TC Nevada v. Hernandez CA2/5

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Testo completo

Filed 4/27/26 TC Nevada v. Hernandez CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

TC NEVADA, LLC et al., B338694

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV02323)

LUZ ELENA HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Anne Hwang, Judge. Affirmed.
The Bucklin Law Firm and Stephen L. Bucklin for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, Ernest
Slome, Daniel R. Velladao and Patrick J. McCormick for
Defendants and Respondents.

__________________________
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs and appellants TC Nevada, LLC and TLC
Luxury, LLC sued defendant and respondent Luz Hernandez and
others after a fire damaged plaintiffs’ luxury buses. Plaintiffs
appeal from a judgment of dismissal following an order granting
summary judgment in favor of Hernandez.1 Plaintiffs contend
Hernandez made an insufficient showing to shift the burden of
proof on summary judgment. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend
that they have shown material issues of fact precluding summary
judgment. Hernandez contends that after she met her initial
burden by showing plaintiffs reasonably cannot be expected to
establish one or more elements of their negligence claim,
plaintiffs failed to provide evidence raising a material factual
issue as to duty and breach, and therefore summary judgment
was warranted. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This lawsuit concerns two adjacent commercial properties
in Compton, California. Hernandez’s property is occupied by the
business H&H Pallets, Inc. (H&H), co-owned by Hernandez and
her son, that buys and sells pallets.2 Plaintiffs stored luxury

1 None of the other defendants were involved in the
summary judgment motion at issue on this appeal.

2 Neither H&H nor Hernandez’s son was a party the
motion for summary judgment or is a party to this appeal.

2
buses on a commercial property adjacent to H&H. On
February 26, 2021, a fire started in an alleyway, eventually
spreading to H&H and then to adjacent property, where the fire
damaged or destroyed plaintiffs’ luxury buses. The initial cause
of the fire is undetermined, but it is undisputed that the fire
started in the alley and not on Hernandez’s property.

B. Procedural History

In January 2022, plaintiffs filed suit against Hernandez
and others, alleging claims of negligence and negligence per se,
based on the theory that Hernandez’s improper storage of pallets,
in violation of unidentified statutes, ordinances, or laws,
increased the risk of harm and proximately caused the fire
damage to the buses.
Hernandez served plaintiffs with form and special
interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for
production of documents. In relevant part, plaintiffs failed to
give any substantive responses to Hernandez’s discovery requests
about facts supporting plaintiffs’ contentions that Hernandez’s
negligence in storing propane tanks and pallets on her property
proximately caused plaintiffs’ ten luxury buses to be destroyed by
the fire, instead repeatedly answering that such facts were
“unknown”. The only response of any substance from plaintiffs
was their August 2, 2023 response to special interrogatory
number one, which asked plaintiffs to identify all facts
supporting their claim that on the date of the fire, “defendant
knew or should have known of an ongoing hazardous situation,
which existed upon their property.” Plaintiffs responded:
“Defendant accumulated large piles of pallets and large amounts

3
of propane on their property, did nothing to address the homeless
situation in the vicinity, did not provide adequate security and
failed to procure adequate insurance to address her liability in
the event of a large loss.”
On November 3, 2023, Hernandez filed a motion for
summary judgment. In her motion, Hernandez argued that
plaintiffs possessed no evidence supporting their claims of
negligence against her. Specifically, Hernandez did not owe
plaintiffs a duty of care to protect plaintiffs’ property against
hazards originating from the activities of third parties on
property that Hernandez did not own or control. Also, Hernandez
argued that plaintiffs did not possess and could not reasonably
obtain evidence to support their claim that the pallets on
Hernandez’s property: (1) were stacked in a negligent manner on
Hernandez’s property; (2) played a role in plaintiffs’ claimed
damages; or (3) were stacked in a manner that violated a law,
statute, or ordinance.
Plaintiffs’ opposed the motion, arguing that Hernandez
failed to meet her initial burden of production to make a prima
facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material
fact, because she testified in deposition that she did not know
how the fire started. Plaintiffs also argued that Hernandez’s
deposition testimony that she did not know anything about the
stacking of the pallets on the property meant she could not rebut
plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses. In addition, two expert
declarations submitted with their opposition created a triable
factual issue about whether the pallets negligently stored on
Hernandez’s property had proximately caused their damages.
The declarations were from fire and explosion expert Nina Scotti
and real estate management expert Robert Griswold. Plaintiffs’

4
opposition also included a declaration from Chris Sanchez, the
manager of plaintiff TLC Luxury, LLC.
Sanchez declared he was the manager of plaintiff TLC
Luxury, LLC, the fire destroyed ten buses worth approximately
ten million dollars, and the company had lost an additional ten
million dollars in lost income because the buses were no longer
available for use. Sanchez also stated “[f]or many months” before
the fire occurred, the pallets at H&H “were stacked more than
twenty (20) feet in height. In addition, during the same period of
time the pallets were stacked very closely together.”3
The declaration by expert witness Scotti opined that based
on a report prepared by federal investigators, it was her opinion
that “the fire originated in the alley” between two power poles. A
couch and mattress in the alley “contributed to the rapid spread
of fire outside the area of fire origin.” In four short paragraphs,
Scotti described how the fire spread from the alley to plaintiffs’
buses: “The fire spread to Matrix Mattress [another nearby
business] where the fire loading (stored mattresses), intensified
the heat and fire. [¶] . . . The thermal heat flux energy, quickly
spread to H & H Pallets where the fire ignited the high stack of
pallets stored next to the property line. [¶] . . . The arrangement
and storage height of the pallets allowed the fire to climb upward
supported by oxygen that fed through the spacing design of the
pallets. The oxygen contributed to the combustion process
creating a chimney fire effect. [¶] . . . The heat fueled by the

3 As we explain later, because Sanchez’s declaration does
not even purport to address the condition of the pallets on the
date of the fire, was not included in plaintiffs’ separate statement
of undisputed facts, and lacks proper foundation, these
statements are insufficient to establish a material factual issue.

5
stack of pallets ignited more pallets and other combustible
storage, propane and vehicles in the storage yard as it continued
to spread to the adjoining property of TLC Luxury
Transportation, destroying the row of buses in a sequence.”
Scotti opined that if H&H had adhered to Fire Code standards for
pallet storage, including “proper spacing and clearance from
adjoining property lines; maximum storage height; [and] the
proper spacing distance between other stored pallet stacks,”
plaintiffs’ fire damage “could have been significantly reduced, if
not avoided.”
Griswold’s declaration stated that Hernandez, as a
landowner and a landlord of an industrial property, should have
educated herself about the requirements of the Fire Code,
pointing out that even though Hernandez was not English-
speaking, she could have asked for a Spanish-speaking inspector.
Griswold declared that landlords need to educate themselves
about the Fire Code and when Hernandez failed to do so, she
created a dangerous condition on her property.
In her reply brief, Hernandez countered that nothing in
plaintiffs’ opposition demonstrated that Hernandez owed a duty
of care to protect the owners of adjacent properties, or even if
such a duty was owed, no facts existed to show she had breached
the duty.
After posting a tentative ruling and holding a hearing, the
trial court granted Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment,
reasoning that Hernandez met her burden of showing that
plaintiffs could not reasonably obtain evidence that the pallets or
propane on Hernandez’s property caused or negligently
contributed to the spread of the fire. According to the court, the
burden then shifted to plaintiffs to establish a triable issue of

6
material fact. The court noted that plaintiffs did not provide a
separate statement of disputed facts, and only disputed two
factual statements set forth in Hernandez’s separate statement:
the origin of the fire and whether Hernandez was responsible for
the fire. The court ruled that “considering all reasonable
inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have failed to meet
their burden to establish a triable issue of fact regarding a duty
surrounding the manner in which the pallets were stacked on
[Hernandez]’s property. Plaintiffs offer no additional facts in
their separate statement, or evidence relied upon by their
experts, that show how the pallets were organized before the fire
began.” (fn. omitted.)
Judgment in favor of Hernandez and against plaintiffs was
entered, and plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment and Shifting Burdens

In adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, the
moving party (usually the defendant) has the initial burden of
showing that the plaintiff “has not established, and reasonably
cannot be expected to establish, one or more elements of the
cause of action in question.” (Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 500; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Our Supreme Court has stressed that merely “point[ing]
out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably
obtain, needed evidence” will not suffice, and that the defendant
must instead present evidence from which the plaintiff’s inability
to prove his claim can be inferred. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield

7
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854, fn. omitted (Aguilar).) The
moving party may, however, “present evidence that the plaintiff
does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed
evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following
extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”
(Id. at p. 855, fn. omitted.) The evidence may consist of “answers
to interrogatories” as well as other modes of discovery like
“admissions” and “depositions,” as well as any other matter
subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1); cf.
Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 587
[summary judgment can also be supported “through factually
devoid discovery responses”].) “If plaintiffs respond to
comprehensive interrogatories seeking all known facts with
boilerplate answers that restate their allegations, or simply
provide laundry lists of people and/or documents, the burden of
production will almost certainly be shifted to them once
defendants move for summary judgment and properly present
plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses.” (Andrews v.
Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 107 (Andrews).)
In other words, the evidence offered in support of a summary
judgment motion may consist of “ ‘ “factually devoid” discovery
responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred.’ ”
(Id. at p. 101.)
If the moving party carries its initial burden, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to the cause of action. . . .” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012)
55 Cal.4th 1148, 1154.)
Here, by providing the trial court with plaintiffs’ factually
devoid discovery responses, Hernandez met her initial burden of

8
showing that plaintiffs could not reasonably obtain any evidence
showing that Hernandez was negligent or that her negligence
caused the harm suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs simply
responded “unknown” to special interrogatories requesting all
existing facts and names of witnesses to support their
contentions that Hernandez created a dangerous condition by
allowing pallets to be stacked higher than permissible by law or
storing propane negligently, and that absent such negligence, the
fire would not have spread and destroyed plaintiffs’ property.
When asked to identify what laws, statutes, or ordinances
plaintiff purportedly violated, plaintiffs also responded
“unknown.” And after denying all of Hernandez’s requests for
admission, plaintiffs responded to Form Interrogatory 17.1,
which in part asks the responding party to identify all facts that
support such denials, with either a single word answer,
“unknown,” or the meaningless statement, “According to
Exhibit 21 the initial cause of the fire is still under
investigation.”4 All of these factually devoid discovery responses
support a reasonable inference that plaintiffs cannot reasonably
obtain evidence to support their claims against Hernandez, and
so the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show a material factual issue
on one or more elements of their negligence claims.

4 Exhibit 21 was a report from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department, produced by plaintiffs in response to Hernandez’s
request for production of documents, but it contained no
information relevant to any possible negligence by H&H or
Hernandez.

9
B. Plaintiffs’ Burden to Show a Genuine Issue of
Material Fact

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated (before the trial court or
on appeal) that they have admissible evidence sufficient to
establish a genuine issue of material fact on their negligence or
negligence per se claims. At core, plaintiffs contend that
Hernandez was negligent in failing to inspect her property and
discover the alleged “dangerous condition” of pallets stacked too
high and too densely. They argue this negligence caused
plaintiffs monetary damage when their luxury buses caught on
fire. Hernandez contends that she did not owe plaintiffs any duty
to protect their property from a fire originating outside of her
property, and even if such a duty was owed, plaintiffs lack any
evidence of breach.
We agree as a general proposition that a landowner has a
duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the land, and
that this duty of care is not limited solely to injuries occurring on
the land itself. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132,
1158–1160.) However, on the facts before us, plaintiffs have
failed to provide any law or evidence to support their argument
that the generalized duty to exercise reasonable care requires the
non-participatory co-owner of a commercial property to protect
owners or occupiers of adjacent commercial properties from risks
that originate outside of either property.
Plaintiffs’ appeal focuses solely on a landowner’s duty to
exercise reasonable care, including a duty to inspect the property

10
for dangerous conditions.5 However, the cases plaintiffs rely on
are classic “slip and fall” cases where a business that is open to
the public has a duty to ensure the safety of invitees present on
the landowner’s property. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26
Cal.4th 1200, 1205 [“store owner exercises ordinary care by
making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises
open to customers, and the care required is commensurate with
the risks involved”]; Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035–1036 [store owner has “a duty to exercise
reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe for
patrons”].) Those cases bear no relevance to determining
whether the owner of a commercial property closed to the general
public owes adjacent landowners a duty to minimize the risk that
a fire originating off-premises will spread and be amplified by a
condition on defendant’s property and then spread to those
adjacent properties.
We determine the trial court correctly concluded that
Hernandez did not owe plaintiffs a duty of care, and even if she

5 To the extent plaintiffs might have argued that
Hernandez had any duty to control the acts of the unknown third
parties who initially caused the fire in the alley, they have
forfeited such arguments by failing to raise them in the trial
court or on appeal. “ ‘[A]s a general matter, there is no duty to
act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.’ (Delgado
v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235.) However, ‘[i]n a
case involving harm caused by a third party, a person may have
an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another’s harm if that
person is in what the law calls a “special relationship” with either
the victim or the person who created the harm.’ (Brown [v. USA
Taekwondo (2021)] 11 Cal.5th [204,] 215 (Brown).)” (Murphy v.
Pina (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 305,
322 (Murphy).)

11
did, plaintiffs have not met their burden to show a material
factual issue on the question of breach.

1. Negligence – Relevant Law

A claim based on negligence and premises liability share
the same elements, namely, (1) a legal duty of care, (2) breach of
that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in injury. (Kesner,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1158; Issakhani v. Shadow Glen
Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 917, 924,
(Issakhani).) In order to prove negligence, plaintiff must
establish duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages.
(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618 (Regents).) “ ‘[T]he existence and scope’ of the
defendant’s duty is one of law to be decided by the court, not by a
jury, and therefore it generally is ‘amenable to resolution by
summary judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Kahn v. East Side Union High
School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1004; Murphy, supra, 115
Cal.App.5th at p. 322.)
“Duty is not universal; not every defendant owes every
plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if ‘ “the plaintiff’s
interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s
conduct.” ’ [Citation.] Whether a duty exists is a question of law
to be resolved by the court. [Citation.]” (Brown, supra, 11
Cal.5that p. 213.) “Where the defendant has neither performed
an act that increases the risk of injury to the plaintiff nor sits in a
relation to the parties that creates an affirmative duty to protect
the plaintiff from harm, however, our cases have uniformly held
the defendant owes no legal duty to the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 216.)

12
“The ‘general rule’ governing duty is set forth in Civil Code
section 1714 (section 1714). [Citation.] First enacted in 1872,
section 1714 provides: ‘Everyone is responsible . . . for an injury
occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill
in the management of his or her property or person . . . ’
[Citation.] (Id., subd. (a).) This statute establishes the default
rule that each person has a duty ‘to exercise, in his or her
activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’ [Citation.] [¶]
Section 1714 states a broad rule, but it has limits. We have
explained that the law imposes a general duty of care on a
defendant only when it is the defendant who has ‘ “created a
risk” ’ of harm to the plaintiff, including when ‘ “the defendant is
responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse.” ’
[Citations.] The law does not impose the same duty on a
defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff
would suffer the harm alleged. Generally, the ‘person who has
not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take
affirmative action to assist or protect another’ from that peril.
[Citations.]” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 213−214.)
Civil Code section 1714 does not, however, “impose a
presumptive duty of care to guard against any conceivable harm
that a negligent act might cause.” (Southern California Gas Leak
Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 399.) Although the statutory
language does not draw any express distinction between
personal, property, or financial injury, California Supreme Court
cases recognize that “liability in negligence for purely economic
losses . . . is ‘the exception, not the rule.’ ” (Id. at p. 400.)
Liability under a negligence theory “extends a right of
recovery to individuals in relationships involving dependence or
control, and who by virtue of those relationships have reason to

13
expect the defendant’s protection.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 220.) “A defendant cannot be held liable in negligence for
harms it did not cause unless there are special circumstances —
such as a special relationship to the parties — that give the
defendant a special obligation to offer protection or assistance.
This rule reflects a long-standing balance between several
competing interests. It avoids difficult questions about how to
measure the legal liability of the stranger who fails to take
affirmative steps to prevent foreseeable harm, instead leaving the
stranger to make his or her own choices about what assistance to
offer.” (Ibid.)

2. Hernandez Does Not Owe a Duty of Care to
Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs here have not identified any facts that would
support a determination that Hernandez owed plaintiffs any duty
of care. No facts have been identified to show that Hernandez, as
the owner of a commercial property, has any “special
relationship” with plaintiffs, as the owners or occupiers of an
adjacent commercial property, or with any possible person who
started the fire in the alleyway behind Hernandez’s commercial
property, such that it owed plaintiffs a duty of care to reduce the
risk of a fire spreading from the alley, through Hernandez’s
property, and then onto plaintiffs’ property.

a. Rowland Factors

“A duty of care exists when one person has a legal
obligation to prevent harm to another person, such that breach of

14
that obligation can give rise to liability. [Citations.] Whether a
duty of care exists is not a matter of plucking some immutable
truth from the ether; instead, the existence of a particular duty of
care reflects a determination that the ‘ “ ‘sum total’ ” ’ of
‘ “ ‘considerations of [public] policy [should] lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. ’ ” ’ ”
(Issakhani, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 924–925.)
In determining whether a particular defendant owes a
particular plaintiff a legal duty of care sufficient to support a
negligence claim, “courts must ask: (1) Does the defendant owe
the plaintiff a legal duty of care under traditional principles of
tort law and, if so, (2) do the relevant public policy considerations
set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108
(Rowland), nevertheless favor ‘limiting that duty’? (Brown[,
supra,] 11 Cal.5th [at pp. 209,] 218−219.)” (St. John v. Schaeffler
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1155.)~ The Rowland factors are
“ [1] the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, [2] the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [3] the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, [4] the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,
[5] the policy of preventing future harm, [6] the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and [7] the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)
The first three factors—“foreseeability, certainty, and the
connection between the plaintiff and the defendant”—relate to
foreseeability of the type of injury, and the last four—“moral
blame, preventing future harm, burden, and availability of
insurance”—relate to public policy considerations that might

15
influence excluding certain plaintiffs or injuries from relief.
(Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1145; Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 1085.) The Rowland factors assist courts in determining
whether carving out certain categories of cases from the general
duty of reasonable care “is justified by clear considerations of
policy.” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 772
(Cabral); Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1077, 1083.)
The first two Rowland factors support finding a duty in the
present case because it is both foreseeable that a fire could
spread from one property to another, and here it is certain that
the spread of the fire caused economic harm to plaintiffs. “The
third factor, ‘the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered’ [citation], is ‘strongly
related to the question of foreseeability itself’ [citation], but it
also accounts for third party or other intervening conduct.
[Citation.] Where the third party’s intervening conduct is
foreseeable or derivative of the defendant’s, then that conduct
does not ‘ “diminish the closeness of the connection between
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff's injury.” ’ [Citations.]”
(Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1086.) This factor weighs
against finding a duty, because the fire did not start on
Hernandez’s property, and (as we discuss later), there is no
evidence that Hernandez took an affirmative action that made
the fire any more likely to spread to plaintiffs’ property.
Turning to the policy considerations outlined in Rowland,
these generally weigh against imposing a duty of care to protect
adjacent properties. First, imposing a duty is unlikely to prevent
future harm beyond the same incentives that lead a business to
take measures to protect its own property from fire damage; the

16
persons best suited to prevent this type of harm are the adjacent
landowners themselves, since they are already incentivized to
protect their own property from fire and are aware of the nature
of their neighbors’ businesses. Each landowner is in the best
position to take precautionary measures. (See Issakhani, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 928–929.) We would not describe running
a pallet recycling business, which inherently involves large
amounts of combustible materials, to carry a high degree of
“moral blame,” and the consequence of imposing a duty would
simply be a higher cost of business, which is not necessarily
desirable for the community. Finally, while fire insurance is
generally available for an owner’s property, the same is true for
plaintiffs or any other potential victim of a fire that spreads from
one property to another. This appears to be a situation where
both the costs and availability of insurance weigh in favor of each
party making their own respective decisions about how much
insurance to obtain. For example, it would be absurd to require a
small café to obtain insurance to cover the potential losses if they
owed a duty of care to an expensive art gallery next door.
Considering the full circumstances here and the Rowland
factors, we conclude that the overall weight of considerations
counsel against imposing a duty of care in these circumstances.

b. Negligence Per Se

Negligence per se “can be applied generally to establish a
breach of due care under any negligence-related cause of action.”
(Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1210.) “Under the
doctrine of negligence per se, compliance with the standard of
conduct established by the relevant statute, ordinance, or

17
regulation is adopted as the duty of care. [Citation.] This creates
a rebuttable presumption of negligence where the statute,
ordinance, or regulation is violated. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1210.)
Negligence per se is not an independent tort. Rather it is
an evidentiary presumption applicable when the violation of a
statute, ordinance, or regulation proximately causes death or
injury to someone or something protected by the enactment.
(Evid. Code, § 669; Gravelin v. Satterfield (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
1209, 1218–1219.) “ ‘Nearly all the cases in which the
presumption of negligence under Evidence Code section 669 has
been applied involve what may be termed ‘safety’ statutes,
ordinances or regulations, that is, governmentally designed
standards of care intended to protect a particular class of persons
from the risk of particular accidental injuries. [Citations.]’ ”
(Cal. Serv. Station Etc. Ass’n v. Am. Home Assur. Co. (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 1166, 1178 (CSSARA), quoting Sierra–Bay Fed.
Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318,
333–334, fns. omitted.) “Although a statute or ordinance can give
rise to a duty of care and simultaneously fix the standard of care
[citations], the two concepts are ‘analytical[ly] distinct[ ]’
[citation]. The duty of care establishes whether one person has a
legal obligation to prevent harm to another [citation], while the
standard of care defines what that person must do to meet that
obligation and thus sets the standard for assessing whether there
has been a breach [citation]. The default standard of care is the
obligation to take ‘reasonable care’ [citations], although a statute
may define a more specific obligation [citations] and, under the
doctrine of negligence per se, may erect a rebuttable presumption
of breach if that obligation is not met [citations]. The standard of
care is relevant only if there is a duty of care for it to impose.

18
The standard of care presupposes a duty; it cannot create one.
[Citation.]” (Issakhani, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 934–935.)
While they did not identify a particular enactment in their
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, on appeal
plaintiffs belatedly point to section 315.7.3 of the California Fire
Code, which provides that pallets shall not be stored at a height
exceeding 20 feet. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, § 315.3.) This section
appears in the California Code of Regulations, Title 24, Part 9,
Chapter 3, and a “user note” at the beginning of the chapter
states that the general requirements set out in Chapter 3 “are
intended to improve premises safety for everyone, including
construction workers, tenants, operations and maintenance
personnel and emergency response personnel.”
<https://codes.iccsafe.org/content/CAFC2025P2/chapter-3-
general-requirements>[as of Apr. 24, 2026], archived at
https://perma.cc/8MAY-TXMN.
However, plaintiffs do not make any argument about the
intended purpose of the section of the Fire Code they rely upon.
They certainly do not address why the section would support
finding the owner of a pallet recycling facility owes a duty of care
to adjacent properties. In fact, the Health and Safety Code
already provides for civil liability for fire damage caused to
adjacent properties, but only when the individual or entity has
set the fire or is responsible for attending to it.6 (Health & Saf.

6 The full statutory text reads: “Any person who personally
or through another willfully, negligently, or in violation of law,
sets fire to, allows fire to be set to, or allows a fire kindled or
attended by him to escape to, the property of another, whether
privately or publicly owned, is liable to the owner of such
property for any damages to the property caused by the fire.”

19
Code, § 13007; Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 499.)
Ultimately, we are unconvinced that Fire Code section
315.7.3 gives rise to a duty of care in the context before us. (See,
e.g., cases catalogued in Issakhani, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 933–934; CSSARA, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1180 [“the
Evidence Code section 669 presumption of negligence applies only
after determining that the defendant owes the plaintiff an
independent duty of care, which has not been demonstrated
here”].)

3. Plaintiffs Have Not Raised a Material Factual
Issue that Hernandez Breached Any Duty of Care

Even if we assume that Hernandez as a landowner had a
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to adjacent
landowners, and even if we assume that the scope of her duty
included not stacking pallets more than 20 feet high in violation
of the Fire Code, plaintiffs still fail to show error. Plaintiffs have
not provided any admissible evidence that on the night of the fire
the pallets were stacked or arranged in a manner that violated
the Fire Code, and therefore plaintiffs have not raised a material
factual issue on whether Hernandez breached her duty to
exercise reasonable care.

a. Sanchez Declaration

The only evidence purporting to describe the conditions on
Hernandez’s property relating to the pallets is the Sanchez
declaration. Sanchez makes the following bald statement, with

20
no background about the basis for the statement (including
whether his statement is based upon his personal knowledge):
“For many months prior to the fire on February 26, 2021, the
pallets at the premises of H&H Pallets, Inc. were stacked more
than twenty (20) feet in height. In addition, during the same
period of time the pallets were stacked very closely together.”
This proffered declaration fails to raise a material factual issue of
breach, both because it was not cited in plaintiffs’ separate
statement, and because it lacks any foundation, and even on its
face it does not purport to set forth facts existing at the time of
the fire.
Both the moving and opposing parties on a motion for
summary judgment must include all material facts and
supporting evidence in a separate statement.7 (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 480, 492–493 (LAUSD).) “ ‘[A]ll material facts must

7 “As Witkin describes it, opposition to a summary
judgment ‘must contain a separate statement that (1) indicates
whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees with the moving
party’s assertion that specific material facts are undisputed
[citation], (2) sets forth plainly and concisely any other material
facts that the opposing party contends are disputed, and (3)
refers to the supporting evidence for each contention ([Code Civ.
Proc., §] 437c[, subd.] (b)(3).’ (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed.
2008) Proceedings Without Trial, § 218, p. 657.) The proper
format for the separate statement is illustrated at California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f). And the Witkin passage
concludes—just as the summary judgment statute expressly
provides—this way: ‘Failure to comply with this requirement of a
separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the
court’s discretion, for granting the motion.’ [Citations.]” (Rush v.
White Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1097.)

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be set forth in the separate statement. “This is the Golden Rule
of Summary Adjudication: if it is not set forth in the separate
statement, it does not exist.” ’ [Citation.]” (North Coast Business
Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22,
30−31.) An opposing party must also “clearly indicate which of
the facts contained in the moving party’s separate statement it
disputes. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) Each party also
must supply a ‘reference to the supporting evidence’ in its
separate statement ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(1), (3)).”
(Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1214; LAUSD, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at pp. 492–493.)
Although Sanchez’s declaration was filed together with
plaintiffs’ summary judgment opposition and cited in the first
paragraph of the factual summary in the opposition brief, it is not
cited anywhere in the separate statement. Therefore, the trial
court correctly did not consider it.
In addition, Hernandez raised numerous evidentiary
objections to Sanchez’s statements about the height and
arrangement of the pallets, including that the statements were
vague and ambiguous, lacked foundation or personal knowledge,
assumed facts not in evidence, were speculative and an
incomplete hypothetical.8 In its order granting summary
judgment, the court declined to rule on any of Hernandez’s
objections, stating “they have no effect on the ruling herein.” In

8 The complete list of objections to Sanchez’s statement
about the pallets was: “Irrelevant. Lacks Foundation.
Speculation. Incomplete Hypothetical. Lacks Personal
Knowledge. Argumentative. Assumes Facts not in Evidence.
Calls for Legal Conclusion. Calls for Expert Opinion.”

22
that circumstance, Hernandez’s objections are preserved for our
review on appeal. (See Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512,
534–535.) Because Sanchez does not even purport to have
personal knowledge of, or address how the pallets were stacked
on the night of the fire, we agree that the court was correct to
disregard it. (See LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
939, 947–948 [corporate representative’s declaration correctly
excluded where there was no indication representative had
personal knowledge].)

b. Expert Witness Declarations

To the extent that plaintiffs rely on expert witness
declarations to raise a genuine issue of material fact, because the
expert witnesses had no firsthand knowledge of how the pallets
were stacked on the night of the fire, their declarations are
ineffectual to create a factual issue on the elements of duty or
breach. (People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 26 [expert
testimony about case-specific facts of which the expert has no
independent knowledge is excluded as hearsay]; Martinez v. City
of Beverly Hills (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 526–527 [plaintiff’s
expert opinions on whether divot in alley was a dangerous
condition did not create a triable issue of material fact].) In
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Romero (1954) 128
Cal.App.2d 331, the reviewing court reversed a judgment in favor
of plaintiffs in an action to recover damages resulting from a
house fire, because the trial court had made no finding of
negligence by the defendant. (Id. at p. 333.) Because the only
evidence of defendant’s possible negligence was a hearsay
statement relied upon by an expert witness, and such evidence

23
was not admissible, the appellate court remanded for a retrial.
(Id. at pp. 336−339.)
Neither Scotti nor Griswold professed to have any personal
knowledge about the state of the pallets on the night of the fire,
instead basing their expert opinion on the assumption that the
pallets were stacked higher than 20 feet. Because plaintiffs
failed to refer in their separate statements to any admissible
evidence regarding how the pallets were stacked on the night of
the fire, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of Hernandez.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendant and respondent Luz
Hernandez is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

24
TC Nevada, LLC, et al. v. Luz Hernandez
B338694

BAKER, J., Concurring

Although I do not subscribe to all the particulars of the
opinion for the court’s analysis, I agree the judgment should be
affirmed.

BAKER, J.

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