CourtListener 10849307•People v. Young CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Young CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B331830
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA384433)
v.
DESTINY YOUNG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Hansen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and
Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles S.
Lee and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, Destiny Young pleaded guilty to two counts of
voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (a)), three
counts of robbery (§ 211), and three counts of attempted robbery
(§§ 664/211), which she committed with her boyfriend Jabaar
Thomas. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Young was sentenced to
an aggregate determinate term of 25 years in prison in exchange
for her truthful testimony at Thomas’s trial.
In 2022, Young filed a petition for vacatur of her two
voluntary manslaughter convictions and resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied the petition because the court found the prosecution
had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Young was guilty of
the murders of Marcelo Aragon and Gabriel Ben-Meir under
sections 188 and 189 as amended.
On appeal, Young contended that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that she was a
major participant in the underlying robberies and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. A majority of this court
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 This was Young’s second petition for resentencing. The
trial court denied her first petition because former section
1170.95 (now § 1172.6) did not apply to manslaughter
convictions. This court affirmed the trial court’s order. Former
section 1170.95 was subsequently amended to include relief for
defendants with manslaughter convictions where the defendant
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial in which the defendant
could have been convicted of murder.
2
affirmed the trial court’s order as to both manslaughter
convictions.3
Young petitioned for review in our Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court granted review and deferred further action in the
matter pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in
People v. Emanuel, S280551 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. On June 2,
2025, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in People v. Emanuel
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 894 (Emanuel). On December 17, 2025,
the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with
directions to vacate the submission and reconsider the case in
light of Emanuel. We vacated our January 27, 2025 opinion, and
the parties filed supplemental briefs. We issue this revised
opinion addressing Young’s arguments in light of Emanuel.
We affirm the trial court’s order.
3 Justice Baker dissented in part and concurred in part.
With respect to the murder of Aragon, Justice Baker concluded
the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that Young acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Justice Baker concurred with the majority that substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Young could still
be convicted of the murder of Ben-Meir under the laws as
amended as a major participant in the robbery who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
3
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY4
A. Facts
In mid-April of 2011, Young moved into her godmother’s
house. She met Thomas at a nearby liquor store on or about
April 15, 2011. Young initially thought Thomas was approaching
her to sell her drugs. The two ran into each other again in the
neighborhood after that and quickly became friendly.
Young’s godmother told her not the get involved with
Thomas. Young’s godmother was wary of Thomas because she
had a previous confrontation with him. Young’s godmother also
knew Thomas to be violent. She said Thomas “was a woman
beater and a bad person.” Thomas had beaten a woman who
Young’s godmother knew. The woman was injured so badly that
she had to be “put in the hospital.” Young’s godmother also knew
that Thomas had a relationship with the woman across the street
4 The facts are taken from Young’s May 2011 police
interrogation, her April 2012 preliminary hearing, her June 2013
proffer interview, and her February 2016 testimony at Thomas’s
trial. Although the trial court did not specify which documents
were admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, the
parties agree that these were the sources the court considered in
making its ruling. From our review of the transcripts of the
hearing, that appears to be correct. In light of the parties’
agreement, our own review of the transcript of the evidentiary
hearing, and the absence of contentions relating to the admission
of evidence, we accept the parties’ representations. We note that
although Young attached these documents to her evidentiary
brief filed with the trial court (see post), they were not included
in the record on appeal. Young moved to augment the record,
and we granted her motion in our order of June 21, 2024.
4
and she told Young that she had seen Thomas “get violent” with
the woman.
Young disregarded her godmother’s advice and continued to
see Thomas. The romantic relationship lasted from mid-April to
May 11, 2011, when they were arrested. The first week they met
they saw each other every day. Their relationship became
serious very quickly. Young believed that Thomas loved her. He
said that he wanted to marry her and they talked about getting
an apartment together.
Thomas did not have an apartment when Young met him;
he was staying with his brother. Thomas made money by selling
drugs. Young’s godmother did not allow Thomas inside her
house, so Thomas and Young drove around together a lot while
Thomas sold crack. Thomas and Young sometimes slept in
Young’s car together, or at a hotel, or at “Mama Pat’s” house.
Mama Pat was an elderly woman who Thomas supplied with
drugs. In exchange, Mama Pat allowed Thomas to store his
clothing and “cut up” his drugs at her house.
Young first learned that Thomas had a shotgun about a
week or two into their relationship. Thomas picked Young up in
a rental car. When Young got in, she saw the shotgun on the
back seat. Young also saw Thomas’s shotgun at Mama Pat’s
house. Thomas kept the shotgun in a bag under a futon and
pulled it out for Young to see. Young let Thomas keep the
shotgun in the trunk of her car sometimes.
Young was never afraid of Thomas, but she had “seen him
get a pretty good temper[,]” and she knew he was “hot-headed.”
Young admitted that, during the second week she was dating
Thomas (prior to his commission of the murders in the instant
case), she saw him “put hands on” the neighbor across the street.
5
Thomas told Young that he had committed multiple
robberies during the few weeks they had been dating. He was
very “[n]onchalant” when he said it, “like it didn’t matter.”
Young was committed to the relationship. She was willing to aid
Thomas in the robberies regardless of what happened.
1. The Aragon Murder
At around 11:00 p.m. on April 30, 2011, Thomas and Young
were driving around in his rental car looking for someone to rob.
Young drove and Thomas sat next to her in the front passenger
seat with the shotgun concealed inside a bag. Young was “hoping
that [Thomas] wouldn’t hurt nobody”, but she thought it was
possible that Thomas would hurt someone using the shotgun.
Young and Thomas spotted three males walking together.
Young drove past the men. One man, later identified as Marcelo
Aragon, split off from his friends. Thomas told Young to circle
back past Aragon so that Thomas could determine if Aragon was
alone and rob him. Young circled back. Thomas waited a minute
while Aragon’s companions continued walking down the road,
and then got out of the car with the shotgun. Young did not try
to dissuade Thomas. She remained inside the car in the middle
of the street with the engine running and the lights on.
Young kept a lookout, but intermittently looked back over
her shoulder to watch the robbery. She saw the two men
struggling. It appeared to her that Aragon was attempting to get
Thomas’s hands off of him. Thomas was still holding the
shotgun. Young turned away to make sure there were no people
or cars in the area. She heard a gunshot followed by a scream
that she described as “close to blood[]curdling”, but “louder than
6
that.” When she looked back again, Thomas was “skipping”
toward the car with the gun. Thomas got inside and Young
began driving away. As she did, Young looked back and saw
Aragon leaning against a wall.
Young did not ask Thomas whether he shot Aragon and
Thomas did not say. “[T]he way that [Aragon] screamed, [she
knew] something had to happen but [she] didn’t want to know for
sure.” Young just “didn’t want to process it.” “It was more
convenient for [her] to not to get confirmation . . . .” She “turn[ed]
a blind eye” to the shooting rather than trying to help Aragon or
confirm that he had been shot because she wanted to ignore “the
bad” and continue dating Thomas.
Thomas did not tell Young to drive him away from the
shooting. She drove away “[b]ecause [she] needed to.” She
wanted to “get away from the [violence of the] scene.” Young
drove to her godmother’s house and got out of the rental car.
Thomas drove away. Thomas stole about $30 from Aragon.
Later, Young and Thomas bought alcohol using the money.
Aragon died of the gunshot wound.
2. The Ben-Meir Murder
On May 8, 2011, at around 12:00 or 1:00 a.m., Young and
Thomas drove around looking for someone to rob using Young’s
car. Young drove Thomas to Mama Pat’s house to pick up
Thomas’s shotgun. Thomas then rode in the front passenger seat
of Young’s car with the shotgun. They spotted a man later
identified as Gabriel Ben-Meir exiting his car carrying groceries.
Ben-Meir started to cross the street. Thomas told Young to stop,
so she drove up a little bit and stopped in the street. Young was
7
concerned when Thomas got out of the car, but she did not drive
away because she knew Thomas would get caught without her
help. Young looked back and saw Thomas and Ben-Meir engaged
in a struggle. Ben-Meir was down on his knees. She looked away
briefly, and when she looked back again Ben-Meir was face-down
on the ground with his hands up. Young heard a gunshot. Ben-
Meir was lying flat on the ground. Young did not recall seeing
Ben-Meir move after the gun shot. Thomas returned to Young’s
car with Ben-Meir’s groceries and the shotgun. Young asked
Thomas if he shot Ben-Meir, and Thomas denied it. Young drove
them away from the scene. Young said that hearing the gunshot
did not bother her because she did not know what actually
happened. She did not see Thomas shoot Ben-Meir.5
3. The Robbery Spree Committed with Richard
Anderson
On May 10, 2011, Young and Thomas committed a string of
robberies and attempted robberies with Thomas’s friend, Richard
5 Young’s version of the facts changed over time. When she
was initially arrested she said Thomas borrowed her car a few
times, and intimated that he may have used her car in a robbery
without her knowledge. Young told police she knew Thomas had
taken money from random people on the street. Thomas told her
about the street robberies, but he did not say anything specific.
He would just come back with money and say, “ ‘I got
somebody.’ ” Thomas never said that he had used a shotgun.
Young told the police she thought it would be stupid of Thomas to
walk down the street with the gun. Young denied that she had
ever been with Thomas while he was committing a robbery.
8
Anderson. Young drove the group from location to location in her
car throughout the day and into the night. They robbed and/or
attempted to rob two liquor stores, a donut shop, and four
individuals on the street. The robberies/attempted robberies of
the individuals included three separate incidents—the robbers
targeted a lone man, a couple, and a lone woman on the street
after dark. Thomas picked the targets and directed Young to
drive to various locations; Young drove; and Anderson, armed
with Thomas’s loaded shotgun, approached and threatened the
intended victims and took any items they surrendered. When
Anderson attempted to rob the lone man, Young heard a gunshot.
Anderson ran back to the car and Young drove them away from
the scene. Young said that she was “shocked that the gun went
off.” Young was concerned someone might have been shot and
she knew that it may have happened, but she did not ask
Anderson if anyone had been hurt. Thomas asked Anderson
what happened, but Young claimed she could not remember
Anderson’s response.
At the proffer, a deputy district attorney questioned Young
regarding her state of mind after she heard the gunshot:
“[Q.] . . . [A]re you thinking to yourself, all right, that’s it, I
don’t want to—we, our luck has run out, I don’t want
anybody to be hurt, I’m done with this. Did you think that
at all?
“[A.] No.
Young was more forthcoming at the proffer and in her testimony
at Thomas’s trial, and the majority of the facts were gleaned after
her preliminary hearing testimony.
9
“[Q.] No, ‘cause you went on and did another robbery with
[Thomas and Anderson], right? Did you at any point say to
them look, if you guys want to use the car, take the car, but
I’m out. I don’t want any part in this.
“[A.] To . . . Remove myself? No.
“[Q.] Why not?
“[A.] I can’t honestly answer that.”
“¶ . . . ¶
“[Q.] What were you getting out of this is what I’m
asking—what were you getting out of being there with
[Thomas and Anderson]?
“[A.] The time that I had with [Thomas], to be honest. I
mean, that was the whole thing that I was looking at. I
mean, I, I wasn’t really paying attention to what was going
on—I was just going along with it. I mean, I—that’s as
honest as I can be. I can’t say that, you know, I was even
in—thinking about what was going on.”
The day after the robbery spree, Young was arrested in
connection with the crimes.
B. Petition for Resentencing
In May 2022, Young filed a petition for resentencing
utilizing a standard form. The court appointed counsel.6
6 The court directed the People to respond and/or appear at
the next scheduled hearing. The People did not file a response,
but appeared at all proceedings.
10
The court ordered copies of the record in Young’s first
section 1170.95 petition for resentencing, the “plea transcript,”
and Young’s testimony at former codefendant Thomas’s trial.
Following a hearing on the matter, the court found Young
prima facie eligible for relief under section 1172.6 and issued an
order to show cause.
In June 2022, Young filed an evidentiary brief, contending
that she could not be found guilty of the murders under sections
188 and 189 as amended because she was not a major participant
in the underlying robberies who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. Young also contended that the People had violated
her right to due process by making arguments that were
inconsistent with the position the People took at Thomas’s trial.
Attached to the brief were transcripts of Young’s May 2011
interview with police; transcripts of Young’s April 2012
preliminary hearing testimony; transcripts of Young’s June 2013
proffer; a copy of Young’s March 2014 cooperation agreement
with the District Attorney; transcripts of Young’s testimony at
Thomas’s trial in February 2016; the prosecution’s arguments at
Thomas’s trial; and Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd’s 2023 psychological
evaluation of Young based on an evaluation she conducted in
2013.
C. Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing, the People argued that Young
was a major participant in the robbery of Aragon who acted with
reckless indifference to human life, and that she could still be
convicted of murder under the current laws.
11
Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor had taken a
very different view at Thomas’s trial, and depicted Young as
minimally involved and pathetic in her desire to be loved. Young
was characterized as an unsophisticated driver who took
direction from Thomas. Counsel emphasized that Young had not
seen Thomas kill either of the victims and did not know anyone
had died until her interview with police. It may have been willful
ignorance on her part, but not reckless indifference. Counsel
asserted that Young had only known Thomas for two weeks
before he killed Aragon, and she had not witnessed Thomas being
violent. Although her godmother told her Thomas was a
“ ‘woman-beater,’ ” Young had never personally seen that side of
him. Young was suffering from mental disorders that caused her
to deny that reality.7 She was drinking hard liquor daily.
Young’s mental disorders prevented her from being a restraining
influence. She never left the vehicle and never told Thomas to
shoot anyone. Young’s participation in a garden variety armed
robbery where death was possible was insufficient to establish
reckless indifference.
7 At the hearing, the defense called Dr. Kaser-Boyd to
testify regarding Young’s mental disorders. The prosecutor
objected on relevance grounds. The trial court permitted the
testimony insofar as it related to the issue of reckless indifference
to human life. We do not include a recitation of Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s
testimony here, as neither party mentions it on appeal and it
does not appear to have factored into the trial court’s decision.
12
D. Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found Young not credible. The court stated
that Young continually minimized her role and had a “selective
memory.” What Young remembered and what happened changed
depending on her “status.” The court specifically rejected Young’s
story that she did not know the victims had been shot and/or
killed. As to both victims, the trial court found that Young was
guilty under the current laws of felony murder as a major
participant in the underlying robberies who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
The trial court found that Young and Thomas “were
partners in crime and lovers. . . . [T]hey talked about their
crimes, despite her denial. She’s not credible as to this.” Young
and Thomas looked for potential victims together. The court
inferred that the couple discussed what type of victim they
wanted to rob and that Young drove in a manner that facilitated
the crimes. The court stated, “It is a reasonable inference that
she was dating this man, living with him, that she discussed with
him the plans to commit the numerous robberies. . . . [¶] It’s, to
me, not realistic to believe that they just went out and were
driving around, and he says, ‘stop,’ and he gets out. They talked
about it.” The court observed that Young consistently stated that
she acted voluntarily.
The court found not credible Young’s testimony that she did
not know Thomas would commit these violent robberies. Young
knew Thomas was prone to violence and had committed violent
robberies before she participated in either crime with him.
13
Young was present in both robberies. She was not like the
getaway driver who is parked a distance down the street. Young
was idling at the scene of the crime so that Thomas could jump
out, rob a victim, and immediately jump back in the car and
leave. She was approximately 10 to 20 feet away when the
murders were committed. The court found Young’s presence
significant, because without her presence Thomas could not have
pulled off the robberies. Young was present for all stages of the
crimes—planning, execution, flight, and dividing the spoils.
The court stated that it defied common sense that Young
heard a shotgun blast, saw Aragon stumble away and brace
himself against a wall, and yet did not know he was shot. Young
knew Thomas had shot Aragon and that Thomas was willing to
use violence to rob people. She saw Ben-Meir begging on the
ground.
The court found that Young had an opportunity to restrain
Thomas or aid the victim in both instances. She could have told
Thomas to get back into the car or she could have driven away.
Young could have aided the victim at the scene or called 9-1-1,
but she did neither.
With respect to the murder of Ben-Meir, the trial court
additionally found that Young was guilty of malice murder
because she acted with intent to kill, or alternatively, she was
guilty because she acted with implied malice.8
8 Because we conclude that Young was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life in both
robberies, we need not address whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that she acted with implied
malice or intent to kill in Ben Meir’s murder.
14
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
1. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended
sections 188 and 189 “as to the ‘felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Sen. Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd.
(f).) As amended, the law defining malice provides that except for
first degree felony murder, ‘in order to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. . . . ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 54, fn.
omitted.)
Pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (a), a person
convicted of manslaughter by plea may file a petition to have the
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced if “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of . . .
manslaughter [after] . . . accept[ing] a plea offer in lieu of a trial
at which the petitioner could have been convicted of
15
murder . . . . [and] [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.”
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the trial court must issue an order
to show cause. If an order to show cause issues, the court then
“hold[s] a hearing to determine whether to vacate the . . .
manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts,” unless the
parties “waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that the
petitioner is eligible to have [his or her] . . . conviction vacated
and to be resentenced.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1)–(2).) “At the
hearing . . . the burden of proof . . . [is] on the prosecution to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
On appeal from a trial court’s order denying a section
1172.6 petition following a subdivision (d)(3) hearing, this court
evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s
determination using the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747.) “ ‘[W]e look
to whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence of
“ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ ” to “support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt” ’ that petitioner was guilty.
([People v.] Clark [(2016)] 63 Cal.4th [522,] 618 [(Clark)].)”
(People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1017 (Henley).)
“We examine the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment and defer to the trial court’s implicit credibility
findings. [Citation.] ‘ “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is
unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the
16
[fact finder]’s verdict.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Diaz (2026) 118
Cal.App.5th 545, 558.)
2. Felony Murder
“Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who
was not the actual killer and did not act with the intent to kill
can only be liable for murder if [the defendant] was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. [Citations.] ‘[T]he standard under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable
for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a
special circumstance under section 190.2[, subdivision] (d), as the
former provision expressly incorporates the latter.’ [Citation.]
Accordingly, death penalty cases interpreting section 190.2,
subdivision (d), including People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, are controlling . . . .”
(People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123.)
a. Major Participant
In determining whether the defendant was a major
participant in the underlying felony, “the ultimate question [is]
whether the defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities
known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently
significant to be considered ‘major.’ [Citations.]” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) To determine whether a defendant was a
major participant in the underlying felony, we consider multiple
factors, including: “What role did the defendant have in planning
the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role
17
did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons?
What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of
them necessarily sufficient.” (Ibid.)
b. Reckless Indifference
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Awareness of no more than the
foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is
insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life; ‘only
knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory
requirement.” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins).) To determine whether defendant had the requisite
18
mental state, “[w]e analyze the totality of the circumstances” in a
manner that largely overlaps with our major participant
discussion. (Id. at pp. 676–677.) As our Supreme Court has
explained, “ ‘[a]lthough we state these two requirements
separately, they often overlap,’ ” “ ‘for the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he [or
she] acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
“In Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 618 through 622, the
California Supreme Court established a five-factor test for
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. . . . [N]o one factor is necessary, nor is any necessarily
sufficient.” (Henley, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1015–1016.)
The factors we consider are: (1) use or awareness of the presence
of weapons; (2) duration of the crime; (3) efforts taken to
minimize violence; (4) knowledge of a cohort’s likelihood of
killing; and (5) physical presence at the scene and opportunity to
restrain confederates or aid victims. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at pp. 885–895.)
c. People v. Emanuel
In Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th 867, our Supreme Court
clarified what factual scenarios can support a finding of reckless
indifference to human life. There, Louis Emanuel and
codefendant Jacob Whitley met John Sonenberg, the victim, on a
residential street abutting a public park at approximately 3:06
p.m., ostensibly to buy marijuana from Sonenberg. (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 876–877.) The transaction was brief and
ended in Sonenberg’s death. At approximately 3:15 p.m.,
19
witnesses heard a gunshot and screeching tires. (Id. at p. 877.)
One person saw a truck moving perpendicular to the street at
high speed. (Ibid.) The truck stopped on the sidewalk with its
tailgate against a tree. (Ibid.) The engine was still running and
the driver’s door was open. (Ibid.) Sonenberg was lying face
down on the ground. (Ibid.) A forensic pathologist testified that
the cause of Sonenberg’s death was a close-range gunshot to the
side of his neck. (Ibid.) Sonenberg sustained an abrasion to his
forehead consistent with blunt force trauma. (Ibid.)
Breanna Santos, Emanuel’s former girlfriend, told officers
that Emanuel told her that he and Whitley went to the park to
get marijuana from Sonenberg. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 878.) Emanuel said that “ ‘ “[Sonenberg] wasn’t trying to give
it up.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Emanuel started to walk away and said to
Whitley, “[L]et’s go.” (Id. at p. 879.) Whitley would not leave and
Sonenberg would not let go of the drugs. (Id. at pp. 878–879.)
Whitley hit Sonenberg in the head with a gun, but was not able
to knock Sonenberg out. (Ibid.) Sonenberg started fighting back.
(Ibid.) Whitley aimed the gun at Sonenberg’s leg, but Sonenberg
pushed the gun up. (Ibid.) Whitley fired and hit Sonenberg in
the neck. (Ibid.) Emanuel panicked and left the scene. (Id. at
p. 879.)
Destinee Kindle, who was in a relationship with Whitley at
the time of the murder, testified that Whitley showed her a news
story about the shooting and said he and Emanuel were involved.
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 879.) Whitley told Kindle that
he was trying to rob Sonenberg for marijuana and accidentally
shot Sonnenberg in the neck when he was aiming for Sonenberg’s
foot. (Ibid.)
20
Emanuel was convicted of first degree felony murder as a
non-shooter under the former felony murder law. (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 879.) In 2018, he filed a petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. (Id. at p. 881.) The
trial court found Emanuel prima facie eligible for relief, issued an
order to show cause, and held an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
Following the hearing, the trial court denied Emanuel’s petition.
(Ibid.) Although the trial court found there was no evidence that
Emanuel either knew Whitley was armed or likely to use lethal
force, it found Emanuel “ ‘created’ the situation by participating
in the robbery, and thus, had an affirmative obligation to do more
than withdraw his aid and support from a murderous cohort.”
(Ibid.)
Emanuel appealed. He conceded that he was a major
participant in the robbery, but argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support the finding that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 881.) The Court of Appeal adopted the trial court’s reasoning
and affirmed the court’s order. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
reasoned that as someone who participated in the planning of the
robbery and intended to benefit from it, Emanuel could have
prevented the robbery from occurring or could have done more to
prevent the shooting. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 881, 896.) In so doing, the
high court emphasized: “ ‘The degree of risk to human life is
crucial to the analysis.’ [Citation.] As the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged, ‘ “the possibility of bloodshed
is inherent in the commission of any violent felony,” ’ such that
one who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate such a crime may
21
well anticipate ‘the use of lethal force as a possibility.’ [Citation.]
Were that degree of culpability sufficient, however, it would
amount to ‘ “little more than a restatement” ’ of the former felony-
murder rule that Senate Bill No. 1437 retired. [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 884.) “This Court has thus made clear that participation in a
‘ “garden-variety armed robbery,” ’ i.e., one in which the only
factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a
participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to
establish reckless indifference. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court found that the first and fourth
factors—knowledge and use of weapons and knowledge of a
codefendant’s likelihood of killing—were entirely absent in
Emanuel’s case. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) There
was no evidence that Emanuel knew that Whitley possessed a
gun, knew that Whitley brought the gun to the robbery, or knew
that Whitley was likely to use lethal force. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court also observed that neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeal had addressed the second factor—
duration of the crime. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886.)
The high court stated that the robbery and murder were of short
duration—likely under 12 minutes. (Ibid.) Significantly, “[t]here
was no prolonged period of restraint, and the interaction appears
to have been nonviolent until Sonenberg refused to relinquish the
marijuana.” (Ibid.) At that point, Emanuel had told Whitley
“[L]et’s go.” and started walking away. (Ibid.) The court
concluded the second factor was neutral, as “it did nothing to
heighten the risk of violence beyond that inherent in the robbery
itself.” (Ibid.)
Regarding the third factor—efforts taken to minimize the
risk of violence—the Supreme Court held that the trial court
22
incorrectly found that, although “ ‘the commission of the crime
during daylight hours in public view may have had the potential
for minimizing violence . . . .’ ” “ ‘there was no evidence that the
robbery was planned for that time or planned for that time or
that it was planned to occur at that time for the purpose of
minimizing risk of violence’ ”. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 887.) The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Whitley and
Emanuel had arranged to meet Sonenberg at the park at 2:30
p.m. (Ibid.) There was no requirement that there be direct
evidence that there was a plan to minimize violence;
circumstantial evidence was sufficient. (Ibid.) The Supreme
Court reasoned that Emanuel’s plan to commit the robbery
during daylight hours in a public place where there might be
witnesses indicated an effort to minimize violence, and did not
support a finding of reckless indifference. (Ibid.) The Supreme
Court observed that in finding “Emanuel ‘had an opportunity to
minimize the risk of violence during the robbery itself but failed
to do so,’ ” the lower courts had conflated the third factor with
physical presence at the scene and the opportunity to restrain
cohorts or aid victims. (Ibid.) The court clarified the third factor
analysis, stating that “the need to minimize the risk of violence is
‘ “less pressing” ’ when the planned crime does not involve ‘ “the
use of weapons.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “This fact is, by itself, a significant
step towards minimizing the likelihood that the plan would result
in a ‘grave risk of death.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Where an
‘objective evaluation of the circumstances’ of the crime suggests
the risk of violence is grave, the defendant’s apparent efforts to
minimize that risk may be unavailing. [Citation.] Conversely,
the absence of such efforts does not necessarily evince a
subjective disregard for risk where the objective circumstances of
23
the planned crime suggest the risk of violence posed is no more
than that inherent in any violent felony. [Citation.] In such a
case, then, the absence of efforts to minimize the risk of violence
cannot be said to weigh in favor of a finding of reckless
indifference. This applies all the more so when the planned
crime does not involve the use of weapons.” (Id. at p. 888.)
Additionally, the third factor does not include consideration of
whether the defendant was able to prevent the robbery from
occurring. (Id. at pp. 888–889.) Finally, regardless of whether
the circumstances reflect an effort to minimize violence, the
circumstances impact evaluation of “the objective risk of violence
posed by the crime and reasonably anticipated by the
perpetrator,” and whether that risk is greater than that in any
violent felony. (Id. at p. 889.)
With respect to the fifth factor—physical presence at the
scene and opportunity to restrain the violence or aid the victim—
the court explained that proximity becomes relevant when a
codefendant makes his intent to inflict violence clear, and the
defendant has an opportunity to do something to prevent that
violence. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 889–893.) In such
cases, “ ‘the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of
several intermediate steps, or where the [co-]participant who
personally commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to
suggest a willingness to use lethal force.” (Id. at p. 889.) As
examples, the court cited count-downs and warning shots. (Id. at
pp. 890, 892.) In Emanuel’s case, he told Whitley “[L]et’s go.” and
began walking away. “When met with resistance, Emanuel
abandoned the plan rather than resort to greater violence.” (Id.
at p. 891.) The lower courts had not properly credited this
evidence, instead concluding that Emanuel could have done more.
24
(Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that “[t]he focus should not be on
the ultimate efficacy of his actions, but on what his actions reveal
about his mental state.” (Ibid.) Where violence escalates quickly,
there may not be an opportunity to intervene. A failure to
intervene should not weigh in favor of a finding of reckless
indifference if there is not an opportunity to do so. (Id. at p. 892.)
Emanuel had no real opportunity to intervene as the violence
occurred quickly and without warning. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court acknowledged that “a defendant’s
conduct following the use of lethal force may be reflective of his or
her mental state during the offense,” but clarified that flight from
the scene without rendering aid to the victim may or may not
evince indifference. (Id. at p. 893.) In Emanuel’s case, the crime
was committed in a public place in the middle of the day, which
increased the odds that other people would aid Sonenberg and
that Emanuel and Whitley would be caught. (Id. at p. 894.)
Under the circumstances it was hard to discern Emanuel’s state
of mind from his flight. (Ibid.) “While postflight conduct may
shed light on a defendant’s state of mind, conduct temporally
removed from the violent act must clearly evince a culpable
mental state.” (Ibid.) “However contemptible we may find a
defendant’s conduct following a killing, the governing standard is
not satisfied by evidence that the defendant was generally
indifferent to the fact that someone has been killed; it requires
evidence that, at the time of the shooting, the defendant acted
with indifference toward the grave risk that someone could be
killed. Though the former may be evidence of the latter, it is
insufficient, standing alone, to support murder liability.” (Id. at
p. 895.) As an example of postflight behavior evidencing
indifference, the court cited Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137,
25
151. In Tison, one victim survived the shooting, but the
defendants disabled the victims’ vehicle and abandoned them in
the dessert, virtually ensuring death. (Ibid.) Emanuel took no
actions after Whitley shot Sonenberg to prevent Sonenberg from
receiving aid. (Ibid.)
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme
Court concluded that nothing about the planned robbery in
Emanuel’s case elevated the risk to human life beyond that in
any armed robbery—there was no evidence that Emanuel knew
Whitley had a gun or a propensity for violence. (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 895–896.) Moreover, Emauel’s failure to do
everything possible to prevent the shooting and aid Sonenberg
was not sufficient to demonstrate indifference, and his flight from
the scene could be equally attributable to disregard or fear. (Id.
at p. 896.)
B. Analysis
1. The Aragon Murder
a. Major Participant in the Robbery
With respect to the first factor when evaluating major
participation—Young’s role in planning the offense—the trial
court found not credible Young’s testimony that she merely drove
around and Thomas told her what to do. The court stated that
the two “were partners in crime and lovers.” The record supports
the trial court’s inference that Young was a partner in the crimes.
Although the relationship was new, it advanced rapidly. By the
time of Aragon’s murder, Young and Thomas were together day
26
and night and discussing marriage. Young played a part in
Thomas’s criminal activities. She drove Thomas around the
neighborhood to sell crack and went with him to Mama Pat’s
where he “cut up” his drugs. Given the intensity of the
relationship and the extent to which Young was already involved
in Thomas’s criminal activities, the court rationally inferred that
the two discussed the robberies.
Contrary to Young’s assertions, her role went “beyond that
of ‘an ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder.’ ”
Young drove Thomas around the neighborhood searching for a
target, she acted as a lookout and getaway driver, and she shared
in the spoils of the robbery, drinking the alcohol that she and
Thomas purchased with money Thomas took from Aragon.
Young did not simply drive to a pre-determined location, park
down the street out of view, and wait for Thomas to return. She
kept the car running only feet away from the scene. Young’s
participation was critical to both locating and stealthily
approaching Aragon. The sawed-off shotgun was difficult to
conceal due to its size. Young recognized this and told officers it
would be stupid of Thomas to walk down the street with it.
Without her assistance, Thomas would have a difficult time
catching victims off guard because of the shotgun. The shotgun
would also be difficult to conceal following a robbery. Young
acknowledged this as well—she stated that she did not drive
away because she knew if she did Thomas would get caught.
Young’s role in Aragon’s robbery was significant and weighs
against her.
As to the second Banks factor, there was no evidence that
Young provided Thomas with the shotgun, but she knew that
27
Thomas had the shotgun and that it was loaded. This factor also
weighs against her.
Regarding the third Banks factor, Young was fully aware
that Thomas had a history of violence. Her godmother warned
her to stay away from him when they first met and banned
Thomas from coming into her house because he had beaten a
woman so badly that the woman had to be “put in the hospital.”
Prior to the Aragon robbery, Young saw Thomas “put hands on” a
neighbor. The third factor weighs against Young.
As to the fourth factor—was the defendant present at the
scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death?—Young was only a short distance
away and watched the robbery transpire. She saw the men
struggling, but did nothing to prevent further violence. Young
observed that Thomas was holding the shotgun and Aragon was
attempting to free himself. Instead of attempting to deescalate
the conflict by telling Thomas to leave, or alternatively leaving in
the running car to seek help, Young stood guard, scanning the
area to ensure that no one else was witnessing the robbery, and
waiting to assist Thomas in his escape. The trial court found that
Young knew Thomas shot Aragon, based on Young’s statements
that she heard the shotgun fire and a louder than blood-curdling
scream, and then saw Aragon slumped against a wall. Young
consistently stated and testified that she was not afraid of
Thomas and that she was not forced into doing anything—she
was in the relationship no matter the consequences. In short,
Young could have encouraged Thomas to leave or she could have
abandoned Thomas and sought help when things started to
become dangerously violent, but she chose not to.
28
Regarding the fifth Banks factor—Young’s actions after the
force was used—Young knew that Aragon had been shot, but she
did nothing to assist him. Instead, she drove Thomas away from
the scene because it was “more convenient” for her to avoid
acknowledging that Thomas shot and likely killed Aragon.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Young was a major participant in the Aragon robbery.
b. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
With respect to the reckless indifference inquiry, the
Aragon murder is not analogous to the murder in Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 876. Significantly, there was no evidence
that Emanuel knew Whitley possessed a gun or that he knew
Whitley brought a gun to the robbery, and there was no evidence
that Emanuel knew Whitley was likely to use lethal force. In
contrast, Young knew that Thomas planned to use a shotgun, and
that it was loaded. Moreover, Young’s willingness to have the
shotgun in the car when she was driving increased the risk of gun
violence. The shotgun was bulky and hard to conceal. Had
Young not assisted Thomas by transporting the shotgun, Thomas
may not have been able to use a lethal weapon to rob Aragon.
Unlike Emanuel, Young knew that her partner had a propensity
for violence. She was told Thomas had beaten a woman so badly
that the woman had to be hospitalized, and Young had witnessed
Thomas physically assaulting a neighbor. Young said she was
concerned that Thomas would use the gun to harm someone—i.e.,
29
she believed Thomas would shoot a victim in order to commit a
robbery.9 Both of these factors weigh heavily against Young.
The Aragon robbery was similar to the robbery in Emanuel
in that it was very brief in duration. In this case, as in Emanuel,
the duration of the encounter did not increase the risk to the
victim, and is a neutral factor.
With respect to efforts taken to minimize the risk of
violence, in Emanuel our Supreme Court clarified that this factor
focuses on efforts that were taken to minimize the risk prior to
commission of the crimes. Emanuel planned for the robbery to
take place in the middle of the day in a public place. The
Supreme Court observed that the fact that Emanuel was not
aware of weapons or know that Whitley had a propensity for
violence made “the need to minimize the risk of violence . . . ‘ “less
pressing[.]” ’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 887.) In the
Aragon robbery, the opposite was true—Young knew that
Thomas had a history of violence and was armed with a loaded
weapon—the need to minimize the risk was therefore pressing.
The robbery was committed late at night after Thomas and
Young ensured that Aragon’s companions would not be present to
aid him during or after the robbery. Despite Young’s awareness
of these circumstances, there is no evidence that she made an
effort to minimize the risk of violence. Rather, as Thomas
suggested, Young drove past Aragon and circled back to ensure
that Aragon was isolated. Young did not insist that Thomas
9 Young’s statement that she “hoped” Thomas would not
hurt anyone with the gun does not assist her. Young knew that
the robbery had a real potential to include a shooting but decided
to participate despite the serious risk to human life that a
shooting would pose.
30
unload the shotgun before robbing Aragon or suggest any other
precaution. This factor supports the trial court’s finding that she
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Like Emanuel, Young was present at the scene. Our
Supreme Court has counseled that “ ‘[p]roximity to the murder
and the events leading up to it may be particularly significant
where . . . the [co]participant who personally commits the murder
exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal
force. In such cases, “the defendant’s presence allows [her] to
observe [her] cohort[] so that it is fair to conclude that [she]
shared in [his] actions and mental state. . . . [Moreover,] the
defendant’s presence gives [her] an opportunity to act as a
restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant
fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is
arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.” ’ (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 887.) Young stopped the vehicle only after Aragon was
isolated, and she stayed within view of the robbery and watched
the robbery unfold. She saw Thomas and Aragon engaging in a
physical struggle before Thomas fired the shotgun. As was the
case in Emanuel, Young did not have a significant amount of
time to intervene, but she could have exhorted Thomas to leave
with her, as Emanuel encouraged Whitley to do. She also could
have driven off, which would both remove her from the situation
and perhaps create uncertainty that would allow Aragon to
escape. At best, this factor is neutral, considering the fact that
Young had a short time in which to react. It is notable, however,
that Emanuel acted in a similarly short timeframe, whereas
Young did not.
31
Young’s subsequent behavior also demonstrates
indifference. The trial court rationally inferred that, given what
she knew and witnessed, Young knew that Thomas shot and
likely killed Aragon. This did not dissuade Young from
participating in the robbery in which Ben-Meir was killed; nor
did it dissuade Young from participating in an extensive robbery
spree involving the shotgun only days after the Ben-Meir murder.
When Young heard the shotgun fire while Anderson was robbing
an individual on the street, she was still not deterred, but went
on to participate in other street robberies.
c. Totality of the Circumstances
Analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the Aragon
robbery was not a “ ‘ “garden-variety armed robbery,” ’ ” in which
the only factor supporting reckless indifference is the fact that a
participant is armed with a gun. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 884.) Young was aware that Thomas was violent and armed
with a loaded gun. The robbery took place at night, after Thomas
and Young assured that Aragon was isolated—Aragon’s friends
would not be present to assist him during the robbery and would
be less likely to know that he needed medical attention
afterwards. Young did not suggest any modifications that would
have lowered the risk of Aragon’s death, such as insisting that
Thomas unload the gun. She did not encourage Thomas to leave
when she saw the men struggling or remove herself from the
situation. She heard the gunshot and Aragon’s louder than
blood-curdling scream and saw Aragon slumped against a wall,
but she did not make any effort to help him. Young did not
refuse to participate in robberies with Thomas after Aragon was
32
shot. She assisted in the robbery in which Ben-Meir was shot
and killed and then assisted in a spree of robberies in which
Anderson used and fired the shotgun. Her crimes ended only
with her arrest.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that
Young was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life in the Aragon robbery. As such, she
could still be found guilty of felony murder under sections 188
and 189 as amended on January 1, 2019.
2. The Ben-Meir Murder
a. Major Participant in the Robbery
The same factors that weighed against Young in the
robbery of Aragon provide substantial evidence that Young was a
major participant in Ben-Meir’s robbery. We will not recount the
factors common to both robberies in depth, but instead discuss
additional evidence of Young’s participation in the Ben-Meir
robbery.
Young’s role in the Ben-Meir robbery was even greater
than her role in Aragon’s. In the Aragon robbery, Young drove
Thomas’s rental car. In the Ben-Meir robbery she used her own
vehicle. Young not only knew that Thomas would use a loaded
shotgun in the Ben-Meir robbery, she helped him procure the gun
by driving Thomas to Mama Pat’s to pick it up.
By the time of the Ben-Meir robbery, Young was not only
aware of Thomas’s propensity for violence through her godmother
and the violent incident with a neighbor that she herself
33
witnessed—she now knew that Thomas had shot Aragon (likely
fatally) in the earlier robbery.
Young was present at the robbery and saw Thomas
standing over Ben-Meir, who was first on his knees and then
face-down on the ground with his hands up. Despite knowing
that Thomas shot and likely killed their last victim, Young did
nothing to try to dissuade Thomas when she saw him standing
over a helpless Ben-Meir with the shotgun. She did not tell
Thomas they should leave or drive her own car away from the
scene. After she heard the gunshot and looked back to see Ben-
Meir lying motionless on the pavement, Young did not try to aid
him or call 9-1-1.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Young was a major participant in the Ben-Meir robbery.
b. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
As with the major participant analysis, the reckless
indifference factors that were present in the Aragon robbery were
also present in the robbery of Ben-Meir, so we detail only the
additional evidence that supports the trial court’s finding.
In addition to knowing that Thomas was using a loaded
shotgun to rob Ben-Meir, Young knew Thomas was likely to use
lethal force in the robbery, because Thomas shot Aragon only
eight days earlier.
Thomas’s robbery of Ben-Meir involved clear steps in
escalation—the two men first struggled, then Ben-Meir went
down on his knees, and finally Ben-Meir lay flat on the ground
with his hands up. It was however, still brief, so we cannot say
that the duration of the robbery placed Ben-Meir at greater risk.
34
Young failed to make any effort to minimize the violence in
the Ben-Meir robbery. Her failure was particularly significant in
the wake of the Aragon shooting. Young knew that the
circumstances were similar—it was night, Ben-Meir was isolated,
and Thomas was again armed with a loaded shotgun that he had
demonstrated he would use—yet she did not insist that Thomas
unload his gun or take some other precaution that would prevent
another shooting.
As with the Aragon robbery, Young stayed on the scene but
made no attempt to encourage Thomas to leave and extricate
herself from the situation or to otherwise restrain his violence.
Young had already experienced a preview of events by the time of
the Ben-Meir robbery. Young could have anticipated that
Thomas would shoot Ben-Meir if Ben-Meir resisted. If Young
intended to avoid further violence she would have done
something to restrain Thomas or to aid Ben-Meir when she saw
the men struggling. She did not.
Young’s behavior before and after the Ben-Meir robbery
also evidences her reckless indifference to human life—Young
had participated in the robbery in which Thomas shot Aragon
only eight days earlier, yet she did not hesitate to assist Thomas
in a second armed robbery. After Thomas shot and killed Ben-
Meir, Young continued to commit armed robberies with him. As
she told authorities, she wanted to spend time with Thomas and
she was willing to turn a blind eye to the fact that Thomas was
shooting and killing people in order to continue the relationship.
She did not consider refusing to participate in the robberies.
35
c. Totality of the Circumstances
The totality of the circumstances support the trial court’s
finding of reckless indifference. As in the Aragon robbery and
murder, Young knew that Thomas was armed with a loaded
shotgun and that he had a history of violence. She knew that
Thomas was capable of shooting a victim and potentially killing
that victim to commit a robbery. Young took no steps to
minimize the chance of violence and again assisted in the robbery
of an isolated individual at night. Young saw Ben-Meir struggle
with Thomas, go down on his knees, and then lie flat on the
pavement. She knew Ben-Meir was vulnerable, yet did not say
anything to Thomas or drive away in her own car. After the
shooting, Young saw that Ben-Meir remained motionless on the
ground but she did not attempt to help him. Instead, she
continued committing armed robberies with Thomas until they
were finally arrested.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that
Young was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life in the Ben-Meir robbery, and was
therefore ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
36
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Young’s section
1172.6 petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:
KIM (D.), J.
37
The People v. Destiny Young
B331830
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
We find ourselves in the same place we were before our
Supreme Court granted review and ordered this court to vacate
its prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867. In that prior opinion, I agreed
with the majority that substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s ruling that defendant and appellant Destiny Young
(defendant) was ineligible for Penal Code section 1172.6 relief in
connection with her conviction for the voluntary manslaughter of
Gabriel Ben-Meir. I did not agree, however, with the majority’s
holding that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s ruling
that defendant was foreclosed from obtaining Penal Code section
1172.6 relief on her conviction for the earlier voluntary
manslaughter of Marcelo Aragon (Aragon).
Our Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Emanuel only
reinforces the correctness of my earlier-expressed view. The
majority concludes otherwise by getting lost in the trees (what
with its musings about bulky shotguns) and missing the forest; in
Emanuel’s words, by allowing “[t]he nonexhaustive list of factors
identified as relevant to the reckless indifference inquiry . . . [to]
supplant the standard they are meant to elucidate.” (Emanuel,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at 896.) As the majority concedes, defendant
was a “lookout and getaway driver,” and we have uncontested
direct evidence of her mental state at the time of the planned
Aragon robbery that the majority relegates to a footnote: she
hoped no one would get hurt—and did not think anyone would
get hurt—even though she knew someone “possibly” might. This
mental state does not foreclose section 1172.6 relief for the
Aragon killing.1 (Emanuel, supra, at 884 [“As the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged, ‘“the possibility of bloodshed
is inherent in the commission of any violent felony,”’ such that
one who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate such a crime may
well anticipate ‘the use of lethal force as a possibility’”]; ibid.
[“‘“Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish
reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a
‘grave risk of death’” satisfies the statutory requirement’”]; ibid.
[“participation in a ‘“garden-variety armed robbery,”’ i.e., one in
which the only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is
that a participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without
more to establish reckless indifference”].)
1
The majority says the direct evidence of defendant’s mental
state “does not assist her” because she “knew that the robbery
had a real potential to include a shooting but decided to
participate despite the serious risk to human life that a shooting
would pose.” That is fundamentally wrong in two separate ways.
First, it is not enough to say defendant knew that the robbery
had “a real potential” (which is just alternate phrasing for
“possibility”) to include a shooting. All armed robberies do, and
as the excerpts from Emanuel that I quote demonstrate, that is
not enough. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 884.) Second, it is of
course true that just about all shootings pose serious risks to
human life; that is the nature of the weapon. Saying so has no
analytical significance. The right question is whether defendant
knowingly created a grave risk of death in the planned Aragon
robbery. (Ibid.) There is no substantial evidence she did.
2
Only after Jabaar Thomas, the actual killer, shot Aragon
can defendant be said to have understood he was not just a
reported domestic abuser but someone who posed a grave risk of
using lethal force. It was only at that point that she was
recklessly indifferent to human life by continuing to participate
in robberies with him. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 883
“‘[r]eckless indifference to human life is “implicit in knowingly
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death”’”]; id. at 884 [“‘“[t]he defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed,” and he or she must consciously disregard
“the significant risk of death his or her actions create”’”].)
BAKER, Acting P. J.
3
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.