CourtListener 10851732•Berry v. Ogbuehi CA5
Testo completo
Filed 5/1/26 Berry v. Ogbuehi CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROLAND ALFRED BERRY,
F089631
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 23CU0433)
v.
CLEMENT OGBUEHI, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Valerie R.
Chrissakis and Melissa R. D’Morias, Judges.
Roland Alfred Berry, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Iveta Ovsepyan, Assistant Attorney General,
Rolando Pasquali and David Klehm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Roland Berry, an incarcerated prisoner, is plaintiff and appellant in this medical
malpractice action against defendants Dr. Karim Rasheed, an ophthalmologist in private
Judge Chrissakis issued the pre-trial orders; Judge D’Morias presided over the
jury trial.
practice, and Clement Ogbuehi, a physician’s assistant employed by the California
Department of Corrections. Dr. Rasheed obtained summary judgment in his favor and
was the respondent in a prior appeal filed by Berry from the ensuing judgment of
dismissal. As for Obguehi, the malpractice claim against him proceeded to jury trial and
the jury returned a verdict in his favor. Berry now appeals from the subsequent
judgment; he challenges various pretrial orders made by the trial court, as well as a ruling
the court rendered during the trial. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Berry’s Eye Surgery and Related Infection
Berry, who is 79 or 80 years old, is incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse
Treatment Facility at Corcoran State Prison (Corcoran). As reflected in Berry’s medical
records in the record on appeal, in 2022, Berry suffered from glaucoma in both eyes.
Cataract surgery was recommended for his left eye, and cataract and glaucoma surgeries
were recommended for his right eye.
Dr. Rasheed, an ophthalmologist at Sani Eye Center in Templeton, performed
these surgeries on Berry and provided follow up care on an outpatient basis. Ogbuehi,
the respondent in this appeal, was employed at that time as a physician’s assistant by the
California Department of Corrections at Corcoran. Ogbuehi also had a role in Berry’s
treatment with respect to his eye conditions during the relevant period.
Dr. Rasheed performed cataract extraction surgery on Berry’s left eye (with a lens
implant) on March 9, 2022. Berry appeared to tolerate the procedure well, with no undue
complications. Thereafter, on March 23, 2022, Dr. Rasheed performed cataract
1 We granted a motion to augment the record filed by Berry. Based on the motion
to augment, the record on appeal in this matter includes the record on appeal filed in this
court in Berry’s prior appeal, that is, his appeal from the judgment of dismissal in favor
of Dr. Rasheed. (Berry v. Rasheed, et al., Case No. F088719 [affirming judgment].) The
factual and procedural background delineated here is drawn almost verbatim from our
opinion in that prior appeal, Case No. F088719.
2.
extraction surgery and glaucoma surgery on Berry’s right eye; a stent was placed in the
eye to address the glaucoma. Berry was subsequently seen by Dr. Rasheed for regular
follow-up care.
During a follow-up examination on June 1, 2022, Dr. Rasheed diagnosed Berry
with a serious eye infection, endophthalmitis, in his right eye. Dr. Rasheed performed
“an urgent anterior chamber vitrectomy” and “AC tap (wash out) with antibiotic
injection,” among other procedures, to treat the infection. After additional follow-up
visits, on August 15, 2022, Dr. Rasheed recommended a “consultation with a retina
specialist for right eye vitrectomy to remove vitreous debris and improve visual acuity.”
Thereafter, Berry began treatment with a retina specialist, Dr. Derek Lauritzen.
Berry’s Medical Malpractice Complaint
On October 30, 2023, Berry filed in the Kings County Superior Court, the
complaint initiating the instant action; the complaint named Dr. Rasheed and Ogbuehi as
defendants. The complaint asserted that Dr. Rasheed and Ogbuehi committed medical
malpractice in treating Berry’s right eye, leading to loss of vision in that eye. More
specifically, Berry alleged in his complaint:
“On May 27, 2022, plaintiff was ex[p]eriencing severe vision loss after
undergoing right eye cataract surgery performed by defendant Karim
Rasheed, MD, at Sani Eye Center, Templeton … Plaintiff contacted
medical staff at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and
State Prison (SATF), where plaintiff informed [a nurse] that plaintiff could
not see out of his right eye and was ex[p]eriencing severe right eye pain …
[The nurse] contacted defendant [Ogbuehi], PA, by phone call, and notified
[him] that plaintiff was experiencing severe right eye pain with vision loss,
and required an outside emergency examination. Defendant Ogbuehi told
[the nurse] that there is nothing we can do for him, give him a morphine
pill, and send him (plaintiff) back to his housing unit, and tell him
(plaintiff) to see the doctor on his yard tomorrow morning. Defendant
Obguehi [showed] deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical
needs … It was not until June 1, 2022 that defendant Rasheed, MD,
reported that plaintiff’s right eye was severely infected….
3.
“[¶] On August 15, 2022, two months after defendant Rasheed detected …
plaintiff’s severe right eye infection, and approximately five months after
performing cataract surgery, defendant Rasheed recommended that plaintiff
be seen by a retina specialist for a vitrectomy to remove vitreous debris …
It was not until October 5, 2022, that plaintiff learned, to what extent of eye
damage, defendant Rasheed caused as a result of malpractice.” (Some
capitalization omitted.)
Berry sought compensatory and punitive damages in his complaint.
Trial Court Proceedings
On September 5, 2024, the trial court granted Dr. Rasheed’s motion for summary
judgment. Judgment in favor of Dr. Rasheed was entered on September 19, 2024.
Berry’s claims against Ogbuehi proceeded to jury trial. The jury found Ogbuehi
did not commit medical negligence. Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of
Ogbuehi on January 31, 2025. This appeal followed.
Since the resolution of Berry’s claims on appeal does not turn on the evidence
presented at trial, we need not summarize the trial evidence here.
DISCUSSION
Berry challenges: (1) the trial court’s granting of Ogbuehi’s pretrial motion to
strike Berry’s punitive damages claim; (2) the trial court’s denial of Berry’s pretrial
motion for entry of default against Ogbuehi; (3) the trial court’s denial of Berry’s pretrial
motion for appointment of a medical expert; and (4) the trial court’s denial of Berry’s
request, during trial, for a body attachment bench warrant for Dr. Rasheed, for purposes
of securing his expert testimony/opinion testimony at trial. For reasons discussed below,
we affirm.
I. Trial Court’s Granting of Ogbuehi’s Motion to Strike Berry’s Punitive
Damages Claim
Berry contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Ogbuehi’s motion
to strike his punitive damages claim. We reject this contention. (See Abbott
4.
Laboratories v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 642, 651 [we review an order striking all
or part of a pleading for abuse of discretion].)
A. Background
On May 7, 2024,2 Ogbuehi filed a motion to strike Berry’s claim for punitive
damages on grounds that Berry had not complied with Code of Civil Procedure3
section 425.13; this was Ogbuehi’s first appearance in the case. Under section 425.13,
any claim for punitive damages against a healthcare provider must be preceded by a
motion requesting leave to file such a claim.4
Berry opposed the motion asserting, inter alia, that he was exempted from
complying with section 425.13 because he had moved for trial preference. Berry had
filed, on April 22, a motion for trial-setting preference on grounds he was over 70 years
old and in ill health. (See § 36, subd. (a).)
On June 10, the trial court heard and granted Ogbuehi’s motion to strike Berry’s
punitive damages claim. The same day, the court granted Berry’s motion for trial
preference and set an early trial date.
2 Subsequent references to dates are to dates in 2024 unless stated otherwise.
3 Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless stated
otherwise.
4 Section 425.13, subdivision (a) provides:
“In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health
care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other
pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a
claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended
pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended
pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented that the
plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail
on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code. The court shall not grant a
motion allowing the filing of an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive
damages if the motion for such an order is not filed within two years after the complaint
or initial pleading is filed or not less than nine months before the date the matter is first
set for trial, whichever is earlier.”
5.
B. Analysis
The trial court’s order granting Ogbuehi’s motion to strike noted the motion was
granted “in accordance with CCP [section] 425.13.” The trial court explained:
“As noted [in section 425.13,] a [punitive damages] claim may not
be brought against a health care professional, unless on motion of the
plaintiff the court finds there is a substantial probability that plaintiff will
prevail on [the] claim [pursuant to] Civil Code section 3294.
“The motion must be brought within 2 years of the filing of the
complaint or 9 months before trial, whichever is earlier. Plaintiff cites
Looney v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 521, 531-536, asserting
there is an ‘exception’ to the requirement to file the requisite motion under
CCP § 425.13, to include his pending motion for trial setting preference
under CCP § 36. However, Looney appears instead to hold that where a
motion for trial setting preference is granted and the trial date is advanced,
the 9-month time limit for filing the motion may not necessarily apply in
that case. (1 Cal.App.5th 521, 535 [‘We therefore imply an exception to
section 425.13 which permits the granting of a motion brought less than
nine months prior to the first assigned trial date where it is necessary to
protect a plaintiff’s right to a preferential trial date and the defendant
receives or has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery regarding
the punitive damage[s] claim.’].) The case does not stand for the
proposition that the motion under section 425.13 for seeking punitive
damages against a healthcare professional is not required to be made
simply because a CCP § 36 motion [for trial setting preference] is
pending.” (Italics added.)
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order granting Ogbuehi’s motion
to strike Berry’s punitive damages claim for lack of compliance with section 425.13.
To the extent Berry argues the trial court erred in failing to grant him leave to file
an amended pleading upon making the necessary showing in a motion under section
425.13, that contention is unavailing. Berry has not shown he sought leave to file the
requisite motion under section 425.13. In any event, Ogbuehi defeated Berry’s
underlying medical malpractice claim at trial. Accordingly, Berry cannot show
prejudice arising from any putative error by the trial court with respect to any potential
punitive damages claim.
6.
II. Trial Court’s Denial of Berry’s Motion for Entry of Default Against Obguehi
Berry contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for entry
of default against Ogbuehi. We disagree.
A. Background
Berry served Ogbuehi with the summons and complaint in this matter on
January 11. Ogbuehi did not appear in the case until May 7, when he filed the above-
discussed motion to strike Berry’s punitive damages claim.
On March 13, Berry filed a request for collective entry of default as to “Karim
Rasheed, MD; Clement Ogbuehi, P.A., et al.,” and for entry of a $350,000 clerk’s
judgment in his favor. The trial court clerk denied Berry’s request for default, stating:
“Default NOT entered as requested” because “[d]efault may not be request[ed] against ‘et
al,’ [and] defendant Rasheed [has] filed a Response.”
Thereafter, on July 3, Berry filed “a motion for entry of default … and to enter
judgment on the pleadings of $350,000” (motion for entry of default) against Ogbuehi.
(Capitalization omitted.) On July 9, the trial court denied the motion in a written order.
In its written order, the court stated:
“In reviewing the record before the court, it appears the March 13,
2024 request for entry of default was properly denied by the clerk based on
[Berry] requesting that default be entered against ‘Karim Rasheed, M.D.;
Clement Ogbuehi, PA, et al.’ As correctly stated by the clerk in rejecting
the request for entry of default, default may not be entered against ‘et al.’
and Defendant Rasheed had filed a responsive pleading on February 29,
2024. As such, default could not be entered ‘as requested’ and the clerk
properly denied the request for entry of default. [Berry’s] argument that the
clerk’s communication ‘misled’ him to believe that he could not submit
another request for entry of default against Defendant Ogbuehi individually
is unavailing. The clerk did not make any representations regarding
Defendant Ogbuehi, including whether he was represented by the same
counsel as Defendant Rasheed, but merely explained the reasons for
declining to enter default based on the manner in which [Berry] had
requested it.
7.
“In addition to the request for default having been properly denied
by the clerk, it is now improper to enter default against Defendant Ogbuehi
where, as [Berry] identifies, Defendant Ogbuehi filed a responsive pleading
by way of his Motion to Strike filed May 7, 2024. (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1014.) (The court also notes that Defendant Ogbuehi has since filed an
Answer on July 5, 2024.) Accordingly, [Berry’s motion for entry of
default] is hereby DENIED.”
On August 5, Berry moved to strike Ogbuehi’s answer, among other things.
Berry’s motion to strike Ogbuehi’s answer was heard and denied by the court on
September 5, on grounds Ogbuehi was not properly served with a copy of the motion.5
In addition, Berry moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s July 9 order
denying his motion for entry of default against Ogbuehi (motion for reconsideration).
The court heard and denied, on September 5, Berry’s motion for reconsideration of its
July 9 order.
In denying Berry’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged that
the summons and complaint were served on Ogbuehi on January 11, but Ogbuehi did not
file a responsive pleading—namely, his motion to strike Berry’s punitive damages
claim—until May 7. The court indicated that Ogbuehi’s responsive pleading—that is, his
motion to strike Berry’s punitive damages claim—was not timely under section 585,
subdivision (f). However, the court further explained:
“[The court clerk] properly rejected [Berry’s] request for entry of
default based on the manner in which [Berry] had requested it (i.e., by
requesting entry of default against both defendants, even though Defendant
Rasheed had filed a responsive pleading and by including ‘et al.’ in the
request). Furthermore, [Berry] did not renew his request for entry of
default [i.e., by filing a motion for entry of default] until after Defendant
Ogbuehi had filed his Motion to Strike [Punitive Damages Claim], which
appears to have had the effect of extending his time to answer. (Code Civ.
5 The trial court also noted that Ogbuehi’s answer was timely filed because it was
filed within 30 days after the court’s June 10 ruling granting his motion to strike Berry’s
punitive damages claim. Specifically, the court stated: “[I]t appears that [the] defendant
filed an answer within the 30 day deadline[] and [Berry] provided no authority for
striking an Answer timely filed after a duly noticed motion to strike.”
8.
Proc. § 435, subd. (c) [‘If a party serves and files a notice of motion to
strike without demurring to the complaint, the time to answer is extended
and no default may be entered against that defendant except as provided in
[Code Civ. Proc. §§] 585 and 586.’].) Additionally, as Defendant Ogbuehi
filed his Answer on July 3, 2024 (within 30 days after the court’s June 10,
2024 ruling on [Ogbuehi’s motion to strike Berry’s punitive damages
claim]), his Answer was timely filed, and default may not now be entered
against him. (Code Civ. Proc. § 585, subd. (b).)”
B. Analysis
To reiterate, on March 13, Berry filed a request for entry of default as to “Karim
Rasheed, MD; Clement Ogbuehi, P.A., et al.” After that request was denied by the trial
court clerk, Berry filed a motion for entry of default, which, in turn, was denied by the
trial court. Berry challenges the court’s ruling.
As described above, the trial court’s denial of Berry’s motion for entry of default
was centered on the trial court clerk’s stated rationale for denying Berry’s request for
entry of default. In denying Berry’s request for collective entry of default, the trial court
clerk noted: “Default NOT entered as requested” because “[d]efault may not be
request[ed] against ‘et al,’ [and] defendant Rasheed [has] filed a Response.” Berry did
not follow up by filing a corrected application requesting the trial court clerk to enter
default solely as to Ogbuehi.
Eventually, on May 7, Ogbuehi appeared in the matter by filing a motion to strike
Berry’s punitive damages claim, which motion was granted by the court on June 10.
Thereafter, on July 3, Berry filed the instant motion for entry of default. The trial
court, in denying Berry’s motion for entry of default, specifically noted that “the
March 13, 2024 request for entry of default was properly denied by the clerk based on
[Berry] requesting that default be entered against ‘Karim Rasheed, M.D.; Clement
Ogbuehi, PA, et al.” In his briefing to this court, Berry has not addressed the court’s
stated basis for denying his motion for entry of default. Berry has therefore forfeited any
challenge to the court’s ruling. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564
[orders and judgments are presumed correct, and the appellant must affirmatively show
9.
error]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956
[“ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ”].)
The trial court, in denying Berry’s motion for entry of default, further noted that,
by the time Berry brought his motion for entry of default, Ogbuehi had appeared in the
matter by filing a motion to strike Berry’s punitive damages claim. (See § 1014 [“A
defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers, demurs, [or] files a notice of
motion to strike[.]” (Italics added.)].) Therefore, the court could properly decline to
authorize entry of default against Ogbuehi at that juncture. (See Goddard v. Pollock
(1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 137, 141 [“it is now well established by the case law that where a
pleading is belatedly filed, but at a time when a default has not yet been taken, the
plaintiff has, in effect, granted the defendant additional time within which to plead and he
is not strictly in default”];6 Lorenz v. Commercial Acceptance Insurance Co. (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 981, 997-998 [“The policy of the law … does not favor default.”];
Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1364 (Elkins) [recognizing the
“ ‘ “strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits,” ’ ” italics in
original].)
In sum, Berry’s argument that the trial court was required to grant his motion for
entry of default because Ogbuehi’s motion to strike punitive damages claim was
untimely, is not persuasive. (See A & B Metal Products v. MacArthur Properties (1970)
6 Section 585, subdivision (a) states that if no answer or other responsive pleading
“has been filed with the clerk, … within the time specified in the summons, or within
further time as may be allowed, the clerk, upon written application of the plaintiff, …
shall enter the default of the defendant[.]” (Italics added.) When a responsive pleading is
filed before a plaintiff’s application for default, courts have applied the italicized
language to the facts and concluded that the plaintiff, in effect, has allowed the defendant
further time. (See Fiorentino v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 596, 605 fn. 3
[where the plaintiff has not yet applied for entry of default, plaintiff in effect, has allowed
the defendant further time to plead].)
10.
11 Cal.App.3d 642, 647 [“an untimely pleading is not a nullity, and it will serve to
preclude the taking of default proceedings unless it is stricken”]; accord Cuddahy v.
Gragg (1920) 46 Cal.App. 578, 580.)7
Berry’s additional argument that the trial court further erred in denying his motion
to strike Ogbuehi’s subsequently filed answer is also unavailing, because, as noted, the
court denied that motion as it was not properly served on Ogbuehi. The trial court also
reasoned that Ogbuehi’s answer was timely filed because it was filed within 30 days after
the court’s June 10 ruling granting his motion to strike Berry’s punitive damages claim.
(See § 435, subd. (c); § 473, subd. (a)(1) [“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and
on any terms as may be proper … enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.”]; Jackson v.
Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 749 [“[T]he trial court had discretion to consider [the]
defendant’s untimely [filing].”].)
III. Trial Court’s Denial of Berry’s Request for Appointment of a Medical Expert
Berry next challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for appointment of a
medical expert. On the record before us, Berry has not shown the trial court erred.
A. Background
On May 6, Berry filed a motion for appointment of a medical expert. Berry
sought the appointment of a medical expert given his claims for medical malpractice and
the fact that Dr. Rasheed planned to file a motion for summary judgment supported by a
declaration from a medical expert. On June 11, the trial court denied Berry’s motion for
appointment of a medical expert. Since Berry filed his motion for appointment of a
medical expert at least in part in the context of Dr. Rasheed’s motion for summary
judgment, our analysis of this issue necessarily refers to the proceedings on Dr.
Rasheed’s motion for summary judgment.
7 Notably, Berry has not shown he filed a motion to strike Ogbuehi’s motion to
strike punitive damages claim, nor that the trial court struck the latter.
11.
B. Analysis8
“Generally, ‘negligence’ is the failure to exercise the care a reasonable person
would exercise under the circumstances. [Citation.] Medical negligence is one type of
negligence, to which general negligence principles apply.” (Massey v. Mercy Medical
Center Redding (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 690, 694.) “The elements of a medical
malpractice claim are ‘ “ ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s
negligence.’ ” ’ ” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 463, 468, fn. 2 (Avivi).)
“Both the standard of care and [a defendant’s] breach must normally be
established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.” (Avivi, supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467.) In addition, “ ‘[c]ausation must be proven within a
reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.’ ” (Dumas v.
Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603; see also Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical
Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 153 (Sanchez) [“ ‘Whenever the
plaintiff claims negligence in the medical context, the plaintiff must present evidence
from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty to the plaintiff and that the
breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.’ ”].)
Given his medical malpractice claims, Berry moved for appointment of an expert
to address the “critical issue of causation.” Berry’s motion further noted: “The issue of
causation is beyond common knowledge [of] any layperson.” Under Evidence Code
8 Berry raised this same issue in his prior appeal following the trial court’s
granting of Dr. Rasheed’s summary judgment motion. Our analysis here mirrors our
resolution of this issue in the opinion issued in the prior case. (Berry v. Rasheed, et al.,
Case No. F088719.)
12.
section 730, the trial court has the discretion to appoint an expert for indigent prisoner
litigants. “[T]he discretionary appointment of an expert pursuant to Evidence Code
section 730 is among the measures available to trial courts to ensure indigent prisoner
litigants are afforded meaningful access to the courts.” (Smith, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at
p. 459.)
As mentioned, on June 11, the trial court denied Berry’s motion for appointment
of a medical expert. The court’s written order denying Berry’s motion stated in part:
“With respect to the motion for appointment of expert witnesses, the
motion is also denied, without prejudice. The statutory authority
empowering a court to appoint an expert is completely discretionary.
(Evid. Code § 730; Hulbert v. Cross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 405, 416-17.)
As an initial matter, Plaintiff presents no authority for the appointment of
an expert to help an indigent person pursue a medical malpractice case, and
no funds are available to this court from which to pay an expert to assist
Plaintiff in the prosecution of his case.
“Moreover, while Plaintiff lists three individuals in Fresno and
Kings County that ‘could be appointed to evaluate’ his case, Plaintiff has
not presented any information in his motion that would allow the court to
assess whether any of these experts would be appropriately appointed in
this case. Specifically, Plaintiff does not provide for any of these experts
an hourly rate, a curriculum vitae, or a declaration to show the
qualifications or intended testimony of the experts in Plaintiff’s case to
enable the court to determine whether appointment of a particular expert is
appropriate or warranted to support Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of a medical expert is also denied
without prejudice.”
In the meantime, on May 10, Dr. Rasheed had filed a motion for summary
judgment on grounds, inter alia, that he did not breach the standard of care in his
treatment of Berry. Dr. Rasheed’s motion was supported by a declaration from
Dr. Daniel Beers, an ophthalmologist. Dr. Beers reviewed the records of Dr. Rasheed’s
treatment of Berry and opined that Dr. Rasheed had acted within the standard of care.
Dr. Beers acknowledged that Berry developed a post-surgery eye infection but opined
13.
“there was nothing about the care and treatment provided by Dr. Rasheed at any time that
in any way fell below the standard of care.”
The trial court heard Dr. Rasheed’s summary judgment motion on August 19. The
court noted that “Plaintiff is required to present [an expert] declaration where a
defendant, as here, presents competent expert evidence that the Defendant’s treatment
met the standard of care.” The court therefore, on its own motion, continued the hearing
to September 5, “to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to renew his request for appointment of
a medical expert[.]” In making this ruling, the court stated: “The court reiterates that the
continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment is to allow Plaintiff an
opportunity to review his request for appointment of a medical expert, but the court does
not prematurely opine as to the merits of a renewed motion that does not set forth the
criteria outlined in the court’s order … which would be necessary for the court to appoint
such an expert.”
At the next hearing on Dr. Rasheed’s motion for summary judgment on
September 5, Berry did not renew his motion for appointment of a medical expert, and
the court granted Dr. Rasheed’s motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court
observed: “[T]he court again notes its additional bases for initially declining to appoint
an expert witness for Plaintiff, to wit: that Plaintiff failed and has still failed to present
any information in his motion [to appoint an expert witness] that would allow the [c]ourt
to assess whether any of his named experts would appropriately be appointed in this case,
their hourly rate, a curriculum vitae, or a declaration to show their qualifications or
intended testimony.” (Italics added.) The court further stated: “[N]one of those things
have been done … Instead, what I hear from Mr. Berry is he has a specialist out there, but
he hasn’t gotten a declaration to put before the Court despite the continuance.” The court
noted that had Berry supplied the needed information or declaration and an expert
potentially been appointed, the court could have considered delaying ruling on
Dr. Rasheed’s summary judgment motion.
14.
Berry’s briefs do not persuasively address the court’s above-noted reasons for
denying his motion to appoint a medical expert. Accordingly, we conclude that Berry has
not shown that the trial court’s denial of his motion to appoint a medical expert under the
circumstances reflected in the record, was an abuse of discretion.
IV. Trial Court’s Denial of Berry’s Request, During Trial, For a Body
Attachment Bench Warrant for Dr. Rasheed
Finally, Berry argues the trial court erred in denying his request, during trial, for a
body attachment bench warrant to compel Dr. Rasheed to testify in an expert
capacity/provide opinion testimony in Berry’s case against Obguehi. We conclude Berry
has forfeited his arguments. In any event, even were we to consider Berry’s arguments as
presented, they lack merit.
A. Berry Has Forfeited his Arguments
As noted, Berry contends the trial court erred in denying his request for a body
attachment bench warrant to compel Dr. Rasheed to testify in an expert capacity/provide
opinion testimony in Berry’s case against Obguehi. However, Berry’s arguments are not
supported by requisite citations to the record. Accordingly, Berry has forfeited his
arguments. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
142, 156 [“ ‘ “[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, ... the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived” ’ ”]; Duarte v. Chino
Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 [“If a party fails to support an
argument with the necessary citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be
stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived.”]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a).)
In any event, Berry’s contentions, taken as presented, lack merit. Berry contends
that he subpoenaed Dr. Rasheed to appear as a witness at trial. Berry notes that
Dr. Rasheed’s testimony was necessary to shed light on issues related to the “ ‘[s]tandard
of care’ ” and “the essential element of causation.” Berry states that Dr. Rasheed “was
15.
subpoenaed and given the ordinary witness fees due to him” to testify as Berry’s treating
physician, but Dr. Rasheed requested an expert fee of “$20,000.00 to testify at trial.”
Berry adds that “the trial court denied [Berry’s] request to issue a body attachment to
bring Dr. Rasheed to trial as he was paid the normal witness fees.” Berry states the court
incorrectly ruled, pursuant to Government Code section 68092.5, that “Dr. Rasheed [was]
entitled to expert fees of $20,000.00 before attaching a warrant to get him to trial.” Berry
asserts the court abused its discretion.
Ogbuehi, for his part, also does not delineate the background relevant to resolution
of this issue. Nonetheless, Ogbuehi responds that “the court properly denied [Berry’s]
request for a body attachment bench warrant [for] Dr. Rasheed during trial.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
Ogbuehi argues that, under Government Code section 68092.5, subdivision (a)(1),
both an expert witness and a treating provider “ ‘who is asked to express an opinion’ at
trial” is entitled to his “ ‘reasonable and customary hourly rate’ ” for the duration of his
testimony. Ogbuehi adds that, under Government Code section 68092.5, subdivision (b),
this fee must be tendered “with the subpoena or prior to the expert’s testimony” and
“[f]ailure to tender the fee with the subpoena renders the subpoena ineffective to compel
the physician’s attendance at trial unless the parties stipulate otherwise.”
Ogbuehi contends that Dr. Rasheed requested $20,000 for his trial testimony;
Berry did not furnish the fee to Dr. Rasheed prior to the requested testimony; the parties
did not reach a stipulation regarding Dr. Rasheed’s appearance at trial; and therefore, the
subpoena served on Dr. Rasheed was not effective to compel his testimony. Ogbuehi
adds: “To the extent that [Berry] disagreed with Dr. Rasheed’s fee, he was required to
file a motion with the trial court. (Gov. Code, § 68092.5[,] subd. (c).) Rather than file
the required motion, Berry proceeded with a request for a body attachment. [Citation.]
Such is not the appropriate procedure when a party disagrees with an expert’s fee. On
that basis, the trial court properly denied [Berry’s] request.”
16.
Berry posits the trial court erred under Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d
310 (Evers). He points out that Evers clarified that Government Code section 68092.5
requires the payment of expert witness fees to a witness only when the witness testifies
solely as an expert. (See Evers at pp. 315-316.) Berry provides the following quote from
Evers: “ ‘A physician who has rendered medical services to the patient by way of
examination or treatment is subject to the power of subpoena and entitled only to
ordinary witness fees.’ ” (See Evers at p. 316)
Ogbuehi counters: “Berry improperly relies upon [Evers] in an attempt to avoid
the plain language of the statute. However, Government Code [section] 68092.5,
subdivision (a)(1) was amended after the decision in Evers to specifically cover treating
physicians. As such, Evers is inapplicable.” Ogbuehi is correct; Government Code
section 68092.5 was amended as described, by Stats. 1988, c. 275, § 1 (1987-1988 Leg.
Session). (See Cal. Subpoena Handbook, § 5:5.)
Here, Berry contends Dr. Rasheed would have opined on issues related to the
standard of care and to causation, among other things. For Dr. Rasheed to provide such
opinions, he would have been entitled, under Government Code section 68092.5, at a
minimum to his customary hourly fee for the duration of his testimony. But Dr. Rasheed
was, instead, provided with the statutory witness fee, rendering ineffective the subpoena
served on him, for the above-described purpose. Under these circumstances, Berry has
not shown the trial court erred in denying his request for a body attachment bench
warrant for Dr. Rasheed. Further, as noted above, Berry has not provided record citations
supporting his arguments and, consequently, this court cannot ascertain all the facts
relevant to his arguments.
17.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.9 Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
LEVY, J.
9 Berry’s request for sanctions against the Clerk of the Kings County Superior
Court is denied.
18.
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