CourtListener 10847924•Newborn v. City of L.A. CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 4/24/26 Newborn v. City of L.A. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
LAJUNE SHANNEL NEWBORN, B335443
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV42704)
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Graciela Freixes, Judge. Reversed, with
directions.
Law Office of Herb Fox, Herb Fox; Levin & Nalbandyan
and Harry Nalbandyan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Assistant City Attorney, and
Sara Ugaz, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
LaJune Newborn appeals from a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) entered in favor of the City of Los Angeles
(City). Newborn was seriously injured when a uniformed police
officer riding a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
motorcycle sped in front of her vehicle as she was driving on the
freeway and kicked up a large metal object that broke through
her windshield and struck her in the head. A jury found in favor
of Newborn in a special verdict and awarded her $2.5 million in
damages. Newborn challenges the trial court’s order granting the
City’s motion for JNOV. The City filed a protective cross-appeal
from the denial of its motion for new trial. We reverse the
judgment entered in favor of the City and direct the court to
enter an order denying JNOV and the request for a new trial and
to reinstate judgment in favor of Newborn.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Accident
On December 19, 2018, Newborn was driving toward
Santa Clarita in the carpool lane of the 14 freeway at
approximately 2:40 p.m. when a uniformed officer riding a police
motorcycle passed in front of her vehicle from the right and
merged into her lane.1 The motorcycle kicked up metal debris,
which broke through Newborn’s windshield and struck her in the
1 Solo drivers were allowed to occupy the carpool lane before
3 p.m.
2
head. Newborn lost consciousness. Her car first collided with the
center divider and then hit the right shoulder. The car came to
rest across the lanes on her side of the freeway. Newborn was
bleeding profusely from her head and was transported to the
hospital. The motorcyclist, apparently unaware of the accident,
rode away. The personal identity of the motorcyclist is unknown.
LAPD Officer Joseph Barr was riding his LAPD motorcycle
behind Newborn. He witnessed the accident, stopped to render
aid, and provided a statement to California Highway Patrol
Officer Korey Reynolds at the scene. Officer Reynolds noted in
his accident report that Officer Barr identified the motorcyclist
who kicked up the debris as an LAPD officer.
The debris was found in Newborn’s car and identified as a
leaf spring from a commercial truck. It weighed five to six
pounds and was nine and one-half inches long, two and one-half
inches wide, and less than an inch thick.
B. Trial Proceedings
Newborn filed a personal injury lawsuit against the City,
the State of California, the County of Los Angeles, and the City of
Santa Clarita. Newborn alleged the defendants were liable under
a theory of respondeat superior for the motorcyclist’s negligent
operation of the motorcycle and for negligently entrusting the
motorcycle to the unknown officer. Trial commenced on March 6,
2023, and proceeded against the City only; the other defendants
were dismissed before trial.
Newborn testified she was driving approximately 65 miles
per hour when she observed two motorcycle officers in her
rearview mirror. One “zoomed” past her; Newborn identified the
passing motorcyclist as an LAPD officer who was wearing a black
3
uniform, a bulletproof vest with “POLICE” across the back, and a
white helmet with black on it. She testified, “the bike was white
with gold lettering on it and had a bunch of guns on the side.”
Newborn explained she drove alongside LAPD officers “every
day” during her commute, and she was thus able to identify the
motorcycle that crossed in front of her as an LAPD motorcycle.
On cross-examination, defense counsel read Newborn’s deposition
testimony to her in which she did not identify the motorcyclist as
an LAPD officer or describe seeing black and gold on the
motorcycle. Newborn stated she did not remember what she said
at her deposition.
Newborn testified she lost consciousness when something
hit her in the head after the motorcyclist passed her. She
recalled waking up to Officer Barr rendering aid. Newborn
testified her eye socket was “crushed,” and she had to undergo
surgery to repair it. She described the lasting effects of the
accident, including daily migraines, forgetfulness, nerve pain,
vertigo, and panic attacks. Newborn also presented expert
testimony regarding her injuries.
Officer Reynolds, who investigated the accident, testified at
trial that he prepared his report of the accident according to his
standard practice, but that he had no independent recollection of
the contents of his report. Officer Reynolds referred to his report
during his testimony to refresh his memory and testified
Newborn told him at the hospital that a police motorcycle passed
her and kicked up the debris that broke through her windshield.
Officer Reynolds also testified Officer Barr identified the
motorcyclist as an LAPD officer at the scene of the accident.
Officer Barr denied he identified the motorcyclist as an
LAPD officer. Officer Barr stated that Officer Reynolds did not
4
appear “real[ly] interested” in talking to him because he was not
taking notes, spoke to him for “about a minute,” and “was trying
to walk away.”
Officer Barr further testified he was at an LAPD training
session for motorcycle officers on the day of the accident and was
heading home. He stated he was traveling approximately
70 miles per hour, and he estimated Newborn was traveling at
approximately the same speed. He saw a black and white police
motorcycle ahead of Newborn. Officer Barr testified he had a
clear view of the motorcycle and Newborn’s car because he and
the other motorcycle were driving closer to the double yellow lane
lines on the right while Newborn’s car was centered in the lane.
He stated he saw the motorcycle kick up debris, which hit
Newborn’s car. Officer Barr testified the motorcyclist did not
appear to react to the debris and did not look back, change speed,
or change lanes.
When the debris hit Newborn’s car, Officer Barr testified he
saw the car collide with the center rail at approximately 90 miles
per hour and then veer to hit the right shoulder at approximately
50 miles per hour. Officer Barr stopped to render aid to
Newborn. Shortly afterward, several other LAPD motorcycle
officers, who had also been at the training, stopped to help direct
traffic. Officer Barr and other witnesses testified that many law
enforcement officers lived in the Santa Clarita and Antelope
Valley area.
Officer Barr also testified the LAPD had a policy allowing
its motorcycle officers to ride their motorcycles home unless the
officer was injured. When Officer Barr was asked whether he
was still on duty when he rode his motorcycle home, he
responded, “Sometimes yes, but most of the time no.” Officer
5
Barr explained he was on duty only if something occurred that
required his assistance. Officer Barr described his job as a
motorcycle officer, stating it involved traffic enforcement,
including writing tickets and investigating traffic collisions.
Officer Barr stated it was “[v]ery common” in his experience to
hit debris while riding a motorcycle on freeways in Southern
California. Officer Barr also testified many other police
departments wore similarly colored uniforms and rode similar
motorcycles as the LAPD.
LAPD officer Brian Wilson testified regarding the training
received by LAPD motorcycle officers, including what was
outlined in the LAPD training manual. Officer Wilson testified
motorcycle officers were trained to be aware of and avoid debris.
They were also trained to go safely over debris if it could not be
avoided. Officer Wilson stated, “personally, I stay out of the car
pool lane because that’s where all the trash goes to.” Officer
Wilson confirmed many other law enforcement agencies rode the
same motorcycles and wore similar uniforms as the LAPD.
The trial court instructed the jury on theories of vicarious
liability and respondeat superior. The court also used CACI No.
3720 to instruct the jury on the scope of employment:
Lajune Newborn must prove that the motorcyclist
ahead of Lajune Newborn was acting within the scope of
their employment when Lajune Newborn was harmed.
Conduct is within the scope of employment if:
(a) It is reasonably related to the kinds of tasks that
the employee was employed to perform; or
(b) It is reasonably foreseeable in light of the
employer’s business or the employee’s responsibilities.
6
The trial court denied Newborn’s request to instruct the
jury on the “going-and-coming” rule in CACI No. 3725.2
The special verdict form asked the jury to answer the
following questions: (1) “Was the motorcyclist ahead of Lajune
Newborn’s vehicle an employee of the Los Angeles Police
Department?”; (2) “Was the motorcyclist ahead of Lajune
Newborn’s vehicle acting within the scope of their employment
with the Los Angeles Police Department at the time of the
incident?”; (3) “Was the motorcyclist ahead of Lajune Newborn’s
vehicle negligent?”; (4) “Was the negligence of the motorcyclist
ahead of Lajune Newborn’s vehicle a substantial factor in causing
2 CACI No. 3725 states: “In general, an employee is not
acting within the scope of employment while traveling to and
from the workplace. But if an employer requires an employee to
drive to and from the workplace so that the vehicle is available
for the employer’s business, then the drive to and from work is
within the scope of employment. The employer’s requirement
may be either express or implied. [¶] The drive to and from work
may also be within the scope of employment if the use of the
employee’s vehicle provides some direct or incidental benefit to
the employer. There may be a benefit to the employer if (1) the
employee has agreed to make the vehicle available as an
accommodation to the employer, and (2) the employer has
reasonably come to rely on the vehicle’s use and expects the
employee to make it available regularly. The employee’s
agreement may be either express or implied.” The court declined
to give CACI No. 3725 because it determined the jury instruction
addressed the required use of a vehicle, rather than permissive
use, and the use of an employee’s personal vehicle rather than
the employer’s vehicle. Neither party challenges this ruling on
appeal.
7
harm to Lajune Newborn?”; (5) “What are LaJune Newborn’s
damages?”
Newborn’s theory at trial was that the unidentified
motorcyclist was an LAPD officer who was traveling home on an
LAPD-issued motorcycle. Newborn argued to the jury at closing
that the officer was traveling in excess of the speed limit and was
going too fast to avoid the leaf spring in the road. Newborn’s
counsel also made the following argument to the jury regarding
the scope of employment inquiry:
“[T]he second question we have to answer in this case is
was that motorcyclist ahead of Ms. Newborn’s vehicle in the
course and scope of their employment when this happened? This
is probably the second easiest question to answer on this verdict
form.
“And here’s the law. It’s instructive. The law says that
conduct, whatever you’re doing is within the course and scope of
employment if one of these conditions are met. The first
condition is the conduct riding the motorcycle on a freeway, is it
reasonably related to the kinds of tasks that an LAPD officer is
employed to perform? We heard the testimony. The bike has
guns on it, uniform. LAPD’s manual requires that they assist
when they see something. It’s a requirement. I asked Officer
Barr if you see something and you assist, are you on duty? He
says, yes, of course. That’s one arm. If you prove that, then the
answer to this question is yes very easy. The second one is, is it
reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s business? [¶]
And this is kind of funny because LAPD is in the business of
policing, not your typical business like a grocery store or the
employee’s responsibilities. There are policeman or a woman, so
let’s look at the evidence in this case, so it’s 100 percent
8
undisputed in this case that LAPD officers get to take their bikes
home. [¶] It’s a privilege. They love it. They can ride in the
carpool lanes. They get home faster. And that’s the question I
asked Barr, hey, if you’re on your bike and something happens,
does it require you to do something? He says yes. It’s their duty.
So if you’re wearing the uniform, you have the guns. You’re on
the bike. You’re in the course and scope of employment.”
The City took the position at trial that Newborn failed to
meet her burden to prove the motorcyclist was an LAPD officer,
was acting in the scope of employment, or was negligent for
failing to see a piece of debris that blended into the roadway. In
particular, counsel argued Newborn’s identification was not
credible, and Officer Reynolds’s report was contradicted by
Officer Barr, highlighting that many law enforcement agencies in
the area wore similar uniforms and rode the same motorcycle. In
closing arguments, counsel for the City countered plaintiff’s
characterization of the scope of employment evidence as follows:
“What is the evidence that that front motorcycle rider was acting
within the course and scope of their employment with the LAPD?
Even if -- let’s say you say it was an officer from LAPD, you know
how much evidence there is that that person was in the course of
employment at the time the accident happened? Zero. The
burden of proof is on plaintiff. What’s the evidence that that
person was working? The officers are allowed to take their
motorcycles home. That person -- if it was an LAPD officer, he or
she could have been on their motorcycle doing anything else, not
on the job.
“There is zero evidence that that front motorcycle rider was
in the course and scope of employment. . . . [¶] . . . Ms. Newborn
must prove that the motorcyclist ahead of Ms. Newborn was
9
acting within the scope of their employment and then that’s what
you’d consider right there, A and B. I’m going to ask you to
consider what evidence you have received, not innuendo and
smoke, but evidence you have that that front rider was an
employee of LAPD. There is none.”
During its deliberations, the jury requested and received a
readback of testimony by Officer Reynolds and Officer Barr. The
jury also asked the following questions: “When an LAPD officer is
driving home in a uniform on a motorcycle and there is no
accident is he/she on duty? Is the[ir] radio on? If their radio is
on, are they required to respond? Is he or she in the scope of
employment on the way home?” After conferring with counsel,
the trial court responded, “Your decision must be based only on
the evidence presented in trial.” The jury then requested a
readback of “plaintiff’s closing argument about acting within the
scope of employment. Also include defense clos[ing]. Question #2
specifically.” The trial court again conferred with counsel and
responded, “The arguments of counsel are not evidence. Please
refer to CACI jury instruction 3720.”
The jury returned a verdict in Newborn’s favor, answering
“yes” to each of the questions on the special verdict form. When
polled, nine jurors voted to answer “yes” on question 2 regarding
the scope of employment, and three voted to answer “no.” The
jury awarded $73,000 in future economic loss/future medical
expenses, $225,000 in past non-economic loss, and $2,202,000 in
future non-economic loss for a total award of $2.5 million.
C. Post-trial Proceedings
The City filed motions for JNOV and new trial, primarily
arguing insufficient evidence supported the findings that the
10
motorcyclist was an LAPD officer or that the motorcyclist was
acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident.
In its motion for JNOV, the City argued the motorcyclist was not
acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident
under the going-and-coming rule and that there was no nexus
between the motorcyclist’s negligence and employment with
LAPD. In its new trial motion, the City challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence on the jury’s findings that the
unidentified motorcyclist was an LAPD employee, that the
motorcyclist was acting within the scope of employment at the
time of the accident, and that the motorcyclist was negligent.
At the hearing on the post-trial motions, the court orally
granted the JNOV motion. It declined to reverse the jury’s
finding that the motorcyclist was an LAPD employee. The court
stated the “gravamen” of the City’s JNOV motion was its
challenge to the jury’s finding that the motorcyclist in front of
Newborn was acting within the scope of employment at the time
of the accident. The court ruled there was no substantial
evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence
to support the jury’s finding that the motorcyclist was acting
within the scope of employment with the LAPD at the time of the
accident. The court stated the only evidence at trial as to the
scope of employment was Officer Barr’s testimony, which it
summarized as follows:
“Officer Barr’s testimony was unequivocal in describing
that the only time an officer is on duty when riding his
motorcycle home is when he renders assistance after seeing
something that requires it. Officer Barr’s answer to plaintiff’s
counsel’s question, quote, and when you assist, you’re then on
duty; isn’t that correct, end of quote, confirms that to be the case.
11
It is undisputed that the front motorcycle rider did not engage in
rendering assistance at any time relevant to this action. No
other evidence was presented to establish that the unknown
motorcyclist was on duty at the time of the accident.
“In describing his observations of the front motorcycle after
it went over the debris, it is clear that the driver was unaware of
the events that transpired after the debris flew up from the road
and impacted the plaintiff’s vehicle. Accordingly, even if the
unidentified driver of the front motorcycle was an LAPD officer,
which the jury found he was, plaintiff’s counsel’s questioning
acknowledges that LAPD requires an officer to assist only when
they see something.” The court ruled that the evidence presented
at trial, specifically Officer Barr’s testimony, was insufficient to
support a finding the motorcyclist was acting within the scope of
employment with the LAPD at the time of the accident.
Newborn disputed the court’s characterization of the
evidence, asserting Officer Wilson and Officer Barr testified
about the different roles that LAPD motorcycle officers play and
their obligation to respond to calls made to the radios embedded
in their helmets. The court was not persuaded to change its
ruling. It vacated the judgment in favor of Newborn and entered
judgment in favor of the City. It took the City’s motion for new
trial off calendar as moot.
Newborn timely appealed from the JNOV. The City timely
filed a protective cross-appeal from the court’s ruling on its new
trial motion.
12
DISCUSSION
A. JNOV
Newborn contends the trial court erred when it vacated the
jury’s verdict and granted the City’s JNOV motion on the ground
that there was no evidence to support the jury’s special verdict
finding that the motorcyclist was acting within the scope of
employment at the time of the accident. We agree.
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may
be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there
is no substantial evidence in support. [Citation.] [¶] . . . As in
the trial court, the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any
substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports
the jury’s conclusion.’ ” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011)
51 Cal.4th 764, 770; accord, Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc.
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 192; Markow v. Rosner (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1045 (Markow).)
“The court may not weigh evidence, draw inferences
contrary to the verdict, or assess the credibility of witnesses. The
court must deny the motion if there is any substantial evidence to
support the verdict. [Citations.] This court therefore may uphold
the order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
affirm the judgment based thereon only if, reviewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to [Newborn], resolving all
conflicts, and drawing all inferences in her favor, and deferring to
the implicit credibility determinations of the trier of fact, there
was no substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict in her
13
favor. ‘If the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable
inferences may be drawn,’ the court erred in granting the motion
and we must reverse.” (Begnal v. Canfield & Assocs. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 66, 72-73.) “Our determination as to the requisite
substantial evidence is de novo.” (Lurner v. American Golf Corp.
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 121, 133.)
2. Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer
may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee
within the scope of employment.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 208 (Mary M.).) “The doctrine of
respondeat superior applies to public and private employers
alike.” (Id. at p. 209; see also Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a) [“A
public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or
omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of
his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this
section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee
or his personal representative”].)
“The doctrine is a departure from the general tort principle
that liability is based on fault. [Citation.] It is ‘ “a rule of policy,
a deliberate allocation of a risk.” ’ [Citations.] Respondeat
superior is based on ‘ “a deeply rooted sentiment” ’ that it would
be unjust for an enterprise to disclaim responsibility for injuries
occurring in the course of its characteristic activities.” (Mary M.,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 208.) “[T]he central justification for
respondeat superior [is] that losses fairly attributable to an
enterprise—those which foreseeably result from the conduct of
the enterprise—should be allocated to the enterprise as a cost of
doing business.” (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara
14
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004 (Farmers).) Mary M. articulated
“three reasons for applying the doctrine of respondeat superior:
(1) to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) to give
greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) to
ensure that the victim’s losses will be equitably borne by those
who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury.” (Id.
at p. 209.)
“In California, the scope of employment has been
interpreted broadly under the respondeat superior doctrine.”
(Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1004.) This has led California
courts to formulate different tests to determine what conduct
falls within the scope of employment. Musgrove v. Silver (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 694, 707 to 710 (Musgrove), collected cases and
identified “four different tests for assessing whether particular
acts should be deemed to be within the scope of employment and
hence a basis for imposing vicarious liability”: (1) the risk-focused
test, (2) the foreseeability-focused test, (3) the benefit-and-
custom-focused test, and (4) the public policy-focused test. We
address only the first two in this opinion because CACI No. 3720,
the instruction given to the jury in this case, is based on these
two tests. (See Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 655, 674-675 (Bullock) [“We review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict under the law
stated in the instructions given, rather than under some other
law on which the jury was not instructed”].) As stated, CACI
No. 3720 asks whether the employee’s conduct “is reasonably
related to the kinds of tasks that the employee was employed to
perform” or “reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s
business or the employee’s responsibilities.”
15
As Musgrove explains, the risk-focused test “focuses on
whether the ‘risk’ engendered by the employee’s allegedly
tortious conduct is ‘inherent in the working environment’ or
‘ “ ‘ “may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental” to
the enterprise undertaken by the employer.’ ” ’ [Citations.]
Given this focus, an employee’s allegedly tortious conduct is
deemed to be within the scope of employment only if that conduct
is required by, engendered by, or an ‘ “outgrowth” ’ of his
employment. [Citations.] Put differently, there must be ‘ “ ‘a
nexus between the employee’s tort and the employment.’ ” ’
[Citation.] This is why an employee’s conduct is not within the
scope of employment merely because he ‘use[s] . . . property or
facilities entrusted to him by’ his employer.” (Musgrove, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 708.)
The foreseeability-focused test “focuses on whether ‘ “the
employee’s [allegedly tortious] [ ]conduct could be reasonably
foreseen by the employer.” ’ [Citation.] For these purposes, the
concept of ‘foreseeability’ has a different—and, significantly, a
narrower—definition than it does in tort law generally. Under
this narrower definition, an employee’s allegedly tortious conduct
is sufficiently foreseeable to be deemed within the scope of
employment only if, ‘ “in the context of the particular enterprise,” ’
the employee’s ‘ “conduct is not so unusual or startling that it
would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among
other costs of the employer’s business.” ’ [Citations.] As the
italicized language indicates, what matters is whether ‘the
employee’s act is foreseeable in light of the duties the employee is
hired to perform’ [citations], and hence whether the plaintiff’s
injury is the type of injury ‘that “ ‘as a practical matter [is] sure
16
to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise.’ ” ’ ”
(Musgrove, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 708-709.)
Musgrove noted there are “further refinements-slash-
corollaries to these tests,” including the going-and-coming rule.
(Musgrove, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 707, fn. 5.) That rule
states that an employer is generally not responsible for torts
committed by an employee who is going to or coming from work.
“The reason for this ‘going and coming’ rule is that ‘the
employment relationship is “suspended” from the time the
employee leaves until he returns [citation], or that in commuting
he is not rendering service to his employer [citation].’ ” (Tryer v.
Ojai Valley School (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1481.) Although
the jury’s questions implicated the going-and-coming rule, the
trial court expressly directed it to only consider CACI No. 3720.
As stated, our review is limited to whether substantial evidence
supports the jury’s findings in the special verdict. (Sukoff v.
Lemkin (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 740, 743.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding the
LAPD Motorcyclist Was Acting Within the Scope of
Employment
1. An officer’s off-duty status does not solely determine
whether tortious conduct is within the scope of
employment
The trial court granted JNOV because it concluded there
was no evidence the LAPD motorcyclist was acting within the
scope of employment based on Officer Barr’s “unequivocal”
testimony that the motorcyclist was not on duty at the time of the
accident. But under well-established California law, whether a
public safety officer is on duty or off duty is not the sole factor
17
that determines whether the officer’s tortious conduct is within
the scope of employment. In short, whether the LAPD
motorcyclist was acting within the scope of employment does not
turn on whether the motorcyclist was on duty or not, and the
trial court erred by grounding its JNOV ruling on the
motorcyclist’s off-duty status.
Several California authorities have examined whether, as a
matter of law, an off-duty police officer’s conduct falls within the
scope of employment. For example, in Inouye v. County of
Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 278, 280 (Inouye), the court
reversed summary judgment for the County and held that “Los
Angeles County’s [ ] policy of deeming its off-duty safety police
officers to not be engaged in the performance of their duties is
ineffective to insulate the County from respondeat superior
liability for the alleged wrongful conduct of an off-duty safety
police officer in the course of making an arrest.” And in Juarez v.
San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
1213, 1217, the court held that an off-duty police officer’s
misconduct while investigating a suspected theft of his cell phone
after identifying himself as a police officer could fairly be
regarded as an outgrowth of his employment and was not so
unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to expose the
District to liability, reversing an order sustaining a demurrer.
And in Perez v. City and County of San Francisco (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 826, 841 (Perez), the court also reversed summary
judgment entered in favor of the defendant city and held that an
off-duty officer’s negligent failure to secure an employer-approved
firearm in an unattended vehicle after returning home from
assigned training fell within the scope of employment. Perez
observed the officer brought his firearm while traveling to the
18
training because he was on duty and would be training near a
county jail. Under these circumstances, Perez found a jury could
infer the officer thought he might be called to respond to an
incident at the jail while he was off duty. (Id. at p. 841.)
Accordingly, even if the LAPD motorcyclist in this case was off
duty when Newborn was injured, the jury could still have
reasonably found the motorcyclist was acting within the scope of
employment based on the evidence before it.3
3 To be sure, an employer is not strictly liable for all acts by
its employees during working hours or while on duty. (See
Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 997 [sexual harassment of a
fellow deputy sheriff while on duty “is not a risk that may fairly
be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the operation of
a county jail,” therefore “such conduct must be deemed to fall
outside the scope of a deputy sheriff’s employment”]; Thorn v.
City of Glendale (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383 [city fire
marshal who entered plaintiff’s business premises during
working hours under color of authority was not acting within
scope of employment when he set fire to the premises]; Hoblitzell
v. City of Ione (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 675, 683 [city building
inspector and city police officer in civilian clothes staged fake
building inspection during normal business hours for personal
reasons; they were not acting within scope of employment].)
The California Supreme Court explained in Farmers that
“an employer will not be held vicariously liable for an employee’s
malicious or tortious conduct if the employee substantially
deviates from the employment duties for personal purposes.
[Citations.] Thus, if the employee . . . acts out of ‘personal malice
unconnected with the employment’ [citation], or if the misconduct
is not an ‘outgrowth’ of the employment [citation], the employee
is not acting within the scope of employment. Stated another
way, ‘[i]f an employee’s tort is personal in nature, mere presence
19
Having concluded the trial court granted JNOV based on
incorrect reasoning, we now consider whether substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding on scope of employment.4
2. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding on
the scope of employment
Under CACI No. 3720, the only jury instruction on scope of
employment given at trial, Newborn could prove the LAPD
motorcyclist’s conduct fell within the scope of employment by
proving that: “(a) [the conduct] is reasonably related to the kinds
of tasks that the employee was employed to perform; or (b) [the
conduct] is reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s
business or the employee’s responsibilities.” The jury found in
her favor on the scope of employment issue in its special verdict,
but it did not specify the basis.
Our review of the trial record reflects substantial evidence
supports both. For purposes of JNOV, like the trial court, we
at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties
prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of
action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.’ [Citation.] In such cases, the losses do not foreseeably
result from the conduct of the employer’s enterprise and so are
not fairly attributable to the employer as a cost of doing
business.” (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1004-1005.)
4 The City does not argue there are alternative theories that
support affirming the JNOV. (See Cal. Serv. Station Etc. Ass’n v.
Am. Home Assur. Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1171 [“we are
not bound by the trial court’s reasons; if correct upon any theory
of applicable law, the JNOV must be affirmed”].) As we explain
below, it is estopped from relying on and/or waived the going-and-
coming rule.
20
accept the jury’s special verdict finding the unidentified
motorcyclist was an LAPD officer. Newborn testified at trial that
the LAPD motorcyclist was wearing an LAPD uniform, riding an
LAPD motorcycle, and carrying firearms.5 She further testified
she yielded to the LAPD motorcyclist when the motorcyclist
“zoomed” past her because the motorcyclist was a law
enforcement officer. Officer Barr testified LAPD policy allowed
motorcycle officers to ride their motorcycles home, but they were
required to respond to an emergency or other similar situations.
He also testified an LAPD motorcycle officer’s typical duties
involved traffic enforcement, including writing tickets and
investigating traffic collisions. From this evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer the responsibilities of a uniformed LAPD officer
riding a department-issued motorcycle on public roads includes
responding to emergencies, even when off duty and outside of the
agency’s jurisdiction.
This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
finding the motorcyclist’s conduct was “reasonably related to the
kinds of tasks that a LAPD motorcycle was employed to perform.”
The motorcyclist’s conduct in speeding past a motorist on an
LAPD motorcycle while in uniform and then negligently kicking
up debris on the road onto Newborn’s vehicle was an
“ ‘ “outgrowth” ’ ” of the job of riding on a motorcycle to respond to
emergencies. The risk of harm to a motorist like Newborn is
inherent in the working environment of an LAPD motorcycle
5 We do not conclude an LAPD officer is always acting within
the scope of employment when in uniform, driving an LAPD
vehicle, and carrying weapons. We conclude only that, under the
facts presented at trial, the jury’s finding on the scope of
employment was supported by the evidence.
21
officer and ‘ “ ‘ “may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly
incidental” to the enterprise undertaken by the employer.’ ” ’ ”
(Musgrove, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 708.) That is, there is a
“nexus” between the LAPD motorcyclist’s tortious conduct
(kicking up debris on the road while riding an LAPD motorcycle
in uniform) and his employment as an LAPD officer. (Ibid.)
For the same reasons, the LAPD motorcyclist’s negligence
was also “reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s
business or the employee’s responsibilities.” In light of the duties
the motorcyclist was hired to perform—riding an LAPD
motorcycle on public roads to respond to emergencies—the harm
to a motorist such as Newborn is reasonably foreseeable. Officer
Barr testified it was “[v]ery common” in his experience to hit
debris while riding a motorcycle on the freeways in Southern
California. Officer Wilson testified motorcycle officers were
trained to be aware of and avoid debris, and that they were also
trained how to ride over debris safely. In short, the LAPD
motorcyclist’s act of speeding and kicking up debris on the road
“ ‘ “is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to
include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the
employer’s business.” ’ ” (Musgrove, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 708.)
Additionally, the three tort policy objectives undergirding
enterprise liability support the jury’s finding of respondeat
superior liability against the City. (Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at
p. 209; accord, Perez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 842-843.)
First, the jury’s finding helps to prevent recurrence of the
tortious conduct because it may prompt law enforcement
agencies, such as the LAPD, to provide more training to
motorcycle officers about how to avoid debris on highways and to
22
impose stricter rules regarding speeding while using a city-
provided motorcycle.6 Second, the jury’s finding gives greater
assurance of compensation to victims because Newborn was
compensated for her injuries. Third, the jury’s finding helps to
ensure that Newborn’s losses will be equitably borne by those
who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury.
Here, the community benefits from the LAPD’s policy allowing
officers to ride city-issued motorcycles when off duty because
those officers are ready and available to address emergencies. It
is thus equitable to impose respondeat superior liability on the
City for those officers’ negligence while riding city-issued
motorcycles on public highways. (See also Farmers, supra,
11 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)
The City raises several opposing arguments. First, it
contends the motorcyclist could not have acted within the scope of
employment because the motorcyclist was traveling outside of
and in the opposite direction of the LAPD’s jurisdiction, which is
the City of Los Angeles. According to the City, commuting home,
whether on an LAPD motorcycle or not, is not something a police
officer does “ ‘in the context of the particular enterprise’ ” of
policing. The geographical limitations of the LAPD’s jurisdiction
are not detrimental to Newborn’s case in light of Officer Barr’s
testimony that the LAPD requires its officers to stop and render
aid if they witness an accident. In fact, Officer Barr and other
fellow LAPD officers stopped to render aid to Newborn, even
though they were off duty and outside LAPD jurisdiction.
Further, Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (a)(3), extends the
6 We note the City does not argue the imposition of liability
in this case will compel the LAPD to prohibit its officers from
riding their motorcycles off duty.
23
authority of peace officers to encompass “any place in the state”
for “a public offense committed . . . in the peace officer’s presence,
and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or
property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense.” (See
also Inouye, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 284 [discussing broad
scope of authority conferred upon peace officers].)
Next, the City argues that, if the motorcyclist was
commuting home, we should conclude the motorcyclist was riding
the LAPD motorcycle solely for personal benefit. The City’s
argument conflates the two tests in CACI No. 3720 (the risk-
focused test and the foreseeability-focused test) with the benefit-
and-custom-focused test. (See Musgrove, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 708-710.) But the trial court did not instruct the jury on
that latter test, and we need not consider it. (Bullock, supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 674-675 [“We review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict under the law stated in the
instructions given, rather than under some other law on which
the jury was not instructed”].) Having met her burden to prove to
the jury that the LAPD motorcyclist was acting in the scope of
employment under the risk-focused test and/or the foreseeability-
focused test, Newborn was not additionally required to prove the
purpose of the motorcyclist’s trip was for the benefit of the LAPD.
Third, the City argues the going-and-coming rule bars
vicarious liability. But the City objected to Newborn’s request to
instruct the jury on the going-and-coming rule because it took the
position that CACI No. 3725, which states the rule, did not apply
to the facts of this case. The trial court accepted the City’s
argument and declined to instruct the jury with CACI No. 3725.
When the jury asked during deliberations whether the
motorcyclist was acting “in the scope of employment on the way
24
home,” the court directed the jury to consider the evidence
presented and did not instruct it on the going-and-coming rule.
The City may not now assert this theory as a ground to affirm the
JNOV. (See M. Perez Co., Inc. v. Base Camp Condominiums
Assn. No. One (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 456, 463 [judicial estoppel
prohibits a party from taking inconsistent positions in the same
or different judicial proceedings]; see also Findleton v. Coyote
Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 565, 569
[waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right].) Although the City asserts it did not “ ‘waive the
defense’ ” due to its position on CACI No. 3725, the City
acknowledges CACI No. 3720 accounts for the going-and-coming
rule. And, as stated, substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding of scope of employment under CACI No. 3720.
C. New Trial
The City asserts in its cross-appeal that the trial court
erred by denying its new trial motion because the weight of the
evidence was contrary to the jury’s special verdict findings.7 The
City’s contentions are unpersuasive.
1. Standard of Review
“[T]he merits of a motion for a new trial denied by
operation of law may be reviewed upon appeal in the same
manner as if expressly denied by the court.” (Estate of Shepard
7 The new trial motion was denied by operation of law after
the trial court took it off calendar because it was rendered moot
by the JNOV. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 660, subd. (c) [effect of
failure to timely rule on motion for new trial “shall be a denial of
the motion without further order of the court”].)
25
(1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 70, 73; accord, Weisenburg v. Molina
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 478, 486.) We generally review orders
granting or denying a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 859; Denton v. City and County of San Francisco (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 779, 794.) “Where a party claims . . . insufficient
evidence, a ‘new trial shall not be granted . . . , unless after
weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire
record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court
or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or
decision.’ [Citation and footnote omitted.] ‘A trial court has
broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion, and the court’s
exercise of discretion is accorded great deference on appeal.’
[Citations.] ‘Accordingly, we can reverse the denial of a new trial
motion based on insufficiency of the evidence . . . only if there is
no substantial conflict in the evidence and the evidence compels
the conclusion that the motion should have been granted.’ ”
(Howell v. State Dept. of State Hospitals (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
143, 149 (Howell).)
Here, the trial court did not exercise its discretion “to
reweigh this evidence in its exclusive role as the 13th juror.”
(Maroney v. Iacobsohn (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 473, 486.) It
instead took the new trial motion off calendar on mootness
grounds after it granted the City’s motion for JNOV. The City’s
new trial motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and,
on appeal, it contends the weight of the evidence did not support
the jury’s verdict. Under these circumstances, the parties agree
this court should review for substantial evidence. (See Maroney,
at p. 486; contra, Reynosa v. Superior Court (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 967, 990, fn. 14 [“The substantial evidence
26
standard of review ‘operates only where it can be presumed that
the court has performed its function of weighing the evidence. If
analysis of the record suggests the contrary, the rule should not
be invoked’ ”].)
We need not determine whether the standard of review
requires we look for substantial evidence or review the matter
under the stricter “ ‘no substantial conflict in the evidence’ ”
standard articulated in Howell, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
page 149. The evidence in the record demonstrates the new trial
motion was properly denied under either standard.
2. LAPD Officer
The City argues there was insufficient evidence supporting
the jury’s special verdict finding the motorcyclist was an LAPD
officer. It cites “(1) an inadmissible hearsay statement from
Officer Reynolds, but Officer Barr—the person who supposedly
made the statement to Officer Reynolds—denied having made it,
and (2) Ms. Newborn’s trial testimony that the motorcycle had
LAPD insignia on it, which was wholly inconsistent with her
statement to the CHP, complaint, which also named the State,
and deposition testimony.”8
8 The City also appears to rely on plaintiff’s counsel’s
statement during a pretrial hearing that Newborn “couldn’t recall
specifically LAPD badging. She did recall officer’s uniform was
black, and the motorcycle that they were riding was the same one
that the officer—arriving at the time.” The jury did not consider
these statements because they were not made in the jury’s
presence and arguments by counsel are not evidence. (Villacorta
v. Cemex Cement, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433.)
27
The trial court, in its JNOV ruling, indicated this was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding on this issue. It
concluded there was “conflicting testimony” and “the jury was
afforded the opportunity to weigh the testimonies of Officer Korey
Reynolds, Officer Barr, and the plaintiff, assess credibility, and
make reasonable inferences to support their conclusion reflected
in the verdict that the front motorcyclist was an employee of the
LAPD. That determination is not in contention in this [JNOV]
motion.” At trial, Newborn testified she could see the
motorcyclist as the motorcyclist passed her, and she identified
the motorcyclist as an LAPD officer. Newborn explained she
commuted next to LAPD officers daily. On cross-examination,
Newborn acknowledged she did not make that identification at
her deposition and stated she did not remember what she said in
the deposition. Although at trial and during his deposition,
Officer Barr denied identifying the motorcyclist as an LAPD
officer, Officer Reynolds testified at trial that he had noted in his
report that Officer Barr stated at the scene the motorcyclist was
an LAPD officer.
The court’s evaluation of the evidence, although considered
in connection with the JNOV motion, demonstrates there was a
substantial conflict in the evidence, and the evidence did not
compel the conclusion that a motion for new trial should have
been granted. (Howell, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.) The
jury was entitled to and did resolve that conflict. Further, even if
Officer Reynolds’s statement constituted inadmissible hearsay,
Newborn’s testimony at trial alone constitutes substantial
evidence that the motorcyclist was an LAPD officer. (See
Catherine D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 922, 931
[appellate court should defer to jury’s assessment of witness
28
credibility].) This substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding the motorcyclist was an LAPD officer and does not compel
the conclusion that a motion for new trial should have been
granted.
3. Scope of Employment
For the same reasons we discussed in Part B, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the jury’s special verdict finding
that the motorcyclist was acting within the scope of employment
at the time of the accident. The evidence at trial established the
motorcyclist was wearing an LAPD uniform, riding an LAPD
motorcycle, and carrying firearms. Officer Barr testified LAPD
motorcycle officers were allowed to take their motorcycles home
and, even when off duty, officers were required to respond when
an event required their assistance. Further, the duties of an
LAPD motorcycle officer include riding a motorcycle to enforce
traffic laws. This substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
and does not compel the conclusion that a motion for new trial on
the scope of employment should have been granted.
4. Negligence
The City also asserts insufficient evidence supports the
jury’s special verdict finding on negligence. According to the
City, “[t]he accident could have happened without negligence
because not every piece of debris on the freeway—especially
something with the dimensions and coloring of a fractured leaf
spring—can be seen and avoided.” According to the City, neither
accident reconstruction expert “could explain to the jury whether
a reasonable motorcyclist exercising due care could have seen and
avoided the fractured leaf spring—which was small and grayish
29
in color—while traveling at freeway speed” because the
motorcyclist was unidentified and did not testify to the
circumstances of the accident.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that it “must” find
negligence if it found (a) the motorcyclist violated Vehicle Code
section 22350, the basic speed law, and (b) the violation was a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm.9 At trial, Newborn
testified she was driving at approximately 65 miles per hour
when the motorcyclists “zoomed” past her. Officer Barr
estimated he was traveling at approximately 70 miles per hour,
Newborn was traveling at approximately the same speed, and the
motorcyclist was ahead of both of them. Officer Wilson testified
LAPD motorcyclists were trained to spot and avoid debris on the
road. Both Officer Barr and Officer Wilson testified debris was
common on freeways, and Wilson stated he avoided the carpool
lane for this reason. From this evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer the motorcyclist was speeding and did not see
the debris before the motorcycle kicked it into Newborn’s
windshield and caused her injuries. This is substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s special verdict finding the motorcyclist was
negligent. (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
570, 582.) Further, this evidence does not compel the conclusion
that the motion for new trial should have been granted. (Howell,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.)
9 Vehicle Code section 22350 states: “No person shall drive a
vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or
prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on,
and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a
speed which endangers the safety of persons or property.”
30
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of the City is reversed. On remand,
the trial court shall vacate its order granting JNOV to the City,
enter a new order denying the motion for JNOV and the motion
for new trial, and reinstate the judgment in favor of Newborn
consistent with the jury’s verdict.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
31
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