People v. Urrutiaguillen CA4/3

CourtListener 10848681Calctapp27 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/27/26 P. v. Urrutiaguillen CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064569

v. (Super. Ct. No. 23HF0672)

FERNANDO URRUTIAGUILLEN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed.
Jo Pastore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Fernando Urrutiaguillen appeals the trial court’s
judgment, specifically challenging denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a search of his vehicle in the course of a traffic stop. The trial
court found there was reasonable suspicion warranting further investigation,
the scope of the search did not exceed the verbal and written consent given by
Urrutiaguillen, and there was probable cause for the search. We find there is
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determinations and therefore
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Traffic Stop
On April 18, 2023, Officer Justin Lopez was on duty, in uniform,
driving his marked patrol car northbound on the I-5 freeway in Irvine,
California, with his K-9, Astro. He initiated a traffic stop of a Jeep Grand
Cherokee driven by Urrutiaguillen because he observed it traveling about
70 miles per hour and following the truck in front of it too closely.
Urrutiaguillen followed Lopez’s instructions in stopping the vehicle.
Lopez approached the Jeep on the passenger side and
immediately smelled a strong odor of gasoline. He began the encounter by
telling Urrutiaguillen the reason for the stop. Urrutiaguillen provided his
Arizona driver’s license and registration but no proof of insurance. Lopez
gave the license and registration to Officer Gabriel Blanco, a backup officer
assisting him that day; Blanco ran a check to see if the license was valid and
for outstanding warrants. Those checks came back clear. The process took
approximately three minutes.

2
While Blanco was checking the documents, Lopez had
conversations with both Urrutiaguillen and his wife. During those
conversations, Lopez noted Urrutiaguillen was nervous and was “gripping the
steering wheel with both hands very tightly,” hanging onto it as if he “didn’t
want to let go.” Lopez asked Urrutiaguillen why he was nervous.
Urrutiaguillen responded, “he was nervous because he didn’t have
insurance.” Urrutiaguillen’s wife, sitting in the passenger seat, stated that he
had recently been terminated from his job in corrections. There were three
children in the back seat.
During his initial conversation, Lopez did not ask any questions
about the vehicle smelling like gasoline. He asked where they were coming
from and where they were going. Urrutiaguillen said they were traveling
from Tecate, Mexico to his aunt’s house in Los Angeles, expecting to return to
Mexico the next day. This information was corroborated by Urrutiaguillen’s
wife in a separate conversation with Lopez about nine to ten minutes into the
traffic stop.
About 11 to 12 minutes into the stop, Lopez asked Urrutiaguillen
where he lived, where he purchased the car, and whether there was anything
illegal in it. Lopez then asked if he could search the vehicle “real quick,” and
Urrutiaguillen gave his verbal consent. Before Lopez conducted the search,
Urrutiaguillen also signed a written consent form. The family then got out of
the vehicle. At this point, Lopez still had not said anything to any member of
the family about the car smelling like gasoline.
Lopez retrieved his K-9, Astro, from his marked patrol car about
16 minutes into the stop. Astro walked around Urrutiaguillen’s vehicle and
alerted near the left rear passenger door seam on the exterior. Lopez opened
the back door of the vehicle; Astro entered the vehicle and alerted again.

3
Astro placed his two front paws on the left rear passenger floorboard and
stared down towards the left rear passenger seat.
Lopez then conducted a full search of the vehicle. Around this
time, Lopez said, “it kind of smells like gasoline in here” and noted the odor
was much stronger in the rear passenger area. This was the first time during
the traffic stop Lopez had verbalized anything about the smell of gasoline.
Several minutes later, he again mentioned the smell, saying “‘it reeks in here
right?’”
About 32 minutes into the stop, Lopez asked Urrutiaguillen why
the vehicle smelled like gasoline. Urrutiaguillen responded he ran out of gas
in Tecate and the gas can had spilled in the back area of the vehicle.
Lopez investigated the fuel tank, hitting it with the palm of his
hand. He testified, “It felt very dense like if it was completely full, but the gas
gauge was only half full.” Lopez also noted that the undercarriage of the
vehicle was covered in dried mud except for several screws holding the fuel
tank in place. The screws had tool marks, and there was no mud on the
screws.
Lopez then called another unit to bring a fuel tank scope to the
scene. The unit arrived approximately 20 to 30 minutes later. A “probe” was
fed into the gas tank, and the camera showed a white rectangular package
inside the tank. The package was consistent with Lopez’s experience related
to the transportation of controlled substances. After this on-scene
examination, the vehicle was towed. A few hours later the fuel tank was
accessed from the undercarriage, and several packages were removed from
the tank. These packages were consistent with what Lopez had observed on
the screen of the fuel tank scope. They contained methamphetamine and
heroin, which formed the basis of the charges against Urrutiaguillen.

4
B. Officer Lopez’s training
Lopez received training in drug trafficking, including courses on
smuggling and commercial interdiction. Lopez is a member of the California
Narcotics K-9 Association which also puts on two-to-three-day training
courses related to K-9 and narcotics detection. His training focused more on
drug trafficking as opposed to drug deals in the streets. It included training
on drug trafficking within the United States and on an international level,
how controlled substances are sometimes smuggled into the United States,
and an overview of drug trafficking operations. As part of his current
assignment, he typically investigates drugs coming into the United States
from Mexico.
Lopez’s training included how drugs could be concealed in a
vehicle, and specifically within a gas tank. He observed and participated in a
search at a tow yard and on another traffic stop. He was taught that the
smell of gasoline in a car “can be an indicator of possible criminal activity”
because it can be consistent with the gas tank being tampered with. Lopez
testified, based on his training and experience, that a strong odor of gasoline
coming from the interior of a passenger vehicle with a family inside is
unusual.
Lopez also received K-9 training. Before he became a police
officer, Lopez was in the military and his service included training and work
handling K-9s searching for explosives. As part of his training as a police
officer, Lopez and his K-9, Astro, attended a certified K-9 school put on by the
California Highway Patrol in Sacramento. During this training, Astro was
trained to detect odors of cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana.
This CHP K-9 training included dog handling, patrol, and
narcotics detection training. Astro went through 200 hours of specific drug

5
detection training and had to meet a minimum proficiency to be allowed to
work in the field. Lopez and Astro received their initial certification at the
academy; both are required to be recertified on an annual basis.
When Astro detects one of the drug odors for which he is trained,
he has a definitive or recognizable change of behavior. He goes into his “final
response,” which is a “passive stare.” Lopez described Astro’s final response
as a physical and mental response, or heightened emotional state, noting
Astro’s change in behavior is specific to him. Lopez explained dogs are
trained to have a specific stop and stare response, but the definitive alert
behavior is unique and different to every handler and their dog. He testified,
“[t]hey’re dogs . . .not robots.” Training stresses that the K-9 handler pay
attention to his dog and learn what their change in behavior is. Astro’s
“passive stare [is] his trained final response.” It is the same thing as a “freeze
alert” another dog might perform.
C. Procedural History
Urrutiaguillen was arrested and charged with possession of
controlled substances (methamphetamine) for sale in violation of Health and
Safety Code sections 11378 (count 1) and 11379, subdivision (a) (count 2),
possession of narcotics (heroin) for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code
sections 11351 (count 3) and 11352, subdivision (a) (count 4). The information
alleged sentencing enhancements pursuant to Health and Safety Code
section 11370.4, subdivision (b)(4) (as to counts 1 and 2) and subdivision
(a)(1) (as to counts 3 and 4).
Urrutiaguillen brought a motion to suppress, and the hearing on
this motion included two days of testimony. The trial court denied the
motion. Urrutiaguillen then pled guilty to all charges and admitted all

6
allegations. He was sentenced to a term of three years in county jail, followed
by five years mandatory supervision.
Urrutiaguillen filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Urrutiaguillen challenges the trial court’s denial of his
suppression motion on three grounds: (1) the traffic stop was unlawful and
unlawfully prolonged without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity;
(2) the scope of the search exceeded Urrutiaguillen’s consent; and (3) probable
cause did not support the scope of the search. We conclude there is
substantial evidence to support the court’s factual findings. Based on those
findings, the court did not err in denying Urrutiaguillen’s motion to suppress
evidence.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In ruling upon a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the
credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs
the evidence, and draws factual inferences. We will uphold the court’s express
and/or implied findings on such matters if they are supported by substantial
evidence, but we independently review the application of the relevant law to
the facts.” (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761.)
II.
THE INITIAL STOP WAS NOT UNREASONABLY PROLONGED,
AND THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ANY DELAY

WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement.
(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8–9.) “The United States Supreme Court has

7
interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring state and federal courts to
exclude evidence that government officials obtained in violation of the
amendment’s protections.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.)
“Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions”
and do not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer can articulate
specific facts justifying the stop. (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295,
299.) During traffic stops, officers may take action to address “the ‘mission’”
of the stop and to “‘attend to related safety concerns.’” (People v. Esparza
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1094.) In the context of a traffic stop, an officer’s
mission is to enforce the traffic code and ensure “‘vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly.’” (People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
659, 670 (Gyorgy).) Tasks associated with this mission include checking the
driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and determining
whether the driver has any outstanding warrants or criminal history. (Ibid.)
While the mission of the traffic stop is ongoing, the officer is permitted to talk
to the driver and passengers, gather information related to the traffic stop,
and make observations. (Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355
(Rodriguez).) An officer does not need reasonable suspicion to conduct this
type of inquiry. (People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238.) “A
seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation . . . ‘become[s]
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” (Rodriguez, supra, at
pp. 350–351.) The officer’s authority for a traffic stop ends when the mission
is completed or should have been completed. (Id. at p. 354.) “[T]he question is
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably
designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (People v. Russell

8
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) Information discovered during this type of
inquiry “may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong detention.” (Ibid.)
The Attorney General points to three key pieces of information,
each of which established reasonable suspicion to take the next step in the
investigation and search. First, there was the smell of gasoline which Lopez
testified he noticed as he first approached the vehicle and throughout his
initial contact with the driver. Additionally, Lopez noticed Urrutiaguillen was
nervous, was not forthcoming about where he currently lived or that he was
unemployed, and the family was on a quick turnaround trip from Mexico to
Los Angeles. This information prompted Lopez to ask if he could search the
vehicle, and Urrutiaguillen gave both written and verbal consent. The
consensual search led to Astro’s alert at or near the gas tank, and the
eventual search of the interior of the gas tank.
Urrutiaguillen argues the time it took to run the license check
was less than three minutes, and anything after that initial check was an
unlawful prolonging of the traffic stop, which should result in the suppression
of anything discovered during that prolonged period. This argument relies
heavily on Gyorgy, which held an officer’s inquiry was not based on
reasonable suspicion and he therefore unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop,
resulting in suppression of the evidence obtained during the stop. (Gyorgy,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 676–677.) Urrutiaguillen urges us to reach the
same conclusion here based on his assertion that Lopez “detoured from the
traffic stop’s mission by asking [Urrutiaguillen] questions unrelated to the
suspected traffic violation.” Urrutiaguillen argues Lopez’s inquiries were
aimed at finding evidence of criminal wrongdoing rather than being directed
to the traffic violation.

9
In Gyorgy, the questions asked by the officer were not related to
the traffic stop. The officer asked about the driver’s parole or probation
status, whether he had weapons, and whether he was a narcotics or sex
offender registrant. (Gyorgy, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 664.) The officer
asked the defendant to get out of his vehicle for a pat down, and waited for
backup to conduct the body search, which revealed no illegal items. (Id. at
p. 665.) The officer then claimed he had the right to walk his K-9 around the
defendant’s car, though the defendant did not give consent for a vehicle
search. (Ibid.) The K-9 alerted after circling the vehicle several times. (Id. at
p. 666.)
The Gyorgy court found the stop was unreasonably prolonged
because there was no evidence the officer took steps to conduct the mission of
the traffic stop and instead “detoured from [it] almost immediately,” to
investigate unrelated matters without reasonable suspicion. (Gyorgy, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 672.) The officer did not verify the defendant’s driver’s
license, check his registration or insurance or run a warrants check. (Ibid.)
Also, the K-9 search was unrelated to the officer’s stated mission of
determining the defendant’s sex offender status, and there was no reasonable
suspicion of controlled substances or other illegal items. (Id. at pp. 675–676.)
To establish reasonable suspicion, a detaining officer must be
able to articulate facts which, in the totality of the circumstances, objectively
point to criminal activity. (Gyorgy, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 675.) The stop
cannot be based on ““‘mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch.’”” (People v. Espino
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 757.) Urrutiaguillen argued below that Lopez’s
inquiry and search of the vehicle were a hunch unsupported by reasonable
suspicion. We disagree.

10
The determination of whether Lopez had reasonable suspicion to
prolong the stop hinges on the factual dispute of whether he smelled gasoline
in the vehicle during his initial contact with the driver, or if he noticed it
later. Lopez testified the smell immediately triggered his suspicion that
controlled substances might be in the vehicle. His drug trafficking training
told him the smell of gasoline could be an indication that there were
controlled substances in or near the gas tank. This prompted his questions to
Urrutiaguillen and his wife while the records check was taking place. During
this inquiry, Lopez noted Urrutiaguillen was nervous, and the answers to his
questions gave him more reasonable suspicion to continue his inquiry by
conducting the K-9 search, which ultimately led to the discovery of the
controlled substances.
Urrutiaguillen argues the evidence shows Lopez smelled gasoline
only after Astro alerted in the back seat of the vehicle based on the fact that
Lopez first mentioned the smell to Urrutiaguillen after Astro’s alert.
Additionally, Urrutiaguillen relies on Lopez’s report of the traffic stop, which
states the gasoline smell was detected when Lopez was conducting the
vehicle search.
Urrutiaguillen concedes Lopez testified he smelled gasoline as he
approached the car but argues Lopez’s testimony is not credible because he
later admitted on cross-examination that his report only mentions the smell
of gasoline at the time of the K-9 search. The portion of the record to which
Urrutiaguillen cites is testimony where Lopez admits the contents of his
report (that he smelled a strong odor of gasoline when he entered the vehicle)
but does not recant his testimony that he smelled gasoline immediately upon
approach. Urrutiaguillen describes Lopez’s testimony as “a post-hoc
fabrication meant to justify the otherwise illegal prolonged detention.”

11
In ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court may
weigh evidence, determine credibility and resolve conflicting fact questions.
(People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) When there is
substantial evidence to support the court’s determination, it will be upheld.
(Ibid.) The court accepted Lopez’s testimony as credible, and found when
combined with his training, the smell of gasoline could create reasonable
suspicion, especially when considered with all the other factors present.
Once that factual determination was made, the trial court did not
“feel any of the other questions were of a nature where they were born of an
interrogation, nor did they appear to rise to the level of a hunch or a fishing
expedition.” The questions “were born of an independent pathway that the
officer appeared to be allowed and did pursue.” That pathway came from the
smell of gas at the initial contact with the vehicle, and that allowed the
officer to gather other information that led to “reasonable suspicion [of]
criminal activity.” Based on these factual findings, the court found the
detention was not prolonged. We agree.
Urrutiaguillen next argues that Lopez’s descriptions of
Urrutiaguillen’s nervousness were not severe enough to form the basis of
reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop. Nervousness can be “‘a
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.’” (People v. Flores
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1045.) Nervousness can be in the form of “expressions
of shock upon seeing an officer, ducking and hiding, headlong flight, a sudden
change in direction, walking quickly away while looking back at the officer,
and failing to acknowledge the officer’s attempt to engage the suspect.” (Id. at
p. 1044.) A person’s nervousness during a police encounter may inform
reasonable suspicion if it is “unusually extreme or prolonged.” (U.S. v.
Ludwig (10th Cir. 2011) 641 F.3d 1243, 1250.) Urrutiaguillen argues Lopez

12
did not specifically testify that the observed nervousness was unusually
extreme or prolonged and that motorists engaging with law enforcement are
often nervous. Moreover, Urrutiaguillen argues, there was a valid reason for
his nervousness communicated to Lopez: the lack of proof of insurance.
Lopez testified Urrutiaguillen was “gripping the steering wheel
with both hands very tightly,” and looked as if he “didn’t want to let go.”
Urrutiaguillen does not challenge the veracity or credibility of this evidence,
only that it does not rise to the required level of nervousness to form the basis
of reasonable suspicion.
Even without any nervousness by Urrutiaguillen, Lopez had
information which gave him reasonable suspicion to continue the stop: the
smell of gasoline inside the vehicle, the quick turnaround trip from Mexico to
Los Angeles, and Urrutiaguillen’s evasion of questions about his current
residence. Each of these creates circumstances which, when considered
together, can form the basis of reasonable suspicion. If Lopez’s only
information was the description he gave of Urrutiaguillen’s nervous behavior,
it might not rise to the level of “unusually extreme or prolonged,” but when
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion is
established.
Finally, Urrutiaguillen argues that his connections with Mexico
and a day trip to visit family in Los Angeles cannot form the basis for a
“reasonable, particularized suspicion that he was transporting drugs, in the
absence of further information.” (Italics added.) Urrutiaguillen compares this
to the Gyorgy court’s finding that the presence of the defendant’s truck at a
motel known for drug trafficking was not enough to establish a reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was involved with drug trafficking. (Gyorgy,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 676.) But here, there is more than just the

13
knowledge Urrutiaguillen and his family were driving from Mexico to Los
Angeles for a short “turnaround trip.” There was also his nervousness, his
unemployment, questionable living situation, and the smell of gasoline, all of
which create a totality of circumstances which can form the basis of
reasonable suspicion. The trial court noted that this case does not turn on one
isolated factor. It cannot be said “hey, because you’re unemployed, you must
be a drug dealer.” The court stated all information presented to Lopez must
be considered “from a reasonable standard point of view” to determine “were
they sufficient to allow the officer to do what he did and conduct additional
investigation to determine whether the defendant was transporting anything
illegal in his car, specifically in the fuel tank.” We agree.
III.
THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH DID NOT EXCEED URRUTIAGUILLEN’S CONSENT,
AND THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH

Urrutiaguillen argues the scope of his vehicle search exceeded the
consent he gave, and the search is therefore in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Lopez requested a “real quick” search of the vehicle, and
Urrutiaguillen argues a reasonable person would not assume that includes
waiting for someone from another agency to bring a scope to the scene to
search the interior of the gas tank.
A search unsupported by a warrant, probable cause, or an exigent
circumstance is valid only when there is purported consent. (Florida v. Royer
(1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497 (Royer).) There was no warrant in this case, and
there is no argument the search was based on exigent circumstances.
Therefore, unless there is either consent or probable cause, the evidence must
be suppressed. We find there is substantial evidence of both here.

14
A. The Search Did Not Exceed the Scope of Urrutiaguillen’s Consent
“[T]he search must be limited in scope to that which is justified
by the particular purposes served by the exception.” (Royer, supra, 460 U.S.
at p. 500.) “Whether the search remained within the boundaries of the
consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances.” (People v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408
(Crenshaw).) A consensual search may not legally exceed the scope of the
consent supporting it. (Walter v. United States (1980) 447 U.S. 649, 656–657.)
Generally, consent to search a vehicle includes authority to search “all
compartments in the automobile and . . . any containers found within those
compartments.” (People v. Williams (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 67, 73.)
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent
under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?” (Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248,
251.) Urrutiaguillen argues Lopez set the scope of the search by calling it a
“real quick” look and a typical reasonable person would not interpret that
phrase “to include dismantling vehicle components or conducting a canine
search.”
Urrutiaguillen relies on People v. Cantor (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
961 (Cantor) in support of his argument that the scope of this search
exceeded the level of consent he gave. In Cantor, the Court of Appeal reversed
the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding the search
of a vinyl record cleaner located in the trunk of defendant’s vehicle exceeded
the scope of consent. (Id. at pp. 967–968.) There, officers searched the
passenger compartment, the trunk, under the hood, and rechecked the car’s
interior several times. After all of that, the defendant agreed to a K-9 search,

15
and in the process of removing items from the trunk which could harm the
dog, the officer felt something shift in a box he was holding, opened the box
with a screwdriver, and found cocaine. (Id. at p. 964.) The Cantor court
stated, “Once [the officer’s] exhaustive search of all compartments of the car
revealed no contraband, defendant’s consent ended. No justification existed to
prolong defendant’s detention.” (Id. at pp. 965–966.)
Cantor involved verbal consent only, but here, Urrutiaguillen
gave Lopez both written and verbal consent to search his vehicle.
Additionally, there is nothing in the record which shows Urrutiaguillen made
any attempt to limit the scope of consent, withdraw his consent, or intervene
in the search.
In Crenshaw, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, the defendant knew the
officers were looking for drugs in his vehicle. The Court of Appeal found it
was objectively reasonable to search places a reasonable person would expect
to find drugs, including inside a door panel in the defendant’s vehicle. (Id. at
pp. 1414–1415.) Urrutiaguillen argues his case is unlike Crenshaw, because
there the defendant knew the officers were looking for drugs, but here, Lopez
never told Urrutiaguillen what he was looking for. Therefore, Urrutiaguillen
could not give a fully informed consent and, without that information, the
search of the inside of his gas tank was not objectively reasonable and
exceeded the scope of his consent.
The record here indicates Lopez asked Urrutiaguillen if he had
anything illegal in the car, and specifically mentioned narcotics, marijuana,
heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine. Urrutiaguillen denied there were any
such substances in his vehicle. Additionally, Lopez said, “I don’t want to have
to take apart your car anything like that. You got anything in there bro?”
Urrutiaguillen then responded, “You do, you do whatever you have to do, sir.”

16
Urrutiaguillen knew the scope of the search could and would likely be
expanded beyond a “quick” look. Urrutiaguillen’s statement, “You do, you do
whatever you have to do, sir” is verbal consent to continue the search and
specifically allows for a search of the gas tank.
The trial court noted “[i]t should not have been a surprise to a
reasonable person that that’s where the inquiry and where the search was
going to go towards.” We agree. Urrutiaguillen was aware of the object of the
search and the intended scope of the search. He did not withdraw consent,
and there is substantial evidence he gave further or expanded consent by
telling Lopez to “do whatever you have to do, sir.”
B. There Was Probable Cause to Search the Gas Tank
Presuming consent was not initially valid, or was at least
exceeded, Urrutiaguillen argues Astro’s alert was questionable, meaning
there was no probable cause to conduct the search of the gas tank.
Probable cause is a higher standard than reasonable suspicion,
and it can be found “‘where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient
to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found . . . .’” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
853, 862.) In evaluating whether probable cause exists the court must
consider the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.) Even without consent, an
officer can conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if the officer has
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of
criminal activity. (Id. at pp. 861–862.) An officer with probable cause “‘may
conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle
whose contents are not in plain view.’” (People v. McGee (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 796, 801.)

17
Urrutiaguillen concedes that a K-9 alert is sufficient probable
cause to search a vehicle, but in his motion, he challenged the validity of
Astro’s alert by presenting evidence from an expert on K-9 behavior.
Specifically, Urrutiaguillen challenges Lopez’s testimony that Astro’s
“passive stare” is a trained response he considers to be an alert, even if there
is not a full final “freeze.” The expert testified that none of Astro’s responses
was an actual alert, and when Astro was walking around the vehicle he was
not actively searching and therefore could not “alert.” The expert also
testified Astro did not alert inside the vehicle, that Lopez was too close to the
dog, and he called the “freeze” too quickly.
Urrutiaguillen also relies on Lopez’s testimony that Astro was
limping on scene, and he pulled out a “sticker” embedded in the animal’s paw.
When the sticker was removed, Astro stopped limping. Urrutiaguillen
appears to argue the court could infer this caused a false alert, but no
evidence supports that inference.
The trial court found the K-9 alert “corroborated the officer’s
reasonable suspicions that were further corroborated by him knocking on the
tank a few times and recognizing a sound that was just not consistent with a
full gas tank.” Additionally, while the court found the defense expert was
qualified, it “found the testimony lacked foundation and relevance as to the
underlying specifics of [Lopez] and his dog specifically as to the training they
received, not only in the K-9 academy, but also the subsequent training that
they received.” The expert’s testimony relied on general training and
practices, and the court found Lopez’s testimony about his relationship with
Astro and his ability to interpret Astro’s particular behavior to be more
credible. Substantial evidence supports this finding. Based on this finding,
the court found “the officer had probable cause to search [Urrutiaguillen’s]

18
gas tank.” The court further found that it was reasonable for Lopez to wait
for the scope from another agency “based on reasonable articulable facts that
were given to the officer at that time.” We agree.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

19

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.