencing.” But as we explained
in Frezier, the interplay between sections 1026 and 1026.5, on the one hand,

12
and sections 2900.5 and 4019 on the other hand, reveals ambiguities.
(Frezier, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 666.) Using the People’s argument,
“would mean that no person committed pursuant to section 1026 would be
eligible for any credits, because they are not ‘convicted’ or ‘imprisoned.’ This
would render the reference in section 1026.5 to ‘applicable credits as defined
by Section 2900.5’ entirely superfluous. [Citation].” (Id. at p. 667.) Such an
approach would run afoul of rules regarding statutory interpretation. (Ibid.)
This we declined to do in Frezier, and we decline to do now. As we concluded
in Frezier, “Considering the statutory scheme in the proper context, as we
must, we conclude that section 1026.5 requires that the trial court apply
statutes that typically apply to sentencing—sections 2900.5 and 4019—to
determine the ‘longest term of imprisonment’ that could be imposed, which
section 1026.5 establishes to be equal to the maximum term of commitment
for a person adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity.” (Id. at pp. 667–668.)
To be sure, we agree that “[c]onfinement of a person found to be insane
and sentenced under section 1026 of the Penal Code is for care and
treatment, not punishment.” (Bodis, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 437; see
also Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 819 [recognizing that
section 1026.5 proceedings “are directed at confinement for treatment rather
than punishment”].) That observation leads to the conclusion that conduct
credits do not further the goal of successful mental health treatment because
psychiatric progress takes time, and any scheme that shortens time to treat
someone is not in the interests of the NGI committee or the public. But Moye
identified another critical issue when considering NGIs. “[T]he possibility of
an indefinite, lifetime confinement provided by section 1026 may well deter
from entering an insanity plea those very persons most in need of hospital
treatment. Such a result serves neither the interest of the public nor

13
those . . . who have entered insanity pleas.” (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at
p. 468.) Further, the commitment extension provisions in section 1026.5 offer
opportunities for the continued treatment of an NGI committee.
For these reasons, Frezier remains compelling, and sound policy
reasons support the award of precommitment conduct credits to NGI
detainees.
b. Postcommitment and Post-CONREP Jail Time Credits
J.B. also contends he is entitled to conduct credits for the time he spent
in jail after commitment and prior to placement, and after his CONREP
revocation.
We find Buckhalter instructive here. In Buckhalter, a defendant
sentenced to prison was temporarily transferred back to county jail during
sentencing remand proceedings. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20,
22.) He argued he should receive conduct credits under section 4019 for the
time he spent in jail. (Id. at p. 28.) The high court disagreed, explaining that
the “defendant’s temporary removal from state prison to county jail as a
consequence of the remand did not transform him from a state prisoner to a
local presentence detainee. When a state prisoner is temporarily away from
prison to permit court appearances, he remains in the constructive custody of
prison authorities and continues to earn sentence credit, if any, in that
status.” (Id. at p. 33.)
We find the Buckhalter analysis persuasive. In the two
postcommitment periods for which J.B. seeks conduct credits, he was housed
in county jail while awaiting placement orders for a new mental health
facility. While waiting for his new treatment facility assignment, J.B. was
still committed to the Department of State Hospitals under section 1026.
And his temporary stay in jail post-CONREP did not return him to

14
precommitment detainee status. J.B. argues he should receive additional
credit because he was not medicated or provided mental health services
during this time. Although it is unfortunate the jail did not provide him with
mental health treatment, the statutory scheme does not base entitlement to
credits on treatment received while in interim custodial housing.
c. The Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Grant J.B. Retroactive
Relief
J.B. argues that with section 4019 conduct credits restored to his
maximum term calculations, the initial 2016 extension petition was filed
after his term expired and the court lacked jurisdiction to act. Without
jurisdiction to act initially, the original extension and all following extension
orders are invalid.
It is generally true that if the People do not file a petition before the
maximum commitment date passes, the time for seeking a commitment
extension lapses, and the NGI acquittee no longer comes within the statute.
(See People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 104 (Allen) [concluding as to the
mentally disordered offender statute that the statutory requirement of filing
before the expiration of the commitment is mandatory and that failure to do
so invalidates any subsequent purported extension]; People v. Lara (2010)
48 Cal.4th 216, 235–236 (Lara) [extending Allen to the NGI context and
concluding that “if an extension petition is not filed before the current
commitment ends, the defendant is no longer subject to constraint under the
NGI or MDO statutes”].) But even if a provision is mandatory, “the failure to
comply with its requirements does not necessarily mean a court loses
fundamental jurisdiction resulting in ‘an entire absence of power to hear or
determine the case, [or] an absence of authority over the subject matter or
the parties.’ ” (Allen, at p. 101, fn. 5.)

15
Here, the trial court had jurisdiction over J.B. in July 2014 when it
ordered him committed and awarded him conduct credits, but its error in
rescinding J.B.’s conduct credits resulted in an order made in excess of the
court’s jurisdiction. “ ‘ “[A]n act in excess of jurisdiction is valid until set
aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as
waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.” ’ ” (Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 225.) Thus, the order remained valid unless and until it was judicially set
aside.
In this case, the commitment term the court established in
February 2015 was never appealed or set aside. J.B.’s counsel expressly
agreed to the new maximum commitment date, and J.B. did not appeal the
order. Under Allen and Lara a court only lacks fundamental jurisdiction to
adjudicate an extension petition if it is filed after the original commitment
expired. Because the original NGI commitment ordered by the court was
never set aside, the maximum commitment date did not expire and remained
valid when the People filed their first extension petition. Therefore, the
petition was timely, and the court had jurisdiction to grant it, extending the
commitment.
At the next two recommitment trials, however, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to modify the maximum term of the original commitment because
in an NGI setting the court’s “continuing jurisdiction is narrowly
circumscribed by section 1026 et seq., and none of these sections addresses
the underlying maximum term of commitment.” (People v. Gray (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 148, 166.) At each subsequent recommitment hearing,
section 1026.5 provided the court with jurisdiction to consider only whether
the patient remained a person “committed under Section 1026 for a
felony . . . [who] by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents

16
a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), (8).)
It did not afford the court subject matter jurisdiction to reexamine the
propriety of the original commitment or the basis for the original maximum
commitment term calculation. Thus, when J.B. belatedly raised the conduct
credit issue during the most recent recommitment proceeding in 2023, it was

outside the scope of the court’s jurisdiction under section 1026, et seq.7
Furthermore, contrary to J.B.’s view, Lara and Allen do not provide
authority to retroactively challenge a commitment order that was valid when
issued and remained unchallenged until nearly a decade later. In Gray, the
court explained that “nothing in Lara addressed how the maximum
commitment term was originally calculated or whether it could later be
modified by an NGI acquittee’s nonstatutory stand-alone ‘petition’ for relief
citing inapplicable statutory changes.” (Gray, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 167, fn. 13.) The same could be said of J.B.’s appeal of his third
recommitment petition. Whereas the defendant in Lara challenged the late

7 During oral argument appellant’s counsel contended that even if the
court could not apply the 451 days of precommitment conduct credits, it could
at least have awarded J.B. actual and conduct credit for the 169 days J.B.
recently spent in jail, without medication or treatment, after leaving
CONREP and before being returned to Patton. Without medication or other
treatment, counsel claimed J.B.’s jail time was not part of the hospital
commitment and J.B. was entitled to section 2900.5 credits. Counsel did not
provide separate authority supporting this assertion, and we have found
none. Section 2900.5 provides credit for actual jail time prior to sentencing
and “the period between the date of sentencing and the date the person is
delivered to the agency.” (§ 2900.5, subds. (a), (d), (e).) In the NGI
commitment context, under section 1026.5 J.B. was entitled only to
section 2900.5 credit for his precommitment time in jail, and postcommitment
jail time prior to being transferred to Patton, but not the post-CONREP
period. And as we explained above, J.B. was not entitled to conduct credit for
this period because he remained under the constructive custody of the
Department of State Hospitals.

17
recommitment petition in his case at the first opportunity (Lara, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 221), J.B. attempts to contest the purportedly late filing of
the first recommitment petition on appeal of the court’s granting of the third.
Lara provides no authority for the trial court or this court to belatedly
consider how the original commitment term was calculated.
Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider J.B.’s conduct
credit claim and to modify his maximum commitment term.
C. Proof That the Commitment Offense was a Felony
J.B. contends the recommitment order must be reversed because the
prosecution failed to prove, and the trial court did not find, that he had been
found NGI in a felony, as opposed to a misdemeanor case. Relying on this
court’s opinion in People v. Jenkins (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 41 (Jenkins), the
People respond that J.B. forfeited this issue. Additionally, the People argue
that because this offense-related predicate was already established in a prior
recommitment proceeding, J.B. is collaterally estopped from challenging it on
appeal of subsequent recommitment hearings.
First, we agree with the People that J.B. forfeited this issue on appeal.
“ ‘Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge an assertedly
erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right
to raise the claim on appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The purpose of this rule is to
encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that
they may be corrected. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Additionally, ‘[i]t is both
unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely
brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or
avoided.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)
Here, for the first time on appeal, J.B. raises the question of the trial court’s
alleged failure to find the felony predicate that would allow the state to

18
recommit J.B. to Patton. Had J.B. raised this issue in the trial court, the
People could have responded to it, and the court could have taken the steps it
found reasonable to address the concern. J.B.’s failure to raise this question
to the trial judge deprived the People and the trial court of an opportunity to
grapple with the objection. J.B. has forfeited the issue.
Even were we to reach the merits, Jenkins supports the trial court’s
ruling. In Jenkins, this court considered a similar claim that the prosecution
failed to present evidence that the NGI acquittee’s commitment offense
satisfied the offense-related predicate required by section 1026.5,

subdivision (b)(1).8 (Jenkins, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 45.) The court
noted that section 1026.5 is not itself a crime, and explained that the offense-
related predicate described in section 1026.5 operated not as an element, but
as “a preliminary qualifying condition to define those persons eligible for a
section 1026.5 recommitment and depends for its proof on the circumstances
of the underlying offense which in most cases will be free from dispute.” (Id.
at p. 45.) Thus, the court found it appropriate to require the defendant “to
raise the issue of the offense-related predicate before the People are required
to introduce evidence and the court is required to make an explicit finding on
the issue.” (Id. at p. 46.) The court further observed that “while each
successive recommitment requires a de novo determination regarding the
defendant’s dangerousness,” if the offense-related predicate was ‘actually
litigated’ and established in the first recommitment proceeding, the doctrine

8 In 1985, section 1026.5, subdivision (b) described specific code
violations for which a commitment could be extended. If the felony for which
the committee was found NGI was not specifically listed, section 1026.5
allowed a hospital extension for felonies “involving death, great bodily injury,
or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person.”
(Stats. 1982, ch. 650, § 1, p. 2664.)

19
of collateral estoppel would apply to subsequent recommitments. (Id. at
p. 46, fn. 8.)
In J.B.’s view, Jenkins was wrongly decided. He objects primarily to
putting the onus on the defendant to request proof that the felony
requirement has been met. But logic supports the Jenkins procedure because
the entire recommitment process is only authorized for those NGI acquittees
who committed a felony. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) It is reasonable to assume
an individual committed for a misdemeanor (a) would object long before the
recommitment hearing commenced, and (b) would have been released prior to
the expiration of the initial two-year commitment term. (See § 19.2 [“In no
case shall any person sentenced to confinement . . . on conviction of a
misdemeanor . . . be committed for a period in excess of one year”]; § 1026.5,
subd. (a)(3) [“In the case of a person committed to a state hospital or other
treatment facility pursuant to Section 1026 . . . who committed a
misdemeanor, the maximum term of commitment shall be the longest term of
county jail confinement which could have been imposed for the offense or
offenses which the person was found to have committed, and the person may
not be kept in actual custody longer than this maximum term.”].)
Nonetheless, we need not decide this question because we conclude collateral
estoppel precludes this challenge.
As an initial matter, we note that modern courts use the term “issue
preclusion” instead of “collateral estoppel.” (Samara v. Matar (2018)
5 Cal.5th 322, 326 (Samara).) “The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a
dispute resolved in one case is not relitigated in a later case.” (Id. at p. 326.)
But because the parties refer to the doctrine as collateral estoppel, we do the
same to avoid confusion.

20
Collateral estoppel “prevents ‘relitigation of previously decided
issues,’ ” and “applies only ‘(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue
(3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted
against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that
party.’ ” (Samara, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 327; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990)
51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (Lucido).) “Courts have understood the ‘ “necessarily
decided” ’ prong to ‘require[ ] only that the issue not have been “entirely
unnecessary” to the judgment in the initial proceeding.’ ” (Samara, at
p. 327.)
J.B. contends the record reveals nothing about his first recommitment
order except that it happened. An insufficient record of a court proceeding in
this state is a solvable problem, which does not justify the unnecessary time

and expense of a remand.9 On our own motion, this court takes judicial
notice of the Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino’s minutes
reflecting the December 7, 2016 court trial on the first recommitment petition

9 Courts are advised to consider the public policies underlying the
collateral estoppel doctrine to determine “whether its application in a
particular circumstance would be fair to the parties and constitute sound
judicial policy.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 342–343.) These policies
include “preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of
judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious
litigation.” (Ibid. at p. 343.) Although the party asserting collateral estoppel
bears the burden of establishing its requirements (id. at p. 341), we conclude
judicial economy is best served by supplementing the record with a readily
available court order and preventing unnecessary relitigating to prove an
indisputable fact. No other policy concern counsels against this conclusion.

21
and its December 14, 2016 ruling.10 (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (a)
[authorizing judicial notice of this state’s decisional law], 452, subd. (d)(1)
[allowing courts to take judicial notice of court records from other courts of
this state].)
The existing record already contains the prosecutor’s declaration
accompanying the 2016 recommitment petition, which certified that “[J.B.]
was committed to the Department of Mental Health under Penal Code
[section] 1026.5[, subdivision] (b) for a felony having been found insane.”
Thus, J.B. and his counsel were alerted to the People’s view that he qualified
for a recommitment proceeding.
The court’s December 7, 2016 minutes demonstrate that J.B. was
represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. In other words, he
attended the proceedings and had the opportunity to challenge the felony
predicate and present evidence disputing it. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court granted the petition for extension of commitment, finding that
“[J.B.] meets the criteria of [Penal Code section] 1026.5[, subdivision] (b)(1);
that [J.B.] still suffers from a mental disease, disorder or defect; and as a
result of that disorder, [J.B.] will have serious difficulty controlling his
behavior such that he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to
others.” (See In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314, italics added [explaining
that a court may take judicial notice of “ ‘any orders, findings of facts and
conclusions of law, and judgments within court records. . . . [and] are free to
take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including
the truth of results reached’ ”].) In finding J.B. “[met] the criteria of [Penal

10 Prior to oral argument, we notified the parties of our intent to take
judicial notice of the December 14, 2016 minutes and attached them for the
parties’ review. No party objected during oral argument.

22
Code section] 1026.5[, subdivision] (b)(1),” the court necessarily found he had
been committed for a felony.
Thus, the court’s ruling on J.B.’s first recommitment addressed the
identical issue of whether he was committed on a felony, the issue was
presented by the extension petition and supporting documentation, and J.B.
had the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses. (See People v. Sims
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484 [“An issue is actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it] is
properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for
determination, and is determined.”]; Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341 [issue
actually litigated where each party presented evidence and witnesses in
support of their positions and had the opportunity to present full cases].) The
issue was necessarily decided as it was a required part of the court’s finding
that he met the section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) criteria. (See Samara,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 327 [an issue is “necessarily decided” if it is not
“entirely unnecessary” to the initial judgment].) The adjudication was final
as to his first recommitment petition, and collateral estoppel is now being
asserted by the same party that filed the initial recommitment petition.
Accordingly, because all the elements are satisfied, we conclude J.B. is
collaterally estopped from arguing in the present appeal that the prosecution
failed to prove and the court failed to find that he was found NGI in a felony
case.
D. Substantial Evidence Supports J.B.’s Future Dangerousness and
Inadequate Proof of His Medication Defense
Establishing that an NGI defendant poses a substantial danger of
physical harm to others “requires proof that the person has serious difficulty
controlling his dangerous behavior.” (People v. Williams (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 861, 872 (Williams).) The factors required for an extended

23
commitment must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.; see § 1026.5,
subd. (b)(7).)
The individual may defend against the extension by proving by a
preponderance of evidence that medication effectively controls his mental
illness to make him not dangerous and that he will take his medication in a
completely unsupervised environment. (People v. Bolden (1990) 217
Cal.App.3d 1591, 1601–1602 (Bolden).)
“We review an order to extend commitment under section 1026.5 by
applying the substantial evidence test, examining the entire record in the
light most favorable to the order to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the requirements of the statute satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Williams, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 872.)
1. Additional Facts

The trial occurred in October 2023. All parties acknowledge J.B. was
not medicated in jail following his CONREP revocation and experienced
difficulties upon his return to Patton in July 2022. Accordingly, we focus on
the reports from the year preceding trial.
In November 2022, J.B. moved aggressively toward staff members who
intervened when J.B. overstayed his turn on the computer. He was
cooperative with his psychiatric medications but reported that he only needed
them for sleep.
Interdisciplinary notes from December 2022 described his behavior as
“loud, angry, irritable, [and] demanding,” showed he had “difficulty following
redirections from staff,” and reflected him yelling, “I’m God! I do what the
f*** I want.” J.B. also refused medications nine times between November
2022 and January 2023, because he believed the CONREP director found
“compelling evidence” that he did not have a mental illness.

24
Dr. Kelly Hunsicker’s January 2023 report stated that J.B. did not
believe he had a mental disorder. She noted that he “exhibited an increase in
his mental health symptoms including impulse control deficits, irritability,
paranoia, hypomania, hyperverbal speech, disorganized thinking, [and]
racing thoughts” and opined that he did not appreciate that his mental
illness “impairs his decision making and increases his potential for future
violence.” He believed he had few, if any, risk factors for future violence, and
“[w]hen his assertion that he has not exhibited violence in years was
challenged and contrasted against a lengthy history of sexual aggression
(exposing himself to a unit psychologist (6/2015), masturbating to a female
staff at SHRC (July 2022), being inappropriate with female staff at DSH-
Patton during his current placement), [J.B.] dismissed such behaviors as
irrelevant. He was unwilling to consider that his behaviors are aggressive
and create high risk situations with the potential for violence. He further
minimized the harm and trauma he likely caused the victims of his conduct.
Moreover, he was unwilling to consider that his impulse control deficits, poor
judgment and hypersexual behaviors are symptoms consistent with his
mental illness.”
In February 2023, J.B. followed a group of female nursing students
around and then stood staring at them, which caused the students to feel
uncomfortable and unsafe. A month later, he clenched his fists while yelling
at a staff member who asked him to buss his breakfast tray. The following
day, he made a slashing motion across his neck while walking within inches
of peers. A week later, he told a therapist she had ants on her back and
brushed her lower back with his hands. The other staff member present did
not see any ants in or around the therapist. Later the same day, a female
custodian reported that J.B. brushed up against her backside when she knelt

25
to tie her shoelaces even though the hallway was not crowded and there was
no reason for him to walk so close to her. In April 2023, hospital police
officers were called to deescalate a situation because J.B. was yelling,
verbally aggressive, and posturing with clenched fists.
The May behavioral guideline plan for J.B. reported issues such as
“standing too close to female staff members” and “us[ing] his size or loud
voice to pressure peers to do what he wants.”
Dr. Hunsicker’s June 2023 review of the prior six months of treatment
records noted a worsening of his psychiatric and behavioral status,
explaining that “[a] significant contributor to his decompensation has been
his refusal of psychiatric medications.” She noted that he continued to
exhibit “symptoms of his mental health disorder including impulse control
deficits, mood instability, boundary violations and hypersexual behaviors”
that were “so severe that the team implemented behavioral guidelines.”
Although he demonstrated improved psychiatric status and engagement in
treatment within the weeks preceding the report, she indicated his
willingness to listen to feedback remained relatively poor.
An early August psychology note indicates Patton received a call from a
CONREP liaison reporting that J.B. left a sexually explicit voicemail for a
clinician. The content reportedly “included discussion of orgasms, twisting
nipples, and asking the clinician to get naked so Mr. Bryant could paint her
‘beautiful body.’ ”
At trial, J.B. disagreed with a report from June 2023 stating that he
was selling his Buspar, but he acknowledged he had or planned to barter or
loan it to someone. He said, however, that he would continue to take Buspar
and Seroquel if released into an unsupervised environment because they gave
him “a better quality of life.”

26
J.B. described two incidents where he was attacked and reacted
nonviolently. In April 2023, another patient pushed him into the bathroom
and then hit him in the neck. The patient tried to swing at him again, so J.B.
held the man’s hands until others arrived. In July, another patient punched
him 15 or 16 times in the back after he sat down to eat lunch, and J.B. did
not respond.
When asked about the sexually explicit voicemail he left for a prior
CONREP clinician in August 2023, he admitted it was explicit, but claimed
he was reading her a poem he wrote.
2. Analysis

J.B. acknowledges for purposes of appeal that he suffers from a mental
disease, but he argues the record lacks substantial evidence supporting the
court’s conclusion that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm
to others. We disagree.
The court considered, and was entitled to rely upon, Dr. Hunsicker’s
January 2023 opinion that “[h]is lack of insight into his mental health
disorder places him at increased risk for violence.” “A single psychiatric
opinion that an individual is dangerous because of a mental disorder
constitutes substantial evidence to support an extension of the defendant’s
commitment under section 1026.5.” (People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
870, 879.) Since that time, Dr. Hunsicker has opined that his psychiatric and
behavior status have declined.
Although expert medical opinion evidence based upon conjecture, as
opposed to relevant facts, does not constitute substantial evidence (People v.
Redus (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011), the record discloses multiple
instances of verbal, physical, and sexual aggression supporting the conclusion
that he represents a substantial danger to others, particularly women. He

27
repeatedly reacted aggressively to staff directions by clenching his fists,

moving close to the staff member, and yelling.11 He also threatened another
inmate by making a slashing motion across his neck. Although he downplays
his unwanted and inappropriate sexual touching of, and statements to,
female staff as “bad behavior” comparable to that of “successful young
professional men at a bar on Friday night,” these characterizations
understate the seriousness of the behavior and threat it implies when he is
not within a controlled hospital environment. All the women apparently felt
uncomfortable enough to report the behavior, and the nursing students
expressly stated they felt unsafe. And this behavior occurred while J.B. was
medicated. Furthermore, unlike men at a bar, J.B. has a demonstrated
history of going further and acting on his behavior in threatening ways such
as by pulling out his penis during a therapy session and openly masturbating
while staring at nurses. His criminal history also includes stalking, corporal
injury on a spouse, and assault.
The cases J.B. relies upon are distinguishable. In all the cases, the
record disclosed the defendant had not engaged in any aggressive or violent
behavior while in the hospital or CONREP, whereas J.B. has routinely and
recently behaved aggressively toward staff and other patients. (See People v.
Jenkins (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 142, 151 [“there is no evidence she has been
violent or physically aggressive since her commitment offense in 1999”];
People v. Cheatham (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 782, 790 [“Cheatham has never
engaged in behavior dangerous to others because of his mental disorder.”];

11 We agree with J.B. that the fact he is large, African American man who
is willing to speak up for himself cannot weigh against him. But the record
discloses some evidence that he purposely uses his size to intimidate peers
and staff, which is appropriately considered aggressive behavior.

28
Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003 [“Dr. Tekeste had not witnessed
appellant engaging in any aggressive or violent behaviors in the hospital.
Nor had she found anything in her record review to suggest that he ever
committed any acts of violence since the commitment offense.”]; People v.
Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 96, 103 [“There had been no indication of
violence or aggression in all of the years appellant had been hospitalized or in
the community on CONREP following his prison term.”].)
J.B. also contends he established the medication defense as a matter of
law. To establish the affirmative defense of medication compliance, the NGI
committee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his
medication is effective in controlling his behavior, making him not dangerous,
and (2) he will continue to take his medication without fail in a completely
unsupervised environment. (Bolden, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1601–
1602.) J.B. cites the court’s statement that the reports indicated the
medications put J.B.’s bipolar disorder in remission, and he relies on the
court’s acceptance of his testimony that he would continue taking his
medication postrelease.
These statements do not end the inquiry. As the court acknowledged,
even though Dr. Hunsicker considered the bipolar disorder to be in remission,
the record indicates the medication was not fully controlling his aggressive
behavior. Moreover, the court was not required to rely solely on J.B.’s
statements in assessing whether he would continue to take his medication in
an unsupervised environment. Reports showed J.B. used methamphetamine
while in the less structured environment of CONREP and refused all
psychotropic medications when he was subsequently taken to Sylmar.
During the year leading up to the trial, he refused medications nine times,
and his testimony during trial reflected he did not think it was entirely

29
problematic to barter or loan his Buspar to others. Dr. Hunsicker also noted
in her June 2023 report a worsening of J.B.’s psychiatric status and behavior
over the past six months, adding that refusal of psychiatric medications was
“[a] significant contributor to his decompensation.” Given this evidence, the
court could reasonably have found J.B. had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would continue to take his medication
without fail in an unsupervised setting.
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supported the
recommitment order and the court’s finding that J.B. did not establish the

medication compliance defense.12
E. J.B.’s Request to Represent Himself Was Equivocal and Abandoned
Finally, J.B. contends the court violated his constitutional and
statutory right to represent himself. The People respond that, even assuming
J.B. had the right to represent himself during commitment extension
proceedings, his request was equivocal, and he abandoned it. We agree.
1. Additional Facts

On August 28, 2023, during a pretrial discussion of whether he wanted
a court or a jury trial, J.B. asked the court:
“Is there any way that I can represent myself? And this has
nothing to do with [J.B.’s trial counsel]. I think he’s a great
public defender. There’s just so my [sic] details about certain

12 As J.B. may undergo further recommitment proceedings in the future,
we observe that the records suggest that since 2016, the state hospital
psychologists have not used any of the standard violence risk assessment
tools in formulating their opinions. Studies indicate these tools offer more
predictive value than unstructured clinical judgments, and courts are
beginning to question the appropriateness of relying solely on unstructured
clinical judgment in evaluating recommitments. (See Jenkins, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–160 (conc. opn. of Buchanan, J.).)

30
things that I’ve had to write so many grievances just to cover
myself and there’s certain witnesses that I will be having to call
and certain things brought up in order for me to paint a picture
about a picture that I might have to show in my defense.

“So is there a way that I can represent myself? And if I was to
represent myself, I would want to do a jury trial.”

The court responded that a criminal defendant has a right to represent
himself during his criminal trial, but as they were past that point, the court
would be inclined to deny such a motion if it was presented. After the court
advised J.B. to speak with his attorney, counsel suggested returning on
another date after the parties had time to research the issue, and the court
agreed.
The issue of his right to represent himself was not discussed at the
subsequent hearing. However, defense counsel referenced the fact that he
and J.B. had discussed privately whether he wanted a court trial or a jury
trial and then asked J.B., on the record, whether he wanted a court trial like
they discussed. J.B. responded, “Yeah. We can go ahead and do that.” The
court described the difference between the two types of trials, allowed J.B. to
ask a question, and then J.B. confirmed he would like to proceed with a bench
trial. He then brought up the issue of complaints he filed at Patton that he
wanted to subpoena, and his attorney discussed with the prosecution and J.B.
how quickly they could get those and how it might impact the timing of the
trial. J.B. also said he needed “original copies of all of the grievances that
I’ve written so that I can give them to Mr. Marmont so that he can read over
them and use them for however he can use them.” (Italics added.)
The court held a bench trial. At the conclusion of closing arguments,
J.B. asked, among other things, if he could bring in the therapist and janitor
to testify regarding the incidents in which he touched them. The court

31
explained that evidence had closed. It also denied his request to read a
statement. But J.B. acknowledged that the court had answered his
questions.

32
2. Analysis

The parties dispute whether an NGI defendant has a constitutional or
statutory right to self-representation during a recommitment proceeding. We
need not decide this issue because, even assuming J.B. had the right to
represent himself, we conclude he abandoned his request.
J.B. initially raised the issue by asking, “Is there a way that I can
represent myself?” He then said, “If I was to represent myself, I would want
to do a jury trial.” (Italics added.) It was not so much a firm request but a
question as to whether it was an option. J.B. then had nearly two weeks to
discuss the issue with his attorney and for counsel to research the issue. At
the next hearing, J.B. repeatedly stated, including after explanation and
discussion with the court, that he wanted a bench trial. Given that he
previously had said he only wanted a jury trial if he could represent himself,
this reasonably indicates he had decided against representing himself.
Moreover, he and his attorney discussed on the record his attorney obtaining
some of the grievances that formed the basis for his initial interest in
representing himself. This indicates he intended to move forward with the
help of counsel. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent J.B.’s statement
could be interpreted as request to represent himself, it was equivocal, and he

finally abandoned the effort.13

13 We also note that the court afforded J.B. ample opportunity to speak to
his attorney and the court, as well as ask questions, during the hearing. J.B.,
notwithstanding his psychiatric challenges, is articulate and appeared to
have a high-level of understanding about the proceedings. Had he still
wanted to represent himself or been dissatisfied with his counsel’s answer as
to whether he could, he no doubt would have raised the issue. J.B. likewise

33
DISPOSITION
The order extending J.B.’s commitment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

testified at trial, in addition to interjecting numerous questions and
comments, but never raised the issue of representing himself.

34

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