CourtListener 10851145•Peck v. Grad CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/30/26 Peck v. Grad CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JUDITH PECK,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064524
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01159713)
ROGER GRAD et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Randall J. Sherman, Judge. Affirmed.
Kowal Law Group, Timothy M. Kowal and Ryan Merker; Law
Offices of Catherine Convy and Catherine Convy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hodel Wilks, Matthew A. Hodel and Laura A. Forbes for
Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
In September 2020, Judith Peck filed a complaint against Roger
Grad and Snell & Wilmer, LLP (Snell & Wilmer) (collectively, Defendants)
which asserted a cause of action for fraud in connection with Grad’s legal
representation of Peck’s mother, Bettye Trowbridge Vaughen, in estate
planning matters. Peck alleged that Grad had engaged in a long list of
wrongful and fraudulent conduct from sometime in 2012 and extending
beyond Vaughen’s death in September 2016. Of the many allegations of
wrongful conduct, relevant to this appeal are allegations that in March 2014,
Grad had Vaughen obtain a $17.5 million split dollar life insurance policy on
the life of Peck’s sister, Cynthia Peck. The policy had a lump sum premium of
$7.5 million, which was financed by a loan to Vaughen, and the policy
owner/beneficiary was a trust created for Vaughen’s grandchildren.
The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment brought
by Defendants. The trial court found the claims of fraud, other than those
based on split dollar life insurance policy, were barred by the three-year
statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d)
(section 338(d)). With respect to the split dollar policy, the court concluded
that Peck lacked standing to assert fraud because any damages had been
incurred by Vaughen’s inter vivos trust, and only trustees have standing to
assert a claim of damages to a trust.
In this appeal from the resulting judgment, Peck challenges only
the trial court’s decision regarding her fraud claim based on the split dollar
life insurance policy. She argues that as a trust beneficiary she had standing
to assert that claim and the complaint was timely filed with respect to the
split dollar life insurance policy because the statute of limitations did not
2
accrue until 2019 or 2020, when she obtained certain information regarding
the split dollar policy that supported her fraud claim.
We affirm on the ground the fraud cause of action was barred by
the three-year statute of limitations of section 338(d).1 Although a statute of
limitations defense typically raises a factual question for the trier of fact,
summary judgment is appropriate “‘if the court can draw only one legitimate
inference from uncontradicted evidence about the limitations issue.’” (Choi v.
Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 323–324.) Here, only one
legitimate inference may be drawn from the uncontradicted evidence: By
September 9, 2017, more than three years before filing the complaint, Peck
knew of facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious that
Grad had engaged in some type of wrongdoing regarding the split dollar life
insurance policy.
FACTS
Vaughen was born in the early 1920’s and died in September
2016. Peck is Vaughen’s older daughter and sometimes served as caregiver
during the last seven years of her mother’s life. Cynthia Peck (Cynthia)2 is
Vaughen’s younger daughter. Jesse Trowbridge (Jesse) is Vaughen’s
biological grandson whom Vaughen adopted as her son.
Snell & Wilmer is a law firm. Grad is an estate planning attorney
and a partner in Snell & Wilmer.
1 As we shall explain, the parties had full and fair opportunity to
address the statute of limitations issue and, therefore, Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (m)(2) (section 437c(m)(2)) does not
require us to request supplemental briefing.
2 We refer to Cynthia Peck and Jesse Trowbridge by their
respective first names in order to avoid confusion, and not out of disrespect.
3
In 2000, Vaughen created the Bettye Trowbridge Vaughen Inter
Vivos Trust (the Trust). Vaughen was the original trustee. Under the terms
of the Trust, upon Vaughen’s death, certain Trust assets would be distributed
to Vaughen’s children, including Peck and Jesse, with the remainder
allocated between a children’s trust and a grandchildren’s trust. The
beneficiaries of the children’s trust included Peck, Cynthia, and Jesse.
Vaughen suffered strokes in 2006 and 2009 which left her
homebound, disabled, and dependent on others for care. In May 2010, at
about age 88, Vaughen resigned as trustee of the Trust and appointed
Richard Jackson and Jeanette Robertson as successor co-trustees of the
Trust.
Grad represented Vaughen in estate planning matters from
sometime in 2012 until her death in September 2016. Peck alleged Grad
engaged in wrongful conduct in his representation of Vaughen and in his
handling of her estate after her death in regard to ten topics: (1) drafting and
having Vaughen execute several amendments to and restatements of the
Trust; (2) preparing and having Vaughen execute an advanced health care
directive naming himself and Jackson as agents to make health care
decisions for her; (3) preparing and having Vaughen execute a durable
limited power of attorney to Jackson and Robertson; (4) interfering in
Vaughen’s promise to buy Peck a home in Laguna Woods “in appreciation for
all the care she provided to her for many years”; (5) selling to himself at a
deep discount Vaughen’s coin collection and using the proceeds to partially
offset the loan for the Laguna Woods home rather than to pay off Peck’s
mortgage on another home; (6) misleading Peck into signing an agreement
whereby she would be given an option to purchase from the Trust a home in
Newport Beach rather than inheriting that home outright; (8) preparing
4
paperwork by which Jackson and Robertson could cancel a real estate holding
company that was supposed to be distributed to Peck; (9) creating limited
liability companies to be used as shell companies to receive transfers of real
property from the Trust; and (10) having Vaughen purchase a $17.5 million
split dollar life insurance policy on the life of Cynthia with the $7.5 million
premium being paid by a loan obtained by Vaughen.
The statement of facts and statement of the case in Peck’s
opening brief go over in some detail each of those claims of wrongdoing.
However, Peck does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that her fraud
cause of action was time-barred as to Nos. 1 through 9. In the discussion
sections of Peck’s opening brief and reply brief, she argues only that she
timely filed her complaint with regard to No. 10—the split dollar life
insurance policy—and that she had standing to file that claim. The
remainder of this statement of facts therefore will be limited to general facts
and claims concerning that insurance policy. Facts concerning delayed
discovery and accrual of the statute of limitations are presented in part II.C
of our discussion section, post.
In March 2014, Grad had Vaughen take out a split dollar life
insurance policy on Cynthia’s life. According to Grad, a split dollar life
insurance policy is one in which “one person pays [the premiums] and the
other person benefits.” When death benefits are paid, the beneficiary of the
policy pays back the amount of the premiums to the party who paid them.
For estate planning, the purpose of a split dollar policy is to create tax
savings by reducing the value of the estate.
The split dollar policy on Cynthia’s life paid a death benefit of
$17.5 million. The owner and beneficiary of the policy was the
grandchildren’s trust. The premium was $7.5 million, which was financed
5
entirely by a loan to Vaughen with the split dollar policy assigned to the
lender as collateral for the loan. The loan carried interest at the annual rate
of 4.6 percent, which amounted to annual interest of about $216,700 in the
first year and which increased each succeeding year. The policy was to be
discontinued upon Vaughen’s death. Grad later explained that if Cynthia
died during the policy period, the grandchildren’s trust would receive the
death benefit but would be required to pay Vaughn’s estate $7.5 million for
premiums paid.
Vaughen signed documents for the split dollar life insurance
policy on March 4, 2014. Peck was present when Vaughen signed those
documents, but Peck did not know what they were. On March 6, 2014, Grad
assisted Vaughen in placing a telephone call to the lender to verify
information necessary to obtain the loan to pay the premium on the split
dollar life insurance policy.
With respect to the split dollar life insurance policy, Peck
contends:
1. In March 2014, Vaughen was suffering the effects of strokes,
unable to make decisions or understand what she was signing, and was
hospitalized or incapacitated. Vaughen had no idea what she was signing in
order to obtain the split dollar policy, loan, and assignment.
2. Grad tried to defraud the Trust beneficiaries and the insurer
which issued the split dollar life insurance policy by trying to cancel the
policy after the loan was obtained.
3. Grad personally benefitted from the split dollar policy because
upon policy execution a commission of $1.177 million or $1.7 million (there is
a discrepancy in the record) was paid to a consulting firm for which Grad
6
served as chief executive officer. Soon after receiving the commission, Grad
cancelled the consulting firm’s corporate status.
4. Grad obtained the split dollar life insurance policy by making
false representations to the insurer that Cynthia’s net worth was over $6
million when in fact she was of modest means.
5. Grad misrepresented to Peck that the split dollar policy was a
term policy from which Cynthia would not receive any benefit. The policy was
in fact a whole life policy from which Cynthia could obtain funds.
6. Due to the split dollar policy and the loan obtained against it,
Vaughen’s estate was subject to an audit, which caused the estate to incur
more than $1.4 million in attorney fees as well as increased trustee fees and
costs.
7. Vaughen’s estate was obligated to pay interest of 4.6 percent
on the $7.5 million loan. For the period of March 10, 2019, through March 9,
2020, the total amount of interest was $332,450.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Peck filed her complaint against Defendants on September 10,
2020. She filed an amended complaint in July 2021. Peck asserted causes of
action for elder abuse, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and
intentional interference with expected inheritance.
The trial court sustained demurrers to the amended complaint
with leave to amend the fraud cause of action. Plaintiff filed a second
amended complaint asserting only an amended fraud cause of action.
In February 2024, Defendants brought a motion for summary
judgment. The motion was made on the ground the fraud cause of action
(1) was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of section 338(d) and
7
(2) lacked merit because Peck could not establish false representation and
reliance.
In April 2024, the trial court denied Peck’s ex parte request for a
90-day continuance of hearing on the motion for summary judgment but
granted Peck a two-week extension based on personal circumstances of her
counsel. The hearing was set for May 24, 2024, which made Peck’s opposition
papers due on or before May 10, 2024 (former Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (b)(2); Stats. 2016, ch. 86, § 22).
On May 10, 2024, Peck filed opposition consisting only of a
memorandum of points and authorities and a declaration from an attorney
named Hallie J. Lindsey. The memorandum of points and authorities cited to
Peck’s complaint, Defendants’ separate statement, and an opposition
separate statement, but not to any actual evidence. Peck did not submit a
responding separate statement as required by Code of Civil Procedure section
437c, subdivision (b)(3). The declaration was not signed. Peck again
requested a continuance of the motion in order to conduct discovery.
On May 14, 2024, Defendants timely filed a reply in support of
their motion for summary judgment and objections to the Lindsey
declaration. On the next day—May 15, 2024—Peck filed a “declaration re
delay” from her counsel, which attempted to justify the failure to timely file
opposition to the summary judgment motion. On May 16, Peck filed another
declaration from her counsel. Attached to this declaration were hundreds of
pages of evidence offered in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
On May 17, 2024, Defendants filed a request to strike all of the
opposition papers filed by Peck, including (1) her memorandum of points and
authorities, (2) the unsigned Lindsey declaration, (3) counsel’s May 15
8
declaration and exhibits, (4) counsel’s May 16 declaration and exhibits, and
(5) Peck’s evidentiary objections.
On May 20, 2024—ten days after her opposition was due—Peck
filed her own declaration setting forth her version of events and attaching
over 100 pages of exhibits. On May 22—two days before the hearing—Peck
filed “supplemental opposition” to the summary judgment motion. The
supplemental opposition consisted of a memorandum of points and
authorities and Peck’s opposition separate statement of disputed and
undisputed facts.
Defendants filed a request to strike Peck’s May 20 declaration
and a request to strike Peck’s opposition separate statement.
A tentative ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
was posted on May 23, 2024. The tentative ruling was to grant the motion on
the ground the claims, except the claim based on the split dollar policy, were
time-barred because Peck knew or should have been suspicious of the alleged
wrongdoing more than three years before she filed her complaint. The court
found that Peck lacked standing to assert claims regarding the split dollar
life insurance policy. The court reasoned that damages from the split dollar
life insurance policy would have been incurred by the trust and therefore only
the trustees had standing to assert claims on the trust’s behalf.
The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held, as
scheduled, on May 24, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
affirmed the tentative ruling and granted the motion. The court issued a
minute order which restated the tentative ruling. The court denied Peck’s
request for a continuance, sustained Defendants’ objections to all of Peck’s
late-filed documents, and ordered those late-filed documents to be stricken.
The court declined to rule on Defendants’ objections to the Lindsey
9
declaration because the court found that evidence was not material to its
decision.
A judgment in Defendants’ favor was entered in June 2024. Peck
timely appealed from that judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review and Scope of Evidence Considered
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. (Saelzler
v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) Summary judgment is
warranted if the moving papers establish there is no triable issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 843.)
We consider all of the evidence presented by the parties (except
for evidence which the trial court properly excluded), liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all
doubts about the evidence in that party’s favor. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46
Cal.4th 1035, 1039.) We must draw from the evidence all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. (Caliber Paving Co., Inc. v. Rexford Industrial Realty &
Management, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 175, 180.)
Peck does not challenge the trial court’s decision to strike her
late-filed documents except in one respect unrelated to the statute of
limitations.3 The stricken documents included Peck’s opposition separate
statement and all of Peck’s evidence in opposition to Defendants’ motion for
3 Peck argues her late-filed documents were not late as to the
trial court’s decision on standing, which was raised sua sponte.
10
summary judgment, except for the Lindsey declaration. The Lindsey
declaration was inadmissible because it was unsigned. (Gonzalez v. Kalu
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 21, 25, fn. 2; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.257.)
Thus, in determining whether there was a triable issue of fact regarding the
split dollar life insurance policy, we consider only the evidence submitted by
Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.
II.
The Fraud Cause of Action Is Barred by
the Three-year Statute of Limitations
A. Standing
Peck argues the trial court erred by finding she lacked standing
to assert the fraud claim based on the split dollar life insurance policy. She
contends the trial court raised the standing issue sua sponte and ruled on it
without permitting briefing from the parties.4 We do not address the standing
issue because the fraud claim arising out of the split dollar life insurance
policy is barred by the three-year statute of limitations of section 338(d).
B. Supplemental Briefing Is Not Required
Although, as to the split dollar life insurance policy, the trial
court granted summary judgment based only on lack of standing,5 we do not
4 In addition, Peck cites cases holding that a trust beneficiary has
standing to pursue claims against a third party defendant, such as Grad, who
actively participated with the trustee in, and benefitted from, a breach of
trust. (See, e.g., King v. Johnston (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1500.) Grad
argues that Peck forfeited her challenge to the trial court’s findings on lack of
standing by failing to object to the court’s tentative ruling.
5 Defendants contend the trial court’s findings of undisputed facts
regarding the statute of limitations apply to the allegations regarding the split
dollar life insurance policy as well as to the other allegations of wrongdoing.
We do not read the court’s order that way. While some of the trial court’s
11
have to request supplemental briefing pursuant to section 437c(m)(2) to
affirm on that ground. Under section 437c(m)(2), “[b]efore a reviewing court
affirms an order granting summary judgment or summary adjudication on a
ground not relied upon by the trial court, the reviewing court shall afford the
parties an opportunity to present their views on the issue by submitting
supplemental briefs.” We did not request supplemental briefing but the
parties had full and fair opportunity to brief the statute of limitations with
respect to the split dollar life insurance policy, and Peck devoted a
substantial portion of both her opening brief and reply brief to that issue.
(See Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 323, 336,
fn. 1 [if a party “has been afforded an opportunity to present its views, no
supplemental briefing is required”]; Bains v. Moore (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
445, 471, fn. 39 [the purpose of section 437c(m)(2) was “fully met” because
both appellants and respondents addressed in their briefs the ground for
summary judgment that was not relied on by the trial court].)6
C. The Statute of Limitations Accrued No Later Than September 9, 2017,
More Than Three Years Before Peck Filed Her Complaint.
The statute of limitations for fraud is three years. (§ 338(d).) “The
cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery,
by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.)
general findings, such as those regarding Vaughen’s capacity, would apply to
the split dollar policy, none of the findings specifically address that policy.
6 Grad argues that Peck’s failure to comply with summary
judgment procedure, including her failure to file a timely responding separate
statement, is sufficient reason alone to affirm the judgment. Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3) gives a trial court discretion to
grant a summary judgment motion if the opposing party does not comply
with the separate statement requirement; that statute does not give the
Court of Appeal discretion to affirm summary judgment on that ground.
12
“The statute commences to run only after one has knowledge of
facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus
putting him on inquiry.” (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412,
437.) “A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to
establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once
the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue,
she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a
suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot
wait for the facts to find her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103,
1111; see Vera v. REL-BC, LLC (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 57, 69 [“A fraud claim
will accrue even without actual knowledge if a plaintiff knows facts that
should raise suspicion and trigger a further investigation”].)
Peck filed her complaint on September 10, 2020. The undisputed
facts establish that by September 9, 2017, Peck had knowledge of facts
sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of wrongdoing.
Peck saw Vaughen sign the split dollar life insurance policy
documents on March 6, 2014. Peck did not know what those documents were,
and Grad did not, at that time, explain to Peck what Vaughen was signing.
But on that date, Cynthia was handed a notebook containing documents
pertaining to the split dollar life insurance policy. Jackson took the notebook
from Cynthia, removed financial information, and handed the notebook back
to her. Cynthia later gave copies of the contents of the notebook to Peck and
to Jesse.
By the time Vaughen signed the split dollar policy documents and
loan documents, Peck had formed the beliefs that Vaughen had been “gravely
disabled” since 2009 and that Vaughen did not have capacity to enter into the
trust amendments and restatements prepared by Grad or to make any
13
changes to her estate plan. In an e-mail dated November 20, 2014, Peck told
Grad and Jackson that Vaughen’s 2009 stroke “involved the entire frontal
lobe” and “[i]t is not acceptable to me to be changing the long term plans my
mother had for me . . . .” Grad responded with an e-mail stating “[i]f you
really believe that your mother has lacked sufficient mental capacity to make
any decisions with regard to her assets or her estate since April 11, 2011 you
should consult your own legal counsel . . . .”
In early 2015, Peck retained counsel in connection with concerns
she had over Vaughen’s estate. Peck and her attorney met with Grad on
October 21, 2015, to ask him about changes to the Trust and the split dollar
life insurance policy.7 At that meeting, and again in October 2016, Peck’s
counsel requested an accounting of the Trust.
In an e-mail to Jackson dated February 5, 2015, Peck “pose[d] the
issue” of how Cynthia could have passed a physical for “the life insurance”
just a few months before being diagnosed with severe heart valve damage. In
an e-mail to Jackson dated April 28, 2016, Peck complained that “hidden
from the Life insurance policy” was that Cynthia suffered from Reiter’s
syndrome. Peck wrote: “You already know what I think of C[ynthia]’s
7 Peck alleged: “Plaintiff was made aware of a life insurance
policy, which was represented to Plaintiff by Defendant Roger Grad to be a
term policy. Specifically, on or about October 21, 2015, Plaintiff met with . . .
Grad to discuss various matters of . . . Vaughen’s ongoing care [and] the life
insurance policy that was obtained. . . . [¶] . . . During the October 21, 2015
meeting, Plaintiff requested information from . . . Grad regarding the life
insurance policy. In response, . . . Grad represented to Plaintiff and
[Plaintiff’s attorney], who was present at the meeting as well, that the life
insurance policy was a term policy and that Cynthia Peck could not and
would not receive any personal benefit from the policy. . . . Grad specifically
stated to Plaintiff that the policy was obtained to save the estate in taxes that
would benefit the beneficiaries, including Plaintiff.”
14
perspective(s) on health, including her own health, and I think you should be
aware of what I think of this over the top health cost for C[ynthia] to be
holding onto that $17 million life insurance policy, which if they find out
would be null and void anyway.”
In August 2016, Cynthia forwarded to Peck an e-mail dated
January 17, 2014, regarding the status of the loan for the split dollar life
insurance policy premium and “housekeeping duties to perform” once the
loan offer was made. In an e-mail dated August 26, 2016, Cynthia told Peck
that “[t]he ‘trust’ set up for me is supposedly from the savings the estate will
save by having borrowed against the $17 million whole life policy on me.”
(Italics added.) In another e-mail to Peck on the same date, Cynthia wrote
that Grad’s “scheme is crumbling.”
A family meeting was held on September 19, 2016, soon after
Vaughen had passed away. At this meeting, Jesse brought up the subject of
the split dollar life insurance policy and asked whether it was for estate
taxes. Grad responded by explaining what a split dollar policy was and that
its purpose was to serve as a “tax shield” by decreasing the value of the
estate. Grad identified Cynthia as the insured on the policy and amount of
the death benefit as $24 million. When Peck asked Grad to explain further,
he declined and suggested instead that she do a google search on
“multigenerational split dollar.” Grad then stated that Vaughen had taken
the policy out on Cynthia’s life and that Cynthia was not the owner, could not
cancel the policy, and was “completely unconnected other than [being] the
insured.” Grad explained that Vaughen had borrowed the money to pay the
premium, the grandchildren’s trust was the owner/beneficiary, and the policy
would be cancelled when Vaughen’s estate was closed. Peck asked if it was
15
true that the loan for financing the premium had “$780,000 worth of interest
on it in two years.” Grad replied, “No.”
In an e-mail dated February 11, 2017, Peck told her daughter
that having Vaughen sign the split dollar life insurance policy was “elder
fin[an]c[i]al abuse.” Peck also wrote: “This all demonstrates there is clear and
convincing evidence of the fraud the estate knew about before the 2 years and
the actions they took to avoid that discovery by the life insurance company.
Per C[ynthia] the policy costs $280[,000] per year and I was there w[hen]
roger [Grad] said it would be cancelled post death. Also $280[,000] per year is
$840 K if 3 years since inception and the savings per the confidential memo
from Roger . . . of the family meeting is anticipated to be 155 of the
grandchildren’s trust of $5.4 million. Well, guess what, they lost at $810 K
savings.”
With the e-mail, Peck sent her daughter copies of various
documents relating to the split dollar life insurance policy, including the table
of contents from the split dollar life insurance policy notebook that had been
given to Cynthia and a projected loan performance schedule.
The evidence thus shows that by February 2017, Peck believed
that Vaughen lacked capacity in March 2014 to make decisions and sign
documents relating to her estate, knew of the split dollar life insurance policy
and its terms, had copies of policy documents and documents related to the
loan, knew the amount of the premium, knew the premium had been
financed by a loan to Vaughen of $7.5 million, knew the amount of the annual
projected interest payments on that loan, and knew that the policy would be
cancelled upon the close of Vaughen’s estate. By early 2015, Peck was
concerned enough about Grad’s handling of Vaughen’s estate that she
retained counsel. By April 28, 2016, Peck expressed her suspicions that the
16
split dollar life insurance policy had been fraudulently obtained by failing to
disclose Cynthia’s true health condition to the insurer. Cynthia’s August 26,
2016, e-mail alerted Peck that the split dollar life insurance policy might in
fact be a whole life policy rather than a term policy. By February 2017, Peck
believed that Grad had committed fraud and financial elder abuse by having
Vaughen take out the split dollar life insurance policy.
In addition to her knowledge about the split dollar life insurance
policy, Peck disliked and distrusted Grad, and her dislike and distrust should
have heightened her suspicions. In fact, Peck had not liked or trusted Grad
since the day in 2011 when she first met him. By September of 2015, Peck
was concerned that Grad was having Vaughen sign documents when she was
disoriented. Peck even complained about Grad to the Newport Beach Police
Department. In December 2016, Peck told her daughter in an e-mail that
Grad had Vaughen sign documents without regard to Vaughen’s medical
condition or medication she was taking.
Peck had come to believe by May 4, 2014, that Grad was
restricting her access to Vaughen. She believed Grad was acting unethically
and untruthfully. In an e-mail to Jackson dated February 18, 2015, Peck
wrote that “you guys” were “shutting down any communication with me
whatsoever” and were “in there coaching my mother who [cannot] remember
a thing or process any complexities of anything explained to her.” In
September 2015, Peck said in an e-mail the she was “dumbfounded” at Grad
going to Vaughen’s house “unsupervised” to have Vaughen sign documents.
At the family meeting in September 2016, Peck confronted Grad
and accused him of making false statements, abusing and denigrating her,
taking Vaughen’s coins, coercing Vaughen to sign documents, and “violat[ing]
everything my mother ever put in writing.” By late 2016, Peck, as well as her
17
siblings Cynthia and Jesse, were investigating Grad’s handling of Vaughen’s
estate and what they perceived to be self-dealing. Peck, Cynthia, and Jesse
routinely exchanged communications and documents regarding Grad. In her
August 26, 2016, e-mail to Peck, Cynthia claimed that Grad’s “scheme” was
“crumbling.”
Peck argues she did not learn of the commission paid on the split
dollar policy and of alleged misrepresentations made to the insurer regarding
Cynthia’s net worth until 2019 during discovery conducted in probate
lawsuits. Peck also contends it was not until February 2020 that she obtained
a copy of the transcript of the call placed by Vaughen and Grad to verify to
the lender information necessary to obtain the loan to pay the premium on
the split dollar policy.
The statute of limitations commences not when a party learns of
all facts supporting a claim, but when a party had facts “sufficient to make a
reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud.” (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.,
supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 437.) “‘Rather than examining whether the plaintiffs
suspect facts supporting each specific legal element of a particular cause of
action, we look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a
type of wrongdoing has injured them.’” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 323, quoting Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35
Cal.4th 797, 807.) By September 9, 2017, Peck knew of facts that would make
a reasonably prudent person have reason to suspect that Grad had engaged
in some type of wrongdoing in procuring the split dollar life insurance policy.
An analogous situation arose in Optronic Technologies, Inc. v.
Celestron Acquisition, LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 770.) There, the plaintiff
alleged a cause of action for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage based on an allegedly fraudulent transfer that was completed on
18
January 1, 2020. (Id. at pp. 782–783, 787, 789–790.) The plaintiff did not file
its complaint until November 2022, after the two-year statute of limitations
had elapsed. (Id. at p. 789.) The plaintiff contended the tortious interference
claim was not time-barred because it did not learn until December 2021,
upon receiving a copy of an e-mail, that the transfer constituted an
independently wrongful act. (Id. at p. 790.) The Court of Appeal concluded
the plaintiff was aware of the transfer and its allegedly fraudulent nature in
February 2020 and therefore “had ample information to either pursue the
cause of action or further investigate [the defendant’s] role.” (Ibid.) Here,
Peck was aware of the split dollar life insurance policy and its allegedly
fraudulent nature by September 9, 2017. Further knowledge was
unnecessary to trigger the statute of limitations.
Peck argues Grad actively concealed his misconduct,
misrepresented the split dollar policy’s type and benefits, and “stonewalled
Peck’s requests for trust accountings.” In support of that argument, Peck
cites only to late-filed evidence that was stricken by the trial court.
Peck argues there remains a triable issue whether she exercised
reasonable diligence in investigating her claims against Grad. To invoke
delayed accrual, a plaintiff must establish both that plaintiff conducted “a
reasonable investigation of all potential causes of that injury” (Fox v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808) and “had no actual or
presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him [or her] on inquiry”
(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 437). If we were to
assume that Peck exercised reasonable diligence in investigating the split
dollar life insurance policy, the undisputed facts nonetheless establish she
had enough actual or presumptive knowledge by September 9, 2017, to form
19
more than “a suspicion of wrongdoing” triggering the running of the statute
of limitations. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1111.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants may recover costs on
appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
20
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.