People v. Sheriff CA1/1

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Testo completo

Filed 4/27/26 P. v. Sheriff CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A168228
v.
(Contra Costa County
ISHMAEL WAREND SHERIFF, Super. Ct. No. 042200025)
Defendant and Appellant.

After a jury found Ishmael Warend Sheriff guilty of torture (Pen. Code,1
§ 206) and attempted sexual penetration by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, and fear (§§ 664, 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)), among other crimes, he was
sentenced to seven years to life in prison for the torture conviction,
consecutive to an aggregate determinate term of eight years and eight
months, including one year for the attempted sexual penetration. In this
appeal, he claims: (1) the torture conviction is unsupported by substantial
evidence; (2) the attempted sexual penetration conviction is likewise
unsupported by substantial evidence; (3) the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Sheriff’s previous attack on the victim; (4) in light of the
indeterminate sentence for torture, the consecutive sentence for attempted

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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sexual penetration is barred by section 654’s prohibition of punishing the
same act under more than one provision; and (5) the trial court violated the
Racial Justice Act (RJA; § 745) in its response to racial remarks made by the
victim’s mother in a victim impact statement. Because Sheriff’s last claim is
forfeited and his others lack merit, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Sheriff and the victim had dated for about three years before the events
underlying this case. When those events transpired, the two were living
together in an apartment in Antioch. The victim worked as an escort who
provided sexual services for money. Sheriff would advise the victim on
matters related to her work, reviewing her online advertisements and
instructing her never to engage in unprotected sex. After a customer paid for
sexual services, the victim would send the money to Sheriff. The two broke
up for about three months and then reconciled at Sheriff’s insistence, with
the victim moving back into the apartment and the previous financial
arrangement resuming.
One day, Sheriff choked the victim during an argument, leaving scratch
marks on her neck. Two days later, Sheriff undertook a course of conduct by
which he tortured and variously assaulted the victim for more than 24 hours.
Early that morning, a man had arrived at the apartment and engaged in
sexual activity with the victim in exchange for money. Sheriff had previously
approved this transaction, but told the victim not to allow the man to
“wander all around the house [or] go into the kitchen” or the bedroom. In
order to make sure these instructions were followed, Sheriff placed a phone
camera in the kitchen and recorded the interaction. After the man paid the
victim and left the apartment, Sheriff returned and began to question the
victim about various details of her encounter with the man. When Sheriff

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accused the victim of lying, she suggested that he review the video from the
phone camera.
While they were watching the video, Sheriff began to assault the
victim. The assault included: slapping and punching her in the face, back
and abdomen; kicking her in the legs with heavy boots; manually striking her
in the head and hand with the same boots; tying socks around her mouth so
that she could not scream “nearly as much”; whipping her about five times
with a cord; urinating on her face and in her mouth and ordering her to
swallow the urine; ordering her to pick up, chew, and swallow feces produced
by Sheriff’s dog;2 handcuffing her arm to her leg; and burning her leg and
buttocks with a torch lighter.
At one point, Sheriff instructed the victim, who was not wearing
underwear, to sit on the living room floor and spread her legs. Her vagina
was exposed and her vaginal lips were open. Sheriff then called his dog over
and told the dog to lick, but the dog just lay in place. After Sheriff reiterated
the command three to five times, the dog, which had not been trained to lick
on command, briefly sniffed the victim’s vagina. When this occurred, the
dog’s nose made contact with the outer vulva for about two to three seconds.
Sheriff then ordered the victim into his car, handcuffed and with a ski
mask to hide some of her injuries. The assault continued, as Sheriff: punched
her in the face; hit her in the knees and hands; used a knife to “slice” her
hand and arm; used the same knife to jab her legs several times; and used a
flashlight to hit her in the face, hand and knee about 20 times. When Sheriff

2 Sheriff forced the victim to comply with this order by threatening to

hit her again. The victim complied, trying whatever she could to calm the
situation. About three times, the forced attempts to swallow the feces
resulted in vomiting, but Sheriff did not allow the victim to rinse out her
mouth.

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eventually stopped at a Denny’s restaurant to order food, he left the victim in
the parking lot, handcuffed to the passenger-side headrest. The victim
removed the headrest and escaped the car when Sheriff went inside to collect
his order, but Sheriff saw the victim inside the restaurant and promptly
attempted to drag her back to the car. Finally, the victim successfully broke
free of Sheriff’s grip and Sheriff fled the scene.
The District Attorney charged Sheriff by information with torture
(§ 206; count 1); attempted sexual penetration by a foreign object by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear (§§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A) & 664; count 2);
causing injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 3 & 10); false
imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237; count 4); kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a);
count 5); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6); reckless
evasion of a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 7); pimping (§ 266h,
subd. (a); count 8); and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2); count 9).
In limine, the trial court denied Sheriff’s motion to exclude evidence of
a prior uncharged domestic violence offense in which he assaulted the same
victim. After the presentation of evidence, Sheriff successfully moved to
dismiss under section 1118.1 to dismiss the pandering charge. The jury
found Sheriff guilty of all remaining charges, and it found true the three
enhancement allegations. During a victim impact statement, the victim’s
mother made repeated references to Sheriff’s race, expressing her dismay
that a Black man would “tear down” a Black “woman like this.” Sheriff was
ultimately sentenced to seven years to life in prison for count 1, to be served
consecutively to an aggregate determinate term of eight years, eight months,
for the other offenses.

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II. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Torture Conviction
Sheriff argues his torture conviction is not supported by substantial
evidence. Specifically, he contends there is no substantial evidence to
support a finding that Sheriff acted “with the intent to cause cruel or extreme
pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for
any sadistic purpose.” (§ 206 [defining torture].) We disagree.
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A
reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s
credibility.’ ” (People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 526–27.)
“ ‘Courts have interpreted intent to inflict “cruel” pain and suffering as
intent to inflict extreme or severe pain.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hamlin (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) This “intent to cause severe pain need not be
proven by direct evidence, but can be inferred from the circumstances of the
offense . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1429–1430.) Here, that Sheriff acted with such
intent is sufficiently evident from the circumstances. Because there is a
surfeit of such circumstances, we will highlight a few representative
examples: During a course of conduct that lasted more than a day, Sheriff

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punched the victim nearly 50 times, hit her 15 to 20 times with a work boot
and 20 times with a flashlight, burned her body with a torch lighter, stabbed
her with a kitchen knife, and whipped her with the cord of a flat iron five
times. Some of this conduct occurred after the victim’s screams prompted
Sheriff to gag her with socks. Photographs admitted at trial showed injuries
all over her body including scalp wounds, a gash on her face from being
struck with the boot or flashlight (and which required stitches), a “busted”
lip, various lacerations, bruises, swelling, and burn marks, and two black
eyes. She spent four days in the hospital. On a pain scale of one (least) to
ten (most), the victim described feeling pain all over her body she rated as an
eight or nine. Under the circumstances,3 it is reasonable to infer from the
sheer volume of abuse Sheriff inflicted on the screaming victim that,
whatever other intentions he might have had, Sheriff also intended to cause
the victim severe pain to a degree inexplicable by any other motive.
Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Sheriff acted “for
the purpose of revenge.” (§ 206.) The victim was a sex worker and Sheriff’s
live-in girlfriend. Before the act of prostitution that anticipated Sheriff’s
crime, Sheriff had set up his phone camera inside their apartment to capture
the encounter between the victim and her customer. The victim testified that
Sheriff’s abuse began after she and Sheriff viewed the resulting video, and
Sheriff began accusing her of cheating on him. He then interrogated her
about perceived violations of their purported agreements concerning such
encounters; he asked the victim when she and Sheriff had agreed that she

3 Sheriff’s calculated behavior—restraining the victim in handcuffs and

silencing her screams—refutes any suggestion his conduct was a mere
“ ‘explosion of violence [citations] or an “act of animal fury” ’ rather than an
intent to inflict pain for revenge, extortion, persuasion, or other sadistic
purpose.” (People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.)

6
could sit with the customer on the couch, and he became angry when the
video showed the customer walking into the kitchen for a glass of water, in
violation of an earlier agreement to keep customers out of the kitchen. From
this sequence of events, it is reasonable to infer that Sheriff’s aim in
assaulting the victim was to punish her—to get revenge—for the victim’s
alleged failures to honor their agreement.
In sum, the torture conviction is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conviction for Attempted
Sexual Penetration
According to Sheriff, his conviction for attempted sexual penetration
“based on [an] incident in which he commanded or tried to coax his dog to lick
[the victim’s] vagina, is supported by insufficient evidence to establish he
took a direct step toward getting his dog to commit a penetration or even
intended that his dog commit a penetration.” We disagree.
Section 289, subdivision (a)(1)(A), proscribes any “act of sexual
penetration when the act is accomplished against the victim's will by means
of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person . . . .” An attempt to commit a crime
requires “proof of both specific intent to commit the crime and a direct, but
ineffectual, act done toward its commission.” (People v. Lenart (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1107, 1126.)
First, we disagree with Sheriff’s argument that the evidence was
legally insufficient “to prove . . . he intended the dog [to] penetrate” the
victim’s vagina instead of simply licking it. Sheriff told the victim, who was
not wearing underwear, to sit on the ground in the living room and spread
her legs, with her “knees . . . propped up.” She was exposed. In her
testimony at trial, when the victim was asked whether “the lips to [her]

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vagina [were] open or spread open,” she replied, “Yes.” When Sheriff then
told the dog to come closer to the victim, she closed her legs. Sheriff
responded by telling her to reopen them “and let the dog lick down there.”
Sheriff “tried to maybe coax the dog into licking [her].” After three to five
commands to the dog, it eventually sniffed and touched its nose twice around
the victim’s vulva. From Sheriff’s commands, and the exposed position he
directed the victim to assume, it is reasonable to infer that his act of
commanding his dog to lick the victim’s vagina evinced an intent for the dog’s
tongue to penetrate the opening of her genitals, however slightly. Because
such penetration is proscribed by section 289 (see People v. Quintana (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [contact with the genitalia inside the exterior of
the labia majora, including the vagina, constitutes “sexual penetration”
within the meaning of section 289]), there is substantial evidence of Sheriff’s
intent to commit that crime.
Second, we reject Sheriff’s contention that no substantial evidence
supports a finding that he took a direct step toward the commission of the
crime because “no evidence shows that [the] dog had ever been trained to lick
anything in particular when appellant coaxed or commanded it to do so . . . .”
There was no testimony to suggest that Sheriff somehow lacked the mental
capacity to understand the relationship between cause and effect. To the
contrary, by the time he issued commands to his dog, Sheriff had already
successfully brought his will to bear on the external world: striking the victim
and thereby causing her pain and gagging her with socks to muffle her
screams. The victim also testified that the dog usually listened to commands
well, “know[ing] usually what his owner [wa]s saying . . . .” And here it was
Sheriff’s repeated urging of the dog to lick her vagina, coupled with his
repeated insistence that the victim open and reopen her legs to expose herself

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before the animal that allowed—at a minimum—the inference that Sheriff
believed his dog capable of performing the act given the conditions he
created.
With attempt crimes, “ ‘ “[t]here is a material difference between the
preparation antecedent to an offense and the actual attempt to commit it.
The preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures
necessary for the commission of the offense, while the attempt is the direct
movement toward its commission after the preparations are made. In other
words, to constitute an attempt the acts of the defendant must go so far that
they would result in the accomplishment of the crime unless frustrated by
extraneous circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Luna (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 535,
540–41.) Sheriff’s claim of insufficient evidence focuses on the dog’s lack of
any specific training to lick on command, and because Sheriff did not do
anything, beyond coaxing, to induce the dog to lick the victim.4 Sheriff
contends he had no ability to “get his dog to lick” the victim’s vagina.
With or without training, dogs have been recognized by California
courts as instrumentalities of crime. (See e.g., People v. Nealis (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 6 [depending upon the circumstances of each case,
even an untrained dog that follows a command to attack and is of sufficient
size and strength relative to inflict death or great bodily injury, may be
considered a “ ‘deadly weapon or instrument’ ” within the meaning of section
245]; People v. Frazier (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 613, 618–619 (Frazier) [“A dog
may be the instrumentality of an attack causing great bodily injury just as a
loaded gun or knife can be” and the prosecution is not “required to disprove
an instinctive canine attack when the testimony showed defendant’s express

4
As an example of an inducement, Sheriff points to the lack of evidence
that he put “food substance” on the victim “to attract the dog.”

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command to an obeying dog.”].) In Frazier, the defendant’s act of commanding
a dog to attack the victim was sufficient proof that he “personally” inflicted
great bodily injury in violation of section 12022.7. In People v. Henderson
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 453, 470, it was held that “while not inherently deadly
weapons”, the defendant’s encouragement of his aggressive dogs’ behavior
toward peace officers supported his conviction for exhibiting a deadly weapon
with the intent to resist arrest. (Id. at p. 467; see § 417.8.) These cases reveal
that, at least as far as personal-use enhancements and the offenses of assault
and exhibiting a deadly weapon are concerned, the contextual circumstances
and the manner in which an animal is commanded or handled may be
determinative of whether one has used that animal as an instrumentality of
crime. Accordingly, we find it reasonable for a finder of fact to conclude that
Sheriff’s use of the dog in this case, as explained above, constituted the direct
but ineffectual act necessary to support his attempted sex offense conviction.5
Moreover, convictions for attempts have been upheld where
“ ‘defendants had the specific intent to commit the substantive offense and
. . . under the circumstances as the defendants reasonably saw them[,] they
did the acts necessary to consummate the substantive offense; but because of
circumstances unknown to defendants, essential elements of the substantive
crime were lacking.’ ” (People v. Cecil (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 769, 776.) Thus,
a conviction for an attempted crime will not be reversed for the actual

5
We therefore reject Sheriff’s effort to liken his case to Luna, a case
where no action by the defendant showed he had moved beyond the
preparation stage to manufacture controlled substances. Without having
obtained an essential ingredient to manufacture the drug, Luna had not
taken an “ ‘unequivocal overt act which can be said to be a commencement of
the commission of the intended crime.’ ” (People v. Luna, supra,
170 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.) In this case, all the components of the offense
were present, choreographed by, and under Sheriff’s direction.

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impossibility of the target crime’s commission under the circumstances if “the
means used by the defendant and the surrounding circumstances make the
crime apparently possible.” (People v. Van Buskirk (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d
789, 793 [upholding attempted murder conviction where defendant used
defective gun], italics added.) Here, even if (contrary to Sheriff’s manifest
expectations) the dog did not understand or would not obey the command to
lick, the fact that the dog was obedient and would usually heed its owner’s
commands, along with the fact that a dog’s tongue could in principle be a
means of penetration, supply sufficient evidence for the apparent possibility
of committing attempted sexual penetration.
Substantial evidence supports the conviction for attempted sexual
penetration.
C. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting Evidence
Regarding Sheriff’s Previous Attack on the Victim
Sheriff contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence that Sheriff “committed a prior uncharged domestic violence offense
against” the victim. We disagree.
Evidence Code section 1109 provides, with exceptions not relevant
here, that “in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an
offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of
other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by [Evidence Code s]ection
1101” and its general prohibition of character evidence to prove conduct, as
long as “the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code s]ection
352.” In turn, Evidence Code section 352 allows a “court in its discretion [to]
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or

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of misleading the jury.” “We will not overturn or disturb a trial court’s
exercise of its discretion under section 352 in the absence of manifest abuse,
upon a finding that its decision was palpably arbitrary, capricious and
patently absurd.” (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314.)
Sheriff argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence under Evidence Code section 1109 because its probative value was
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice under Evidence Code section
352. However, relying on People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405, Sheriff
acknowledges in his opening brief that “the prejudicial effect of prior crimes
evidence is evaluated with reference to whether the evidence of the prior
crimes is ‘stronger’ or ‘more inflammatory’ than the evidence concerning the
charged crime, and whether the defendant was already convicted for the prior
crimes so that the jury is not tempted to convict him of the charged crime to
punish him for the prior crimes.” Here, the evidence of the prior assault, in
which Sheriff punched the victim once, was considerably weaker and less
inflammatory than the evidence supporting his conviction for torture, which
we have already surveyed.
Further, the general presumption against admitting evidence of prior
uncharged offenses is based in significant part on the possibility that a jury
might have a “tendency to condemn, not because [the defendant] is believed
guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from
[the] other offense . . . .” (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 317.) But
no such possibility arises from the record here. First, the court’s instructions
to the jury detailed how it was permitted to consider the evidence. Beyond
that, we are unconvinced the trajectory of Sheriff’s hypothetical argument
points to an abuse of court discretion. That is to say, a hypothetical jury that
did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Sheriff was guilty of torture

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and the seven other offenses of which he was convicted, but still wanted to
punish him for punching the victim once, could have done so by finding
Sheriff guilty of just one of the charged offenses, such as the causing-injury-
to-a-cohabitant charge in Count 3. Instead, the real jury found him guilty of
that charge and even graver crimes like torture, thus belying any suggestion
that the verdict was motivated by the uncharged prior offense. For those
reasons, the prior-offense evidence posed no danger of undue prejudice, and
no such danger could outweigh the evidence’s probative value.
D. There Was No Error Under Section 654
Sheriff argues “the torture and attempted sexual penetration were part
of an indivisible transaction to which section 654”—forbidding multiple
punishment for the same act—“applies.” Again, we disagree.
“Section 654 provides that even though an act violates more than one
statute and thus constitutes more than one crime, a defendant may not be
punished multiple times for that single act. [Citation.] The ‘act’ which
invokes section 654 may be a continuous ‘ “course of conduct” . . . comprising
an indivisible transaction . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘The divisibility of a course of
conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the defendant . . . . [I]f the
evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives
which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the trial
court may impose punishment for independent violations committed in
pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or
were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Akins
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 338–39.) “Where, as here, the court made no
express findings on the issue, a finding that the crimes were divisible is
implicit in the judgment and must be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1083.) Accordingly,

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we review the trial court’s implicit determination in this respect for
substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
As we have already observed, torture requires the “intent to cause cruel
or extreme pain and suffering.” (§ 206.) This means “physical pain or
suffering.” (People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1047 (Mejia).) But
nothing in the evidence concerning the attempted sexual penetration reveals
such an intent. Rather, the victim described Sheriff’s dog as “a really good
dog” and “very sweet.” Her testimony did not associate any physical pain
with the result of Sheriff’s commands for the dog to lick her, the position
Sheriff made her assume, or the dog touching her. The record evidence
provides no reason to believe that cruel or extreme physical pain or suffering
resulted. Consequently, we will not disturb the trial court’s implicit finding
that the attempted sexual penetration was divisible from the course of
conduct underlying the torture conviction.
As for Mejia, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th, Sheriff’s reliance on that case is
misplaced. Granted, Mejia held that “section 654 precludes imposition of
unstayed sentences for both torture and any of the underlying assaultive
offenses upon which the prosecution relies to prove that element.”6 (Mejia, at
pp. 1044–45.) But Mejia is distinguishable from the present case because,
unlike the spousal rape in Mejia and as we have noted, there is evidence here
that the act of attempted sexual penetration “was not a part of [the] course of
conduct” underlying Sheriff’s commission of torture. (Id. at p. 1045.)
Similarly, unlike the final assault described in Mejia, there is a basis here
“for concluding that the [attempted sexual penetration] was . . . in some . . .

6
Apparently recognizing this distinction at the sentencing hearing, the
trial court stayed four counts (domestic battery [count 3], false imprisonment
[count four], kidnapping [count five], and assault with a deadly weapon
[count six]) and three accompanying great bodily injury enhancements.

14
manner distinct from” the torturous acts. (Id. at p. 1046.) In short, no
evidence suggests the attempted sexual penetration either contributed to any
cumulative infliction of great bodily injury, or manifested any intent to cause
physical pain or suffering. Thus, regardless of any errant comments by the
prosecutor suggesting otherwise, the attempted sexual penetration could not
have been “essential to satisfying an element of” torture. (Ibid.) Section 654
does not apply.
E. Sheriff’s Claim Under the Racial Justice Act Is Forfeited
According to Sheriff, “the trial court violated the Racial Justice Act
when it permitted the complaining witness’s mother to refer repeatedly to
[Sheriff’s] race in her victim impact statement, ruled the racial references
were relevant, and implicitly considered those references when it imposed
sentence.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) However, as the Attorney
General notes in his brief, appellant’s admitted failure to raise the RJA claim
below has resulted in his forfeiture of the claim on appeal.7 For this
proposition, the Attorney General correctly cites three cases: People v. Lashon
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 815–817, People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
76, 112–116, and People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 41. By contrast,
respondent has cited no authority for the proposition that an RJA claim on
appeal is not thus subject to forfeiture. We therefore deem the claim
forfeited.
III. DISPOSITION
We affirm.

7 In his reply brief, Sheriff contends “the defense did persistently object

to the witness’s racial references and asked the court to strike those
references from the record,” while conceding that this was “not explicitly on
grounds provided by the RJA.” But preserving a claim for appeal generally
requires an objection at trial on the specific ground asserted on appeal. (See,
e.g., People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 893.)

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_________________________
SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

People v. Sheriff / (A168228)

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