Solis v. Sohnen Enterprises CA2/5

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Filed 4/30/26 Solis v. Sohnen Enterprises CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

CANDIDA SOLIS, B323296

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles
County Super. Ct.
v. No. 21STCV26265)

SOHNEN ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Timothy P. Dillon, Judge. Reversed.
Wolflick, Khachaturian & Bouayad, Gregory D. Wolflick
and Theodore S. Khachaturian for Defendants and Appellants.
Moon Law Group, Kane Moon, Christopher L. Garcia and
Sara Salinas for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
After an employer failed to pay arbitration costs within 30
days of the due date, the employee filed a motion to withdraw
from arbitration and litigate in state court as permitted under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97.1 The trial
court found the employer breached the arbitration agreement and
granted the motion. On appeal, the employer and two
individuals contend that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) governs the arbitration agreement and
preempts section 1281.97.
On May 23, 2024, we issued our initial majority opinion
with a dissent in this case. First, the majority determined that
an order granting a motion under section 1281.97 to withdraw
from arbitration and proceed in court is appealable. Second, the
majority concluded that the order must be reversed because the
substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA apply to the
arbitration agreement in this case. Alternatively, even if
California’s arbitration laws applied, the majority construed
section 1281.97 to mandate findings of breach and waiver for
nonpayment of arbitration fees, in violation of the substantive
provisions of the FAA.
On August 21, 2024, the California Supreme Court granted
review in this case and deferred further action pending its
decision on a similar preemption issue under the provisions of
section 1281.98 (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted June 12, 2024, S284498). On
August 11, 2025, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 322–323

1 All further statutory references are to the California Code
of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.

2
(Hohenshelt), rejecting a construction of 1281.98 that would
result in preemption, and instead concluding, when properly
construed, the provisions of section 1281.98 are not preempted by
the FAA.
The California Supreme Court transferred this case back to
us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider it in light
of Hohenshelt. Based on the guidance provided in Hohenshelt, we
conclude that even when an arbitration agreement is governed by
the FAA in its entirety, including both substantive and
procedural provisions of the FAA, a state law arbitration
procedure that does not conflict with the FAA’s procedures or the
FAA’s substantive equal-treatment principle will apply in state
court. In this case, the arbitration agreement selected the FAA
in its entirety, but section 1281.97, properly construed in
accordance with Hohenshelt, does not conflict with any procedure
of the FAA and is not preempted by the substantive provisions of
the FAA. We now vacate our original opinion issued on May 23,
2024, and issue this new opinion reversing the trial court’s order
with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 2016, plaintiff and respondent Candida
Solis executed an arbitration agreement with defendant and
appellant Sohnen Enterprises that stated, “This Agreement is
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), 9 U.S.C.
[section] 1, et seq.” The agreement provided that “any disputes
regarding the enforceability, interpretation, scope, applicability
or coverage of this Agreement are reserved solely for the Court,
not for arbitration.” If the parties could not agree on an

3
arbitrator, a party could “seek court appointment of an arbitrator
pursuant to the FAA.” The agreement explained that arbitration
fees would be paid by Sohnen or other parties to the dispute, not
by the employee, but parties choosing to be represented by an
attorney would be responsible for their own attorney fees.
During arbitration, the parties could conduct discovery and bring
motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except as
specifically provided otherwise in the agreement. The parties
waived class or representative actions “to the fullest extent
permitted by the FAA.” The agreement also provided, “The
arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or
legal reasoning and the arbitrator’s award may be vacated or
corrected by a court of competent jurisdiction for any such error.
The decision of the arbitrator can be entered and enforced as a
final judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction.”
Solis worked in Sohnen’s warehouse from August 2014 to
August 2020. On July 16, 2021, Solis filed a complaint against
Sohnen and two former coworkers, defendants and appellants
Claudia Hernandez and Diana Garcia (collectively Defendants)
for sexual harassment, sexual orientation harassment,
gender/sex discrimination, disability discrimination, Labor Code
violations, and related causes of action. On November 10, 2021,
the parties stipulated to stay the trial court proceedings and
arbitrate pursuant to their arbitration agreement, which they
attached. The stipulation stated that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applied to the arbitration. The parties represented
that their agreement “fully complies with the requirements of
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 83,” because the arbitration would provide a neutral
arbitrator, all types of relief otherwise available in court, a

4
written arbitration award, and Sohnen would pay “the entire cost
of the arbitration filing fee and the arbitrator’s initial deposit (or
any similar request, including any fees or costs that are unique to
the arbitration) on or before any deadline specified by the
arbitrator to do so[.]” The trial court entered an order in
accordance with the terms of the stipulation, stating that Sohnen
must pay the arbitration costs on or before any deadline specified
by the arbitrator.
Solis filed a demand for arbitration with the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS). On April 7,
2022, JAMS sent a notice to the parties stating that filing fees of
$1,750 were due upon receipt. Once the fees were received,
JAMS would formally commence the matter and proceed with the
arbitrator selection process. Sohnen paid the filing fees on
May 13, 2022.
Solis filed a motion in the trial court to withdraw from
arbitration and vacate the stay of court proceedings pursuant to
section 1281.97. She argued that under section 1281.97, Sohnen
materially breached the arbitration agreement and waived its
right to arbitrate by failing to pay the arbitration fees within 30
days of the due date.
Defendants opposed the motion on several grounds,
including that the FAA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
applied to the arbitration, rather than California’s Code of Civil
Procedure, and the FAA preempts sections 1281.97, 1281.98, and
1281.99.
In June 2022, Solis filed a reply. She noted Sohnen did not
dispute that the deposit to initiate arbitration was not paid
within 30 days of the due date. She argued that although the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the arbitration itself,

5
there was no arbitration because Sohnen did not timely pay the
deposit required to commence arbitration. In addition, the FAA
did not preempt section 1281.97, because section 1281.97
facilitated arbitration by requiring prompt payment of
arbitration expenses.
On June 22, 2022, a hearing was held on the motion to
withdraw from arbitration and vacate the stay of court
proceedings under section 1281.97. The trial court took the
matter under submission. On July 26, 2022, the trial court asked
the parties to submit further briefing as to whether Sohnen’s late
payment was a violation of the parties’ stipulation and the court’s
order requiring payment that created a separate ground to grant
the motion to vacate. Solis provided a supplemental brief taking
the position that the trial court could not grant the motion to
vacate the stay and withdraw from arbitration as a sanction for
Sohnen’s violation of the court order, and Sohnen’s breach of the
stipulation did not have an impact on whether the parties were
required to arbitrate. Defendants filed a supplemental brief
arguing that Sohnen did not violate the court’s order, and in fact,
had paid the arbitration fees early, because no arbitrator had yet
been appointed.
Another hearing was held on the motion to vacate on
August 23, 2022. The trial court found Sohnen had paid the
required arbitration fees late and therefore breached the
arbitration agreement, as provided in section 1281.97. The court
concluded the FAA did not preempt section 1281.97. As an
additional basis for the ruling, the court found Sohnen violated
the trial court’s order to pay the cost of the arbitration and the
initial deposit on or before the arbitrator’s deadline. Although
federal rules might apply to the arbitration itself, the court

6
concluded federal rules did not apply to the trial court’s decisions
in advance of the arbitration proceeding, and the parties had
delegated threshold determinations to the court. The court
awarded $1,500 in monetary sanctions to Solis for reasonable
expenses incurred as a result of the material breach. Defendants
filed a timely notice of appeal from the order under section
1281.97.
As noted above, we issued our initial majority opinion on
May 23, 2024, concluding that the arbitration agreement was
governed by the FAA, rather than California arbitration law, but
that even if section 1281.97 applied, it was preempted by federal
law. The California Supreme Court granted review in this case
on August 21, 2024, and deferred further action pending its
decision on a similar preemption issue in Hohenshelt v. Superior
Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted June 12, 2024,
S284498. On August 11, 2025, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Hohenshelt, interpreting the provisions of section
1281.98 to avoid preemption by the FAA. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18
Cal.5th at pp. 322–323.) The California Supreme Court
transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our
decision and reconsider it in light of Hohenshelt. The parties
have not filed supplemental briefs.

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether an
order under section 1281.97 allowing a party to withdraw from

7
arbitration and proceed in court is an appealable order.2 We
have an independent obligation to confirm that an appealable
order or judgment exists establishing appellate jurisdiction.
(Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.)
“The right to appeal is statutory.” (Gastelum v. Remax
Internat., Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1021 (Gastelum).)
Section 904.1 provides a general list of appealable civil judgments
and orders.3 In addition, an order “dismissing or denying a

2 Appealability was not at issue in Hohenshelt.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 324–326). In Hohenshelt,
the trial court denied the plaintiff’s petition to withdraw from
arbitration and proceed in court pursuant to section 1281.98.
(Ibid.) The plaintiff sought review through a petition for writ of
mandate, which the appellate court granted in Hohenshelt v.
Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1326. The California
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s order with
directions to remand the matter to the trial court to consider
whether the defendant was excused from failing to timely pay
arbitration fees and whether the delay caused compensable harm
to the plaintiff. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.)

3 Section 904.1 states in full: “(a) An appeal, other than in
a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal. An appeal, other
than in a limited civil case, may be taken from any of the
following: [¶] (1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory
judgment, other than as provided in paragraphs (8), (9), and (11),
or a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by
Section 1222. [¶] (2) From an order made after a judgment made
appealable by paragraph (1) [¶] (3) From an order granting a
motion to quash service of summons or granting a motion to stay
the action on the ground of inconvenient forum, or from a written
order of dismissal under Section 581d following an order granting

8
petition to compel arbitration” is appealable under section 1294,
subdivision (a), of the California Arbitration Act (CAA; § 1280

a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient
forum. [¶] (4) From an order granting a new trial or denying a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. [¶] (5) From an
order discharging or refusing to discharge an attachment or
granting a right to attach order. [¶] (6) From an order granting
or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an
injunction. [¶] (7) From an order appointing a receiver. [¶] (8)
From an interlocutory judgment, order, or decree, made or
entered in an action to redeem real or personal property from a
mortgage thereof, or a lien thereon, determining the right to
redeem and directing an accounting. [¶] (9) From an
interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the
rights and interests of the respective parties and directing
partition to be made. [¶] (10) From an order made appealable by
the Probate Code or the Family Code. [¶] (11) From an
interlocutory judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions
by a party or an attorney for a party if the amount exceeds five
thousand dollars ($5,000). [¶] (12) From an order directing
payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a
party if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).
[¶] (13) From an order granting or denying a special motion to
strike under Sections 425.16 and 425.19. [¶] (14) From a final
order or judgment in a bifurcated proceeding regarding child
custody or visitation rights. [¶] (b) Sanction orders or judgments
of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less against a party or an
attorney for a party may be reviewed on an appeal by that party
after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the
discretion of the court of appeal, may be reviewed upon petition
for an extraordinary writ.”

9
et seq.). Interlocutory orders, on the other hand, are generally
not appealable. (Gastelum, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.)
No statute expressly states that orders under section
1281.97 are appealable, but California courts have concluded
orders that are the “functional equivalent” of denying a petition
to compel arbitration are appealable under section 1294,
subdivision (a). In Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc. (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 94, 98 (Henry), the appellate court concluded that an
order staying arbitration proceedings under section 1281.2 of the
CAA should be treated the same as an order denying a petition to
compel arbitration. Under section 1281.2, if a court determines
that a party to arbitration is also a party to litigation with a third
party and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact, the court may order a stay of arbitration
pending the outcome of the court action. The Henry court
reasoned, “an order staying arbitration is the functional
equivalent of an order refusing to compel arbitration. We note
the advantages of arbitration include ‘a presumptively less costly,
more expeditious manner of resolving disputes.’ [Citations.] It
follows a party to a valid arbitration agreement has a contractual
right to have its dispute with another party to the contract
resolved quickly and inexpensively. An order refusing to compel
arbitration, if not reviewed immediately, would significantly
delay arbitration and defeat its purpose. The order would force
the party seeking arbitration to proceed with a potentially
lengthy and costly trial and, if dissatisfied with the result, appeal
from the final judgment. [Citation.] By the time the Court of
Appeal overturned the trial court’s order, the value of the right to
arbitrate would be significantly diminished by the delay and
expense of litigation. The Legislature’s dissatisfaction with this

10
result led it to enact section 1294, subdivision (a) which
specifically authorizes an appeal from an order ‘dismissing or
denying a petition to compel arbitration. . . .’ (Recommendation
and Study Relating to Arbitration (Dec. 1960) 3 Cal.Law Revision
Com.Rep. (1961) G–1, G–60 & fn. 194.)” (Henry, supra, 233
Cal.App.3d at pp. 99–100.) “[An] order staying arbitration is
merely the flip side of an order refusing to compel arbitration and
should be treated the same for purposes of appellate review.” (Id.
at p. 100.)
An interlocutory order denying a stay of court proceedings,
however, is not an appealable order. (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
The Best Service Co., Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 650, 651–652.)
Denying a stay of court proceedings is not the functional
equivalent of denying a petition to compel arbitration. (Id. at
p. 654.) Similarly, an order that simply lifts a stay of litigation
that was previously imposed under section 1281.4 pending
arbitration is not an appealable order. (Gastelum, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 1023.)4
Courts have concluded that an order under section 1281.97
is the functional equivalent of denying a petition to compel
arbitration, and therefore, appealable. (Williams v. West Coast

4 An order denying a stay of litigation pending arbitration
is reviewable, however, in connection with an appeal from
another appealable order or judgment. (MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit
Franchising, LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 643, 655.) Section
1294.2 of the CAA provides in pertinent part: “Upon an appeal
from any order or judgment under this title, the court may review
the decision and any intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or
decision which involves the merits or necessarily affects the order
or judgment appealed from, or which substantially affects the
rights of a party.”

11
Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1065 (Williams),
disapproved on another issue by Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 349; Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621,
633 (Gallo), disapproved on another issue by Hohenshelt, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) We agree with Williams and Gallo on this
point. An order under section 1281.97 finding the drafting party
materially breached the arbitration agreement, allowing the
employee or consumer to withdraw a claim from arbitration and
proceed in court, is not simply an order lifting a stay of court
proceedings. An order under section 1281.97 finding a defendant
materially breached the arbitration agreement and waived the
right to arbitrate operates as a complete defense to enforcement
of the parties’ arbitration agreement, which is the functional
equivalent of an order denying a petition to compel arbitration.
(Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1065.) If not reviewed
immediately, the order will significantly delay arbitration and
defeat its purpose by forcing the party desiring arbitration to
conduct a potentially lengthy, costly trial, and to appeal from the
final judgment. By the time the appellate court overturns the
order, the value of the right to arbitrate would be significantly
diminished by the delay and expense of litigation.
Principles of statutory construction support our conclusion.
“[T]he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and
judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is enacted and to
have enacted and amended statutes ‘ “in the light of such
decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.” ’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897.) “ ‘[W]hen the
Legislature amends a statute without changing those portions . . .
that have previously been construed by the courts, the
Legislature is presumed to have known of and to have acquiesced

12
in the previous judicial construction.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 89–90.)
The Legislature was presumably aware of the case law
construing orders that are functionally equivalent to denying a
motion to compel arbitration to be appealable, but the
Legislature did not include any language to alter the existing law
or address appealability when it enacted section 1281.97.
Moreover, after Williams and Gallo held that orders under
section 1281.97 are appealable as the functional equivalent of an
order denying a motion to compel arbitration, the Legislature
amended section 1294, subdivision (a), effective January 1, 2024,
to add that “the perfecting of such an appeal shall not
automatically stay any proceedings in the trial court during the
pendency of the appeal.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 710 (S.B. 365), § 1.)5
By amending section 1294, subdivision (a), without changing the
portion that had been construed to include orders under section
1281.97, the Legislature is considered to have acquiesced to the
judicial construction. The Legislature chose instead to balance

5 An analysis of Senate Bill 365 (SB 365) prepared for the
Senate Judiciary Committee states the purpose of the bill as
follows in pertinent part: “Current law allows corporate
defendants to pause a consumer, government, or worker’s case by
simply filing an appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to
compel arbitration. Through this process, powerful corporations
delay cases filed against them for typically one to three years.
This bill allows consumers, governments, or workers to move
their case forward if a company files an appeal, rather than
waiting for years while the appeal is heard. SB 365 will level the
playing field for consumers, governments, and workers who
deserve to move their case forward when a company or employer
violates their rights.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of SB
365 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 7, 2023, p. 6.)

13
competing interests by providing, in the trial court’s discretion,
for litigation to proceed in court while the order denying
arbitration is reviewed on appeal.
Because we conclude the order under section 1281.97 is
appealable, we consider whether the trial court properly applied
section 1281.97.

B. Relevant Statutory Schemes

1. The FAA

The FAA was enacted to override judicial hostility to
enforcing arbitration agreements. (Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University
(1989) 489 U.S. 468, 478 (Volt).) It incorporates “a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration.” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 761.)
The FAA applies to arbitration provisions in contracts
involving commerce. (9 U.S.C. § 2.)6 Section 2 of the FAA

6 Specifically, the FAA applies in “any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9
U.S.C. § 2.) The phrase “involving commerce” in section 2 of the
FAA is broader than merely people and activities within the flow
of interstate commerce; it extends the FAA’s reach to the full
limits of the Commerce Clause. (Allied-Bruce Terminix
Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 279 & 273; Muller
v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1056,
1062.) “Employment contracts, except for those covering workers
engaged in transportation, are covered by the [FAA.]” (Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.
(2002) 534 U.S. 279, 289.)

14
provides that an arbitration agreement within the scope of the
FAA is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract or as otherwise provided in [the FAA].” (9 U.S.C. § 2.)
Section 2 of the FAA encompasses two concepts: an
“enforcement mandate” establishing that arbitration agreements
are enforceable under federal law, and a “savings clause”
allowing invalidation of arbitration agreements on grounds that
apply to any contract. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 327.)
The two concepts combined form “ ‘an equal-treatment principle:
A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on
“generally applicable contract defenses” like fraud or
unconscionability, but not on legal rules that “apply only to
arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” ’ ” (Viking River Cruises, Inc.
v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 650.)
The FAA does not bestow arbitration agreements with
special status; it simply ensures arbitration agreements are as
enforceable as other contracts. (Cronus Investments, Inc. v.
Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 384 (Cronus).)
The substantive federal arbitration law contained in
section 2 of the FAA applies to any arbitration agreement within
the scope of the FAA, whether in federal or state court. (Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24;
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334,
1350–1351 (DIRECTV); Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 387–
390.) The FAA does not expressly preempt state law, and
Congress did not intend for the FAA to occupy the entire field of
arbitration. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 477.) But when the FAA
applies to an agreement, the substantive provisions of the FAA

15
will preempt state law to the extent that the state law actually
conflicts with the federal law or operates as an obstacle to
accomplishing the purposes of the FAA. (Ibid.; Cronus, supra, 35
Cal.4th at pp. 387–390)
The FAA also contains procedural provisions, which apply
in federal court proceedings related to arbitrations. (DIRECTV,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1351.) By their terms, the procedural
provisions of the FAA are limited to federal courts and do not
apply in state court. (Ibid.) For example, sections 10 and 11 of
the FAA set forth provisions for limited judicial review of
arbitration awards by “the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made.” (9 U.S.C. § 10, § 11;
DIRECTV, supra, at p. 1351.)
Generally, if an arbitration proceeding is filed in California
court and the parties’ agreement falls within the scope of the
FAA, the procedural provisions of the FAA do not apply; instead,
the procedural provisions of California’s arbitration laws apply in
California courts by default, unless the state law procedure is
preempted because it conflicts with the substantive equal-
treatment principle of the FAA. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 407–410 (Rosenthal);
Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 164–174
(Valencia).) “It is a ‘general and unassailable proposition . . . that
States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation
in their own courts,’ even when the controversy is governed by
substantive federal law.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
p. 409.)

16
2. The CAA

In California, the CAA provides a comprehensive statutory
scheme, which governs arbitration agreements outside the scope
of the FAA. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th
1, 9; Derner & Haydock, Confirming an Arbitration Award (1997)
23 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 879, 882–883, fn.19 [“In rare cases,
where the arbitration matter does not involve interstate
commerce, a state arbitration act may apply”].) In addition, as
explained above, when an agreement falls within the scope of the
FAA, the CAA supplies procedural law in state courts “to fill in
gaps left by the FAA,” provided the state law does not conflict
with the FAA’s equal-treatment principle. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18
Cal.5th at p. 327.)
The CAA similarly provides that a written arbitration
agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except on
grounds for the revocation of any contract. (§ 1281.) “[U]nder
California law, as under federal law, an arbitration agreement
may only be invalidated for the same reasons as other contracts.”
(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 98.)
In 2019, the California Legislature added sections 1281.97,
1281.98, and 1281.99 to the CAA to assist consumers and
employees who find themselves in “procedural limbo” because
they are required to submit a dispute to arbitration, but the
entity enforcing the arbitration agreement has not paid the
arbitration fees required to proceed. (Stats. 2019, ch. 870, § 4;
Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 329.) Section 1281.97
addresses the failure to timely pay fees or costs to initiate

17
arbitration, while section 1281.98 addresses the failure to timely
pay fees or costs to continue arbitration.
Section 1281.97, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “In an
employment or consumer arbitration that requires . . . the
drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration
can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration
proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date[,] the
drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement,
is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel
arbitration under [s]ection 1281.2.”
Section 1281.97, subdivision (b), provides, “If the drafting
party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in
default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may do
either of the following: [¶] (1) Withdraw the claim from
arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. [¶]
(2) Compel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs related to the arbitration.” If
the employee or consumer chooses to withdraw from arbitration
and proceed in court, the court must impose sanctions on the
drafting party under section 1281.99. (§ 1281.98, subd. (d).)
In addition to the remedies provided under section 1281.97,
section 1281.99 provides that the company or business that
materially breached the arbitration agreement must pay the
“reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs,
incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material
breach” (§ 1281.99, subd. (a)), and may also suffer an evidentiary,
terminating, or contempt sanction unless it “acted with
substantial justification” or “other circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust” (§ 1281.99, subd. (b)).

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C. Effect of Contract Provision Selecting Applicable
Law

Parties can expressly agree on the law that applies to their
agreements. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 476.)

1. Selection of California Law

When parties have expressly agreed to arbitrate in
accordance with state law - whether state substantive law, state
procedural law, or both - the FAA does not preempt the state law
to which the parties agreed. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 477–
478.) In other words, if the parties have agreed to apply a
provision of the CAA, no discussion of preemption is required.
For example, in Volt, the parties’ contract fell within the
coverage of the FAA because it involved interstate commerce, but
the contract contained a choice-of-law provision selecting
California’s arbitration rules. (Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 470–
472.) The Volt court concluded the parties’ contract could be
interpreted to incorporate California rules of arbitration without
offending any policy in the FAA. (Ibid.) “There is no federal
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules;
the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according
to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.” (Volt, supra,
489 U.S. at p. 476.) The appellant asserted that section 1281.2,
subdivision (c), which allows the court to stay arbitration pending
the resolution of litigation with a third party, was pre-empted
because it conflicts with procedural provisions of the FAA that do
not permit a stay of arbitration. (Id. at pp. 476–477.) The Volt
court held that because the parties agreed to arbitration in

19
accordance with California law, the application of section 1281.1,
subdivision (c), was not preempted. (Ibid.) “Where, as here, the
parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is
fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is
that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit
it to go forward.” (Id. at p. 479.)
In Cronus, the parties’ agreement selected California law,
but also selected the FAA “if it would be applicable.” (Cronus,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 380.) A dispute arose as to whether the
court should apply section 1281.2, subdivision (c), allowing a stay
of arbitration, or section 3 of the FAA, requiring a stay of
litigation pending completion of the arbitration. (Ibid. at
pp. 387–88.) The California Supreme Court concluded that the
procedural provisions of the FAA, by their terms, were not
“applicable” in state court, so there was no conflict to resolve
about which procedure had been selected by the parties. (Id. at
pp. 387–390.) The substantive provisions of the FAA were
applicable, but section 1281.2, subdivision (c), did not conflict
with the FAA’s substantive equal-treatment principle. (Id. at
p. 391.) The Cronus court added, “Our opinion does not preclude
parties to an arbitration agreement to expressly designate that
any arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA’s
procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.
We simply hold that the language of the arbitration clause in this
case, calling for the application of the FAA ‘if it would be
applicable,’ should not be read to preclude the application of
1281.2(c), because it does not conflict with the applicable
provisions of the FAA and does not undermine or frustrate the

20
FAA’s substantive policy favoring arbitration.” (Cronus, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 394.)
In Valencia, the court considered yet another conflict
between section 1281.2, subdivision (c), and the procedures of
sections 3 and 4 of the FAA. (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 156–157.) The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes as
provided by California law, and the arbitration decision was to be
in accordance with substantive California law, but interpretation
of the agreement “ ‘shall be governed by the [FAA].’ ” (Id. at
pp. 159–160, emphasis omitted.) The Valencia court concluded
the same rules of contract interpretation applied under both the
FAA and the CAA. (Id. at p. 176.) Applying the plain meaning
rule of contract interpretation, as employed by the FAA, the court
found the agreement expressly incorporated the CAA’s
procedural provisions, and did not expressly adopt the FAA’s
procedural provisions, so section 1281.2, subdivision (c) applied.
(Id. at pp. 177–178.)

2. Selection of Federal Law

Parties may also select the FAA to govern their agreement,
including the FAA’s procedural provisions, rather than the
procedures of the CAA. (Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 394;
Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157.) If state and federal
arbitration procedures conflict, but the parties expressly selected
the procedural provisions of the FAA, the federal procedures will
be applied in state court based on the parties’ choice of law.
(Cronus, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 394; Valencia, supra, 185
Cal.App.4th at p. 157.) No discussion of preemption is required
under these circumstances.

21
For example, in Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc.
(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114–1115 (Rodriguez), the court
was faced with the conflict between section 1281.2, subdivision
(c), and the FAA’s procedural provisions. The parties’ contract
agreed to arbitrate claims “[p]ursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act.” (Id. at p. 1116.) The Rodriguez court found the phrase
“ ‘pursuant to the FAA’ ” to be “broad and unconditional.” (Id. at
p. 1122.) The parties had unambiguously adopted all of the FAA,
including both its procedural and substantive provisions. (Id. at
p. 1122.) No language in the contract suggested the parties
intended to limit the application of the FAA or incorporate
California arbitration law. (Id. at p. 1122.) Although the
procedural provisions of section 3 of the FAA do not generally
apply in state courts, the parties had designated the FAA’s
procedural provisions to apply to their arbitration proceeding
rather than state procedural law. (Id. at p. 1122.) Therefore, the
court concluded, “[t]he FAA controls, including section 3 which
requires the court to stay the judicial proceeding and compel
arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1122; but see Wright v. WellQuest Elk
Grove, LLC (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 267, 281 [broad language to
arbitrate “in accordance with” FAA did not constitute express
designation of FAA’s procedural provisions, disagreeing with
Rodriguez court].)

3. Choice of Law Issue Not Timely Raised

In DIRECTV, the California Supreme Court considered
whether California’s provisions for judicial review of an
arbitration award applied, allowing parties to alter to scope of
judicial review by agreement, or the procedural provisions of the

22
FAA applied, which do not permit parties to expand the scope of
judicial review by agreement, but allow states to provide for
additional review. (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1339–
1340.) The parties’ agreement stated the arbitrators did not have
the power to make errors of law and the award may be vacated or
corrected for such an error. (Id. at p. 1341, fn. 3.) The agreement
also provided that “ ‘[the arbitration provisions of the agreement]
and any arbitration conducted hereunder shall be governed by
the [FAA.]’ ” (Ibid.)
In a footnote, the DIRECTV court concluded the appellant
had not timely raised the question of whether judicial review was
governed by the FAA based on the choice-of-law provision in the
parties’ agreement. (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1350,
fn. 12.) The DIRECTV court stated, “[s]ections 10 and 11 of the
FAA refer to review by ‘the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made.’ (9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a), 11(a).)
The parties’ contract did not specify whether enforcement
proceedings were to be brought in state or federal court,
providing generally that ‘[t]he decision of the arbitrators may be
entered and enforced as a final judgment in any court of
competent jurisdiction.’ DIRECTV’s petition to vacate the award
was filed, argued, and appealed in state court, and before the
[decision in Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (2008) 552 U.S.
576,] both parties proceeded on the theory that the CAA was
controlling. ‘The rule is well settled that the theory upon which a
case is tried must be adhered to on appeal. A party is not
permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different
theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing

23
litigant.’ [Citations.]” (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1350,
fn. 12.)
The DIRECTV court went on to conclude that the FAA’s
procedural provisions were not controlling in state court, the
provision of the parties’ contract expanding the scope of judicial
review to include errors of law was enforceable under the CAA,
and the CAA’s procedure was not preempted by the substantive
policy of the FAA. (Id. at pp. 1340, 1352–1354.)
More recently, in Hohenshelt, the California Supreme
Court considered whether section 1281.98 applied to the parties’
arbitration proceeding or was preempted by the substantive
provisions of the FAA. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 322.)
The parties’ agreement provided that all claims would be
submitted to arbitration “ ‘governed by [the FAA].’ ” (Id. at
p. 324.) For the first time in briefing before the high court, the
respondent contended that section 1281.98 did not apply because
the parties had agreed to be bound by the FAA. (Id. at p. 326.)
The Hohenshelt court noted that whether the parties can, and
did, opt out of the CAA was not the issue on which the
respondent had sought review. “Accordingly, we decline to
address the belated contention that the CAA does not apply here.
We assume the CAA applies and proceed to examine the issue on
which we granted review.” (Id. at p. 327.)
The Hohenshelt court construed the plain language of
section 1281.98 in the context of California contract law.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 331–332.) The court found
no indication that the Legislature intended to displace
longstanding statutes and equitable principles providing relief to
a breaching party under certain circumstances. (Id. at p. 341.)
The court concluded that section 1281.98, properly construed in

24
harmony with California’s background statutes, makes
arbitration contracts enforceable on the same grounds as apply to
other contracts and is not preempted by the equal-treatment
principle of the FAA. (Id. at p. 346.)

D. Application to the Present Agreement

In this case, Defendants contend the FAA governs the
arbitration agreement, including the substantive and procedural
provisions of the FAA, while Solis contends the procedures of the
CAA apply, including section 1281.97. We find that the
agreement is governed by the FAA in its entirety, including the
substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA. But we
conclude that even when an agreement selects the procedures of
the FAA in their entirety, if a state law procedure does not
directly conflict with the FAA’s procedures or with the FAA’s
substantive equal-treatment principle, the state law procedure
applies in state court to fill in the gaps left by the FAA.

1. Standard of Review

Whether the arbitration agreement incorporated the FAA’s
procedural provisions, rather than section 1281.97, is a question
of law involving statutory and contract interpretation, with no
parol evidence, which we review de novo. (Rodriguez, supra, 136
Cal.App.4th at p. 1117.) “Under the plain meaning rule, courts
give the words of the contract or statute their usual and ordinary
meaning.” (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 162.)

25
2. Interpretation of Choice of Law Provision

The arbitration agreement in this case plainly states “this
agreement is governed by the FAA.” As in Rodriguez, supra, 136
Cal.App.4th at p. 1122, the statement in the arbitration
agreement is broad, encompassing both the procedural and
substantive provisions of the FAA. The agreement consistently
refers to procedures contained in the FAA, such as allowing a
party to seek appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to the FAA.
In addition, both the arbitration agreement and the parties’
stipulation expressly agree to apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to the arbitration. There is no provision explicitly
referring to California law in the agreement. We find the
arbitration agreement selected the procedural provisions of the
FAA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Solis contends the arbitration agreement affirmatively
incorporated California’s arbitration law, including section
1281.97, by stipulating that the arbitration “fully complies” with
the requirements of Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 91, and listing those
requirements. We disagree. In Armendariz, the California
Supreme Court held that discrimination claims under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) are
arbitrable if the arbitration meets certain minimum standards of
fairness allowing employees to vindicate their statutory rights,
“including neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of adequate
discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited form of
judicial review, and limitations on the costs of arbitration.” (Id.
at p. 91.) Armendariz does not require parties to arbitrate under

26
the CAA. The agreement that the arbitration would meet
California’s minimum requirements for a fair arbitral forum did
not designate California arbitration law to govern the
agreement.7
We conclude, however, that the selection of the procedural
and substantive provisions of the FAA, without more, does not
preclude the application of state law procedures that do not
conflict with the procedural or substantive provisions of the FAA.
States establish procedural rules governing litigation in state
courts which apply by default, even when a dispute is governed
by substantive federal law. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
p. 409.) As the California Supreme Court explained in
Hohenshelt, “because the procedures in the FAA are not
comprehensive, every state has enacted its own arbitration act to
fill in gaps left by the FAA,” supplying rules that apply in state
court to an arbitration proceeding within the scope of the FAA as
long as they do not conflict with the substantive provisions of the
FAA. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 327.) In this case, the
arbitration agreement selects the procedural provisions of the

7 Solis has not raised any issue based on the provision of
the arbitration agreement allowing a court to vacate or correct
the arbitrator’s award for an error of law. The procedural
provisions of the FAA do not allow parties to expand the scope of
review by agreement (Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
supra, 552 U.S. at p. 590), while California law allows parties to
expressly agree to judicial review of the merits of an arbitration
award (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1339–1340). On
appeal, however, Solis has not relied on this provision as evidence
that the parties intended to apply California’s arbitration law to
the agreement, and therefore, any such argument has been
waived.

27
FAA, but does not expressly preclude application of the CAA or
section 1281.97. Defendants have not shown that section 1281.97
conflicts with any procedural provision of the FAA or any
provision of the parties’ agreement. Therefore, section 1281.97
applies to the arbitration proceeding in this case, unless it is
preempted by the substantive equal-treatment principle of the
FAA.

3. Preemption Analysis

Whether a state statute is preempted by the FAA depends
on whether the statute conflicts with or obstructs the purpose of
the FAA. (Gallo, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 637, disapproved on
another issue by Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 349.) “The
United States Supreme Court has frequently held that state laws
invalidating arbitration agreements on grounds applicable only to
arbitration provisions contravene the policy of enforceability
established by section 2 of the FAA, and are therefore
preempted.” (DIRECTV, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1351.) But state
laws that regulate arbitration without undermining the FAA’s
substantive policies are not preempted. (Gallo, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639.)
Even prior to the enactment of section 1281.97, under
generally applicable principles of California contract law, an
employee could avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement by
showing that the employer’s failure to perform an obligation was
a material breach of the agreement. (See Pry Corp. of America v.
Leach (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 632, 639; Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc.
(2005) 430 F.3d 1004, 1010–1012; Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 265, 277–278.) Similarly, an employer who fails to

28
perform an obligation under an arbitration agreement may have
waived the right to demand arbitration. (Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 983 (Engalla).)
Whether a party’s breach is material or a waiver of the right to
arbitrate is normally a question of fact. (Brown v. Grimes, supra,
192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 277–278; Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
pp. 983–984.)
In California, a payment made within a reasonable time
after the specified due date will usually constitute substantial
compliance unless the contract provides that time is of the
essence (Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment Group,
L.L.C. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 357, 364), but courts have
determined that certain types of contracts require time is of the
essence based on the subject matter of the contract (Hohenshelt,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 342–343). Arbitration agreements
inherently require that time is of the essence to achieve the
benefits of speed and efficiency that are hallmarks of alternative
dispute resolution. (Ibid.)
California law also contains several provisions that prevent
unjust forfeiture of arbitration rights for failing to pay arbitration
fees, including section 473, subdivision (b), and Civil Code
sections 3275 and 1511. (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
pp. 332–335.) As the California Supreme Court explained in
Hohenshelt, section 1281.97 cannot be construed in isolation to
mandate findings of material breach and waiver for late
payment, in a manner which does not apply to contracts
generally, in violation of the equal-treatment principle of the
FAA. (See id. at p. 341 [construing similar provisions of section
1281.98].) Section 1281.97 must be construed in the context of
longstanding California contract law permitting the operation of

29
statutes and equitable principles that provide relief from
forfeiture. (See ibid. [construing section 1281.98 in harmony
with background statutes and principles allowing relief from
forfeiture where nonperformance was not willful, fraudulent, or
grossly negligent].) When construed in harmony with
California’s generally applicable contract law, section 1281.97
makes arbitration contracts enforceable on the same grounds as
apply to other contracts and is not preempted by the substantive
provisions of the FAA. (See id. at p. 346.)
Although section 1281.97 is not preempted by the FAA, in
light of the clarification that section 1281.97 does not preclude
application of California law providing relief to a breaching party
under certain circumstances, we must reverse the order allowing
Solis to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, and
remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether Sohnen
may be excused for failing to timely pay arbitration fees in this
case.

E. Compliance with Court Order

As an alternative basis for the order granting the motion to
withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, separate from
the payment deadline imposed by section 1281.97, the trial court
found Sohnen violated the court’s order to pay arbitration fees
and costs “on or before any deadline specified by the arbitrator.”
Defendants contend the payment order was not violated, and in
any event, vacating the stay of judicial proceedings was not an

30
appropriate sanction for any alleged violation of the payment
order. We agree.
The trial court’s payment order did not set a deadline for
payment that was violated. Nor can the invoice from the
arbitration provider be reasonably construed to have set a
specific payment date: the invoice ambiguously states that it is
“due upon receipt,” and Sohnen had a reasonable time for
payment from the point the invoice was received. Further, the
payment order did not reasonably advise the parties of the
consequences for violating any payment deadline. There is no
substantial evidence that a deadline imposed by the payment
order was missed, nor is there evidence justifying the sanction of
vacating the stay of judicial proceedings.

DISPOSITION

The August 23, 2022 order is reversed and remanded for
the trial court to consider whether the failure to timely pay
arbitration fees in this case may be excused under California law.
In the interests of justice, the parties are ordered to bear their
own costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J

31
Candida Solis v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. et al.
B323296

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring

For reasons I have given in another case involving
defendant and appellant Sohnen Enterprises, I concur in the
judgment only.

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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