CourtListener 10855920•Marriage of C.M. and A.S. CA5
Testo completo
Filed 5/7/26 Marriage of C.M. and A.S. CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of C.M. and A.S.
C.M., F090435
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 16CEFL02670)
v.
OPINION
A.S.,
Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Glenda Allen-
Hill, Judge.
A.S., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant A.S. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s order granting respondent
C.M.’s (Mother) petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200, et seq.) (undesignated
statutory references are to the Family Code), and denying Father’s petition for a DVRO.
Father argues the trial court failed to make the necessary express findings under
section 6305, and no substantial evidence supports the ruling.
As the trial court declined to issue mutual restraining orders, the trial court was not
obligated to make express findings under section 6305. Further, we find substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s order. On this basis, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In August 2025, Mother filed a petition for a DVRO. She alleged that, during a
custody exchange, she attempted to speak with her son because Father would not let him
exit the car. She told her son he did not need to be afraid, and he could come home if he
wanted. According to Mother, Father then shoved her twice in front of the children,
leaving a visible mark on her arm. Their daughter tried to run toward Mother, but Mother
told her to stay back because she was not sure what Father would do next. Ultimately the
police were called, and Father was arrested. Mother also indicated Father made harassing
phone calls to her, drives by her home weekly, and is stalking her.
About 10 days later, Father filed a petition also seeking a DVRO. Father filed a
supporting declaration stating that on July 25, 2025, during a routine custody exchange,
Mother became extremely aggressive and tried to forcibly remove their son from Father’s
convertible vehicle because he wanted to stay with Father. According to Father, Mother
and her fiancé, who was present for the altercation, acted violently and damaged Father’s
vehicle while trying to extract their son from his car. He filed a request for sole legal and
physical custody of the children. He also attached photographs from the incident and a
$6,863.43 repair estimate for his car.
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In a supplemental declaration, Father explained his friend was present at the
custody exchange to serve Mother with legal documents regarding their custody case.
Mother came close to Father and then accused him of shoving her, which Father asserts is
untrue. Father had positioned himself in self-defense to prevent Mother from reaching
into his vehicle where their son was sitting. Despite the purported shove, Mother
remained very close to Father, and Father closed the convertible top on the vehicle to
deescalate the situation.
After hearings were held, the court ruled in open court that Mother had met her
burden of proof to support the issuance of a DVRO, and ordered that it be in effect for
three years. The court also found Father had not met his burden of proof and denied his
petition. Mother was granted sole physical and legal custody of the children, Father was
granted unsupervised visitation on scheduled weekends, and custody exchanges were to
occur at the children’s school or at Supporting Hands Family Agency.
While the record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript, Father filed a
proposed settled statement, which the trial court certified. The settled statement contains
a summary of the evidence submitted at the hearing on the petitions, and a summary of
the court’s ruling. As follows, the settled statement provides the following summary
from proceedings held on August 29, 2025:
“[Mother] testified that earlier in the day on the day of the incident,
she sent her fiancé [D.V.] to pick up the children. She stated that [Father]
did not release the children to her fiancé [D.V.] She then stated that she
called the police.
“[Mother] testified that during a custody exchange at a mutually
agreed police station location, she walked over to [Father’s] car to remove
her son. She stated that when she reached inside the vehicle to unbuckle
the child’s seatbelt, [Father] shoved her.
“[Mother] did testify that she stated, ‘be ready for what’s about to
[happen] next.’ [Mother] said that she meant for a police standby.
3.
“[Mother] later testified that she was referring to court ordered
messages between [Father] and herself. She referred to the messages that
said she was ‘filing for a temporary restraining order[.]’ After [Mother]
said, that she was implying that she meant she was going to file for a
temporary restraining order when she said ‘be ready for what’s about to
happen next.’
“[Mother] testified that she does get escorted out of the courthouse.
“[Mother] also stated that earlier in the day, her fiancé went to pick
up the children but was unable to do so because [Father] refused to release
them. She claimed police were later called after the exchange. [Mother]
denied damaging [Father’s] vehicle but admitted reaching into the car to
assist her son.
“[Mother] claimed she and the children feared [Father], cited that
there is [a] ‘fine line’ in calling police on [Father]. She stated she is not
aggressive.”
D.V. also testified on August 29, 2025, as summarized in the settled statement:
“[D.V.] stated that [Mother] had previously requested escorts out of
the courthouse for safety reasons.
“[D.V.] confirmed that police were called after the exchange earlier
on the day of the incident because he was unable to retrieve the children at
that time.
“[D.V.] testified he was present during the custody exchange and
observed portions of the incident.
“[D.V.] initially stated that [Father] struck [Mother], but later said
that he did not say that.
“[D.V.] then testified that he saw [Father] raise his arm in a
defensive manner. He said that [Father] moved [Mother], which he
interpreted as pushing her, though he acknowledged the arm position
suggested as [sic] a defensive action.
“[D.V] confirmed that he was on the phone with the police prior to
the alleged shove.
“[D.V.] testified that he did not see [Mother] touch the vehicle at any
time during the exchange.”
Father testified on September 2, 2025, as summarized in the settled statement:
“[Father] testified to court ordered messages between [Mother] and
[Father]. [Father] said that [Mother] said that she would be at the drop off
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location in the messages. [Father] then stated that she sent her fiancé to
pick up the children. [Father] said that he did not release the children to
[Mother’s] fiancé due to previous conflicts.
“[Father] said that the drop off location was at a nearby police
station that was mutually agreed upon between himself and [Mother].
“[Father] said that he let his daughter out of the car from the
passenger side back seat then walked back over to the driver’s side of his
vehicle. [Father] said that [Mother] was served with paper [sic] by his
friend who was at the location with him. [Father] continues on to say that
after being served she walked over to his vehicle.
“[Father] testified that [Mother] was the primary aggressor. He
stated that [Mother] stood very close to his vehicle and aggressively
reached inside to remove their son’s seatbelt. [Father] testified that he told
[Mother] multiple times to stop touching his car and to step away.
“He denied ever shoving or striking [Mother] and testified that his
arm was raised defensively to protect himself and his son from [Mother]
reaching into the car. He stated that he closed the car’s convertible top to
prevent the situation from escalating further. [Father] also testified that
[Mother] caused damage to his car’s top while he was closing it by
grabbing at it and trying to reaching [sic] in while it was going up. [Father]
said that [Mother] caused damage to the car by scratching due to keys she
had in her hand. [Father] said that vehicle damage was caused by
[Mother’s] fiancé. [Father] testified that [Mother’s] fiancé caused damage
to his spoiler on his car when he was behind the car.
“[Father] said that [Mother] is escorted out after court hearings. He
also said that he believes that [Mother] is not afraid of him.
“[Father] said that [Mother] took matters in her own hands by
escalating the situation instead of waiting for the police who were already
called.
“[Father] explained that his actions were defensive and that [Mother]
has a pattern of using police and [child protective services] to harass him.
He also testified that he believes [Mother] filed for the restraining order to
gain an advantage in child custody matters.”
Father’s witness, A.J., testified on September 2, 2025, as summarized in the settled
statement:
“[A.J.] heard [Mother] say, ‘be ready for what’s about to happen
next,’ which sounded angry and upset, before the exchange took place.
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“[A.J.] observed the children speaking with their mother over the
phone: the daughter expressed she wanted to go home, and the son stated
he wanted to stay with [Father].
“[A.J.] testified that she was not at the scene of the incident.”
Proffered and admitted exhibits were documented as follows:
“Exhibit B: Police report documenting damage to [Father’s] vehicle
caused during the incident.
“Exhibit C: Photograph showing how close [Mother] stood to
[Father’s] vehicle.
“Exhibit D: Photograph showing [Father’s] arm position.
“[Mother’s] Photo (no exhibit label): Photo of alleged red mark on
[Mother’s] arm.
“Court-Ordered Message Log: Communication between [Mother]
and [Father] from the day of the incident. [Mother] objected on grounds of
relevance when [Father] attempted to use messages from the day of the
incident. Court’s Ruling: Overruled. Judge allowed [Father] to present the
messages after confirming their authenticity with [Mother].”
The court’s findings that Father challenges were described in the settled statement:
“The court found [Mother’s] witness to be credible and not aggressive. The judge stated
that [Mother] was the initial or primary aggressor when she approached [Father’s] vehicle
to retrieve her son, but found that [Father] became the dominant aggressor at the end of
the incident, relying on a photo that appeared to show [Father’s] arm raised. The court
further found, by the preponderance of the evidence, that a restraining order should issue
against [Father].”
DISCUSSION
Father argues the trial court committed several prejudicial errors in ruling on the
DVRO petitions, including that the court’s order granting Mother’s DVRO petition is
unsupported by substantial evidence.
As an initial matter, we note that Mother did not file a respondent’s brief on
appeal. Such a failure is not treated as a de facto default; rather, the reviewing court
examines the appellant’s brief in conjunction with the record to determine if the appellant
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carried his burden of demonstrating prejudicial error at the trial court level. (In re
Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 232–233; In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 830, 834, fn. 2; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.220(a)(2) & 8.360(c)(5)(B).)
As such, we turn to examine each of Father’s claims of error.
I. Family Code Section 6305: Dominant Aggressor Analysis
In finding that Father acted as the dominant aggressor, Father makes several
arguments that the trial court’s analysis was flawed and erroneous.
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a
petition for a restraining order under [the DVPA’s] statutory scheme.” (In re Marriage of
Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) Pursuant to the DVPA, a court
may issue a protective order “‘to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a
recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons
involved’ upon ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’” (Nevarez v. Tonna
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782, quoting former § 6300; accord, § 6300, subd. (a).) In
relevant part, the DVPA defines domestic violence as abuse perpetrated against a spouse
or former spouse, cohabitant or former cohabitant, or a person with whom the respondent
is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship. (§ 6211, subds. (a)–(c).)
Section 6305 governs whether a court may issue mutual domestic violence
restraining orders. Under this statute, “[t]he court shall not issue a mutual restraining
order enjoining the parties from specific acts of abuse” unless it “makes detailed findings
of fact indicating that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither party
acted primarily in self-defense.” (Id., subd. (a), (2).) To determine whether both parties
acted primarily as aggressors, “the court shall consider the provisions concerning
dominant aggressors set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of Section 836 of the
Penal Code.” (Id., subd. (b).) Penal Code section 836, subdivision (c)(3), provides that
“The dominant aggressor is the person determined to be the most significant, rather than
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the first, aggressor. In identifying the dominant aggressor, an officer shall consider
(A) the intent of the law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse,
(B) the threats creating fear of physical injury, (C) the history of domestic violence
between the persons involved, and (D) whether either person involved acted in self-
defense.”
DVPA orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Salmon v. Salmon (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 1047, 1054 (Salmon).) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified
standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of the trial court’s ruling
under review.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.) The trial
court’s findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo; and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious. (Id. at pp. 711–712.) “‘If the court’s decision is influenced by an
erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of
its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]
Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect
legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] The question of whether a trial court applied the correct legal
standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de
novo review [citation].” (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.)
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent,
and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
B. Analysis
The record on appeal consists of a clerk’s transcript, which includes a settled
statement in lieu of a reporter’s transcript. Father did not request a statement of decision,
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and the trial court did not issue one. Rather, Father filed a proposed settled statement,
which the trial court certified as “an accurate summary of the testimony and other
evidence that is relevant to [Father’s] appeal.”
As already noted, the settled statement reflects the following summary of findings
the trial court made after the hearing: “The court found [Mother’s] witness [D.V.] to be
credible and not aggressive. The judge stated that [Mother] was the initial or primary
aggressor when she approached [Father’s] vehicle to retrieve her son, but found that
[Father] became the dominant aggressor at the end of the incident, relying on a photo that
appeared to show [Father’s] arm raised. The court further found, by the preponderance of
the evidence, that a restraining order should issue against [Father].”
Reyling on Salmon, Father argues the trial court erred by finding him to be the
dominant aggressor without identifying what statutory factors supported that conclusion,
or how Father’s conduct could be construed as dominant aggression. Father maintains
the court must do more than label one party the dominant aggressor, it must demonstrate
on the record that it applied the statutory factors and explain its reasoning.
Father’s reliance on Salmon is misplaced. In Salmon, the husband and the wife
filed competing petitions for a DVRO, a hearing was held, and the trial court granted the
wife’s petition but denied the husband’s petition. (Salmon, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1052.) On appeal, the husband argued the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
make factual findings with respect to each of the factors identified in section 6305 (as
articulated in Pen. Code, § 836, subd. (c)). (Salmon, supra, at p. 1059.) The appellate
court was unpersuaded, explaining that argument “ignores the fact that section 6305 acts
only to limit the issuance of a mutual restraining order. The presence of the statutory
factors and requirement of detailed factual findings are necessary prerequisites to a grant
of mutual relief. [Citations.] Nothing in the statute mandates the issuance of a mutual
restraining order. Nor does the statute require detailed findings of fact when the court
declines to issue a mutual restraining order.” (Id. at pp. 1059–1060.) As the trial court
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had not issued mutual restraining orders, “the court was not required to make detailed
factual findings,” and was “required only to follow the general rule applicable to all
petitions and provide ‘a brief statement of the reasons for the decision in writing or on the
record.’” (Id. at p. 1060, quoting § 6340, subd. (b).)
Likewise, in this case, the trial court did not grant mutual relief on the DVRO
petitions—it granted only Mother’s petition. The settled statement reflects a summary of
the trial court’s on-the-record statement of reasons, including that Father was the
dominant aggressor, even though Mother was the initial/primary aggressor. From this, it
can be inferred the trial court credited Mother’s testimony that Father shoved her “when
she reached inside the vehicle to unbuckle the child’s seatbelt .…” Mother also presented
photographic evidence of a bruise on her arm; there was also a photograph purportedly
showing Father with his arm raised during the incident. Although Father submitted
declarations and gave testimony that he did not shove Mother and raised his arm trying
only to shield himself and their son in the car, the court clearly did not credit Father’s
version of events—a factual finding within the trial court’s exclusive province to make.
(Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 823; see City of Manhattan Beach v.
Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 262 [“the court is better positioned than are we to
observe a witness’s demeanor and discern his or her credibility”].) Mother’s testimony,
even if controverted, may constitute substantial evidence if the trial court credits it as
true.
Penal Code section 836 defines “dominant aggressor” as “the person determined
to be the most significant, rather than the first, aggressor.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).) In making
this assessment, the court is to consider “(A) the intent of the law to protect victims of
domestic violence from continuing abuse, (B) the threats creating fear of physical safety,
(C) the history of domestic violence between the persons involved, and (D) whether
either person involved acted in self-defense.” (Ibid.; accord, § 6305, subd. (b).) From
the settled statement’s summary of the court’s reasoning, it is clear the court did not
10.
credit Father’s assertion of self-defense and, on this issue, credited Mother’s version of
events instead. As Mother indicated Father resorted to physical force to push Mother
away from the vehicle, leaving a mark on Mother’s arm, there was substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Father was the dominant aggressor.
Father argues the trial court failed to expressly consider whether he acted in self-
defense. However, as explained in Salmon, the court had no obligation to make express
findings regarding the statutory factors where no mutual restraining orders were issued.
Although Father disagrees with the court’s implicit crediting of Mother’s testimony and
the photographs, they support the finding Father was the dominant aggressor, we do not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. The trial court explained its decision for making its
finding, and it was supported by substantial evidence. (§ 6340, subd. (b) [upon denying a
DVRO petition, the court shall “provide a brief statement of the reasons for the decision
in writing or on the record”].)
II. Substantial Evidence
Father argues the trial court’s ruling was based only on speculation rather than
substantial evidence, and thus constituted an abuse of discretion.
We review the court’s factual findings supporting the grant or denial of a DVRO
under the substantial evidence standard of review. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
1, 12.) “In reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to determine whether
there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial
court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial
court’s findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not
determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence
supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a
contrary finding.” (Ibid.)
Father argues no witness testified that he forcibly moved Mother in a manner
consistent with causing injury, and Mother’s witness, D.V., gave inconsistent testimony
11.
about what he saw. According to the settled statement, the court characterized Father’s
conduct as forcibly moving Mother, and attributed Mother’s red mark to that conduct,
relying on a photograph rather than the testimony establishing that use of force. Father
maintains the photograph was ambiguous and did not depict any act of violence.
The trial court clearly credited Mother’s testimony that Father shoved her during
the altercation, and found her testimony corroborated by the photographs. Although
Father views the evidence differently, Mother’s testimony and the photographs
constituted evidence that is “‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value’”
(Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 374), and “[t]he testimony of one
witness, even that of a party, may constitute substantial evidence” (In re Marriage of
Fregoso & Hernandez, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 703). Based on this evidence, the
court’s ruling is not speculative or built on unsupported inferences as Father argues.
Moreover, even if the evidence could have supported a contrary finding, the trial court’s
assessment of witness credibility and probative weight of the evidence is “binding and
conclusive” on appeal—the appellate court does not reweigh it. (In re Marriage of Hill
& Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1052.)
Relatedly, Father contends there is no evidence to support the finding that he was
the dominant aggressor, and in making this finding, the trial court necessarily relied on
inferences that are not supported by the evidence. Father points to the damage to his
vehicle he claims Mother caused during the altercation, and he maintains there is no
evidence she was not the one who damaged it. Father also argues there is no evidence he
acted with any intent to provoke or intimidate Mother—rather, Father maintains, the
evidence reflects only a routine custody exchange where Mother chose to approach
Father’s vehicle. Father points out Mother’s voluntary approach to his vehicle supports
an inference she was not afraid for her safety; there were pending petitions that Mother
had violated custody orders; Mother made statements during the altercation that showed
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she was threatening Father that she would get a restraining order; and no criminal charges
were filed against Father related to the incident.
Essentially, Father contends the evidence should be viewed differently: his
testimony and evidence regarding how the incident unfolded should be credited, and his
actions should have been characterized as self-defense. Based on the settled statement,
however, it is clear the trial court did not wholly credit Father’s version of events, and it
did not find that Father acted in self-defense. It is the trial court that hears the testimony,
evaluates the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and assesses the probative
weight of all admitted evidence. Even if the evidence could have supported the contrary
findings Father contends should have been made, that is not a basis to reverse the ruling.
(See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582 [“[o]ur job is only to see
if substantial evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of the prevailing party, not to
determine whether substantial evidence might support the losing party’s version of
events”].)
As already noted, Mother’s and D.V.’s testimony was found credible in salient
respects, and even to the extent their testimony may have conflicted to some degree, the
trial court was free to evaluate what portions of their testimony to credit or discredit.
(See Minnegren v. Nozar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 500, 513 [trier of fact may “‘believe and
accept a portion’” of a witness’s testimony “‘and disbelieve the remainder’”].) Their
testimony was not inherently improbable or impossible, and it constitutes substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. (See People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86,
105 [unless demonstrably false, credibility determinations of a testifying witness are left
to the trier of fact].) As for the damage to Father’s vehicle, the court may have
reasonably concluded Father’s decision to close the convertible top escalated the
altercation and functionally precipitated and proximately caused any damage to the car.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling.
13.
DISPOSITION
The court’s September 2025 ruling on the parties’ respective DVRO petitions is
affirmed. Father shall bear his own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(2).)
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