Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises CA2/5

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Filed 4/30/26 Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MASSIEL HERNANDEZ, B323303

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV26283)

SOHNEN ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Steven I. Goorvitch, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Wolflick, Khachaturian & Bouayad, Gregory D. Wolflick
and Theodore S. Khachaturian for Defendant and Appellant.
Moon Law Group and Kane Moon for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
An employee filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281.97 to withdraw from arbitration and litigate in state
court after the employer failed to pay arbitration costs within 30
days of the due date.1 Based on the provisions of section 1281.97,
the trial court found the employer breached the arbitration
agreement and granted the motion. On appeal, the employer
contends that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq.) governs the parties’ arbitration agreement and preempts
section 1281.97.
On May 22, 2024, we issued our initial majority opinion
with a dissent in this case. First, the majority determined that
an order granting a motion under section 1281.97 to withdraw
from arbitration and proceed in court is appealable. Second, the
majority concluded that the order must be reversed because the
substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA apply to the
arbitration agreement in this case. Alternatively, even if
California’s arbitration laws applied, the majority construed
section 1281.97 to mandate findings of breach and waiver for
nonpayment of arbitration fees, in violation of the substantive
provisions of the FAA.
On August 21, 2024, the California Supreme Court granted
review in this case and deferred further action pending its
decision on a similar preemption issue under the provisions of
section 1281.98 (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted June 12, 2024, S284498). On
August 11, 2025, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in

1 All further statutory references are to the California Code
of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.

2
Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 322–323
(Hohenshelt), rejecting a construction of 1281.98 that would
result in preemption, and instead concluding, when properly
construed, the provisions of section 1281.98 are not preempted by
the FAA.
The California Supreme Court transferred this case back to
us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider it in light
of Hohenshelt. Based on the guidance provided in Hohenshelt, we
conclude that even when an arbitration agreement is governed by
the FAA in its entirety, including both substantive and
procedural provisions of the FAA, a state law arbitration
procedure that does not conflict with the FAA’s procedures or the
FAA’s substantive equal-treatment principle will apply in state
court. In this case, the parties’ agreement selected the FAA in its
entirety, but section 1281.97, properly construed in accordance
with Hohenshelt, does not conflict with any procedure of the FAA
and is not preempted by the substantive provisions of the FAA.
We now vacate our original opinion issued on May 22, 2024, and
issue this new opinion reversing the trial court’s order with
directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 2016, plaintiff and respondent Massiel
Hernandez executed an arbitration agreement with defendant
and appellant Sohnen Enterprises, Inc., that stated, “This
Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), 9
U.S.C. [section] 1, et seq.” The agreement provided that “any
disputes regarding the enforceability, interpretation, scope,
applicability or coverage of this Agreement are reserved solely for

3
the Court, not for arbitration.” If the parties could not agree on
an arbitrator, a party could “seek court appointment of an
arbitrator pursuant to the FAA.” The agreement explained that
arbitration fees would be paid by Sohnen or other parties to the
dispute, not by the employee, but parties choosing to be
represented by an attorney would be responsible for their own
attorney fees. During arbitration, the parties could conduct
discovery and bring motions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure except as specifically provided otherwise in the
agreement. The parties waived class or representative actions “to
the fullest extent permitted by the FAA.” The agreement also
provided, “The arbitrator shall not have the power to commit
errors of law or legal reasoning and the arbitrator’s award may
be vacated or corrected by a court of competent jurisdiction for
any such error. The decision of the arbitrator can be entered and
enforced as a final judgment in any court of competent
jurisdiction.”
Hernandez worked for Sohnen as a “product handler” from
February 2015 to August 2020. On July 16, 2021, Hernandez
filed a complaint against Sohnen for disability discrimination,
Labor Code violations, and related causes of action. On
November 8, 2021, the parties stipulated to stay the trial court
proceedings and arbitrate pursuant to their arbitration
agreement, which they attached. The stipulation stated that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the arbitration. The
parties represented that their agreement “fully complies with the
requirements of Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83,” because the arbitration would
provide a neutral arbitrator, all types of relief otherwise available
in court, a written arbitration award, and Sohnen would pay “the

4
entire cost of the arbitration filing fee and the arbitrator’s initial
deposit (or any similar request, including any fees or costs that
are unique to the arbitration) on or before any deadline specified
by the arbitrator to do so[.]” The trial court entered an order in
accordance with the terms of the stipulation, stating that Sohnen
must pay the arbitration costs on or before any deadline specified
by the arbitrator.
Hernandez filed a demand for arbitration with the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS). On April 7,
2022, JAMS sent a notice to the parties stating that filing fees of
$1,750 were due upon receipt. Once the fees were received,
JAMS would formally commence the matter and proceed with the
arbitrator selection process. Sohnen paid the filing fees on
May 13, 2022.
Hernandez filed a motion in the trial court to withdraw
from arbitration and vacate the stay of court proceedings
pursuant to section 1281.97. She argued that under section
1281.97, Sohnen materially breached the arbitration agreement
and waived its right to arbitrate by failing to pay the arbitration
fees within 30 days of the due date.
Sohnen opposed the motion on several grounds, including
that the FAA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to
the arbitration, rather than California’s Code of Civil Procedure,
and the FAA preempts sections 1281.97, 1281.98, and 1281.99.
In July 2022, Hernandez filed a reply. She noted Sohnen
did not dispute that the deposit to initiate arbitration was not
paid within 30 days of the due date. She argued that although
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the arbitration
itself, there was no arbitration because Sohnen did not timely

5
pay the deposit required to commence arbitration. In addition,
the FAA did not preempt section 1281.97.
On August 31, 2022, a hearing was held on the motion to
withdraw from arbitration and vacate the stay of court
proceedings under section 1281.97. The trial court took the
matter under submission. On September 1, 2022, the court found
Sohnen had paid the required arbitration fees late and therefore
breached the arbitration agreement, as provided in section
1281.97. The court ordered that Hernandez was not required to
arbitrate, granted the motion to withdraw from arbitration, and
vacated the stay of litigation. The court concluded the FAA did
not preempt section 1281.97. As an additional basis for the
ruling, the court found Sohnen violated the trial court’s order to
pay the cost of the arbitration and the initial deposit on or before
the arbitrator’s deadline. Although federal rules might apply to
the arbitration itself, the court concluded federal rules did not
apply to the trial court’s decisions in advance of the arbitration
proceeding, and the parties had delegated threshold
determinations to the court. The court awarded $1,230 in
monetary sanctions to Hernandez for reasonable expenses
incurred as a result of the material breach. Sohnen filed an
appeal from the order under section 1281.97.
As noted above, we issued our initial majority opinion on
May 22, 2024, concluding that the parties’ arbitration agreement
was governed by the FAA, rather than California arbitration law,
but that even if section 1281.97 applied, it was preempted by
federal law. The California Supreme Court granted review in
this case on August 21, 2024, and deferred further action pending
its decision on a similar preemption issue in Hohenshelt v.
Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted

6
June 12, 2024, S284498. On August 11, 2025, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Hohenshelt, interpreting the provisions of
section 1281.98 to avoid preemption by the FAA. (Hohenshelt,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 322–323.) The California Supreme Court
transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our
decision and reconsider it in light of Hohenshelt. The parties
have not filed supplemental briefs.

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether an
order under section 1281.97 allowing a party to withdraw from
arbitration and proceed in court is an appealable order.2 We
have an independent obligation to confirm that an appealable

2 Appealability was not at issue in Hohenshelt.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 324–326). In Hohenshelt,
the trial court denied the plaintiff’s petition to withdraw from
arbitration and proceed in court pursuant to section 1281.98.
(Ibid.) The plaintiff sought review through a petition for writ of
mandate, which the appellate court granted in Hohenshelt v.
Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1326. The California
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s order with
directions to remand the matter to the trial court to consider
whether the defendant was excused from failing to timely pay
arbitration fees and whether the delay caused compensable harm
to the plaintiff. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.)

7
order or judgment exists establishing appellate jurisdiction.
(Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.)
“The right to appeal is statutory.” (Gastelum v. Remax
Internat., Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1021 (Gastelum).)
Section 904.1 provides a general list of appealable civil judgments
and orders.3 In addition, an order “dismissing or denying a

3 Section 904.1 states in full: “(a) An appeal, other than in
a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal. An appeal, other
than in a limited civil case, may be taken from any of the
following: [¶] (1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory
judgment, other than as provided in paragraphs (8), (9), and (11),
or a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by
Section 1222. [¶] (2) From an order made after a judgment made
appealable by paragraph (1) [¶] (3) From an order granting a
motion to quash service of summons or granting a motion to stay
the action on the ground of inconvenient forum, or from a written
order of dismissal under Section 581d following an order granting
a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient
forum. [¶] (4) From an order granting a new trial or denying a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. [¶] (5) From an
order discharging or refusing to discharge an attachment or
granting a right to attach order. [¶] (6) From an order granting
or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an
injunction. [¶] (7) From an order appointing a receiver. [¶] (8)
From an interlocutory judgment, order, or decree, made or
entered in an action to redeem real or personal property from a
mortgage thereof, or a lien thereon, determining the right to
redeem and directing an accounting. [¶] (9) From an
interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the
rights and interests of the respective parties and directing
partition to be made. [¶] (10) From an order made appealable by
the Probate Code or the Family Code. [¶] (11) From an
interlocutory judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions

8
petition to compel arbitration” is appealable under section 1294,
subdivision (a), of the California Arbitration Act (CAA; § 1280 et
seq.). Interlocutory orders, on the other hand, are generally not
appealable. (Gastelum, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.)
No statute expressly states that orders under section
1281.97 are appealable, but California courts have concluded
orders that are the “functional equivalent” of denying a petition
to compel arbitration are appealable under section 1294,
subdivision (a). In Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc. (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 94, 98 (Henry), the appellate court concluded that an
order staying arbitration proceedings under section 1281.2 of the
CAA should be treated the same as an order denying a petition to
compel arbitration. Under section 1281.2, if a court determines
that a party to arbitration is also a party to litigation with a third
party and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact, the court may order a stay of arbitration
pending the outcome of the court action. The Henry court
reasoned, “an order staying arbitration is the functional
equivalent of an order refusing to compel arbitration. We note

by a party or an attorney for a party if the amount exceeds five
thousand dollars ($5,000). [¶] (12) From an order directing
payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a
party if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).
[¶] (13) From an order granting or denying a special motion to
strike under Sections 425.16 and 425.19. [¶] (14) From a final
order or judgment in a bifurcated proceeding regarding child
custody or visitation rights. [¶] (b) Sanction orders or judgments
of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less against a party or an
attorney for a party may be reviewed on an appeal by that party
after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the
discretion of the court of appeal, may be reviewed upon petition
for an extraordinary writ.”

9
the advantages of arbitration include ‘a presumptively less costly,
more expeditious manner of resolving disputes.’ [Citations.] It
follows a party to a valid arbitration agreement has a contractual
right to have its dispute with another party to the contract
resolved quickly and inexpensively. An order refusing to compel
arbitration, if not reviewed immediately, would significantly
delay arbitration and defeat its purpose. The order would force
the party seeking arbitration to proceed with a potentially
lengthy and costly trial and, if dissatisfied with the result, appeal
from the final judgment. [Citation.] By the time the Court of
Appeal overturned the trial court’s order, the value of the right to
arbitrate would be significantly diminished by the delay and
expense of litigation. The Legislature’s dissatisfaction with this
result led it to enact section 1294, subdivision (a) which
specifically authorizes an appeal from an order ‘dismissing or
denying a petition to compel arbitration. . . .’ (Recommendation
and Study Relating to Arbitration (Dec. 1960) 3 Cal.Law Revision
Com.Rep. (1961) G–1, G–60 & fn. 194.)” (Henry, supra, 233
Cal.App.3d at pp. 99–100.) “[An] order staying arbitration is
merely the flip side of an order refusing to compel arbitration and
should be treated the same for purposes of appellate review.” (Id.
at p. 100.)
An interlocutory order denying a stay of court proceedings,
however, is not an appealable order. (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
The Best Service Co., Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 650, 651–652.)
Denying a stay of court proceedings is not the functional
equivalent of denying a petition to compel arbitration. (Id. at
p. 654.) Similarly, an order that simply lifts a stay of litigation
that was previously imposed under section 1281.4 pending

10
arbitration is not an appealable order. (Gastelum, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 1023.)4
Courts have concluded that an order under section 1281.97
is the functional equivalent of denying a petition to compel
arbitration, and therefore, appealable. (Williams v. West Coast
Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1065 (Williams),
disapproved on another issue by Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 349; Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621,
633 (Gallo), disapproved on another issue by Hohenshelt, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) We agree with Williams and Gallo on this
point. An order under section 1281.97 finding the drafting party
materially breached the arbitration agreement, allowing the
employee or consumer to withdraw a claim from arbitration and
proceed in court, is not simply an order lifting a stay of court
proceedings. An order under section 1281.97 finding a defendant
materially breached the arbitration agreement and waived the
right to arbitrate operates as a complete defense to enforcement
of the parties’ arbitration agreement, which is the functional
equivalent of an order denying a petition to compel arbitration.
(Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1065.) If not reviewed
immediately, the order will significantly delay arbitration and

4 An order denying a stay of litigation pending arbitration
is reviewable, however, in connection with an appeal from
another appealable order or judgment. (MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit
Franchising, LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 643, 655.) Section
1294.2 of the CAA provides in pertinent part: “Upon an appeal
from any order or judgment under this title, the court may review
the decision and any intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or
decision which involves the merits or necessarily affects the order
or judgment appealed from, or which substantially affects the
rights of a party.”

11
defeat its purpose by forcing the party desiring arbitration to
conduct a potentially lengthy, costly trial, and to appeal from the
final judgment. By the time the appellate court overturns the
order, the value of the right to arbitrate would be significantly
diminished by the delay and expense of litigation.
Principles of statutory construction support our conclusion.
“[T]he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and
judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is enacted and to
have enacted and amended statutes ‘ “in the light of such
decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.” ’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897.) “ ‘[W]hen the
Legislature amends a statute without changing those portions . . .
that have previously been construed by the courts, the
Legislature is presumed to have known of and to have acquiesced
in the previous judicial construction.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 89–90.)
The Legislature was presumably aware of the case law
construing orders that are functionally equivalent to denying a
motion to compel arbitration to be appealable, but the
Legislature did not include any language to alter the existing law
or address appealability when it enacted section 1281.97.
Moreover, after Williams and Gallo held that orders under
section 1281.97 are appealable as the functional equivalent of an
order denying a motion to compel arbitration, the Legislature
amended section 1294, subdivision (a), effective January 1, 2024,
to add that “the perfecting of such an appeal shall not
automatically stay any proceedings in the trial court during the

12
pendency of the appeal.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 710 (S.B. 365), § 1.)5
By amending section 1294, subdivision (a), without changing the
portion that had been construed to include orders under section
1281.97, the Legislature is considered to have acquiesced to the
judicial construction. The Legislature chose instead to balance
competing interests by providing, in the trial court’s discretion,
for litigation to proceed in court while the order denying
arbitration is reviewed on appeal.
Because we conclude the order under section 1281.97 is
appealable, we consider whether the trial court properly applied
section 1281.97.

B. Relevant Statutory Schemes

1. The FAA

The FAA was enacted to override judicial hostility to
enforcing arbitration agreements. (Volt Information Sciences,

5 An analysis of Senate Bill 365 (SB 365) prepared for the
Senate Judiciary Committee states the purpose of the bill as
follows in pertinent part: “Current law allows corporate
defendants to pause a consumer, government, or worker’s case by
simply filing an appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to
compel arbitration. Through this process, powerful corporations
delay cases filed against them for typically one to three years.
This bill allows consumers, governments, or workers to move
their case forward if a company files an appeal, rather than
waiting for years while the appeal is heard. SB 365 will level the
playing field for consumers, governments, and workers who
deserve to move their case forward when a company or employer
violates their rights.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of SB
365 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 7, 2023, p. 6.)

13
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University
(1989) 489 U.S. 468, 478 (Volt).) It incorporates “a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration.” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 761.)
The FAA applies to arbitration provisions in contracts
involving commerce. (9 U.S.C. § 2.)6 Section 2 of the FAA
provides that an arbitration agreement within the scope of the
FAA is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract or as otherwise provided in [the FAA].” (9 U.S.C. § 2.)
Section 2 of the FAA encompasses two concepts: an
“enforcement mandate” establishing that arbitration agreements
are enforceable under federal law, and a “savings clause”
allowing invalidation of arbitration agreements on grounds that
apply to any contract. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 327.)
The two concepts combined form “ ‘an equal-treatment principle:
A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on
“generally applicable contract defenses” like fraud or
unconscionability, but not on legal rules that “apply only to

6 Specifically, the FAA applies in “any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9
U.S.C. § 2.) The phrase “involving commerce” in section 2 of the
FAA is broader than merely people and activities within the flow
of interstate commerce; it extends the FAA’s reach to the full
limits of the Commerce Clause. (Allied-Bruce Terminix
Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 279 & 273; Muller
v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1056,
1062.) “Employment contracts, except for those covering workers
engaged in transportation, are covered by the [FAA.]” (Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.
(2002) 534 U.S. 279, 289.)

14
arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” ’ ” (Viking River Cruises, Inc.
v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 650.)
The FAA does not bestow arbitration agreements with
special status; it simply ensures arbitration agreements are as
enforceable as other contracts. (Cronus Investments, Inc. v.
Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 384 (Cronus).)
The substantive federal arbitration law contained in
section 2 of the FAA applies to any arbitration agreement within
the scope of the FAA, whether in federal or state court. (Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24;
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334,
1350–1351 (DIRECTV); Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 387–
390.) The FAA does not expressly preempt state law, and
Congress did not intend for the FAA to occupy the entire field of
arbitration. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 477.) But when the FAA
applies to an agreement, the substantive provisions of the FAA
will preempt state law to the extent that the state law actually
conflicts with the federal law or operates as an obstacle to
accomplishing the purposes of the FAA. (Ibid.; Cronus, supra, 35
Cal.4th at pp. 387–390)
The FAA also contains procedural provisions, which apply
in federal court proceedings related to arbitrations. (DIRECTV,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1351.) By their terms, the procedural
provisions of the FAA are limited to federal courts and do not
apply in state court. (Ibid.) For example, sections 10 and 11 of
the FAA set forth provisions for limited judicial review of
arbitration awards by “the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made.” (9 U.S.C. § 10, § 11;
DIRECTV, supra, at p. 1351.)

15
Generally, if an arbitration proceeding is filed in California
court and the parties’ agreement falls within the scope of the
FAA, the procedural provisions of the FAA do not apply; instead,
the procedural provisions of California’s arbitration laws apply in
California courts by default, unless the state law procedure is
preempted because it conflicts with the substantive equal-
treatment principle of the FAA. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 407–410 (Rosenthal);
Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 164–174
(Valencia).) “It is a ‘general and unassailable proposition . . . that
States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation
in their own courts,’ even when the controversy is governed by
substantive federal law.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
p. 409.)

2. The CAA

In California, the CAA provides a comprehensive statutory
scheme, which governs arbitration agreements outside the scope
of the FAA. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3
Cal.4th 1, 9; Derner & Haydock, Confirming an Arbitration
Award (1997) 23 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 879, 882–883, fn.19 [“In
rare cases, where the arbitration matter does not involve
interstate commerce, a state arbitration act may apply”].) In
addition, as explained above, when an agreement falls within the
scope of the FAA, the CAA supplies procedural law in state courts
“to fill in gaps left by the FAA,” provided the state law does not
conflict with the FAA’s equal-treatment principle. (Hohenshelt,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 327.)

16
The CAA similarly provides that a written arbitration
agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except on
grounds for the revocation of any contract. (§ 1281.) “[U]nder
California law, as under federal law, an arbitration agreement
may only be invalidated for the same reasons as other contracts.”
(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 98.)
In 2019, the California Legislature added sections 1281.97,
1281.98, and 1281.99 to the CAA to assist consumers and
employees who find themselves in “procedural limbo” because
they are required to submit a dispute to arbitration, but the
entity enforcing the arbitration agreement has not paid the
arbitration fees required to proceed. (Stats. 2019, ch. 870, § 4;
Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 329.) Section 1281.97
addresses the failure to timely pay fees or costs to initiate
arbitration, while section 1281.98 addresses the failure to timely
pay fees or costs to continue arbitration.
Section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “In an
employment or consumer arbitration that requires . . . the
drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration
can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration
proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date[,] the
drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement,
is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel
arbitration under [s]ection 1281.2.”
Section 1281.97, subdivision (b), provides, “If the drafting
party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in
default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may do
either of the following: [¶] (1) Withdraw the claim from
arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. [¶]

17
(2) Compel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs related to the arbitration.” If
the employee or consumer chooses to withdraw from arbitration
and proceed in court, the court must impose sanctions on the
drafting party under section 1281.99. (§ 1281.98, subd. (d).)
In addition to the remedies provided under section 1281.97,
section 1281.99 provides that the company or business that
materially breached the arbitration agreement must pay the
“reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs,
incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material
breach” (§ 1281.99, subd. (a)), and may also suffer an evidentiary,
terminating, or contempt sanction unless it “acted with
substantial justification” or “other circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust” (§ 1281.99, subd. (b)).

C. Effect of Contract Provision Selecting Applicable
Law

Parties can expressly agree on the law that applies to their
agreements. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 476.)

1. Selection of California Law

When parties have expressly agreed to arbitrate in
accordance with state law - whether state substantive law, state
procedural law, or both - the FAA does not preempt the state law
to which the parties agreed. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 477–

18
478.) In other words, if the parties have agreed to apply a
provision of the CAA, no discussion of preemption is required.
For example, in Volt, the parties’ contract fell within the
coverage of the FAA because it involved interstate commerce, but
the contract contained a choice-of-law provision selecting
California’s arbitration rules. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 470–
472.) The Volt court concluded the parties’ contract could be
interpreted to incorporate California rules of arbitration without
offending any policy in the FAA. (Ibid.) “There is no federal
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules;
the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according
to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.” (Volt, supra,
489 U.S. at p. 476.) The appellant asserted that section 1281.2,
subdivision (c), which allows the court to stay arbitration pending
the resolution of litigation with a third party, was pre-empted
because it conflicts with procedural provisions of the FAA that do
not permit a stay of arbitration. (Id. at pp. 476–477.) The Volt
court held that because the parties agreed to arbitration in
accordance with California law, the application of section 1281.1,
subdivision (c), was not preempted. (Ibid.) “Where, as here, the
parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is
fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is
that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit
it to go forward.” (Id. at p. 479.)
In Cronus, the parties’ agreement selected California law,
but also selected the FAA “if it would be applicable.” (Cronus,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 380.) A dispute arose as to whether the
court should apply section 1281.2, subdivision (c), allowing a stay
of arbitration, or section 3 of the FAA, requiring a stay of

19
litigation pending completion of the arbitration. (Ibid. at
pp. 387–88.) The California Supreme Court concluded that the
procedural provisions of the FAA, by their terms, were not
“applicable” in state court, so there was no conflict to resolve
about which procedure had been selected by the parties. (Id. at
pp. 387–390.) The substantive provisions of the FAA were
applicable, but section 1281.2, subdivision (c), did not conflict
with the FAA’s substantive equal-treatment principle. (Id. at
p. 391.) The Cronus court added, “Our opinion does not preclude
parties to an arbitration agreement to expressly designate that
any arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA’s
procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.
We simply hold that the language of the arbitration clause in this
case, calling for the application of the FAA ‘if it would be
applicable,’ should not be read to preclude the application of
1281.2(c), because it does not conflict with the applicable
provisions of the FAA and does not undermine or frustrate the
FAA’s substantive policy favoring arbitration.” (Cronus, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 394.)
In Valencia, the court considered yet another conflict
between section 1281.2, subdivision (c), and the procedures of
sections 3 and 4 of the FAA. (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 156–157.) The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes as
provided by California law, and the arbitration decision was to be
in accordance with substantive California law, but interpretation
of the agreement “ ‘shall be governed by the [FAA].’ ” (Id. at
pp. 159–160, emphasis omitted.) The Valencia court concluded
the same rules of contract interpretation applied under both the
FAA and the CAA. (Id. at p. 176.) Applying the plain meaning
rule of contract interpretation, as employed by the FAA, the court

20
found the agreement expressly incorporated the CAA’s
procedural provisions, and did not expressly adopt the FAA’s
procedural provisions, so section 1281.2, subdivision (c) applied.
(Id. at pp. 177–178.)

2. Selection of Federal Law

Parties may also select the FAA to govern their agreement,
including the FAA’s procedural provisions, rather than the
procedures of the CAA. (Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 394;
Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157.) If state and federal
arbitration procedures conflict, but the parties expressly selected
the procedural provisions of the FAA, the federal procedures will
be applied in state court based on the parties’ choice of law.
(Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 394; Valencia, supra, 185
Cal.App.4th at p. 157.) No discussion of preemption is required
under these circumstances.
For example, in Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc.
(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114–1115 (Rodriguez), the court
was faced with the conflict between section 1281.2, subdivision
(c), and the FAA’s procedural provisions. The parties’ contract
agreed to arbitrate claims “[p]ursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act.” (Id. at p. 1116.) The Rodriguez court found the phrase
“ ‘pursuant to the FAA’ ” to be “broad and unconditional.” (Id. at
p. 1122.) The parties had unambiguously adopted all of the FAA,
including both its procedural and substantive provisions. (Id. at
p. 1122.) No language in the contract suggested the parties
intended to limit the application of the FAA or incorporate
California arbitration law. (Id. at p. 1122.) Although the
procedural provisions of section 3 of the FAA do not generally

21
apply in state courts, the parties had designated the FAA’s
procedural provisions to apply to their arbitration proceeding
rather than state procedural law. (Id. at p. 1122.) Therefore, the
court concluded, “[t]he FAA controls, including section 3 which
requires the court to stay the judicial proceeding and compel
arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1122; but see Wright v. WellQuest Elk
Grove, LLC (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 267, 281 [broad language to
arbitrate “in accordance with” FAA did not constitute express
designation of FAA’s procedural provisions, disagreeing with
Rodriguez court].)

3. Choice of Law Issue Not Timely Raised

In DIRECTV, the California Supreme Court considered
whether California’s provisions for judicial review of an
arbitration award applied, allowing parties to alter to scope of
judicial review by agreement, or the procedural provisions of the
FAA applied, which do not permit parties to expand the scope of
judicial review by agreement, but allow states to provide for
additional review. (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1339–
1340.) The parties’ agreement stated the arbitrators did not have
the power to make errors of law and the award may be vacated or
corrected for such an error. (Id. at p. 1341, fn. 3.) The agreement
also provided that “ ‘[the arbitration provisions of the agreement]
and any arbitration conducted hereunder shall be governed by
the [FAA.]’ ” (Ibid.)
In a footnote, the DIRECTV court concluded the appellant
had not timely raised the question of whether judicial review was
governed by the FAA based on the choice-of-law provision in the
parties’ agreement. (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1350,

22
fn. 12.) The DIRECTV court stated, “[s]ections 10 and 11 of the
FAA refer to review by ‘the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made.’ (9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a), 11(a).)
The parties’ contract did not specify whether enforcement
proceedings were to be brought in state or federal court,
providing generally that ‘[t]he decision of the arbitrators may be
entered and enforced as a final judgment in any court of
competent jurisdiction.’ DIRECTV’s petition to vacate the award
was filed, argued, and appealed in state court, and before the
[decision in Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (2008) 552 U.S.
576,] both parties proceeded on the theory that the CAA was
controlling. ‘The rule is well settled that the theory upon which a
case is tried must be adhered to on appeal. A party is not
permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different
theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing
litigant.’ [Citations.]” (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1350,
fn. 12.)
The DIRECTV court went on to conclude that the FAA’s
procedural provisions were not controlling in state court, the
provision of the parties’ contract expanding the scope of judicial
review to include errors of law was enforceable under the CAA,
and the CAA’s procedure was not preempted by the substantive
policy of the FAA. (Id. at pp. 1340, 1352–1354.)
More recently, in Hohenshelt, the California Supreme
Court considered whether section 1281.98 applied to the parties’
arbitration proceeding or was preempted by the substantive
provisions of the FAA. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 322.)
The parties’ agreement provided that all claims would be
submitted to arbitration “ ‘governed by [the FAA].’ ” (Id. at

23
p. 324.) For the first time in briefing before the high court, the
respondent contended that section 1281.98 did not apply because
the parties had agreed to be bound by the FAA. (Id. at p. 326.)
The Hohenshelt court noted that whether the parties can, and
did, opt out of the CAA was not the issue on which the
respondent had sought review. “Accordingly, we decline to
address the belated contention that the CAA does not apply here.
We assume the CAA applies and proceed to examine the issue on
which we granted review.” (Id. at p. 327.)
The Hohenshelt court construed the plain language of
section 1281.98 in the context of California contract law.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 331–332.) The court found
no indication that the Legislature intended to displace
longstanding statutes and equitable principles providing relief to
a breaching party under certain circumstances. (Id. at p. 341.)
The court concluded that section 1281.98, properly construed in
harmony with California’s background statutes, makes
arbitration contracts enforceable on the same grounds as apply to
other contracts and is not preempted by the equal-treatment
principle of the FAA. (Id. at p. 346.)

D. Application to the Present Agreement

In this case, Sohnen contends the FAA governs the
arbitration agreement, including the substantive and procedural
provisions of the FAA, while Hernandez contends the procedures
of the CAA apply, including section 1281.97. We find that in
their agreement, the parties selected the FAA in its entirety,
including the substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA.
But we conclude that even when the parties have selected the

24
procedures of the FAA in their entirety, if a state law procedure
does not directly conflict with the FAA’s procedures or with the
FAA’s substantive equal-treatment principle, the state law
procedure applies in state court to fill in the gaps left by the FAA.

1. Standard of Review

Whether the parties’ agreement incorporated the FAA’s
procedural provisions, rather than section 1281.97, is a question
of law involving statutory and contract interpretation, with no
parol evidence, which we review de novo. (Rodriguez, supra, 136
Cal.App.4th at p. 1117.) “Under the plain meaning rule, courts
give the words of the contract or statute their usual and ordinary
meaning.” (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 162.)

2. Interpretation of Choice of Law Provision

The arbitration agreement in this case plainly states “this
agreement is governed by the FAA.” As in Rodriguez, supra, 136
Cal.App.4th at p. 1122, the statement in the arbitration
agreement is broad, encompassing both the procedural and
substantive provisions of the FAA. The agreement consistently
refers to procedures contained in the FAA, such as allowing a
party to seek appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to the FAA.
In addition, both the arbitration agreement and the parties’
stipulation expressly agree to apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to the arbitration. There is no provision explicitly
referring to California law in the agreement. We find the parties

25
selected the procedural provisions of the FAA and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hernandez contends the parties affirmatively incorporated
California’s arbitration law in their agreement, including section
1281.97, by entering the stipulation after he filed suit providing
that the arbitration “fully complies” with the requirements of
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 91, and listing those requirements. We disagree.
In Armendariz, the California Supreme Court held that
discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) are arbitrable if the arbitration meets
certain minimum standards of fairness allowing employees to
vindicate their statutory rights, “including neutrality of the
arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision
that will permit a limited form of judicial review, and limitations
on the costs of arbitration.” (Id. at p. 91.) Armendariz does not
require parties to arbitrate under the CAA. The parties’
agreement that their arbitration would meet California’s
minimum requirements for a fair arbitral forum did not
designate California arbitration law to govern the agreement.7

7 Hernandez has not raised any issue based on the
provision of the parties’ arbitration agreement allowing a court to
vacate or correct the arbitrator’s award for an error of law. The
procedural provisions of the FAA do not allow parties to expand
the scope of review by agreement (Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., supra, 552 U.S. at p. 590), while California law
allows parties to expressly agree to judicial review of the merits
of an arbitration award (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
pp. 1339–1340). On appeal, however, Hernandez has not relied
on this provision as evidence that the parties intended to apply

26
We conclude, however, that the parties’ selection of the
procedural and substantive provisions of the FAA, without more,
does not preclude the application of state law procedures that do
not conflict with the procedural or substantive provisions of the
FAA. States establish procedural rules governing litigation in
state courts which apply by default, even when a dispute is
governed by substantive federal law. (Rosenthal, supra, 14
Cal.4th at p. 409.) As the California Supreme Court explained in
Hohenshelt, “because the procedures in the FAA are not
comprehensive, every state has enacted its own arbitration act to
fill in gaps left by the FAA,” supplying rules that apply in state
court to an arbitration proceeding within the scope of the FAA as
long as they do not conflict with the substantive provisions of the
FAA. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 327.) In this case, the
parties selected the procedural provisions of the FAA, but their
agreement did not expressly preclude application of the CAA or
section 1281.97. Sohnen has not shown that section 1281.97
conflicts with any procedural provision of the FAA or any
provision of the parties’ agreement. Therefore, section 1281.97
applies to the arbitration proceeding in this case, unless it is
preempted by the substantive equal-treatment principle of the
FAA.

3. Preemption Analysis

Whether a state statute is preempted by the FAA depends
on whether the statute conflicts with or obstructs the purpose of
the FAA. (Gallo, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 637, disapproved on

California’s arbitration law to the agreement, and therefore, any
such argument has been waived.

27
another issue by Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) “The
United States Supreme Court has frequently held that state laws
invalidating arbitration agreements on grounds applicable only to
arbitration provisions contravene the policy of enforceability
established by section 2 of the FAA, and are therefore
preempted.” (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1351.) But state
laws that regulate arbitration without undermining the FAA’s
substantive policies are not preempted. (Gallo, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639.)
Even prior to the enactment of section 1281.97, under
generally applicable principles of California contract law, an
employee could avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement by
showing that the employer’s failure to perform an obligation was
a material breach of the agreement. (See Pry Corp. of America v.
Leach (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 632, 639; Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc.
(2005) 430 F.3d 1004, 1010–1012; Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 265, 277–278.) Similarly, an employer who fails to
perform an obligation under an arbitration agreement may have
waived the right to demand arbitration. (Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 983 (Engalla).)
Whether a party’s breach is material or a waiver of the right to
arbitrate is normally a question of fact. (Brown v. Grimes, supra,
192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 277–278; Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
pp. 983–984.)
In California, a payment made within a reasonable time
after the specified due date will usually constitute substantial
compliance unless the contract provides that time is of the
essence (Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment Group,
L.L.C. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 357, 364), but courts have
determined that certain types of contracts require time is of the

28
essence based on the subject matter of the contract (Hohenshelt,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 342–343). Arbitration agreements
inherently require that time is of the essence to achieve the
benefits of speed and efficiency that are hallmarks of alternative
dispute resolution. (Ibid.)
California law also contains several provisions that prevent
unjust forfeiture of arbitration rights for failing to pay arbitration
fees, including section 473, subdivision (b), and Civil Code
sections 3275 and 1511. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
pp. 332–335.) As the California Supreme Court explained in
Hohenshelt, section 1281.97 cannot be construed in isolation to
mandate findings of material breach and waiver for late
payment, in a manner which does not apply to contracts
generally, in violation of the equal-treatment principle of the
FAA. (See id. at p. 341 [construing similar provisions of section
1281.98].) Section 1281.97 must be construed in the context of
longstanding California contract law permitting the operation of
statutes and equitable principles that provide relief from
forfeiture. (See ibid. [construing section 1281.98 in harmony
with background statutes and principles allowing relief from
forfeiture where nonperformance was not willful, fraudulent, or
grossly negligent].) When construed in harmony with
California’s generally applicable contract law, section 1281.97
makes arbitration contracts enforceable on the same grounds as
apply to other contracts and is not preempted by the substantive
provisions of the FAA. (See id. at p. 346.)
Although section 1281.97 is not preempted by the FAA, in
light of the clarification that section 1281.97 does not preclude
application of California law providing relief to a breaching party
under certain circumstances, we must reverse the order allowing

29
Hernandez to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court,
and remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether
Sohnen may be excused for failing to timely pay arbitration fees
in this case.

E. Compliance With Court Order

As an alternative basis for the order granting the motion to
withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, separate from
the payment deadline imposed by section 1281.97, the trial court
found Sohnen violated the court’s order to pay arbitration fees
and costs “on or before any deadline specified by the arbitrator.”
Sohnen contends the payment order was not violated, and in any
event, vacating the stay of judicial proceedings was not an
appropriate sanction for any alleged violation of the payment
order. We agree.
The trial court’s payment order did not set a deadline for
payment that was violated. Nor can the invoice from the
arbitration provider be reasonably construed to have set a
specific payment date: the invoice ambiguously states that it is
“due upon receipt,” and Sohnen had a reasonable time for
payment from the point the invoice was received. Further, the
payment order did not reasonably advise the parties of the
consequences for violating any payment deadline. There is no
substantial evidence that a deadline imposed by the payment
order was missed, nor is there evidence justifying the sanction of
vacating the stay of judicial proceedings.

30
DISPOSITION

The September 1, 2022 order is reversed and remanded for
the trial court to consider whether the failure to timely pay
arbitration fees in this case may be excused under California law.
In the interests of justice, the parties are ordered to bear their
own costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J

31
Massiel Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc.
B323303

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

When this court’s opinion in this appeal first issued, I wrote
separately for several reasons. I expressed doubt that the order
from which this appeal is taken is actually an appealable order
and invited the Legislature to clarify whether it is. I opined the
arbitration agreement at issue is too ambiguous to conclude the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) fully applies, i.e., substantively
and procedurally. And I explained Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281.97 is not preempted by the FAA because there was
“no reason to believe that the Legislature’s specification of a 30-
day timeframe for what constitutes a material breach and waiver
for consumer and employment disputes that are supposed to be
resolved by the faster means of arbitration is meaningfully
inconsistent with what properly constitutes a material breach
and waiver for contracts where time is of the essence—and that is
the only category that matters for comparison purposes.”
Our Supreme Court then granted review and held the
matter for its decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18
Cal.5th 310. Hohenshelt holds the FAA does not preempt a
similar statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, because
the “30-day payment deadline after issuance of [an] arbitrator’s
invoice tracks other situations where contextual clues suggest
that parties want time to be of the essence” and California
statutes requiring prompt payment of arbitration fees should be
construed to permit withdrawing a matter from arbitration when
nonpayment is “willful, grossly negligent” and not when it
“results from a good faith mistake, inadvertence, or other
excusable neglect.” (Id. at 323, 342.)
The opinion the majority issues today after Hohenshelt
considerably narrows the earlier points of disagreement. The
majority concludes the FAA’s substantive and procedural rules
apply but this still does not bar application and enforcement of
the provisions of section 1281.97. I see no need to quibble with
this analysis because the bottom-line result is the same: the
provisions of section 1281.97—construed in the same manner as
our high court construed the provisions of section 1281.98—are
applicable. The majority additionally holds the cause should be
remanded so the trial court can decide whether the untimely
payment of arbitration fees in this case resulted from a good faith
mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. I do not disagree
with giving the trial court the opportunity to make that
determination in the first instance.

BAKER, Acting P. J.

2

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