Lemus v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container CA2/2

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Filed 4/27/26 Lemus v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LUCIO LEMUS, JR., B341878

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV44110)

OWENS-BROCKWAY GLASS
CONTAINER, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William F. Highberger, Judge. Affirmed.
Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Mikael H. Stahle,
Debra J. Tauger; Altshuler Berzon and Michael Rubin for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Candace Bertoldi, Elizabeth MacGregor,
Robin E. Devaux and Brian P. Long for Defendant and
Respondent.
_______________________________________
Lucio Lemus, Jr. (Lemus) appeals summary judgment in
favor of respondent Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.
(Owens). Lemus is pursuing alleged labor law violations as
successor in interest to his father, Lucio Lemus, Sr. (Decedent).
Decedent worked for Owens from 2008 to 2021.
On de novo review, we conclude that Lemus has no
standing to maintain a claim under the Private Attorneys
General Act (PAGA). (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)1 His claims for
failure to provide breaks, overtime pay, or correct wage
statements lack any supporting evidence. The unfair competition
law (UCL) claim fails because no law was violated. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2020, Decedent sued Owens, where he worked as a
welder/fabricator. He alleged that Owens failed to provide meal
or rest periods, pay overtime, minimum wage, or wages due at
the end of employment; failed to maintain records, furnish
accurate wage statements, or pay employee expenses; and
violated the UCL. He sought PAGA penalties.
Owens removed the case to federal court. In 2022, Lemus
substituted into the case as Decedent’s successor in interest.2
Lemus never worked for Owens; he did not file a PAGA letter
with the Labor Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), though
Decedent submitted one in 2020.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
We are using the version of PAGA in effect from June 27, 2016,
until June 30, 2024. (Stats. 2016, ch. 31, § 189.)
2 The federal district court remanded the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in 2023. Its orders do not address the
issues presented here: It merely found Lemus is a proper party
as Decedent’s heir.

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Owens moved for summary judgment. It argued that the
terms of Decedent’s employment were set forth in a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). Human resources manager Sidney
Gleason declared that Decedent was provided paid breaks and
did not complain to Owens or his union that the terms of his
employment were violated. Pay records showed Decedent
routinely received overtime pay. He was employed, but
performed no work, from June 25, 2020, until his death on
October 2, 2021.
Owens argued that Lemus could not maintain a PAGA
claim as he was not an “aggrieved employee.” Owens complied
with all labor laws; Decedent’s claims did not transfer to Lemus;
and there is no evidence of labor violations. Decedent was in a
union, covered by a CBA, and never complained of violations.
The UCL cause of action fails because it is contingent on the
unavailing Labor Code claims.
In opposition, Lemus argued that Decedent’s claims
survive, and he has standing to pursue them. Owens did not
carry its burden of proving compliance with meal, rest, pay, and
wage statement, waiting time, and record requirements. The
PAGA claim is viable and not subject to summary judgment. In
support of his opposition, counsel offered “randomly selected”
time records he claimed did not align with Decedent’s wage
statements.
Owens replied that Lemus failed to raise a triable issue of
material fact. Decedent’s claims could not be assigned, and
unassignable claims do not survive death. Lemus submitted no
admissible evidence that Decedent was deprived of his rights
under the Labor Code. Owens objected that counsel’s declaration

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about Decedent’s wage and time records lacked personal
knowledge and the records are unauthenticated.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The court granted Owens’s motion. It noted that Decedent
was not deposed to preserve his testimony. Without testimony,
the evidence Lemus offered “is no better than speculation.” The
court sustained Owens’s objections to Lemus’s attempted use of
time records and wage statements.
The court ruled that Decedent’s PAGA claim did not
transfer upon death to Lemus. Claims for unpaid overtime and
meal periods are covered by the CBA. Lemus failed to refute
Owens’s showing that it complied with the CBA. Without
Decedent’s testimony, there was no competent evidence showing
he was denied meal breaks.
The court entered judgment for Owens and dismissed
Lemus’s claims with prejudice. He appeals the judgment.
DISCUSSION
1. Appeal and Standard of Review
The judgment is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 437c,
subd. (m)(1), 904.1., subd. (a)(1).) Summary judgment must be
granted if no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Id., § 437c,
subd. (c).) The procedure enables courts to cut through the
pleadings and determine if trial is necessary. (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The motion succeeds if
“the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of
action [because] the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at 854.)
We independently examine the record to determine if
triable issues exist. (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008)

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43 Cal.4th 56, 64.) Evidence presented in opposition to summary
judgment is liberally construed. (Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
2. Lemus Cannot Pursue Decedent’s PAGA Claim
The parties dispute Lemus’s standing to pursue a PAGA
claim. His standing presents an issue of law on undisputed facts.
(A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 677, 687.) PAGA requires “an ‘aggrieved employee’
who can represent the state as a PAGA plaintiff and sue ‘on
behalf of himself or herself and other current or former
employees.’ ” (Hutcheson v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
932, 939; § 2699, former subd. (a).)
PAGA “does not create property rights or any other
substantive rights. Nor does it impose any legal obligations. It is
simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to
recover civil penalties—for Labor Code violations—that otherwise
would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies. As we
have held in the past, the right to recover a statutory penalty
may not be assigned.” (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1765,
AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003
(Amalgamated).) For example, a labor union lacks standing to
pursue a PAGA claim assigned to it because the union was not an
“ ‘ “aggrieved employee.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1005.)
“Ordinarily a right that cannot be assigned does not
survive the death of the person entitled to it.” (Estate of Blair
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 728, 731.) Further, “an action to enforce a
statutory penalty does not survive death and is not assignable.”
(Auslen v. Thompson (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 204, 213.)
A PAGA claim is for statutory penalties. PAGA “authorizes
a representative action only for the purpose of seeking statutory

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penalties for Labor Code violations [citation], and an action to
recover civil penalties ‘is fundamentally a law enforcement action
designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.’ ”
(Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986; Kim v. Reins
International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 86 (Kim) [a
PAGA enforcement action does not “redress employees’ injuries”
and is “between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA
plaintiff acting on behalf of the government”].) “The private
plaintiff has no claim to these statutory penalties; they are the
property of the state.” (Medina v. Poel (E.D.Cal. 2015) 523 B.R.
820, 827; § 2699, former subd. (i) [75 percent of the penalties go
to the LWDA; the remaining 25 percent is disbursed to employees
aggrieved by the labor violation].)
Lemus relies upon survivorship law to assert standing.
(See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.30 [a cause of action “that survives
the death of the person entitled to commence an action or
proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest”], 377.21
[“[a] pending action or proceeding does not abate by the death of
a party if the cause of action survives”].)
Survivorship law does not apply to claims asserted on
behalf of the government. Under PAGA, “[t]he plaintiff is not
even the real party in interest in the action—the government is.”
(Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 745, 757.) “Relief under PAGA is designed primarily
to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action.”
(Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.) Because a PAGA claim is not a
property interest, but a right to pursue a claim on behalf of the
state, it is outside the scope of survivorship statutes’ protection of
a decedent’s personal claims.

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The transfer of PAGA claims upon death was addressed in
Estate of Harrington v. Marten Transp. (C.D.Cal. 2017) 2017
U.S.Dist. Lexis 192220, p. *14.) The court held that “a PAGA
claim is simply not the kind of claim that survives a plaintiff’s
death.” It cited Amalgamated, supra, 46 Cal.4th at page 1003 for
the rule that a PAGA claim cannot be assigned and concluded,
“ ‘a right that cannot be assigned does not survive the death of
the person entitled to it.’ ” (Estate of Harrington, at p. *14;
accord, Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
782, 789 [plaintiff’s death “necessitated the dismissal of her
PAGA claim” unless a contemporaneously aggrieved employee
could substitute in as employee representative].)
Similarly, the court in Khanna v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys. (2009
E.D.Cal. 2009) U.S.Dist. Lexis 133645 rejected an argument that
a PAGA claim may be pursued by decedent’s wife under
California survivorship law. “[A]ny PAGA claim Khanna had,
expired upon his death and Plaintiff, as Khanna’s successor in
interest, cannot bring a PAGA claim on his behalf.” (Id. at p.
*12.) The court wrote that the wife “is not an ‘aggrieved
employee’ herself” and therefore lacks standing to assert a claim
for PAGA penalties. (Ibid.) Here, as in Khanna, Lemus is not an
“aggrieved employee.” Decedent’s PAGA claim did not survive
his death. Lemus lacks standing to pursue it.
3. Individual Claims
Lemus challenges the trial court’s rulings on claims for
missed meal and rest breaks, failure to pay correct overtime
wages, and inadequate wage statements. He is not appealing
rulings rejecting his causes of action for minimum wage; waiting
time penalties; failure to maintain records; or failure to repay
business expenses.

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a. Meal Breaks
Employees are entitled to a minimum 30-minute meal
break after no more than five hours of work. (§ 512, subd. (a).)
An employer satisfies this requirement if it “relinquishes control
over [employee] activities and permits them a reasonable
opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does
not impede or discourage them from doing so. . . . [¶] . . . [T]he
employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no
work thereafter is performed”; no liability attaches so long as the
employer has relinquished control. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.
Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040–1041 (Brinker).)
Owens’s manager Gleason declared that Decedent was
entitled to paid meal and rest breaks. If unable to take a break,
he could report missed breaks to his supervisor, human
resources, or union representative, and was entitled to a
premium payment. Owens has no record of Decedent reporting
missed meal breaks.
Article 18 of the CBA, cited by Gleason, addresses lunch
and rest periods but does not address clocking out. Though
Gleason stated that employees are not required to clock out for
meals, her declaration is contradicted by Owens’s written policy.
It reads, “Employees must clock out when taking a meal break
and clock back in when they resume working. If . . . employees
are unable to clock in or out, they must report their meal break
and all working time to their supervisor.”
Owens’s written policy is consistent with state regulation
requiring that meal periods be recorded. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
§ 11010, subd. 7(A)(3) [“Meal periods . . . shall also be recorded”
though not if operations cease during lunch].) “ ‘[W]ithout the
recording of all in-and-out time, including meal periods, the

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enforcement staff would be unable to adequately investigate and
enforce’ a wage order’s meal period provisions.” (Brinker, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 1053 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)
“ ‘If an employer’s records show no meal period for a given
shift over five hours, a rebuttable presumption arises that the
employee was not relieved of duty and no meal period was
provided.’ ” (Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th
58, 74 (Donohue).) On summary judgment, the presumption does
not impose “ ‘automatic liability’ ” on the employer, who “can
rebut the presumption by presenting evidence that employees
were compensated for noncompliant meal periods or that they
had in fact been provided compliant meal periods during which
they chose to work.” (Id. at p. 77.)
Though Owens failed to record meal breaks, our analysis
does not end there. Gleason rebutted the presumption by
declaring that Owens provided compliant meal breaks, paid a
premium for missed breaks, and Decedent never reported
missing one.3 The sticking point is Lemus’s lack of evidence
showing Decedent ever missed meals, or that Owens failed to
relinquish control over his work for an uninterrupted meal break,
or impeded or discouraged him from doing so. (Brinker, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 1040.)
To establish a prima facie case, an employee “has the
burden of proving that he performed work for which he was not

3 The absence of complaints in Decedent’s work record is
within Gleason’s purview as human resources manager. (See
Angelus Chevrolet v. State of California (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d
995, 1001 [summary judgment declaration was based upon
“personal knowledge of facts gleaned in his capacity as personnel
officer”].)

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properly compensated.” (Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
(1946) 328 U.S. 680, 687 [66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed.2d 1515].) “[A]n
employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in
fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated
and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and
extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”
(Id. at p. 687; Morales v. Factor Surfaces LLC (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 367, 372 [when the employer did not record
plaintiff’s hours, plaintiff was allowed to submit a chart
calculating overtime he was owed, even if imprecise]; Hernandez
v. Mendoza (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 721, 727–728 [plaintiff
testified that he worked 13-hour days].) “[W]here an employer is
subject to a recordkeeping requirement, the burden shifts to that
employer to rebut employee proof of monies owed.” (Donohue,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 75, italics added.)
Lemus has no proof of monies owed. Decedent was not
deposed to establish that he missed meals or was discouraged or
impeded from taking a break; a bare allegation in the unverified
complaint is not proof.4 Nothing Lemus submitted to the court
refutes Gleason’s declaration that Owens provided compliant
meal periods and Decedent never reported missing one. Failure
to record lunch breaks is not conclusive proof that none was ever
taken. There is no triable issue as to how many breaks were
missed, if any. Lemus’s claim simply cannot be proved.

4 “[N]ot all depositions are conducted for discovery
purposes” and may be used to “preserve testimony when there is
reason to believe the deponent will not later be called at trial”
due to illness. (Berroteran v. Superior Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th
867, 894.)

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b. Rest Breaks
Lemus claims Decedent was deprived of rest breaks. An
employer is not required to record breaks; however, it may be
liable if breaks were not taken because “the defendant did not
permit the plaintiffs to take their rest breaks.” (Cicairos v.
Summit Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949, 963.) Gleason
declared that Decedent’s CBA entitled him to paid rest time;
there is no record he was compelled to work through a break or
complained of missed breaks to Owens or his union.
Just as Decedent never testified about meal breaks, no one
preserved his recollection of missed rest breaks. Lemus has no
proof that Decedent was denied breaks. He can only speculate
about Decedent’s rest breaks, and speculation is not a sufficient
basis to proceed to trial.5
c. Overtime Pay
Lemus’s cause of action for failure to pay overtime is based
on section 510. However, section 510 “do[es] not apply to an
employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if
the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work,
and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement
provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and
a regular hourly rate of pay . . . of not less than 30 percent more
than the state minimum wage.” (§ 514.)
Owens offered proof that a CBA covered Decedent’s wages,
hours and working conditions, and provided premium wages for
overtime. Lemus concedes that a CBA governed Decedent’s

5 In his reply brief, Lemus states that he “waives” this
claim, though it is unclear whether he is waiving a response to
Owens’s argument or the entire claim.

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employment: He writes that Decedent was a union member “and
the terms and conditions of his employment were subject to a
collective bargaining agreement (‘CBA’).”6
Lemus argues that Owens did not carry its burden of
showing Labor Code section 514 applies to Decedent because it
relied on hearsay—a state website listing minimum wage rates—
to prove that Decedent earned 130 percent more than the state
minimum wage. Published state wage rates fall within the
hearsay exception for official records. (Evid. Code, § 1280.)
Moreover, Lemus forfeited the argument by failing to object.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1352; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 582, 599, fn.5.) Lemus’s claim for overtime
wages under Labor Code section 510 cannot proceed because he
was exempt under Labor Code section 514.
d. Wage Statements
Lemus contends that Owens failed to provide accurate
wage statements. Section 226 requires an employer to provide an
accurate itemized statement of all amounts earned and owing.
Lemus writes that triable issues exist because Decedent’s
statements “do not reflect the meal premiums owed, . . . do not
accurately reflect the correct calculation of overtime and double
time wages, and they do not reflect wages which were due and
owing for time recorded but which was not paid.”

6 Lemus asserts that Owens waived section 514 by failing
to raise it below; however, Lemus was aware of section 514 and
raised it himself. Its application presents a question of law
inasmuch as Lemus concedes Decedent was covered by a CBA.
(See Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1595
[points may be resolved for the first time on appeal if the facts
are undisputed and the issue raises a question of law].)

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Section 226 imposes statutory penalties for incorrect wage
statements. “[A]n employer’s objectively reasonable, good faith
belief that it has provided employees with adequate wage
statements precludes an award of penalties.” (Naranjo v.
Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1087.)
Nothing in the record shows Owens acted in a knowing,
intentional, or willful manner. (Id. at p. 1079–1080.) Further,
the purpose of imposing the penalty is not “to compensate, but to
deter and punish.” (Id. at p. 1075.) Penalties cannot be assigned
and do not survive an employee’s death. (Amalgamated, supra,
46 Cal.4th at p. 1003; Auslen v. Thompson, supra, 38 Cal.App.2d
at p. 213.)
In any event, Lemus lacks evidence to support a claim that
the wage statements fail to reflect unpaid meal premiums or
overtime. Decedent never complained to Owens about missed
meals or overtime, nor did he preserve his recollections in sworn
testimony. The “randomly selected” documents submitted by
plaintiff’s counsel are unhelpful. The time records date from
2016 to 2019.7 By contrast, many of the wage statements date
from 2020–2021, when Decedent was on Owens’s payroll but not
reporting for work. Lemus did not provide a spreadsheet
comparing the time records to the wage statements; it is not the
job of the courts to make that comparison. No competent
evidence supports the section 226 cause of action.

7 We do not address the court’s ruling on the admissibility
of the time records but assume, arguendo, that they are
Decedent’s records though they do not bear his name.

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e. UCL Claim
Lemus’s UCL claim is based on alleged Labor Code
violations. The complaint states, “Each and every one of
DEFENDANTS’ acts and omissions in violation of the California
Labor Code and/or the applicable IWC Wage Order as alleged
here, including but not limited to DEFENDANTS’ failure and
refusal to provide required rest periods, . . . pay overtime
compensation, . . . pay minimum wages, . . . furnish accurate
itemized wage statements . . . constitutes an unfair and unlawful
business practice” under the UCL.
The UCL “ ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats
them as unlawful practices.” (De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc.
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 966, 980.) As discussed in the preceding sections,
none of Lemus’s Labor Code claims can proceed. Without an
underlying Labor Code violation, Lemus’s UCL claim fails.8

8 An “ ‘individual PAGA claim’ [refers] to claims based on
code violations suffered by the plaintiff.” (Viking River Cruises,
Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 649 [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213
L.Ed.2d 179].) As detailed in this section, Lemus cannot
establish any code violations suffered by Decedent. Therefore, he
has no individual PAGA claim to make.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to
recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article 6, section VI of
the California Constitution.

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