CourtListener 10853328•People v. Dimas CA4/1
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Filed 5/5/26 P. v. Dimas CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086274
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FBA1200622)
v.
ANA DIMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Alexander R. Martinez, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Howard C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christine Y. Friedman and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jason Anderson, San Bernardino County District Attorney, Brent J.
Schultze, Deputy District Attorney, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of neither
party.1
Ana Dimas appeals an order partially denying her request for
resentencing under Penal Code2 section 1172.75. We reverse the order
because Dimas was entitled to have the court consider her eligibility for
ameliorative relief under changes to section 186.22 made by Assembly Bill
No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2014, a jury found Dimas guilty of one count of carjacking
(§ 215, subd. (a)), two counts of kidnapping during a carjacking (§ 209.5,
subd. (a)), and one count of active participation in a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury found true gang enhancements (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)) and firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Dimas
also admitted to a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced
her to a total term of 65 years to life, which included two sentences of 25
years to life for gang enhancements. On direct appeal, we reversed the
conviction for carjacking.
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) identified Dimas as an individual who had been sentenced to a now
invalid one-year prior prison term enhancement. On January 10, 2025,
1 While this appeal was pending, this court granted an application of the
District Attorney of the County of San Bernardino to file an amicus curiae
brief with respect to this claim. Dimas filed a response to the District
Attorney’s amicus brief. We have considered all of the briefing. As we
explain, we accept the concession.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Dimas filed a motion for resentencing and motion to vacate the prison prior
under section 1172.75. At the resentencing hearing, the court struck Dimas’s
one-year prior prison term enhancement and resentenced her to a total term
of 64 years to life. The sentencing court rejected Dimas’s argument that
resentencing under section 1172.75 rendered her case “not final” such that
she could benefit from Assembly Bill No. 333—which changed elements of
gang enhancements—retroactively under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740,
745 (Estrada). Dimas appealed.
DISCUSSION
Dimas contends, and the People concede, the court erred in failing to
apply Assembly Bill No. 333 at her resentencing hearing, and thus, the
matter must be reversed and remanded for a full resentencing. We agree.
A. Resentencing under section 1172.75 renders Dimas’s judgment nonfinal
Dimas’s judgment became “nonfinal” when she returned to the trial
court under section 1172.75 for recall and resentencing. Section 1172.75
provides that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . .
is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The CDCR must notify the trial
court of any person serving a prison term that includes a section 667.5
enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Once the trial court verifies the current
judgment includes the enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) When resentencing the
defendant, “[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2); People v. Saldana (2023)
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97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276 [section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not
merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements].) By the
plain language of the statute, Dimas was entitled to be considered for any
legislative enactments that might provide for a reduction of sentence.
B. Assembly Bill No. 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments
Case law also entitles Dimas to a full resentencing with consideration
given to her eligibility for ameliorative legislative benefits. In the criminal
law context, when ameliorative legislation goes into effect, we generally
presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply
as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all nonfinal cases. (Estrada,
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) For purposes of Estrada, the test for finality is
“whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.”
(People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 679.) The meaning of finality in
the Estrada context is distinct from the issue of whether a judgment is final
for purposes of appealability. (Ibid.)
In People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez), the California
Supreme Court held that a criminal case in which the sentence is not yet
final, including one in which an appellate court has affirmed the conviction
and remanded for reconsideration of sentencing related issues, is nonfinal for
purpose of Estrada and the retroactive application of the benefit of
supervening ameliorative legislation. (Lopez, at pp. 392–393.) Similarly, in
the context of recall and resentencing, appellate courts have determined that
a granting of a petition for resentencing renders a conviction nonfinal for
purposes of retroactive application of ameliorative legislation. (See People v.
Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 251 [defendant entitled to retroactive
application of Assembly Bill No. 333 upon resentencing under section 1172.6
based on changes to felony murder rule]; People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
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546, 551 [defendant entitled to retroactive application for Proposition 57 and
Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) upon resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6].)
In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333, enacting the
STEP Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.) Assembly Bill No. 333
made several changes to the law on gang enhancements. First, it
substantively narrowed the definition of a “criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22,
subd. (f).) Second, it also changed former subdivision (f)’s requirement that a
gang’s members “individually or collectively engage in” a pattern of criminal
activity in order to constitute a “criminal street gang” to now require that any
such pattern be “collectively engage[d] in” by members of the gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (f).) Third, it also “narrowed the definition of a ‘pattern of criminal
activity’ by requiring that (l) the last offense used to show a pattern of
criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the
currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses
were committed by two or more gang ‘members,’ as oppose to just ‘persons’;
(3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the
offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the
currently charged offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).) Fourth, [it] narrowed
what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang,
requiring that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’ (§ 186.22,
subd. (g).)” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.)
Assembly Bill No. 333 took effect on January 1, 2022, and it is
considered ameliorative legislation. (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 397.)
Here, both parties agree, as do we, that Dimas was entitled to the benefit of
Assembly Bill No. 333 because her judgment was not final when the court
engaged in resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to the
trial court to conduct a full resentencing and to determine whether the gang
sentencing enhancements meet the requirements of Assembly Bill No. 333.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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