Barba v. Capstone Logistics CA1/5

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Testo completo

Filed 4/24/26 Barba v. Capstone Logistics CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANGEL BARBA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173018
v.
CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
ANGEL BARBA, A173020
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., (Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. RG21100895)
Defendant and Appellant.

Angel Barba filed this action under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; “Private
Attorneys General Act” or “the Act”)1 to seek remedies for
allegedly unlawful employment practices by Capstone Logistics,
LLC, and Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. In these consolidated appeals,
Capstone and Home Depot challenge the trial court’s denial of
their motion to compel arbitration. Because the court correctly
denied the motion, we affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.

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BACKGROUND

A.

In February 2019, Capstone and Barba entered into an
arbitration agreement in connection with his employment as a
warehouse worker for Capstone. Under the agreement, Barba’s
“continued employment with the Company is deemed to be
acceptance of this Agreement to Arbitrate.” The “Company”
referred to Capstone Logistics, LLC, including “all parent,
subsidiary, and affiliate entities, . . . and their owners, directors,
officers, managers, employees, or agents.” Barba and “the
Company agree[d] to use binding arbitration, instead of going to
court, as the sole and exclusive means to resolve any ‘Covered
Claims’ that arise or have arisen between” them. Barba and the
Company “waiv[ed] and relinquish[ed] [their] respective rights to
trial before a judge or jury in federal or state court in favor of
arbitration.”

The agreement contained provisions specifying “Covered
Claims” as well as “Excluded Claims.” The term “Covered
Claims” applies to “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that
[Barba] may have against the Company, or that the Company
may have against [Barba], whether based on tort, contract,
statute . . . , equitable law, or otherwise.” The foregoing term
“statute” is further defined as “including, but not limited to, any
claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, leave, and/or
unpaid wages, whether they be based on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family
Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, or any other
similar federal, state, or local law or regulation which may apply
to the parties’ employment relationship.” In addition, “Covered
Claims include but are not limited to any claim, dispute, and/or
controversy that may arise out of or be related in any way to
[Barba’s] employment, including but not limited to the

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termination of [his] employment and [his] compensation.
Covered Claims also specifically include but are not limited to
any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that [Barba] may have
against, or that may be related in any way to the services [he] or
the Company provides to, the Company’s business partners or
customers and their employees.”

“Excluded Claims” are “[t]he only exceptions to the
requirement of binding arbitration.” The agreement enumerates
specified types of excluded claims, one of which is “claims that
are not subject to arbitration under current law.”

In a section entitled “Waiver of Class and Collective
Claims,” the agreement provided that “Covered Claims will be
arbitrated only on an individual basis.” Further, the
“[a]greement shall not be construed to allow or permit the
consolidation or joinder of other claims or controversies involving
any other employees or parties, or permit such claims or
controversies to proceed as a class or collective action.”

The arbitration agreement also included a merger clause
and a severability clause.

B.

To strengthen enforcement of the Labor Code, the Act
authorized aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties, acting
as private attorneys general on behalf of the state. (See Adolph
v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116 (Adolph);
§ 2699.) An employee who sues under the Act functions as an
agent of the state—the real party in interest—and may seek any
civil penalties that the state can seek. (Adolph, at pp. 1116-
1117.)

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To have standing to bring an action as an “aggrieved
employee,” under the version of the Act applicable to this case2,
the plaintiff must have been employed by the employer and
suffered at least one Labor Code violation by the employer. (See
Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1120-1121; § 2699, former subd.
(c).) So long as the plaintiff has standing based on one personally
suffered Labor Code violation, the plaintiff, as an agent of the
state, may also prosecute Labor Code violations sustained by
other employees of the same employer but not personally
sustained by the plaintiff. (See Adolph, at p. 1122.) Thus, a
plaintiff may bring personal or individual claims under the Act,
as well as representative claims on behalf of other employees.
(See Adolph, at pp. 1117-1118.)

C.

In 2021, Barba filed the instant action asserting PAGA
claims on behalf of himself and other aggrieved warehouse
employees of Capstone and Home Depot, alleging that the two
companies were joint employers. He alleged various violations of
the wage and hour laws, including that Capstone and Home
Depot failed to pay employees for off-the-clock work, failed to
permit required rest periods, and provided inaccurate wage
statements.

2 After Barba filed his lawsuit in 2021, the Legislature

passed amendments to the Act generally applicable to actions
filed on or after June 19, 2024. (See Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1
[enacting Assembly Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jul.
1, 2024]; id., ch. 45, § 1 [enacting Senate Bill No. 92 (2023-2024
Reg. Sess.), eff. Jul. 1, 2024]; Stats. 2025, ch. 67, §§ 134-135
[enacting Assembly Bill No. 1170 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan.
1, 2026]; see also § 2699.5, subd. (b).) This opinion concerns the
former version of the Act, applicable to Barba’s action. (See §
2699, as amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 31, § 189, eff. Jun. 27,
2016.)
4
Relying on the arbitration agreement, Capstone moved to
compel Barba to arbitrate his individual PAGA claims and to stay
his representative claims pending arbitration. Home Depot
joined in the motion. The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.
The court determined that the agreement was procedurally
unconscionable to some extent because it was required as part of
the employment agreement. The agreement was substantively
unconscionable for several reasons: it was overbroad because it
included any type of claim even if unrelated to Barba’s
employment; it was infinite in duration because it applied to
claims that arose both before and after Barba’s employment; and
it lacked mutuality because there was no way for Barba to know
whether all the entities and individuals included in the definition
of the “Company” had agreed to be bound by the agreement or
whether Capstone had authority to bind them. Further, the
court concluded that, although some of the unconscionable terms
could be severed, the overbroad definition of “Company” could not
be cured without reforming the definition. In addition, the court
reasoned that the interests of justice did not support severing the
unconscionable terms.

DISCUSSION

Capstone and Home Depot assert that the trial court
erroneously concluded the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable. Barba argues that the trial court’s ruling can be
affirmed on an alternative ground: that his PAGA claims are
excluded from arbitration under the agreement’s “Excluded
Claims” provision.3 (See D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners

3 The trial court’s unconscionability ruling made it

unnecessary for the court to address whether Barba’s claims were
“Excluded Claims.” The court did state in the alternative,
however, that had the court granted the motion to compel
arbitration, it would have ordered arbitration of Barba’s
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(1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [explaining that if a trial court decision is
“ ‘right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must
be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have
moved the trial court to its conclusion’ ”].) We agree with Barba,
so we do not reach Capstone and Home Depot’s arguments as to
whether the agreement is unconscionable.

Reviewing the issue de novo, we apply principles of
California contract law to interpret the arbitration agreement,
giving the words in the contract their ordinary meaning. (See
Ford v. The Silver F, Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 553, 565-566
(Ford).) In interpreting the agreement, our goal is to determine
“ ‘the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is
formed.’ ” (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th
1, 18; see also Ford, at p. 567; Civ. Code, § 1636.)

Barba relies on the “Excluded Claims” section of the
arbitration agreement, which provides that “[t]he only exceptions
to the requirement of binding arbitration shall be for ‘Excluded
Claims.’ Excluded Claims are claims for medical and disability
benefits, claims for workers’ compensation, claims for
unemployment benefits, claims asking for emergency or
temporary injunctive relief in a court of law in accordance with
applicable law . . . , or other claims that are not subject to
arbitration under current law.” (Italics added.) Barba argues
that the agreement excludes PAGA claims because they were
“not subject to arbitration under current law” in 2019, when he
entered into the agreement.

In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014)
59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian), overruled on other grounds by Quach
v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, our

individual PAGA claims but denied the request for a stay of his
representative claims; the implication was that the court believed
the claims were not excluded.
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Supreme Court considered an agreement that, in the course of
requiring arbitration of an employee’s individual claims,
purported to categorically waive the employee’s right to bring
representative PAGA actions under the Act. Section 2699,
subdivision (a), grants any aggrieved employee the right to bring
a civil action on behalf of himself or herself “ ‘and other current or
former employees.’ ” (See Iskanian, at p. 383.) Iskanian
explained that “an agreement by employees to waive their right
to bring a PAGA action serves to disable one of the primary
mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code” and frustrates the
goals of the statute. (Iskanian, at pp. 383-384.) Further,
although an individual employee is free to choose not to bring a
PAGA lawsuit in the face of Labor Code violations, “it is contrary
to public policy for an employment agreement to eliminate this
choice altogether by requiring employees to waive the right to
bring a PAGA action before any dispute arises.” (Iskanian, at p.
383.) Iskanian concluded that because “an employee’s right to
bring a PAGA action is unwaivable,” an “agreement requiring an
employee . . . to give up the right to bring representative PAGA
actions in any forum is contrary to public policy” and
unenforceable as a matter of state law. (Id. at pp. 360, 383-384;
see also ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 181
[explaining that Iskanian held that “a court may not enforce an
employee’s alleged predispute waiver of the right to bring a
PAGA claim in any forum”].)

After Iskanian, the courts of appeal held that employees
could not be compelled to arbitrate their representative PAGA
claims, and representative and individual PAGA claims could not
be split into bifurcated proceedings. (See, e.g., Lawson v. ZB,
N.A. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 705, 725, affd. but abrogated on other
grounds sub nom. ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.5th
175; Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408,
421-422; Williams v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 642,
645, 649-650; see also, e.g., Hernandez v. Ross Stores, Inc. (2016)
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7 Cal.App.5th 171, 178.) The upshot of the foregoing case law
was that in 2019, at the time Barba acknowledged the arbitration
agreement, employers could not compel arbitration of PAGA
claims, and in that respect such claims were “not subject to
arbitration under current law.”

Capstone and Home Depot do not dispute that, if “current
law” is understood to mean the law in effect at the time the
agreement was formed, then PAGA claims were “not subject to
arbitration under current law.” But they argue that under the
United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Viking
River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 (Viking River),
individual PAGA claims can be compelled to arbitration. Viking
River held that a rule against bifurcated proceedings for
individual and non-individual PAGA claims frustrates the
Federal Arbitration Act by defeating the parties’ ability to
contractually determine which claims are subject to arbitration
and which are not. (Viking River, at pp. 660-662.) As a result,
Viking River concluded, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the
rule of Iskanian to the extent it prevents enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate individual PAGA claims. (Id., at pp. 660-
662.) Viking River did not disturb Iskanian’s determination that
wholesale waivers of PAGA claims are invalid. (See id. at p. 662.)
According to Capstone and Home Depot, Viking River must be
applied here to determine the claims that are “not subject to
arbitration under current law” because Viking River’s holding
applies to arbitration agreements that predated the Supreme
Court’s opinion. (See, e.g., ibid. [applying the newly announced
holding to the arbitration agreement in that case.].)

The circumstances here are different, however. In Viking
River, there was no dispute about the parties’ mutual intention to
arbitrate the employee’s individual PAGA claim—the question
was to what extent the parties’ agreement was enforceable under
California law and the Federal Arbitration Act. (See Viking

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River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. 643, 647-648, 649.) Here, we are
instead tasked with interpreting the agreement to determine
what claims Barba and Capstone did, and did not, intend to
arbitrate. Viking River’s 2022 holding—permitting the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate individual PAGA
claims—does not tell us what claims Barba and Capstone
intended to exclude in 2019 as “not subject to arbitration under
current law.”

Ford is instructive. In Ford, the court considered a pre-
Viking River arbitration agreement that excluded
“ ‘representative claims under [PAGA],’ ” and the question was
what the parties meant by this phrase. (Ford, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at pp. 558, 566.) Ford concluded that Viking River
did not inform what the parties meant years before when they
used the term “ ‘representative claims,’ ” reasoning that
“[a]lthough Viking River may have changed the law about
whether PAGA claims are divisible into individual and
nonindividual components [citation], Viking River did not change
the principle that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a
dispute that he or she did not agree to resolve by arbitration.”
(Ford, at p. 569; see also LaCour v. Marshalls of CA, LLC (2025)
117 Cal.App.5th 505, 522 (LaCour) [“Although we now know that
PAGA actions can be ‘ “divided into individual and non-individual
claims” where the parties have agreed to arbitrate individual
claims’ [citation], the fact that that is the case today tells us
nothing about whether [the parties] actually made such an
agreement more than a decade ago.”]; Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc.
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, 613 [“Viking River has nothing to say
about whether there was an [earlier] agreement to arbitrate [the
employee’s] individual PAGA claims.”].) Similarly here, Viking
River does not help us understand what claims the parties agreed
to exclude several years before Viking River was decided.

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Capstone and Home Depot next argue that the term
“current law” should be understood to mean the law in effect at
the time the agreement is being enforced.4 We are unpersuaded.
The “temporal benchmark we must use in ascertaining the
parties’ mutual intent” is the time the contract was formed.
(LaCour, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 521.) We ordinarily
presume the parties are aware of and have in mind “ ‘ “all
applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made.” ’ ”
(City of Torrance v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982) 32 Cal.3d
371, 378-379; see also Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44
Cal.4th 937, 954; Swenson v. File (1970) 3 Cal.3d 389, 394-395
(Swenson).) Although the parties to a contract could agree to
incorporate subsequent changes in law, we will not assume that
they did so in the absence of evidence of such an intention. (See
Swenson, at p. 395.) Otherwise, our Supreme Court has
explained, “to hold that subsequent changes in the law which
impose greater burdens or responsibilities upon the parties
become part of that agreement would result in modifying it
without their consent.” (Id. at p. 394.)

Turning to the language used by the parties here, the
exclusion clause uses the temporally limited term “current law.”
That temporal limitation expresses the parties’ intent that the
exclusion be governed by the law existing at the time the contract
was formed. (See Civ. Code, § 1636.) This interpretation is
reinforced by the parties’ use of the same term in the agreement’s

4 After briefing was completed, Capstone requested that we

take judicial notice of three unpublished decisions, including one
superior court order, in connection with this issue. Capstone’s
belated request improperly attempts to circumvent California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, which prohibits citing or relying on
an unpublished opinion except in circumstances inapplicable
here. (See People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 428, fn. 4
[discussing the identically-worded predecessor rule, Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 977(a), (b)].) We therefore deny the request.
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“Rules for Arbitration” provision, which provides a link to the
“current version” of the employment dispute resolution rules of
the American Arbitration Association at the time Barba signed
the agreement. No evidence supports the notion that the parties
intended to give the same term two different meanings.
Moreover, the exclusion provision’s broader reference to “claims
asking for emergency or temporary injunctive relief in a court of
law in accordance with applicable law” (italics added) further
demonstrates, by contrast, that “current law” does not refer to
legal developments that may subsequently become applicable. In
other parts of the agreement, several references to “controlling
law,” “the law governing the claims and defenses pleaded,” and
“applicable law,” like the exclusion clause’s use of “applicable
law,” further underscore that the parties did not intend the term
“current law” to refer to or include all potentially applicable
changes in law. Had the parties intended to incorporate all
“applicable” law or “controlling” law, whenever developed, into
the exclusion, they could have used one of the broader
formulations included elsewhere in the agreement, but they did
not. (See Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation
Dist. v. Department of Water Resources (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
1163, 1186 [explaining that the interpretive rule in contract cases
is that “ ‘in the absence of any expression in the contract to the
contrary, . . . words which are not synonymous were never
intended to be so used.’ ”].)

In light of the foregoing language in the agreement, the
words “current law” cannot be reasonably construed to refer to
the law in effect at the time of enforcement. Because the parties
agreed to exclude these claims from arbitration, our state’s strong
public policy favoring arbitration, on which Capstone and Home
Depot rely, is of no assistance here. (See Quach v. California
Commerce Club, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 580 [“the state
policy ‘ “favoring” ’ arbitration, like the federal policy, ‘is about
treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering
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arbitration’ ”], quoting Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S.
411, 418.)

In sum, Barba’s PAGA claims are excluded by the
arbitration agreement as claims “not subject to arbitration under
current law.”

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying the motion to compel
arbitration is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.

Barba v. Capstone Logistics, LLC (A173018) / Barba v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
(A173020)

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