Keyway Pride Limited v. Reuben CA2/5

CourtListener 10851797Calctapp1 mag 2026

Testo completo

Filed 5/1/26 Keyway Pride Limited v. Reuben CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

KEYWAY PRIDE LIMITED LLC, B340135

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21SMCV00182)

SIMON REUBEN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.
Barnes & Thornburg, David P. Schack, Matthew B.
O’Hanlon, and Brian T. Nguyen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Greenberg Traurig, Eric V. Rowen, and Matthew R.
Gershman for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Keyway Pride Limited LLC (plaintiff) asserted
various civil claims against defendant Simon Reuben (Simon) and
others based on their involvement in the allegedly unauthorized
transfer of plaintiff’s real property located in Beverly Hills.
Simon is a British citizen residing in Monaco. The trial court
granted Simon’s motion to quash plaintiff’s summons for lack of
personal jurisdiction. We consider whether Simon’s role as a
beneficial owner of entities that were involved in lending funds
secured by plaintiff’s property and that later purported to acquire
the property is sufficient to establish he (apart from the entities)
is subject to personal jurisdiction in California.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Disputed Property Transactions and Ensuing
Lawsuit
Plaintiff is a California limited liability company formed in
2017. Its operating agreement provides its sole member is a
Delaware limited liability company called Midas Commodities
Agents Delaware LLC (Midas).1 Plaintiff asserts its “ultimate
beneficial owner” is Kimora Lee Simmons Leissner (Simmons).
Plaintiff characterizes Tim Leissner (Leissner) as Simmons’s
“now estranged husband.”
Plaintiff acquired 25 Beverly Park Circle in Beverly Hills
(the Property) in 2017. Simmons lived at the Property with her
children at all relevant times. In 2018, plaintiff borrowed $12
million from Koronus Holdings Designated Activity Company

1
Midas changed its name to Z-One LLC in 2019.

2
(Koronus) secured by a deed of trust against the Property.2 The
loan documents were executed by Gregory Robinson (Robinson)
on behalf of Midas as Keyway’s manager. Robinson also executed
a first amendment to the deed of trust the following year.
In November 2020, Leissner purported to enter into a
purchase and sale agreement on behalf of plaintiff transferring
the Property to defendant 25 Beverly Park Circle Propco LLC
(Propco). Around the same time, Leissner purported to enter a
contract on plaintiff’s behalf leasing the Property back from
Propco for one year. A lease rider provided plaintiff an option to
purchase the Property within one year for approximately $17.6
million.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Propco in 2021 to cancel
deed and quiet title. Plaintiff filed the operative first amended
complaint in 2023. The first amended complaint includes
additional causes of action against Propco and others allegedly
involved in the disputed transfer.
Plaintiff alleges Leissner had no authority to contract on its
behalf. Plaintiff alleges documents purporting to give Leissner
such authority, on which Propco and others purportedly relied,
were forgeries. Plaintiff further contends that, even if authentic,

2
The loan agreement provided that a substantial portion of
the loan proceeds were to be disbursed to Ghanim bin Saad Al
Saad (Al Saad), an individual who is not a party to this litigation,
with “Mr. Al Saad [required to] use $3,000,000.00 of the [l]oan
proceeds towards funding the redevelopment” of certain property
located in New York. An email between associates of Simon, on
which he was copied, characterized Al Saad as the “borrower” and
“our tenant in . . . the . . . NYC property,” and stated “$3m of
these proceeds will be diverted to initiate that project.”

3
these documents would not give Leissner authority to act on his
own. Plaintiff also maintains, in any case, that the disputed
transaction amounts to “an extension of the loan for one year as a
disguised sale/lease back” that would allow Propco and Koronus
(which have the same beneficial owners) to “evade foreclosure
procedures.” In this regard, plaintiff alleges the purported sale
price was substantially below the Property’s fair market value
and, rather than Propco issuing the loan payoff amount to
Koronus, the outstanding loan balance was “simply credited
against the purported purchase price.” Approximately $2.3
million in cash (the bulk of the difference between the sale price
and the balance due on plaintiff’s debt to Koronus) was wired to
defendant Cantervale Limited (Cantervale), an entity owned by
defendant Amanda Staveley (Staveley).3 Neither Cantervale nor
Staveley has any affiliation with plaintiff.
This appeal concerns only one of the several defendants
named in the operative first amended complaint: Simon. Keyway
alleges Simon and his brother, Reuben David Reuben (David), are
the beneficial owners of Koronus and Propco, which function as
their alter egos.
The first amended complaint alleges causes of action for
quiet title and cancellation of instruments against Propco and
Koronus; causes of action for a civil violation of Penal Code

3
As quoted in the trial court’s minute order denying
Staveley’s motion to quash, Staveley filed a declaration stating
“part of the funds was repayment of . . . funds that [she] had
advanced for the benefit of the borrower of the Koronus loan [(i.e.,
Keyway)]” after learning “Keyway had missed interest payments”
and feeling “embarrassed as [she] had pitched the loan to
Koronus.”

4
section 496 (receiving stolen property), violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and for
declaratory relief against Propco, Koronus, the Reuben brothers,
Cantervale, Staveley, and another entity;4 and claims for breach
of contract and gross negligence against Chicago Title Company
(Chicago Title).
Propco filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff, Simmons,
and Leissner. The operative first amended cross-complaint
alleges causes of action for unlawful detainer, quiet title, breach
of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, equitable lien, ejectment,
trespass, and a common count for money had and received.

B. Simon’s Motion to Quash
Simon and David filed a joint motion to quash Keyway’s
summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Simon and David are
British citizens and longtime residents of Monaco. They are the

4
The other defendant named in these causes of action, PCP
Capital Partners LLP, allegedly furnished the forged operating
agreement for plaintiff to the title company handling the
disputed transaction. With respect to the declaratory relief cause
of action, plaintiff seeks a declaration that “a. Leissner was never
authorized by Keyway [to] act on Keyway’s behalf in connection
with the [purchase and sale agreement], the [g]rant [d]eed, the
[l]ease, and/or otherwise; [¶] b. [t]he purported sale of the
Property to Propco and lease back to Keyway was actually a
disguised loan transaction designed to enhance the [defendants’]
security in the Property and charge an onerous, usurious rate of
interest; [¶] c. Keyway has no obligation to pay claimed amounts
constituting usurious loan interest; and [¶] d. Keyway has no
obligation to repay amounts on the Koronus [l]oan that were not
paid to Keyway upon funding of the loan by Koronus.”

5
ultimate beneficial owners of both Koronus and Propco. Each
filed a declaration stating he has never resided in California, does
not own property in California, has never conducted personal or
other business in California, and has never directly owned any
businesses that are registered or incorporated in California.
(Simon’s declaration does acknowledge, however, that he once
owned real property in Beverly Hills, which he sold in 1986.)
Simon and David argued they are not subject to either
general or specific jurisdiction in California.5 With respect to the
latter theory, Simon and David argued their ownership of Propco
is not sufficient to establish that they purposefully availed
themselves of the benefits of doing business in California and
there is no evidence that Propco is their alter ego. They further
argued the dispute does not arise out of any contacts they might
have with California and, in any case, it would be unreasonable
for a California court to exercise jurisdiction over them.
In opposition, plaintiff argued California has specific
jurisdiction over Simon and David because they “had numerous
contacts with California in connection with the transactions at
issue in the [first amended complaint].” Plaintiff principally
relied on correspondence relating to the loan and disputed
transfer.
With respect to the original loan, plaintiff cited a July 2018
email from James Reuben (James), a director at Reuben Brothers
Limited, to Simon and others explaining the terms of the loan in
broad strokes and noting “[o]ur security is a [four] [a]cre

5
The brothers also argued Keyway had not served process on
them. The trial court rejected this argument, and it is not at
issue in this appeal.

6
residence in Beverly recently purchased for $25m . . . .”6 Simon
replied the same day, emphasizing “[w]e need to ensure that we
have control of rental agreement, if its being let. In other words,
we will need a very strong agreement to ensure that nothing can
be done to reduce the value of the asset. . . .”
Plaintiff cited another July 2018 email from Alexander
Bushaev (Bushaev), whose email domain is “@reubros.com,” to
Eileen Sawyer (Sawyer), a representative of a company called
Motcomb Estates Limited, which plaintiff characterizes as a
vehicle for Simon and David in the United Kingdom. Bushaev
asked Sawyer whether “RBL” (which Keyway surmises refers to
“Reuben Brothers Limited”) should “fund Koronus[.]” A few days
later, Sawyer wrote to someone named Sandrine
(sreuben@libello.com), copying Simon, asking her to “arrange for
Simon (on behalf of [an entity called] Landal) to sign [an]
attached letter” needed “as part of the accounting for the Irish
company” relating to the Koronus loan to Keyway. Sandrine
replied with a copy of a “subscription letter for shares” to
Koronus’s board of directors signed by Simon as a director “[f]or
and on behalf of Landal Worldwide Corp.” (The appellate record
does not provide any further information concerning Landal or its
relationship to the entities involved in this litigation.) The same
day, Bushaev sent Simon an email asking him to “confirm [he
was] OK with” the loan transaction. The appellate record does
not include any reply, but the loan closed on or about that day.

6
James’s email signature block states “Reuben Brothers
Limited is a Company registered in England and Wales . . . with
its registered office” in London. Plaintiff asserts, without citation
to the record, that James is David’s son and Simon’s nephew.

7
About a year later, in July 2019, Sawyer sent Simon an
email describing a one-year extension of the loan. Simon replied
and asked, “Is the new loan for $12 m inc interest or is it an
extension of a[n] older loan of $12 m inc interest[?]” When
Sawyer explained “[i]t is an extension of the existing 12m loan,”
Simon answered, “Ok good. Thanks[.]”
In November 2020, around the time of the purported sale of
the Property, Sawyer wrote to Bushaev, copying Simon, asking
Bushaev to send approximately $2.8 million to Chicago Title “for
the loan redemption and purchase of th[e] property.” Simon
replied, “Agreed.” An attorney for Koronus and Propco provided
copies of Simon and David’s passports and utility bills to Chicago
Title around the same time. When the transaction was
completed, Sawyer wrote to Simon, “We have closed on the
redemption of the Keyway loan/purchase of the [P]roperty.”
Plaintiff argued these documents demonstrate Simon and
David “approved” the Koronus loan and “oversaw and approved”
the purported transfer of the Property. Plaintiff further argued
the litigation arises from this California-directed activity because
its “claims . . . are predicated on allegations that the [a]lleged
[t]ransfer was an invalid disguised loan transaction.” Plaintiff
contended the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Simon and
David would not be unreasonable because (among other things)
they hired the same attorneys as the entity defendants they
controlled, the claims against them and the entity defendants
overlapped, the Property is in California, and plaintiff is a
California entity.
In their reply in support of the motion to quash, Simon and
David argued (among other things) that the emails on which
plaintiff relied involved correspondents outside of California and,

8
in any case, emails sent to California would not amount to
purposeful activity invoking the benefits of doing business in this
state.

C. The Trial Court’s Order
The trial court ruled on Simon and David’s motion to
quash—along with motions to quash filed by Koronus, Staveley,
and Cantervale—in July 2024. The trial court granted Simon
and David’s motion to quash, but denied Koronus, Staveley, and
Cantervale’s motions.7

7
As to Staveley and Cantervale, the trial court determined
Staveley “not only brokered, negotiated, and closed the loan, but
also made several initial payments on the Koronus loan for
Keyway, doing business in California, which was secured by a
deed of trust against the subject California property,” “authorized
the closing of the sale on behalf of Propco, . . . and provided wire
instructions for the sale proceeds to go to Cantervale.” As to
Koronus, evidence that it and Propco have common ownership
and Koronus “inexplicably wrote off the loan balance” as part of
the sale demonstrated a “close nexus between the Koronus loan
secured by . . . the subject California property[ ] and the ultimate,
allegedly fraudulent transfer of the property to the Reuben
[b]rothers’ other[ ] California company, Propco.” Having found
the litigation arises from Staveley, Cantervale, and Koronus’s
California-directed activity, the trial court further found that
exercising jurisdiction over these defendants would be reasonable
based on California’s strong interest in adjudicating a dispute
including a California company regarding real property in
California, plaintiff’s strong interest in convenient and effective
relief in California, and because “judicial economy will be best
served by adjudicating the dispute against all involved parties in
one lawsuit.”

9
In analyzing Simon and David’s motion, the trial court
started from the proposition that “[w]hether a forum may assume
personal jurisdiction over . . . general partners is based upon
assessing the general partners’ forum contacts in their individual
capacities as opposed to their forum contacts on behalf of the
general partnership.” After emphasizing the lack of
correspondence involving David regarding either the loan or the
purported sale, the trial court discussed the “several emails sent
by or to Simon . . . .” The trial court read “the emails involving
Simon [as] appear[ing] to be sent by or to Simon in his capacity
as an agent of Koronus, and not in his individual capacity.”
The trial court further reasoned that other evidence
reflecting Simon and David’s interest in the transaction—such as
the provision of copies of their passports to Chicago Title—did not
demonstrate purposeful availment in their individual capacities.
Although “there [was] evidence in the record that Koronus and
Propco may be alter egos of each other, there [was] no evidence
that David or Simon are alter egos of Koronus and/or Propco.”8

II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the trial court’s analysis, especially its
focus on whether Simon acted in his “individual capacity,” is
defective because it appears to rest on the fiduciary shield
doctrine that is contrary to the weight of California authority.
(See generally Goehring v. Superior Court (Bernier) (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 894, 905-906; Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990)

8
Plaintiff noticed its appeal of the order granting Simon and
David’s motion to quash. It subsequently requested, and this
Court ordered, dismissal of the appeal as to David only.

10
217 Cal.App.3d 103, 115-118; see also Calder v. Jones (1984) 465
U.S. 783, 790 [“[defendants’] status as employees does not
somehow insulate them from jurisdiction. Each defendant’s
contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually”].)
Perhaps, but we review the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale.
(ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP v. Egorov (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 124, 135 [“on appeal from an order granting a motion
to quash, the court’s ruling ‘must be affirmed even if “‘given for a
wrong reason’”’”].) As we shall discuss, with the fiduciary shield
doctrine put to the side, Simon’s minimal role in the loan and the
disputed transfer still does not establish the requisite purposeful
availment under either of the theories plaintiff advances, i.e.,
purposefully directing tortious conduct at California or deriving
benefits from activity in California.

A. General Principles of Personal Jurisdiction
California’s long-arm statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10)
authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of California. “The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a
nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts. [Citation.]
Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally
must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . . such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”’ [Citation.]” (Walden v. Fiore
(2014) 571 U.S. 277, 283, quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)

11
There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general
(sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific
(sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Ford
Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 592
U.S. 351, 358.) “A state court may exercise general jurisdiction
only when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the State.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) There is no chance Simon is subject to general
personal jurisdiction in California and plaintiff does not contend
otherwise.
“Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less
intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class
of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often
go by the name ‘purposeful availment.’ [Citation.] The
defendant . . . must take ‘some act by which [it] purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State.’ [Citation.] The contacts must be the defendant’s
own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ [Citation.]
They must show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out
beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the
forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285[ ] (2014) [using a contractual
relationship that “‘envisioned continuing and wide-reaching
contacts’ in the forum State” as an example of where jurisdiction
would lie]. Yet even then—because the defendant is not ‘at
home’—the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only certain
cases. The plaintiff ’s claims . . . ‘must arise out of or relate to the
defendant's contacts’ with the forum. [Citations.]” (Ford, supra,
592 U.S. at 359, bracketed insertion added.)
California courts commonly parse these principles into
three elements. “A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a

12
nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully
availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the
“controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s
contacts with the forum”’ [citation]; and (3) ‘“the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and
substantial justice’”’ [citation].” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) “The plaintiff asking the forum state
to exert jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant bears the
initial burden of establishing the first two elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, and if the plaintiff does so, the
out-of-state defendant then bears the burden of convincing the
court why the exertion of personal jurisdiction would not comport
with fair play and substantial justice.” (Jacqueline B. v. Rawls
Law Group, P.C. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 243, 253, italics omitted.)

B. Plaintiff Did Not Establish Purposeful Availment
Simon may be subject to personal jurisdiction in California
if he personally established the requisite minimum contacts with
this state. (Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at 905.) Koronus
and Propco’s contacts with California, however, are not
necessarily attributed to Simon. (Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 781, fn. 13 [“It does not of course follow
from the fact that jurisdiction may be asserted over [a corporate
defendant] that jurisdiction may also be asserted over either [its
owner or holding company]”]; Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC v.
Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 969, 981 [“activities that
are undertaken on behalf of a defendant may be attributed to
that defendant for purposes of personal jurisdiction if the
defendant purposefully directed those activities toward the forum
state”].) The analysis must focus on the defendant’s individual

13
conduct. (Keeton, supra, at 781, fn. 13 [“Each defendant’s
contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually”].)
Plaintiff suggests Simon purposefully availed himself of
forum benefits under two alternative tests: the “effects” test and
the “forum benefits” test.9 (See generally Gilmore Bank v.
AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1571
[“because California’s long-arm statute ‘“manifests an intent to
exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction”’ [citation], its courts
may apply the purposeful availment test most conducive to
establishing specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular
case, consistent with due process”].) Although the analyses
overlap in some respects, we will discuss the problems with each
separately.

1. The effects test
With respect to tort claims (such as those plaintiff asserts
against Simon), courts generally apply a test derived from
Calder, supra, 465 U.S. 783 that “requires intentional conduct
expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state in addition to the
defendant’s knowledge that his intentional conduct would cause
harm in the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 271, fn.
omitted; accord Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair &
Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 228 [“Under California

9
Plaintiff’s opening brief includes a separate heading for
what it appears to regard as yet another test for purposeful
availment based on Simon having “[c]reated an [o]ngoing
[r]elationship between [plaintiff], [h]imself, and [forum]
[r]esidents.” Plaintiff, however, does not articulate any
arguments in this section distinct from those relevant to the
effects test and the forum benefits test.

14
law, to establish specific jurisdiction through the effects test a
plaintiff must show the defendant committed an intentional act,
expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state, with the
knowledge that his act would cause harm in the state”].) It is not
enough that a defendant’s actions harm a plaintiff with ties to
the forum state: “[T]he relationship must arise out of contacts
that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State,” and
the “analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside
there.” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 284-285.)
In Calder itself, for instance, a California resident sued a
reporter and editor employed by the National Enquirer based on
an allegedly libelous article published in the magazine. (Calder,
supra, 465 U.S. at 785-786.) The article “concerned the
California activities of a California resident . . . whose television
career was centered in California,” it “was drawn from California
sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of [the
plaintiff’s] emotional distress and the injury to her professional
reputation, was suffered in California.” (Id. at 788-789.)
Although the reporter and editor were “correct that their contacts
with California are not to be judged according to their employer’s
activities” in California, they were “primary participants in an
alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California
resident, and jurisdiction over them [wa]s proper on that basis.”
(Id. at 790.)
The situation here is obviously different: the evidence in
the record does not establish Simon was a “primary participant”
in either the loan or the disputed transfer. Plaintiff offers no
support for the assertion in its opening brief that “Simon
intentionally and knowingly committed tortious acts toward a

15
California resident ([plaintiff], whose ultimate beneficial owner
Simmons is also a California resident)” through his
correspondence relating to the loan and the disputed transfer.
Although it is clear Simon knew the Property is in California,
that is essentially all that may be inferred from his handful of
terse emails concerning the transactions at issue. There is no
indication, for instance, that Simon proposed or negotiated either
the loan or the purported transfer. His concern about the value
of the collateral when the loan was issued in 2018 appears purely
hypothetical, and his uncertainty about whether the 2019
extension was in fact a new loan, if anything, underscores his
relative lack of attention to the matter. There is no evidence
Simon knew plaintiff is a California LLC (much less the terms of
its operating agreement), that Simmons lived at the Property, or
that Simmons had any connection to plaintiff.10 Although Simon
is not insulated from personal jurisdiction by the fact that these
transactions were conducted by entities he allegedly controls, we
do not impute knowledge possessed by employees or
representatives of these entities to Simon for jurisdictional
purposes. (Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at 790 [“Petitioners are
correct that their contacts with California are not to be judged
according to their employer’s activities there. On the other hand,
their status as employees does not somehow insulate them from
jurisdiction. Each defendant’s contacts with the forum State
must be assessed individually”].)

10
Indeed, as we have already noted in the margin, Simon was
receiving emails characterizing Al Saad—with whom he and/or
his organization apparently had a pre-existing relationship—as
the borrower.

16
Plaintiff also compares this case to Taylor-Rush, in which
the plaintiff sued several officers and directors of a company that
acquired her business. (Taylor-Rush, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at
108.) The Court of Appeal held two of these defendants—who
personally “made fraudulent misrepresentations and
nondisclosures” inducing the plaintiff to execute various
agreements—were subject to personal jurisdiction in California,
despite acting in a representative capacity, because their
individual tortious conduct was purposely directed at a California
resident and its effects were felt in the forum. (Id. at 114.)
Simon’s involvement in the loan and the disputed transfer
does not compare to the conduct of the Taylor-Rush defendants
subject to personal jurisdiction in California. As we have already
discussed, Simon’s few short emails do not reflect any personal
involvement in negotiating the transactions at issue or detailed
knowledge of plaintiff’s connections to California. (See Taylor-
Rush, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at 114 [holding, as to other
defendant officers and directors who were not subject to
jurisdiction, the evidence insufficiently established minimum
contacts with California because, among other things, “their
declarations clearly state[d] they did not participate in any of the
negotiations during which [the plaintiff] claim[ed] she was
defrauded”].) Moreover, unlike the defendants in Taylor-Rush,
there is no evidence that Simon had personal contact with any of
plaintiff’s representatives.

2. The forum benefits test
“Under the forum benefits test, purposeful availment may
be found where the defendant purposefully ‘benefits in the forum
by reaching out to forum residents to create an ongoing’

17
relationship. [Citations.]” (ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
136; accord Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 434, 449-450.) As we have already discussed, however, a
corporate defendant’s purposeful availment of the benefits of
doing business in a forum is not alone sufficient to subject its
owners to personal jurisdiction. (Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at 781,
fn. 13; Anglo Irish Bank, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 981.)
To the extent plaintiff’s reliance on forum benefits
principles rests on an alter ego theory, plaintiff has not outright
asserted—and we find no evidence in the record to conclude—
that Koronus and Propco’s corporate identities may be
disregarded and their California contacts ascribed to Simon. (See
Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
523, 537-539 [discussing conditions required to pierce the
corporate veil in personal jurisdiction context, including that
“there must be such a unity of interest and ownership between
the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in
reality exist” and “there must be an inequitable result if the acts
in question are treated as those of the corporation alone”].) There
is nothing in the record, for instance, to suggest Simon
commingled personal funds with those of the entity defendants,
guaranteed their debts, or disregarded corporate formalities.
(Ibid.)
Instead, relying chiefly on Seagate Technology v. A.J. Kogyo
Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 696, plaintiff effectively rehashes the
argument it advanced in the context of the Calder effects test. In
Seagate, the plaintiff sued to recover funds owed by an entity
that purchased computer components on credit. (Id. at 699-700.)
The trial court granted a motion to quash filed by the president of

18
a separate Japanese entity who provided the plaintiff with a
letter stating that entity “‘guarantee[d] all credibility,
responsibility, and liability of the action taken by’” the
purchasing entity. (Id. at 700.) Applying the effects test, the
Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the motion to quash.
The reviewing court expressly rejected the notion that the
individual defendant’s role as an “investor” in the purchasing
entity was sufficient to impute the purchasing entity’s acts to him
but found an effect in the forum state sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction based on “the extension of credit to [the purchaser]
because of the guaranty issued by [the individual defendant] as
president of both [the purchaser] and [the purported
guarantor].”11 (Id. at 704.)
Unlike the individual defendant in Seagate, who wrote a
letter inducing the transactions at issue, Simon’s personal
involvement in the loan and purported transfer amounted to little
more than approving actions taken by apparent associates or
subordinates.12 That is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

11
The Court of Appeal did not discuss the financial benefits
accruing to the Japanese entity’s president until it reached the
question of whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the
individual defendant would comport with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. (Seagate, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d
at 705.) It was in that context that the Court of Appeal
emphasized the individual defendant was the purchaser’s “major
shareholder and had a real interest in its profits.” (Id. at 706.)
12
The record does not reveal the reason Chicago Title
requested copies of Simon and David’s passports and utility bills.
(Their passport numbers and addresses are, however, listed in a
“Currency Transaction Report” prepared by the title company.)
In any case, there is no indication these documents factored into

19
(Seagate, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at 704 [“no personal contact
would result from doing nothing more than ratifying an act taken
by the corporation or by another corporate officer”].) And
contrary to plaintiff’s reading, Seagate does not stand for the
proposition that a corporate entity’s contacts are necessarily
attributable to its owners in the context of a purposeful
availment analysis. As we have already explained, the
purposeful availment analysis is focused on a defendant’s
personal conduct. (Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at 905.)

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. In the interests of
justice, all parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J. MOOR, J.

plaintiff’s dealings with Simon or David in a manner analogous to
the letter at issue in Seagate.

20

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