In re V.M. CA2/1

CourtListener 10853330Calctapp5 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/5/26 In re V.M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE

In re V.M., et al., Persons Coming B346099
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00730)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Dismissed.
Carolyn Pichotta, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant C.R.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services.

_________________________________
We decide this appeal by memorandum opinion. (See Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) For the reasons set forth below, we
dismiss the appeal as moot.
Appellant C.R. (Mother) and Y.M. (Father) share two
children: V.M. (age 5) and E.M. (age 2). In addition, Father has
a daughter, D.M. (age 10), from another relationship. Prior to
the dependency proceedings giving rise to this appeal, V.M., E.M.,
and D.M. all resided with Mother and Father.
In March 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
that D.M. had suffered physical abuse. The caller reported that
D.M. had purple and blue bruises on her arm, as well as marks that
looked like scratches. The caller further reported that D.M. said
she “did not eat the other day” because Mother had “told her to
make her own food.”
DCFS and law enforcement visited the family’s home to
investigate the referral. Father initially denied that he had harmed
D.M. intentionally, but later admitted he struck D.M. with an
extension cord because she had urinated in her bed. He insisted
that “he only hit her once” and that “this was an isolated incident.”
A physical examination of D.M. by law enforcement revealed that,
in addition to the bruises on her arm, she had a bruise above
her right breast and a large bruise on her upper right thigh that
appeared to be “from a solid object.” In the social worker’s view,
“[t]he amount of bruising found on [D.M.] indicated the [description
of the] event reported” by Father was “inaccurate.” Mother said she
was unaware of the bruising on D.M.’s body. She explained, “I don’t
check her. I don’t touch her because I don’t want her to say that I
touch her.”

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DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300
petition on behalf of V.M. and E.M. alleging that Father’s physical
abuse of D.M. placed the other children at risk of serious harm
(§ 300, subds. (a) & (b)).2 The petition further alleged that Mother
knew or should have known of Father’s abuse of D.M., and that
Mother failed to protect the children by allowing Father to continue
to reside in the home and have unlimited access to the children (id.,
subds. (b) & (j)).
At the May 7, 2025 adjudication and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the allegations against both Mother and
Father and assumed dependency jurisdiction over V.M. and E.M.
Mother then “submitt[ed] on the disposition,” and the court ordered
the children placed in Mother’s home with family maintenance
services. Mother timely appealed the jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders. Father did not appeal. Six months later—
while Mother’s appeal was pending—the juvenile court terminated
dependency jurisdiction over V.M. and E.M. without a juvenile
custody order and released both children to Mother and Father.3
Mother now asks us to reverse the jurisdictional findings
against her. ~(AOB 35)~ We, however, conclude that Mother’s
appeal is moot because we cannot provide her with any effective
relief. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 (N.S.) [“the critical
factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 DCFS also filed a petition on behalf of D.M. (See DCFS v.
Y.V. (Apr. 1, 2026, B347131) [nonpub. opn.].) Because D.M. is
not a subject of this appeal, we do not further address her petition.
3 We granted Mother’s request that we take judicial notice of
the November 13, 2025 minute order terminating dependency
jurisdiction.

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whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if
it finds reversible error”].) Mother concedes the unchallenged
jurisdictional findings against Father and the termination of
dependency jurisdiction under the facts here generally support a
mootness finding. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 (D.P.)
[“where jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents
but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered
moot”]; In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 664-665 [“given the
unique nature of juvenile court jurisdiction, termination thereof will
often prevent the reviewing court from granting effective relief”].)
And Mother’s argument that the jurisdictional findings have the
“potential” to be “prejudicial . . . [and] impact future dependency
proceedings” is too speculative to demonstrate “a legal or practical
consequence” that might save her appeal from a mootness
challenge. (D.P., supra, at p. 278 [disapproving a prior appellate
decision “to the extent it held . . . that speculative future harm is
sufficient to avoid mootness”].)
Mother urges us to exercise our discretion to reach the merits
of her appeal even if it is moot. We decline to do so.
This appeal does not present circumstances that generally
warrant discretionary review of a moot case, such as an issue
of broad public interest that is likely to recur, a likelihood of
recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a material
question that remains for the court’s determination. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
Nor are we persuaded that the additional factors our high
court identified in D.P. as weighing in favor of discretionary review
support such review here. The sustained allegations against
Mother are not “particularly pernicious or stigmatizing,” and they
are unlikely to cause prejudicial impact in any future dependency
proceedings. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285–286.) Mother is

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correct that the reasons for mootness here—which include Mother’s
prompt compliance with her case plan resulting in the termination
of dependency jurisdiction—weigh in favor of review. (Id. at p. 286.)
But “no single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court
should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Ibid.)
Rather, “in deciding whether to exercise its discretion, a court
should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency
system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for the children’
with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ ”
(Ibid.) And here, given the other factors counseling against review,
we are not persuaded that discretionary review serves these
overarching goals.
Accordingly, we dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot.

DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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