CourtListener 10852815•People v. Landry CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 5/4/26 P. v. Landry CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087169
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BAF2000888)
v.
MELVIN MARIO JAMES LANDRY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Bernard J. Schwartz, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Longtime friends G.W. and Melvin Mario James Landry got into an
argument, yelling and exchanging obscenities. G.W. slapped Landry and
challenged him to a fight. Landry turned away, retrieved a loaded semi-
automatic handgun from his vehicle, racked the gun, and shot G.W. once in
the chest, killing him.
After receiving the instruction on heat of passion provocation that
reduces murder to manslaughter, a jury convicted Landry of second degree
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and found true that Landry personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily
injury or death to another person (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court
sentenced Landry to an aggregate term of 40 years to life, plus two years in
state prison.
On appeal Landry contends that the conviction must be reversed
because: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law
regarding heat of passion provocation during closing argument; (2) the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to imperfect self-defense; and (3)
no substantial evidence supported the jury’s second degree murder verdict.
We affirm the conviction.
FACUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting
On July 22, 2020, G.W. and his common law wife, O.J., went to her
father’s house in Riverside to pick up their kids and visit with family. G.W.
and O.J. had been together for over 20 years and had three kids together.
1 Further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
2
O.J.’s sister, S.J., and her husband Landry were already at the house
with their own kids. S.J. and Landry had been together since S.J. was 17
years old and had been married since 2014. They had five kids together.
G.W. and Landry had known each other apart from their relationship
through the sisters. They were like brothers. The sisters were also close. At
one point, the four of them had lived together when the sisters were pregnant
at the same time. The two couples socialized together every weekend or
every other weekend. Over the course of their long friendship, G.W. and
Landry would argue over small things or exchange words in passing. But
they had always resolved their disagreements and their arguments had never
gotten physical. O.J. described her brother-in-law Landry as a humble
person and peaceful.
S.J. testified her husband Landry had issues with drinking. He drank
more than one bottle of liquor every day. Prior to the shooting, Landry was
drinking more because they were having marital issues due to Landry’s
infidelity. They had recently separated because Landry had cheated on her,
but still lived in the same house. When he was drunk, he became
unapproachable and angry.
On July 22, 2020, S.J. and Landry were already drinking when O.J.
and G.W. arrived at the house. O.J. and G.W. joined them. All four of them
were drinking Hennessy, and all of them except Landry were also smoking
marijuana. At some point G.W. and Landry left together. When they
returned there was more drinking and dancing.
Both couples had separately planned to spend the night at a nearby
hotel instead of staying in S.J. and O.J.’s father’s house. When they got to
the hotel, the rooms were not available, and they all returned to the house.
3
After they returned, they resumed drinking and dancing as they sat
outside the house. O.J. thought G.W. and Landry were discussing
relationships, and told the police they were talking “about some real shit.”
O.J. knew Landry and S.J. were having issues, but she did not know the
details. S.J. noticed her husband Landry had become standoffish, quiet, and
angry, the state he reached when drunk.
Testifying for the defense, S.J. said she observed her husband ingest a
white powder through his nostrils that evening. She said she saw him do it
at least four times. She knew it was cocaine because she had seen him use it
before. She did not tell this to police in her interview right after the incident
and first mentioned it at trial, four years after the shooting. O.J. testified she
did not see Landry use cocaine that night.
Sometime that evening, G.W. and Landry got into an argument. They
started yelling at each other. At the time, everyone was standing on the
sidewalk. O.J.’s Toyota Camry was parked on the street and Landry’s Dodge
Durango was parked in the driveway.
O.J. did not remember what the argument was about, but she heard
G.W. call Landry a “bitch,” “pussy,” and the “N word.” Landry called G.W.
the “N word” at least once.
G.W. slapped Landry, took off his shirt and challenged Landry to a
fight. S.J. yelled at G.W., “Why would you do that?” The sisters intervened
and tried to separate the two men. G.W. was standing near the Durango in
the driveway and Landry was standing in the street. The sisters were
between them.
O.J. testified that Landry became “upset” after the slap. Landry
exchanged more words with G.W., then walked to his vehicle. Landry opened
the rear driver side door of his Durango, reached for something, and turned
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and walked towards G.W. To O.J. it looked like Landry had something in his
hand, but she could not tell what it was at first. Landry then cocked or
racked what turned out to be a gun. When she saw Landry rack the gun, O.J.
tried to stop him.
Landry reached around O.J., who was standing in front of him, and
fired at G.W., behind her. O.J. was so close that her ears were ringing. Blood
got on the back of O.J.’s skirt Landry shot G.W. once in the chest. There
were no other shots fired.
S.J., who was facing G.W., heard a loud bang and saw a “flash of light”
coming from behind her. G.W. looked at her and asked, “Am I shot?” S.J.
asked, “Are you okay?” and tried to hold him up.
O.J. screamed and ran toward Landry to stop the shooting. She
chased him around the front of the Camry but she fell to the ground. Landry
walked toward the Durango, got into the vehicle, backed out of the driveway,
and drove away.
O.J. got up off the ground and went over to where S.J. was holding up
G.W. They tried to get him into O.J.’s Camry to go to the hospital but he was
too heavy. O.J. called 911 and started CPR. A sheriff’s deputy arrived at
about 3:30 a.m. and took over CPR. G.W. was declared dead at 3:45 a.m. on
July 23, 2020.
S.J. called Landry and told him that G.W. was dead. Landry agreed to
return and surrender to the police. S.J. did not know where he was or what
he did with the gun.
Around 8:25 a.m., Landry returned to the scene in the Durango.
Landry did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance at that time. Sherriff’s department investigators searched the
5
Durango but did not find a gun or any bullet casings in it, or at the scene. No
firearm or casings were ever recovered in the case.
A neighbor’s security camera recorded a video of the shooting, which
was shown to the jury. The beginning of the video captured the sound of a
car starting and music playing. At about 39 seconds into the video, the sound
of a slap can be heard, followed by a thud or a thump, according to witnesses.
None of the witnesses could explain what occurred to cause the thump. A
verbal confrontation ensued. G.W. yelled obscenities and taunted Landry.
Landry responded in kind. According to the video, G.W. told Landry to “Pull
it out,” “hit me,” and “shoot me.” At timestamp 1:21 on the video, witnesses
heard the sound of a gun being racked. Four seconds later, at timestamp
1:25, the gun was fired..
Based on the investigator’s knowledge of firearms, the racking of the
gun meant it was a semi-automatic firearm. Before it was racked there was
not already a bullet in the chamber ready to fire.
A medical examiner testified that the cause of G.W.’s death was a
single gunshot wound to the heart.
B. Prior Proceedings
In a February 2024 trial, a jury convicted Landry of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (count
2). The jury could not reach a verdict on the first degree murder
charge (count 1) and the court declared a mistrial. A second trial was
conducted in May 2024 solely on the murder charge. The jury convicted
Landry of second degree murder.
6
DISCUSSION
A. The Prosecutor’s Arguments on Provocation
Landry contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
in misstating the law on provocation. We agree that the prosecutor made
misstatements, but his counsel failed to object and thus Landry has forfeited
this claim. Since Landry has not shown prejudice, we conclude the failure to
object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
1. Legal Principles
A prosecutor’s conduct during a criminal trial violates the federal
Constitution if it is “ ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ ” (People v.
Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214.) It violates the California Constitution if
it “involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to
persuade either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Where, as here, the
prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury, this constitutes
error if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law, and (2) there is “ ‘a reasonable
likelihood the jury understood or applied the [prosecutor’s remarks] in an
improper or erroneous manner.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659,
667 (Centeno).)
Although we generally review claims of prosecutorial error for an abuse
of discretion, we independently examine what the law is and “objective[ly]”
examine how a “reasonable juror” would likely interpret the prosecutor’s
remarks, bearing in mind that “ ‘ “we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew
the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
prosecutor’s statements.” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340
(Collins).)
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Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. (See § 187, subd. (a).) Malice is presumptively absent when
the defendant acts upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion on sufficient
provocation. (§ 192, subd. (a).)
Heat of passion requires that the provocation caused “an emotion so
intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without reflection”
and can include “ ‘ “ ‘ “[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic
emotion.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 949-950 (Beltran).)
Heat of passion includes both subjective and objective components.
(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549-550.) The subjective component of
heat of passion requires that the defendant killed while under “ ‘the actual
influence of a strong passion’ ” induced by legally sufficient provocation. (Id.
at p. 550; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583–584 (Manriquez).)
As to the objective component, the conduct must be sufficiently
provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to
act rashly and without due deliberation and reflection. (People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 202 (Barton).) Put another way, the provocation
“ ‘must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or
she would lose reason and judgment.’ ” (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th 547 at
pp. 585-86.) This objective component prevents the defendant from “set[ting]
up his own standard of conduct” to justify his actions. (People v. Steele (2002)
27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252.) Accordingly, the focus is on the nature of the
provocation and whether it was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to act
rashly. How a defendant actually responded to the provocation, and the
reasonableness of that response, are not relevant to assessing the adequacy of
the provocation. (People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 (Najera).)
8
“Framed another way, provocation is not evaluated by whether the
average person would act in a certain way: to kill. Instead, the question is
whether the average person would react in a certain way: with his reason and
judgment obscured.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 949.) It is thus a
misstatement of the law to argue that the provocation would only be legally
sufficient if it would have caused a reasonable person to kill the provoker.
(Ibid.)
2. The Prosecutor’s Statements
The prosecutor here repeatedly misstated the law by arguing that the
proper standard for assessing the adequacy of provocation is whether an
ordinary person of average disposition would be moved to kill, and to kill in
the precise manner Landry did. In his initial closing and rebuttal, the
prosecutor made at least four incorrect statements of the law of provocation,
two of which the Attorney General concedes.
In his initial closing argument the prosecutor made the following
misstatements:
1. “So how do we know [Landry] intended to do it? [He] [g]oes
over to the Dodge Durango after the slap . . . [which shows he is] able to walk
away from the slap, and the slap didn’t provoke him such that it would
require a killing.”
2. To satisfy provocation, “an average person’s passions would
have had to have been aroused so much so that that was the reasonable
response, shooting in light of a slap. That’s basically—that’s the argument
for provocation to reduce it, slaps now equal okay to murder.”
In his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor added the following
misstatements:
9
3. “[A] person of average disposition does not react to a slap by
arming themselves with a firearm, walking over step-by-step, closing the
distance, avoiding two other people, and shooting another individual in the
heart.”
4. “A slap from a person of average disposition, having an
argument with a friend would not react from passion rather than judgment
and shoot their friend in the chest.”
The Attorney General acknowledges that statement Nos. 2 and 4 are
incorrect. We conclude all four are misstatements. By misstating the law,
the prosecutor committed error. (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 666.)
Landry’s trial counsel did not object at trial to any of the challenged
statements. To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the
defendant must make a timely objection at trial and request an admonition to
the jury. (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.) A defendant’s failure to
object or request an admonition is excused if either would have been futile.
(Ibid.)
A prosecutor’s misstatements of law are generally curable by an
admonition from the court. (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 548.) In this
case, making objections and requesting an admonition would not have been
futile. The trial court could have immediately corrected misleading or
inaccurate statements of the law and could have warned the prosecutor not to
repeat them. (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.) Had defense
counsel requested admonitions on the law of provocation, there is every
indication the trial court would have given them, as it did when Landry’s
counsel objected that the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt
standard. (Cf. Collins, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 339–340 [defendant
10
objected repeatedly, and “implored” the court to give a supplemental
instruction after rebuttal, but the trial court refused].)
Defense counsel’s failure to timely object and request admonishment
therefore bars Landry from challenging the prosecutor’s comments on direct
appeal. (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.)
3. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to alleged
prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel’s inaction violated
the defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
(People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 972.)
Landry advances that claim here. He bears the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient
because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (Strickland).)
“Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that
‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence
and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of
sound trial strategy.’ ” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.) When
the record on direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the
manner challenged, defendant must show that there was “ ‘ “no conceivable
tactical purpose” ’ for counsel’s act or omission.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25
Cal.4th 610, 675.) Ordinarily, “ ‘the decision . . . whether to object to
comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument is a highly tactical
one.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165 (Johnsen).)
Conceivable tactical reasons exist for counsel’s decision not to object to
the prosecutor’s misstatements. Defense counsel herself recited the correct
11
provocation standard in her closing, which the prosecutor cited in his
rebuttal. (See Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1165 [defense counsel was not
ineffective where, instead of registering a contemporaneous objection, he
made a tactical choice to undermine the prosecutor in his own closing
remarks].) An objection might have served merely to draw the jury’s
attention to minor parts of the prosecutor’s lengthy closing. (See People v.
Planchard (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 157, 176 [defense counsel may make a
tactical decision that “ ‘ “objection or other responses would serve only to
highlight the undesirable testimony.” ’ ”].) When the prosecutor made similar
misstatements during his rebuttal argument, defense counsel may have
made a strategic decision to rely on the counterarguments she had already
made during her closing statement rather than objecting to the prosecutor’s
rebuttal statements. As the California Supreme Court concluded when
presented with a similar situation in Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1165,
such a tactical choice was not objectively unreasonable under Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. 668. (Cf. Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 676 [no conceivable
reason not to object when the prosecutor mischaracterized the reasonable
doubt standard for the first time during rebuttal, since there would be no
opportunity for defense counsel to respond].)
Even if the failure to object were an error, we conclude Landry has
failed to meet his burden to show prejudice under Strickland, which requires
a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors, the result would
have been different. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” (Ibid.)
Landry contends that the prosecutor’s “misleading arguments made it
more likely the jurors would find [Landry] acted with malice aforethought
12
even if the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Landry] did not kill [G.W.] because he was provoked,” and that the
prosecutor’s arguments “caus[ed] the jury to reject a finding of provocation
and convict Landry of murder.”
We are not persuaded. While the prosecutor made incorrect statements
of the law, those statements were interspersed with correct statements of the
law, drawn directly from the jury instructions. As a result, the prosecutor’s
argument may have caused confusion, but it did not leave the jury with the
wrong law or otherwise raise the concern that Landry was convicted by an
improperly instructed jury. Nor is it probable that the result would have
been more favorable for Landry had the jury been admonished not to consider
the prosecutor’s remarks.
First, the court’s instruction using CALCRIM No. 570 correctly set
forth the law of provocation and heat of passion. The instruction informed
the jury that the provocation “would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation . . . .” (CALCRIM No.
570.) The prosecutor referred to this instruction during portions of his
closing arguments, and repeatedly suggested that the jury refer to the
written instructions. When he did recite the law correctly, he used the
language of the jury instructions. (Cf. People v. Medellin (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 519, 535-536 [where “CALCRIM definition did not clarify [a]
point” on which the prosecutor made misstatement, error was prejudicial].)
Second, the jury was repeatedly told orally and in writing that
“[n]othing that the attorneys say is evidence.” (CALCRIM No. 222.) The
court told the jury that it must follow the law as explained by the court, and
that if the attorneys’ comments on the law conflicted with the court’s
instructions, the jury was bound to follow the instructions. (CALCRIM Nos.
13
222, 200.) In its admonishment when the defense counsel objected to another
statement by the prosecutor, the court explained, “The lawyers, obviously,
are allowed to take some advantage of how they want to explain what they
believe the instruction means, but ultimately, it’s your resolution and your
understanding of the instruction based on the law that I’ve given you. So you
have to follow the law as I’ve given you.” While the court was specifically
addressing the instruction on reasonable doubt, the jury would have no basis
to believe the rule would differ as to any other jury instruction.
“[W]e presume that the jury relied on the instructions, not the
arguments, in convicting defendant.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34,
47; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436.) “Arguments by counsel
‘generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court.
The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument,
not evidence, [citation], and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates;
the latter . . . are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.’ ”
(People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 438.) Given the foregoing, it is not
reasonably probable the jury disregarded the trial court’s instructions in
favor of the prosecutor’s formulation of the law. (See Najera, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 224 [where the prosecutor “interspersed” incorrect
statements of the law with correct ones, court presumed the jury relied on the
court’s instructions].)
Third, as was the case in Beltran, here, “[g]iven the strong evidence
supporting defendant’s murder conviction and the comparatively weak
evidence of any legally adequate provocation, a different result was not
reasonably probable.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 957.)
The jury heard that G.W. exchanged obscenities and name-calling with
Landry, slapped him and challenged him to a fight. These are not the type of
14
provocations that the law generally identifies as sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to react rashly from passion rather than from judgment.
“ ‘ “A provocation of slight and trifling character, such as words of reproach,
however grievous they may be, or gestures, or an assault, or even a blow, is
not recognized as sufficient to arouse, in a reasonable man, such passion as
reduces an unlawful killing with a deadly weapon to manslaughter.” ’ ”
(Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 226.) Simple assault does not rise to
the level of provocation necessary to reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826–827
[scratching the defendant’s chest, kicking him and grabbing his shirt does not
constitute legally sufficient provocation]; see also Manriquez, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 585 [calling defendant a “ ‘mother fucker,’ ” taunting him, and
repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should take it out
and use it, “plainly were insufficient to cause an average person to become so
inflamed as to lose reason and judgment”]; Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 226 [calling defendant a “faggot,” pushing him to the ground, and fighting
with him “would not drive any ordinary person to act rashly or without due
deliberation and reflection”].)
More significantly, the jury heard little evidence that Landry actually,
subjectively, shot G.W. in a heat of passion provoked by G.W.’s taunts and
slap. A defendant need not testify to establish heat of passion; circumstantial
evidence is often relied upon to reveal a killer’s state of mind. (People v.
Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.) Here, Landry’s wife testified Landry
had become “standoffish, quiet, [and] angry” before the argument with G.W.
But his state of mind prior to the alleged provocation is irrelevant to whether
Landry reacted in a state of passion in response to the provocation. As to
that, O.J., observed that Landry was “upset” after G.W. slapped him. But
15
Landry had the presence of mind after being slapped to turn away from G.W.,
open the back driver’s side door of his vehicle, retrieve a firearm that he
concealed from view, rack the gun to prepare to shoot, reach his arm around
O.J., and aim a single fatal shot at G.W., avoiding the two other women who
stood close enough that the shot made O.J.’s ears ring and splattered her
skirt with blood. Landry did not release a wild flurry of untargeted shots in
passion and anger. (Cf. People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 180
[the defendants’ testimony they started shooting with their eyes closed in
panic and fear, and evidence they collectively shot 21 bullets in 3.7 seconds–
“significantly faster than would ordinarily be expected to aim and shoot”–was
consistent with “a panic shooting”].)
The testimony that Landry was “upset” is scant evidence that he
reached such violent or intense emotion that he reacted without thinking. He
may have been angry, and may have acted imprudently, in deciding to shoot
his friend. But “[o]ne does not act rashly . . . simply by acting imprudently or
out of anger. Even imprudent conduct done while angry is ordinarily the
product of some judgment and thought, however fleeting.” (Beltran, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 950; see also People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 83
16
(Oropeza) [concluding it was insufficient that “an ordinarily reasonable
person might be angered by the act”].)2
The court’s directions to the jury as to the correct statement of the law
on provocation, and its repeated admonition to follow the court’s instructions
and not the attorney’s arguments, combined with the minimal evidence of the
subjective component of heat of passion, compel us to conclude that Landry
has not met his burden to show prejudice.
We affirm the conviction.
B. Instruction on Imperfect Self-Defense
Landry contends that the court should have instructed the jury on
imperfect self-defense. The court did not err.
1. Legal Principles
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a lesser
included uncharged offense only if there is substantial evidence that would
absolve the defendant from guilt of the greater, but not the lesser, offense.
2 That a slap to the face is intended as an insult has been long been
recognized from the age of chivalric knights to modern televised award
shows. But it is not an offense that historically has triggered such intense
emotion that it precludes rational action; instead, the expected response to
such an offense was so ritualized and intentional that it was coded in formal
sets of rules. (See Allen & Reed, The Duel of Honor: Screening For
Unobservable Social Capital (2006) American Law and Economics Review,
vol. 8, no. 1, 2006, 81, 83, fn. 3 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42705491>
[as of Mar. 20, 2026] [tracing the history of the “duel of honor” from the
1500’s through the middle of the twentieth century, noting such “[d]uels
were fought over an insult, a slap to the face, a slur on reputation, ‘coolness
of manner,’ or, most serious of all, an accusation of lying”]; Cochran, Noted
American Duels and Hostile Encounters (1963) pp. 15-18
<https://openlibrary.org/books/OL5885389M/Noted_American_duels_and_hos
tile_encounters> [as of Mar. 20, 2026] [the “Code Duello,” adopted in 1777,
contained 26 commandments covering all aspects of dueling].)
17
(People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288; Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p.
201.) Minimal and insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require the
instruction. (Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201.)
Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds
that a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but
unreasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be
convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter. (Manriquez,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581.)
2. Analysis
Landry did not testify and made no out-of-court comments indicating
that when he shot G.W., he believed it was necessary to do so to defend his
life or to avoid great bodily injury. It is true that evidence of a defendant’s
honest but unreasonable belief in in the need to defend against imminent
peril to life may be found in the testimony of witnesses other than the
defendant. (People v. De Leon (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 824.) However, no
witness testified that Landry was afraid of G.W. Nor did any of the witnesses
testify that they were afraid of G.W. themselves, which could have led
Landry to the unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to protect
them from G.W. No one ran to hide behind Landry, seeking protection from
G.W. To the contrary, both O.J. and S.J. put themselves between the two
men to prevent further escalation. O.J. testified that Landry appeared
“upset,” not fearful or scared. The primary evidence of Landry’s state of mind
was found in his conduct. He walked away from G.W., went to his car,
retrieved his loaded gun, turned back to G.W., racked the gun, reached
around O.J., pointed his gun at G.W., and pulled the trigger. Following the
shooting, Landry got into his vehicle, backed out of the driveway, drove away
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and got rid of the gun. This suggests that he fired the shot as an act of
aggression, not fear. (See Oropeza, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 82.)
Because no substantial evidence suggested that Landry acted in
imperfect self-defense, the court did not err in failing to sua sponte give an
instruction on this lesser included offense. There was no violation of
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (See People v. Moon (2005) 37
Cal.4th 1, 30 [“There being no error, we also reject defendant’s claim that the
alleged instructional error violated his due process rights under the United
States Constitution.”].)
C. Sufficiency of Evidence of Second Degree Murder
Landry contends that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for
second degree murder, because the evidence only supported that Landry
committed voluntary manslaughter in a heat of passion or in imperfect self-
defense. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th
622, 646.) Unless it is clear that “on no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict . . . ,” we will not
reverse. (People v. Zaun (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174.) Given this
deferential standard of review, a “ ‘defendant bears an enormous burden in
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claiming there is insufficient evidence’ to support a conviction.” (People v.
Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.)
“Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first
degree murder.” (See §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) (People v. Knoller (2007) 41
Cal.4th 139, 151.) Malice may be either express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).)
“Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to
unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) “Malice
is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
2. Analysis
The record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s
conclusion that Landry shot G.W. with express or implied malice. Landry
drank so much that he reached the state of being “standoffish, quiet [and]
angry” before the shooting. But he was a regular drinker, and the amount of
alcohol he consumed did not appear to affect his ability to walk, speak, aim a
gun, or drive. While he was not known to be violent, Landry had secretly
acquired a loaded semi-automatic handgun and hidden it in his Durango.
After his longtime friend G.W. slapped him and challenged him to fight,
Landry hurled an insult back at G.W., walked to his vehicle, opened the back
door, retrieved that loaded gun, and walked back to G.W. G.W. apparently
recognized Landry’s intent, taunting him to “Pull it out,” “hit me,” and “shoot
me.” Landry did so. Less than a minute after G.W. slapped him, Landry
racked the semi-automatic and aimed one fatal shot into G.W.’s chest. He did
not pause to help his wife and sister-in-law in their struggle to save G.W. He
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got into the Durango, drove away, and disposed of the firearm. On this
evidence, a reasonable jury could reject provocation and heat of passion and
convict Landry of second degree murder.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
DO, J.
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