CourtListener 10849097•Burnside v. 1545 Broadway Homeowners Assn. CA1/2
Burnside v. 1545 Broadway Homeowners Assn. CA1/2
CourtListener 10849097Calctapp28 apr 2026
Testo completo
Filed 4/28/26 Burnside v. 1545 Broadway Homeowners Assn. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
REBECCA BURNSIDE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171368, A174209
v.
1545 BROADWAY HOMEOWNERS’ (City & County of San Francisco
ASSOCIATION, et al. Super. Ct. No. CGC-22598325)
Defendants and Respondents.
Appellant Rebecca Burnside sued her condominium homeowners
association and its property manager seeking damages from toxic mold
allegedly caused by water penetrating into her unit, other units, and common
areas. The complaint alleged contract and negligence claims based on
defendants’ breach of the CC&Rs and their maintenance obligations.
Defendants filed a cross-complaint against Burnside.
The case proceeded to a 25-day jury trial, at the conclusion of which the
jury returned with special verdicts that found against Burnside and in favor
of defendants, including verdicts that: (1) Burnside did not do what the
CC&Rs required her to do; (2) the Association was not negligent; and (3) the
property manager was negligent, but its negligence was not a substantial
factor in causing Burnside damage. The jury also found for defendants on the
cross-complaint. Judgment was entered against Burnside, and later
1
judgments awarded the Association costs and attorney fees against Burnside.
Burnside appeals from the judgment on the complaint and cross-
complaint, asserting claims of error by the trial court in its rulings on
motions in limine and other rulings in the course of trial. Burnside also
appeals from the cost and attorney fee judgments, fundamentally arguing
that they must be set aside because the underlying judgment must be set
aside. We conclude that Burnside’s arguments have no merit, and we affirm
the judgments in both appeals.
BACKGROUND
The General Setting
1545 Broadway Street, San Francisco, is a condominium property
consisting of 24 residential units, one commercial unit, and related common
areas. The property is managed by 1545 Broadway Homeowners’ Association
(the Association), a California common interest development association
formed pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act
(Civ. Code, § 4175 et seq.) (Davis-Stirling Act). Its governing documents
include the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). The Bohan
Company, Inc. (Bohan), a corporation, managed the property on behalf of the
Association.
In 2010, Burnside, who is an attorney, purchased unit 305 in the
property, which she occupied as her residence and from which she operates
her law practice.
The Proceedings Below
The Pleadings
In February 2022, Burnside filed a complaint against the Association
and Bohan (when referred to collectively, defendants) alleging claims for: (1)
breach of contract, (2) negligence, and (3) preliminary and permanent
2
injunction. The essence of the complaint was that in 2020 Burnside reported
water leaks in her guest bedroom, to which defendants made only “minor
cosmetic repairs,” and that subsequent leaks occurred that defendants failed
to address in breach of their duties under the CC&Rs. The complaint alleged
that this caused Burnside both property damage and personal injury because
the water intrusion led to mold growth that caused her to develop a litany of
symptoms “including, but not limited to, eye irritation, headaches, nose
bleeds, coughing, heavy chest, asthma, fatigue, nausea, dizziness, sleep
disruption, and hair loss.”
Defendants filed their answer and also a cross-complaint alleging six
causes of action: two claims for breach of governing documents (unauthorized
modification of common areas and failure to remediate mold); two claims for
declaratory relief; and claims for equitable indemnity and contribution.
In November 2022, both sides demanded a jury trial, with Burnside
estimating seven days for trial, defendants five. By the time the case came
on for trial, the estimate had apparently escalated to 16 days, though the
court indicated it thought that estimate was too high. The court’s optimism
was misplaced, as the actual trial took substantially longer, 25 days to be
precise, this, despite, as Burnside’s brief acknowledges, throughout the trial
the court chastised—“threatened” is the word she uses—counsel for among
other things the pace of trial.
The Trial
The case was originally set for trial in August 2023 but both parties
objected, and trial was reset and then against reset pursuant to stipulation
for February 20, 2024. Trial in fact began on February 26.
Meanwhile, in mid-February, both parties filed motions in limine,
Burnside filing four such motions and defendants 10. The motions were
3
argued at length on February 26, following which the court granted some and
denied others. As pertinent to the issues here, the minute order describes the
court’s rulings on defendants’ motions: “Defendant’s Motions In Limine #1
and #2 are DENIED, Motions In Limine #3 is GRANTED. Motions In Limine
#4 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as noted in the court reporter’s
transcript, Motions In Limine #6 and #7 are GRANTED. Motions In Limine
#8 is DENIED. Motions In Limine #5 and #9 are granted limited as to
psychiatric injuries. Motions In Limine #10 oral Motions for site inspections
as set forth on the record regarding Google Maps 352.”
As indicated, the trial began on February 26 and would last,
interrupted by continuances and other matters, until April 16 when the jury
returned its verdicts. During Burnside’s case she put on numerous
witnesses, many of whom were experts, including in the areas of mold,
remediation, general contracting, condominium maintenance, and several
fields of medicine, including psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. Burnside
also introduced some 90 exhibits.1
The heart of Burnside’s lawsuit was that defendants breached the
CC&Rs by failing to maintain or repair the roof and were negligent in that
failure. Defendants’ position was that the moisture and condensation in
Burnside’s unit was from her internal use of the steam shower and that
moisture found in the roof cavities had no causal link to roof leaks—in short,
that the mold infestation in Burnside’s unit was caused by her own conduct.
Closing arguments concluded on April 15, and at 2:29 that day the
bailiff took control of the jury. We do not know how long, if at all, the jury
deliberated that day, but it did deliberate for some two hours on April 16
when, at 12:45, it announced it had reached its verdicts, all of which were
1 This was out of the 213 exhibits Burnside had produced to the court.
4
against Burnside. They included these three:
(1) “3. Was Rebecca Burnside excused from having to do all, or
substantially all, of the significant things that the CC&Rs
required her to do?
“________ Yes ___X____ No (11).
(2) “On Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Negligence against
Defendants, the jury answered as follows:
“1. Please answer the following:
“a. Was 1545 Broadway Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
negligent?
“________ Yes ___X____ No (10)
“b. Was the Bohan Company, Inc. negligent?
“___X____ Yes [] ________ No [¶] . . . [¶]
“2. [¶] . . . [¶]
“b. Was the Bohan Company, Inc.’s negligence a
substantial factor in causing harm to Rebecca Burnside?
“________ Yes ___X____ No (11).”
The verdicts were all unanimous: 11 to 0.2
The jury also found against Burnside on defendants’ cross-complaint,
awarding them $27,688.
On May 17, the trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. Burnside
moved for a new trial, which according to Burnside’s brief was denied. On
August 29, Burnside filed an appeal from the judgment. This is appeal no.
A171368.
2 During trial a juror had been excused, and the trial court offered the
parties various alternatives. They stipulated the case could proceed with 11
jurors.
5
Meanwhile, in July the Association moved for attorney fees and costs
pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Act, seeking $845,012.00. Burnside filed
opposition, and the Association a reply. The motion came on for hearing in
December, and on June 12, 2025, the trial court entered orders awarding the
Association $341,508.00 in attorney fees and $474,752.08 in costs.
Judgments on those orders followed and on August 8, Burnside filed an
appeal from these judgments. This is appeal no. A174209. We ordered the
appeals consolidated.
DISCUSSION
Introduction
As noted, Burnside is an attorney, who was represented by counsel
throughout the proceedings below. She has chosen to represent herself on
the appeals. Doing so, Burnside has filed a brief that, exclusive of exhibits, is
160-pages long, containing 28,935 words. The brief asserts that there are six
“issues presented,” but only the first three assert a specific claim of error by
the trial court, which three read as follows:
“A. Whether motion in limine exclusion of key evidence and expert
opinion necessary to prove her case in-chief and defend against the
counterclaims constituted reversible error . . . .
“B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by prohibiting
examination of adverse party witnesses in her case-in-chief, per evidence code
§ 776 . . . .
“C. Whether a new trial is warranted due to exclusion of critical
corroborating documents and testimony . . . .”3 (Capitalization omitted.)
3 The other three issues either assert cumulative error or are generalized
and vague, reading as follows:
6
We will discuss the three substantive issues below. But before we do, a
few words about Burnside’s briefing, which ignores many principles of
appellate review, not to mention California Rules of Court. Specifically:
California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) provides that an
appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant
facts . . . .” And the leading California appellate practice guide instructs
about this: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately
and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and
likewise as to the applicable law. [Citation.] [¶] Misstatements,
misrepresentations, and/or material omissions of the relevant facts or law
can instantly ‘undo’ an otherwise effective brief, waiving issues and
arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on your credibility, may draw
sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to lose the case.” (Eisenberg et
al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025)
(Eisenberg) ¶ 9:27, italics omitted.) Such summary is lacking here.
Burnside’s brief has a section called, “Factual and Procedural
Background.” The section is 33-pages long, and in it are various “facts” that
can only be described as skewed in favor of Burnside, not the jury verdicts
below. This is most inappropriate, as it is in disregard of the settled principle
of appellate review that the evidence must be viewed most favorable to the
“D. Whether the trial court’s cumulative evidentiary rulings interfered
with appellants constitutional and statutory rights to a fair trial and right to
confrontation . . . .
“E. Whether, in the alternative, the evidentiary rulings at minimum
constituted an abuse of discretion . . . .
“F. Whether the judgment should be reversed as a matter of law
because the steps appellant took in selfhelp discovery were protected activity
shielded by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege . . . .”
(Capitalization omitted.)
7
prevailing party, and in support of the judgment. (Crawford v. Southern
Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429; see generally Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [“ ‘a reviewing court starts with the
presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of
fact.’ . . . A recitation of only defendants’ evidence is not the ‘demonstration’
contemplated under the above rule.”].)
But beyond that, and as illustrated in her index, Burnside’s “factual”
recitation includes facts not even presented at trial. As she describes it,
items in “Red= excluded or not presented.”4
Burnside’s opening brief has no statement as to the “standard of
review.” Cases hold that such omission is by itself sufficient to show that the
appeal has no merit. (See Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE
Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465 [“Failure to acknowledge the
proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit”], citing James B. v.
Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.)5
4 A few illustrations of such pro-Burnside facts include these items listed
in her index:
“1. HEALTH CONDITIONS EMERGED . . . .
“2. BUILDING HISTORY AND ITS HAZARDOUS ROOF. (RED =
EXCLUDED OR NOT PRESENTED) . . . .
“3. 2010–2012: DISCOVERY BY RESPONDENTS . . . .
“4. NUMEROUS LEAK COMPLAINTS STARTED IN 2017. (RED =
EXCLUDED OR NOT PRESENTED) . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“7. AN ILLEGAL THIRD ROOF LAYER . . . .
“8. ERMI TESTING ALSO REVEALS MOLD PRESENCE IN #305,
#306, #205, THE COMMON HALLWAY, AND THE EMERGENCY
STAIRWELL . . . .”
5 While Burnside’s opening brief does not contain a standard of review,
her reply brief asserts that de novo review is appropriate, on the basis that a
ruling that precludes all evidence on a point is equivalent to a non-suit. (See
Garner v. BNSF Railway Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660, 674 [de novo review
where grant of motion in limine was “functional equivalent of an order
8
Burnside Has Demonstrated No Error in the Rulings on
Motions in Limine
As noted, Burnside’s first and most fundamental argument, comprising
some 60 pages of her brief, is that the trial court erred in its rulings on four of
defendants’ motions in limine, in the order Burnside lists them, numbers 3, 6,
4, and 7.
While Burnside’s opening brief does not mention our standard of
review, that standard is well-settled, stemming from the fundamental rule
that we generally apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to any trial
court ruling on the admissibility of evidence. (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 440, 446–447; Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) This includes, for example, rulings whether the
evidence was relevant (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th
229, 281); rulings pertaining to expert testimony (e.g., Mountain View Police
Dept. v. Krepchin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 480, 504; Avivi v. Centro Medico
Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467, 472); and as
particularly apt to the trial court’s rulings here, whether evidence was
properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352, that is, whether the
probative value is substantially outweighed by risk of undue consumption of
time, danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or of misleading the
jury. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1685.) And
such discretionary review applies to rulings on motions in limine. (See
Osborne v. Todd Farm Service (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43, 51; McCoy v.
Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 283, 295–296; Ceja v.
Department of Transp. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1480–1481.)
granting nonsuit”].) That was not the situation here, where Burnside
introduced voluminous evidence, much of which should have been
inadmissible as within motions in limine.
9
As to what a showing of abuse of discretion requires, it has been
described in terms of a decision that “exceeds the bounds of reason” (People v.
Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920), or one that is arbitrary, capricious,
patently absurd, or even whimsical. (See, e.g., People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390.) In its observation on the subject in a
leading case, our Supreme Court has said that “A ruling that constitutes an
abuse of discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
773.) Or, as that court put it in a more recent definition, “arbitrary or
irrational.” (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) These adjectives hardly
describe the trial court’s rulings here.
Against that background, we analyze Burnside’s arguments, beginning
with motion in limine (MIL) number 3.
MIL 3
MIL 3 sought to exclude 36 Google Earth images of the property,
asserting three separate grounds: (1) lack of authentication (Evid. Code,
§ 1401); (2) relevancy (Evid. Code, § 350); and (3) undue prejudice, confusion,
and misleading the jury (Evid. Code, § 352). In the course of argument on
this MIL, it was pointed out that the Google images could include images
that were 10 to 20 years old. The trial court granted the MIL, saying, “352.”6
Burnside has shown no abuse of discretion on that or any other basis.
As to “352,” suffice to say that images years and years before those in
issue here would obviously cause an unnecessary amount of time to explain,
6 Immediately prior to the court’s ruling, defendants’ counsel
acknowledged that “Granting this motion in limine does not preclude plaintiff
from offering pictures that she took or maybe one or her experts took of the
roof and alleged ponding on the roof. It just prohibits them from bringing in
10
not to mention could cause confusion. It hardly needs saying that 20-year-old
images were not relevant to the issues here. And as to the lack of
authentication, Burnside obviously does not contest that “[a]uthentication of
a writing is required before it may be received in evidence.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1401, subd. (a).) Despite that, Burnside does not even attempt to show such
authentication, which was her burden. (People v. Beckley (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 509, 514–515.)
The Google images purportedly showing water conditions on the roof at
different times had no foundation to support the depth of that water, as one
can see in some of the photographs in Burnside’s brief. In short, there is no
reliable indication of what exactly those Google images depict, no reliable
way in determining if the images showed water on the roof, dirt,
discoloration, or something else entirely. Also, the images fail to show how
much time passed from when it rained to when the image was captured.
Burnside argues that Evidence Code sections 1552 and 1553 are the
bases of how Google Earth images are routinely admitted at trial, but fails to
develop the argument. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) states
that each point in a brief must be supported by argument and, if possible,
citation of authority; and, if not, it can be considered waived. (United Grand
Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153; Badie v.
Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784―785 [“When an appellant
fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”].) In any
event, our Supreme Court has held that “the presumptions in section 1552
and 1553 do not in themselves fully supply the necessary foundation” and
these Google Earth images from 10, 20 years back that depict the ponding
issue.” And numerous pictures were in fact introduced.
11
“[t]he secondary evidence rule does not ‘excuse[ ] compliance with Section
1401 (authentication).’ ” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 271.)
Burnside cites to a number of federal and out-of-state cases that she
claims support the proposition that “Google Earth images are routinely
admitted at trial as relevant, probative evidence.” But these cases are not
binding on us, as we ourselves have noted in People v. Mackey (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 32, 87: “we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s test and are not
bound to follow it, even on constitutional questions.” Moreover, Burnside
fails to demonstrate how the cases were interpreting rules or statutes
sufficiently similar to sections of our Evidence Code.7
MIL 6
MIL 6 sought to exclude evidence of defects in the roof either before or
after 2021, basically asserting that: (1) the issue of roofing construction
defects was outside the scope of Burnside’s complaint; (2) Burnside lacks
individual standing to bring a claim for construction defects; and (3) the
Association is not vicariously liable for the actions of a licensed independent
roofing contractor.
Specifically, MIL 6 argued that Burnside’s first cause of action alleged
that the Association breached its contractual duties under the CC&Rs by
failing to investigate and remediate water intrusion in her condominium unit
which purportedly originated from the condominium building’s roof, i.e.,
common area. And her second cause of action was essentially identical to the
first, except it alleged that defendants breached the duty of reasonable care
7 Finally, Burnside’s brief cites an unpublished opinion: People v. Juarez
(Mar. 20, 2025, H050476) [nonpub. opn.]. Passing over whether the case
holds as Burnside represents it does, such citation is in direct violation of
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).
12
by failing to investigate and remediate the purported roof leak.8
MIL 6 was based on the fact that information about roof defects were
claimed for the first time during expert discovery, when a Burnside expert
opined that the roof has three layers despite that the California Building
Code prohibits more than two, and still has a ponding issue. Not only does
Burnside fail to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling on
MIL 6, the fact is that Burnside put in much evidence, including from her
expert William Weber, of the allegedly defective roof, whose testimony
included numerous references to a “roof leak.” In addition to that, Weber
testified about “water in between layers of roofing” and “elevated moisture
underneath the roof material.” And Burnside’s counsel questioned
defendants’ expert Jay Carey about the allegedly illegal layers of roofing,
including the work done in March of 2021. In short, despite the trial court’s
grant of this MIL on construction defects, the jury heard testimony about the
allegedly defective roof.
MIL 4
MIL 4 sought to exclude evidence of leaks in various parts of the
property other than in Burnside’s unit 305. The motion was made on three
grounds: (1) relevancy, (2) hearsay, and (3) Evidence Code section 352. The
motion included a lengthy list of leaks set forth in “bullet-point” fashion, a
list the court addressed point-by-point, in an argument that spanned over 20
pages. Following the argument, the trial court did not, as Burnside argues,
grant the motion except for her unit 305. Rather, as noted above, the trial
court granted the motion in part, and denied it in part, and in doing so in fact
8 The third cause of action was for injunctive relief which is a remedy,
not a cause of action. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 65.)
13
noted some of the bullet-point items were moot and others were withdrawn,
the effect of which is that some evidence could be introduced.9
In any event, Burnside has demonstrated no error. Among other
things, MIL 4 argued that the other water intrusion events required
preliminary facts showing that the water intrusion originated from a common
area, that it caused property damage to Burnside necessitating repairs, that
defendants failed to remediate the property damage, and that the damage
adversely impacted Burnside’s health or property. Burnside failed to show
such preliminary facts.
MIL 4 also argued that other water intrusion was based on hearsay.
Burnside demonstrated nothing to the contrary, and pointed to no exception
to the hearsay rule.
And MIL 4 was based on Evidence Code section 352, as to which the
trial court had to consider the impact of other isolated water intrusion events
and their tendency to prove Burnside’s damages and if they would have
resulted in unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and an undue
consumption of time—as they would have, in a case in which, as Burnside’s
brief admits, the court “repeatedly” “threatened” counsel “for the trial pace,”
to the point it caused her paralegal to cry.
Beyond all that, we note that Burnside’s assertion that the trial court
ruling precluded her from presenting evidence of ponding on the roof and roof
leaks is also belied by the record. Indeed, expert Weber, who inspected the
property beginning in February 2021 and performed follow-up inspections
through 2024, not only gave the testimony discussed above, but also testified
9 In fact, we note that during the questioning of expert Weber,
defendants’ attorney objected to questions based on “MIL,” which objections
were overruled.
14
that Burnside reported roof leaks in 2017 and 2020, and about his own
investigation into alleged water intrusion. He also testified on several
occasions about ponding water on the roof, and the jury was shown
photographs of it.10 And Weber’s reports, photographs, and diagrams were
admitted into evidence, providing the jury with the very evidence Burnside
now claims was excluded: testimony, photographs, infrared imaging,
diagrams, sampling data, and roof-level observations.
MIL 7
MIL 7 was brought on the ground that Burnside was precluded from
recovering damages that were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations, Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivisions (b) and (c). The
motion was straightforward because it presented the relevant statutes of
limitation for property damage (3 years) and negligence (2 years). The
motion argued that any claim for damage that accrued on or before November
9, 2017, was time-barred after May 6, 2021. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subds.
(b), (c); Cal. Rules of Court, Appendix I, Emergency Rules Related to COVID-
19, Rule 9 [tolling statute of limitations by 178 days].) Burnside’s lawsuit
was filed on February 24, 2022, i.e., over nine months after the limitations
period expired. Burnside has shown no error.
It is perhaps enough to note that Burnside’s complaint did not allege
damages starting in 2017. But more importantly, she did not recover any
damages at all, so this MIL could not have prejudiced her. Finally, and as
noted immediately above, expert Weber testified to leaks as early as 2017.
10 Weber even measured one-and-one-quarter inches of standing water
with his tape measure and described the conditions in detail.
15
Burnside Has Demonstrated No Error in the Trial Court’s Other
Rulings.
Burnside’s second argument is that the trial court erred in prohibiting
cross-examination in her case in chief. The argument asserts that the trial
court erred when it ruled that Burnside “could not call [defendants] as
adverse witnesses as part of her case-in-chief, citing the California Judge’s
Bench Book, pointing to the term ‘may’ as indicating [the trial court’s]
discretion.” Burnside cites no record reference supporting this claim of error,
and thus we do not know many things necessary to address the issue. For
example, we do not know if Burnside’s description of the trial court’s claimed
ruling is accurate. Or how the issue presented itself. Or when. Or what the
parties argued. Or what the trial court said when it ruled. Or whether the
witnesses did testify. And when. And what they said. Burnside’s failure to
support the argument with any reference is fatal to her claim.
Again, Eisenberg is apt. As he puts it:
“Citation of Appellate Record: Any statement in a brief concerning
matters in the appellate record—whether factual or procedural and no matter
where in the brief the reference occurs—must be supported by a citation to the
record. The purpose of this requirement is to enable appellate justices and
staff attorneys to locate relevant portions of the record quickly. ([Cal. Rules
of Court, rule] 8.204(a)(1)(C); see Professional Collection Consultants v.
Lauron (2017) 8 [Cal.App.]5th 958, 970 (quoting text); Helm v. City of Los
Angeles (2024) 101 [Cal.App.]5th 1219, 1228–1230; ‘It is not our role to scour
the record to find evidence to support [appellant’s] contention or create a
triable issue of fact. That burden is [appellant’s] alone’].) [¶] . . . [¶]
“When an opening brief fails to make appropriate references to the
record in connection with points urged on appeal, the appellate court may
treat those points as waived or forfeited. (WFG Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Wells
16
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 [Cal.App.]5th 881, 894―prejudice arguments
forfeited for failure to cite record evidence; Shenouda v. Veterinary Med. Bd.
(2018) 27 [Cal.App.]5th 500, 513–515 . . . .). . . . [¶]. . . .
“The violation of [California Rules of Court rule] 8.204(a)(1)(C) may
result in the offending portions of the brief (or even the entire brief) being
disregarded. (Young v. California Fish & Game Comm’n (2018) 24
[Cal.App.]5th 1178, 1190–1191; Liberty Nat’l Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago
Title Ins. Co. (2011) 194 [Cal.App.]4th 839, 846―‘We look askance at this
practice of stating what purport to be facts—and not unimportant facts—
without support in the record. This is a violation of the rules . . . with the
consequence that such assertions will, at a minimum, be disregarded’].)”
(Eisenberg, supra, ¶ 9:36.)
Burnside’s third issue is “whether a new trial is warranted due to
exclusion of critical corroborating documents and testimony.” Recognizing a
trial court’s fundamental power “to control litigation before” it, Burnside’s
argument asserts some boilerplate regarding relevance, and then describes
for over four pages the “documents” allegedly excluded, and then the “fact
witnesses,” going on to identify four people. As we understand Burnside’s
position, one of the four witnesses would have testified as to leaks as old as
2012; the other three, who included Burnside’s ex-boyfriend and a person who
housesat her unit, would have corroborated Burnside’s testimony.
Passing over whether any of the witnesses were appropriate to testify
in this overlength trial, we note that nowhere in the argument is there any
record reference to where, when, or why the rulings were made. Once again,
the issue can be deemed forfeited.
As noted (see fn. 4), Burnside’s last three arguments either assert
cumulative error or are generalized and vague. In sum and in short,
17
Burnside has demonstrated no error in the trial court’s rulings.
But even if she had, she would still not prevail, as she could not
demonstrate a miscarriage of justice. Article VI, section 13 of the California
Constitution states: “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
any cause, . . . or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.” Code of Civil Procedure section 475 is similar, stating that “[t]he
court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error, improper
ruling . . . , which . . . does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. No
judgment, decision, or decree shall be reversed or affected by reason of any
error, ruling, instruction, or defect, unless it shall appear from the record
that such error, ruling, instruction, or defect was prejudicial . . . . There shall
be no presumption that error is prejudicial, or that injury was done if error is
shown.”
Burnside, challenging the erroneous exclusion of evidence, must
demonstrate a “miscarriage of justice,” in other words, “that a different result
would have been probable if the error had not occurred.” (Zhou v. Unisource
Worldwide (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1480.)
As noted, the heart of Burnside’s lawsuit was that defendants breached
the CC&Rs by failing to maintain or repair the roof. In defense, defendants’
roof expert Jay Carey testified that the moisture and condensation in
Burnside’s unit was from her internal use of the steam shower and that
moisture found in the roof cavities had no causal link to roof leaks. And
defendants’ mold expert Tim Kirk testified that mold infestation in
Burnside’s unit was caused by her own negligence. In sum, there was expert
and documentary evidence that water damage in Burnside’s unit 305
18
stemmed from her use of a steam shower, not any building defect. And
Burnside never challenged or objected to the admitted defense exhibits
(numbers 400 et seq.) that directly refuted her claims.
In addition, the jury found that Burnside was not excused from
performing under the CC&Rs. Given that, even if the evidence Burnside
asserts was erroneously excluded had been admitted, Burnside would have
lost the cross complaint, which was based on her violation of the CC&Rs.
As noted, Burnside also appeals the judgments awarding the
Association costs and attorney fees against her, and has filed a separate brief
in that appeal. That brief, however, does not attack the amounts awarded,
nor assert that the hours claimed by the Association’s attorneys or the hourly
rates used by the court were excessive. Rather, the appeal asserts only that
the judgments for fees and costs must be set aside because the underlying
judgment against her was error. Since we have held that Burnside’s appeal
of the underlying judgment fails, so too does her appeal of the fee and cost
awards.
DISPOSITION
The judgments in appeals case nos. A171368 and A174209 are
affirmed. The Association and Bohan shall recover their costs on appeal.
19
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A171368N, A174209N)
20
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