People v. Loya CA2/8

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Filed 5/4/26 P. v. Loya CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B337511

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA227243)
v.

GILBERT NEVEREZ LOYA,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Gilbert Neverez Loya appeals from the trial
court’s order striking his one-year prior prison term enhancement
but refusing to conduct a full resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.75.1 Loya contends that the court erroneously
believed that he was categorically ineligible for resentencing
under section 1172.75 because he was serving an indeterminate
sentence under the “Three Strikes” law. The People agree that
Loya was entitled to resentencing but argue any error was
harmless. Because the record does not clearly indicate that the
court would have made the same decision had it been aware of
the full scope of its resentencing power and discretion, we reverse
and remand the matter with directions for the court to conduct a
full resentencing under section 1172.75.
BACKGROUND
In 1999, Lisa Flores and Loya began dating. After several
months, Loya started physically and verbally abusing Flores.
Although Flores obtained a restraining order against Loya, he
refused to leave her alone. In 2002, Loyoa followed Flores and
her friend as they were driving. Loya rammed his car into their
car several times, causing their car to spin out and come to a stop
facing oncoming traffic.
The People charged Loya with stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b);
count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (an automobile) (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); counts 2 & 3), assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2); counts 4 & 5), possession of a firearm by a felon with
three prior convictions (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); counts 6 & 7),

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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criminal threats (§ 422; count 8), and threatening a witness
(§ 140, subd. (a); count 9). As to counts 1, 4 and 5, the People
alleged Loya personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5). The People
also alleged that Loya had suffered three prior strike convictions
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and that he had
served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Count 9 was stricken before trial. A jury convicted Loya of
stalking and both counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and
acquitted him of the remaining charges. The jury found not true
the firearm allegations. The trial court found true the three
strike allegations, declined to strike any of them, and sentenced
Loya to 25 years to life in state prison plus one year for the prison
prior on count 3. The trial court imposed a concurrent term of 25
years to life for each of counts 1 and 2. A different panel of this
division affirmed Loya’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
In 2014, Loya petitioned the trial court to recall his
sentence and resentence him under section 1170.126. After
issuing an order to show cause, the court denied Loya’s petition,
finding he was ineligible for resentencing. Another panel of this
division affirmed the trial court’s order denying Loya’s
resentencing petition.
In January 2023, Loya was identified as someone
potentially serving a sentence that included a now-invalid one-
year prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
In April 2024, the trial court held a hearing under
section 1172.75. After the court struck his one-year prior prison
term enhancement, Loya asked the court to conduct a full
resentencing. The prosecutor responded that Loya was ineligible

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for resentencing under section 1172.75 because he was serving a
life sentence under the Three Strikes law.
The trial court stated that it likely agreed with the
prosecutor that it was prohibited from conducting a full
resentencing under section 1172.75 because Loya was a Three
Strikes offender. The court believed it lacked the power to strike
any of Loya’s prior strikes under section 1172.75. Nevertheless,
the court stated, “part of me wants to say perhaps I should strike
one strike … .”
The prosecutor responded that it was “simply impossible”
for the trial court to strike one of Loya’s prior strikes. According
to the prosecutor, if the court had the power to resentence Loya,
it could “either strike two of [Loya’s] three strikes and resentence
him as a second striker” or leave “the sentence intact.” If the
court struck two of Loya’s prior strike convictions, the prosecutor
noted, Loya “would be released immediately.” After discussing
Loya’s criminal history and performance record in prison, the
prosecutor opined that “there’s no way for this court to chart
some sort of middle course. It’s either striking two strikes and
releasing Mr. Loya based on its view of his recent positive
programming or any other reason the court could articulate … .
[¶] … [¶] … We’re either re-imposing the sentence or the court is
striking two strikes.”
Loya’s counsel argued that the trial court had discretion
under section 1172.75 to strike any of Loya’s prior strike offenses
under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). While the court was not required to
strike such offenses under section 1172.75, Loya’s counsel pointed
out, it had the discretion to do so. Loya’s counsel asserted that
there was nothing “in the case law or the statute that prohibits

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[the court] from considering striking one or two or however many
strikes. The question to me is should you. … And of course my
position is yes. Because I think that Mr. Loya has demonstrated
a genuine interest and willfulness and a willingness and a
commitment and a history to turn his life around.”
The court concluded that it lacked the power under
section 1172.75 to conduct a full resentencing because Loya was a
Three Strikes offender. But even if it had such power, the court
explained, it would not strike two or more of Loya’s prior strike
offenses. The court noted the frightening nature of the
underlying commitment offense. While Loya had recently taken
serious steps to rehabilitate in prison, the court noted that his
conduct in prison up to that point had been poor. Although the
court would have been inclined to reduce Loya’s sentence in some
manner if it could, such as by striking a “five-year prior,” the
court was not inclined to strike two or more prior strike offenses
and release Loya on time served.
Loya appeals.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 483 went into effect on January 1, 2022,
creating what is now section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3
[creating former § 1171.1]; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12 [renumbering
former § 1171.1 to section 1172.75].) The statute renders legally
invalid any prior prison term enhancement imposed before
January 1, 2020, unless the enhancement was imposed for a prior
sexually violent conviction. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute
also creates a resentencing procedure for defendants who are
currently serving sentences that include a prior prison term
enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)–(d).)

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Once the trial court confirms that the underlying judgment
includes an invalid prior prison term enhancement, the court
must “recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) A defendant who is eligible for relief under
section 1172.75 is entitled to a full resentencing. (People v.
Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1067, fn. 3.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) establishes several
parameters for resentencing. First, the resentencing “shall result
in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser
sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Second, the court must “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Third, the court may “consider
postconviction factors” that speak to whether continued
incarceration remains in the interest of justice, such as the
defendant’s physical condition and records of discipline and
rehabilitation while incarcerated. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
Finally, “[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term,
the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).)
Loya contends, and the People agree, that the trial court
erred when it concluded that it lacked the authority under

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section 1172.75 to conduct a full resentencing, including the
power to strike Loya’s prior strike offenses under Romero and
section 1385. Although the California Supreme Court expressly
declined to address this issue in a recent case discussing a
different issue concerning the Three Strikes law (see People v.
Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 854, fn. 5), other
courts have held that a trial court has “the authority to exercise
its discretion under section 1385(a) and Romero to strike any or
all of [a defendant’s] strike priors after recalling his sentence and
for the purposes of resentencing him under section 1172.75.”
(People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 364.) As the court
in Rogers explained, “[b]ecause a trial court’s power under section
1385(a) to dismiss or strike a strike prior is independent of either
the Three Strikes law or the subsequent Reform Act, any exercise
of that power at a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.75
does not offend either.” (Id. at p. 362.) We agree with Rogers and
follow it here.
The People contend that remand is unnecessary because
the trial court considered whether it would be appropriate to
strike Loya’s strike priors under section 1385 and Romero and,
based on that analysis, decided not to exercise its discretion to
strike any of them. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161 [identifying the factors courts should consider when
determining whether to strike a prior strike].) We disagree.
Where, as here, a trial court sentences a defendant without
being aware of the full scope of its sentencing discretion, remand
is required to allow the court to fully exercise that discretion
unless the record clearly indicates that the court would have
reached the same decision had it been aware of the scope of its
discretion. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

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(Gutierrez).) As we explain, the record does not clearly indicate
that the trial court would have made the same sentencing
decision—i.e., striking only Loya’s prison-prior enhancement—
had it been aware of its full resentencing power and discretion to
strike any of Loya’s prior strikes under section 1172.75.
To be sure, as the People point out, the trial court
considered the circumstances of the underlying commitment
offense, Loya’s criminal history, and Loya’s behavioral and
rehabilitative record in prison before concluding that it would not
be appropriate to strike two or more of Loya’s prior strikes, which
the parties and court agreed would result in his immediate
release from custody. But before it issued its final ruling, the
court told the parties that “part of [it] wants to say perhaps [it]
should strike one strike.” Later, after discussing whether it had
the power to fully resentence Loya, the court stated that although
it was not willing to strike two or more of Loya’s prior strikes, it
“wouldn’t have an issue” with otherwise reducing Loya’s sentence
beyond striking his one-year prison-prior enhancement.
The record, therefore, suggests that the court was willing to
strike one of Loya’s prior strikes if it had the power to do so
under section 1172.75. Because the record does not clearly
indicate that the trial court would have made the same
sentencing decision had it been aware of the full scope of its
resentencing power under section 1172.75, including its authority
to exercise its discretion to strike Loya’s prior strikes under
section 1385 and Romero, remand is necessary for the court to

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exercise that power and discretion in the first instance.
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.)2

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s resentencing order is reversed and the
matter is remanded with directions for the court to conduct a full
resentencing under section 1172.75, including following the
parameters for resentencing set forth in subdivision (d) of that
statute.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

2 Loya asks us to take judicial notice of two amicus briefs
filed in a different appeal, which he claims raise arguments that
are relevant to our evaluation of whether the trial court erred in
finding he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75
because he is a Three Strikes offender. In light of our conclusion
that the trial court erred in finding that Loya is ineligible for
resentencing, we deny his request for judicial notice.

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