CourtListener 10847922•People v. Kessee CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 4/24/26 P. v. Kessee CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B311352
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. TA146654)
v.
SAMUEL P. JACKSON and
KEJON KESSEE,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Michael J. Shultz, Judge. Vacated and stricken in part with directions;
Affirmed in part.
Gregory L. Rickard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Samuel P. Jackson.
Winston Kevin McKesson for Defendant and Appellant Kejon Kessee.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and William H.
Shin and Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In May 2013, defendants Samuel Jackson and Kejon Kessee, both
South Side Compton Crips gang members, drove into rival gang territory
looking for someone to kill. Kessee spotted a man riding a bicycle and
incorrectly identified him as a rival gang member. Jackson exited the vehicle
and fatally shot the man. Defendants were tried together but before separate
juries. Jackson’s jury convicted him of first degree murder and found true
gang and firearm allegations. Kessee’s jury convicted him of second degree
murder and likewise found true gang and gang-related firearm allegations.
On appeal, defendants assert a long list of errors. The Attorney General
concedes that the gang and gang-related firearm enhancements cannot stand,
due to a change in the law, but disputes the remainder of defendants’
contentions. We agree with the Attorney General.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence Against Both Defendants
a. The Shooting
On May 23, 2013, around 11:20 a.m., Alesha Palmer was washing
dishes when she heard a gunshot. She looked out her kitchen window and
saw that a young Black man, later identified as the victim, had been shot
while riding his bike. Palmer also saw a “box-shaped dark gray square car.”
Palmer called the police and told the operator she heard “one loud shot.” She
also described the car as a gray “SUV-type truck.”
Palmer later told the police that the car was “box-shaped, low to the
ground, and dark smoke gray.” The car was driving “casual,” playing loud
music, and did not speed off. Evidence set forth below indicated that the
defendants were driving a Jeep Patriot at the time of the shooting. But when
asked at trial if the car she saw was a Jeep, Palmer said it was “not quite as
boxy.”
Around 11:25 a.m., Deputy Esteban Rodriguez of the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) responded to the crime scene. At the
scene, Deputy Rodriguez saw the victim lying on the street with a gunshot
wound to his abdomen. The victim was straddling a black bicycle, with one
leg under the bike and another leg over it. He was gasping for air but not
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responsive. There was a possible bullet strike mark on the gray stucco wall
of a nearby building. There was also a bullet fragment in the middle of the
street. The victim was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead at 11:53 a.m. The autopsy revealed that the victim suffered a single
fatal gunshot wound in his back.
b. Testimony of Keyshawn Evans1
At the time of the murder, both Evans and Jackson lived in a mobile
home park called Del Amo Estates. Defendants and Evans were members of
the South Side Compton Crips. The Neighborhood Compton Crips was a
rival gang. Evans testified that killing a rival gang member is one way of
moving up to a higher rank in one’s gang.
The day after the murder, May 24, 2013, Jackson asked Evans to meet
him at the Del Amo Estates pool area. Once there, Jackson told Evans about
the shooting. Jackson said Kessee picked him up in a rental car in the
morning, right outside Del Amo Estates, and drove to a “rival enemy hood.”
Kessee was driving and Jackson was in the front passenger seat.
Kessee saw someone he thought was “Ray-Ray” from the Neighborhood
Compton Crips. Kessee told Jackson the man was Ray-Ray. When Jackson
asked if he was sure, Kessee said yes. Jackson got out of the car and shot the
man once with a .44-caliber revolver. Jackson did not want to shoot more
than once because the firearm was loud and powerful.
1 In 2016, a jury convicted Evans of shooting at an inhabited dwelling
and found true a gang allegation. The jury hung on four other charges: one
count of murder and three counts of attempted murder. Shortly thereafter,
Evans agreed to testify in the present case pursuant to a leniency agreement.
Under the agreement, Evans pled guilty to the one count of murder and the
three counts of attempted murder. He also pled guilty to an unrelated
attempted murder charge as well as burglaries in another case. If the
presiding judge in the present case believed Evans testified truthfully, he
would receive 15 years to life in state prison. However, if the judge found he
was not truthful, Evans would receive the maximum of 150 years to life in
state prison.
3
c. The Investigation and Arrest
Prior to the shooting, on May 17, 2013, Kessee dropped off his 2003
Chrysler Concord at the dealership for repairs. That day, Kessee’s mother
rented a gray Jeep Patriot and Keesee was listed as the secondary driver on
the rental agreement.
On May 23, 2013, at 10:20 a.m., an automatic license plate recognition
(ALPR) system camera caught the rental car near the shooting location. On
May 31, 2013, Kessee returned the Jeep to the rental company.
On June 27, 2013, defendants were arrested. Sergeant Robert Gray
and his partner interviewed Kessee. When Kessee was shown a photograph
of the gray Jeep Patriot, he claimed he had never seen it before. Kessee also
denied being involved in the shooting. Kessee called his mother from jail. In
the recorded conversation, Kessee told his mother that he was arrested for
murder. When his mother asked whether it was for a murder that occurred
in Compton or Los Angeles, Kessee warned her that the conversation was
being recorded. His mother then stated, “I’m asking you that . . . because the
detective that called me is from a [Los Angeles] area code.” Kessee confirmed
it was Compton.
Jackson called his girlfriend from jail. She told Jackson the police
already knew “everything.” His girlfriend thought Kessee was talking to the
police and that Kessee was “a fuckin’ snake[,] I told you.”
While in custody, the defendants were placed in a cell together and
their conversation was recorded. Kessee stated, “They got no evidence.” He
then said, “They got the whip [(i.e., car)]. But they don’t have a picture of us;
me and you in the whip.” Kessee reminded Jackson that there was no picture
of him “being in the neighborhood . . . [o]n that day [of the shooting].”
Jackson told Kessee, “Then we just gotta wait it out[,] [¶] . . . [¶] just don’t
say nothing.” Jackson said, “Fucked up. I ain’t banging the hood no more,
bro.” Both defendants were later released.
In July 2014, defendants and Evans were the subjects of a wiretap
investigation. On July 8, 2014, Sergeant Gray left a crime flyer about the
murder at Evans’s house and another one at the workplace of Kessee’s
girlfriend to stimulate conversation about the murder. That day, a phone
conversation was recorded between Evans and Jackson. They discussed the
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flyer, and Evans told Jackson the flyer had the wrong car listed because
defendants used a rental car and not Kessee’s Chrysler at the time of the
shooting. Evans also talked about “my boy” doing the shooting, referring to
Jackson. The next day, Kessee had a conversation with his girlfriend. She
told him, “[D]on’t say nothing ‘cause then you gonna look real stupid, because
you’re gonna be the one that said something.”
d. Cell Phone Evidence
Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Michael Easter analyzed
defendants’ and Evans’s cell phone data and was able to track their locations
at a particular time by measuring signal strength from cell towers nearby.
At trial, Agent Easter explained that a cell phone connects to the cell tower
with the highest signal quality, which is not necessarily the tower closest to
the phone.
On the morning of May 23, 2013, Jackson and Kessee called each other
at 6:15 a.m., and again at 6:52 a.m. Evans and Jackson exchanged multiple
text messages from 7:12 a.m. to 7:19 a.m. Throughout the morning, Jackson
continued to communicate with Evans and Kessee. Both Jackson’s and
Kessee’s phones eventually arrived in the area of the Del Amo Estates. At
10:20 a.m., Jackson called Kessee.2 Jackson’s and Kessee’s phones continued
moving through the same areas. At 11:06 and 11:25 a.m., Kessee’s phone
was likely near the crime scene. At 11:20 a.m., Jackson’s phone received a
call at or near the area of the crime scene. Between 11:44 a.m. and 11:48
a.m., both defendants’ cell phones were still traveling near each other.
2 As previously noted, the ALPR system time stamped the rental car
near the crime scene at 10:20 a.m. Agent Easter opined that it was not
possible for Kessee’s phone to be in the rental car at that time because it was
located approximately a mile away, which would be beyond the sector or
coverage of the cell tower. However, Agent Easter conceded he was unaware
if the ALPR system was “synced up” with cell service providers. In his
experience, he had “worked plenty of cases where traffic cameras are
typically not even synced with each other, let along synced to . . . the cellular
network.” Additionally, there are instances with the ALPR system “where
the time stamp attributed to a given image is off,” by “a few minutes at the
most.”
5
Based on the cell phone data, Special Agent Easter opined that on the
day of the shooting, defendants’ phones were together between 10:20 a.m.
and 11:50 a.m. Based on the same data, Sergeant Gray opined that on the
day of the shooting, Kessee’s and Jackson’s phones traveled to Del Amo
Estates and then together to the crime scene.
e. Firearm Evidence
Anny Wu, an LASD criminalist, examined the fired bullet recovered
from the crime scene. Wu opined that the bullet was consistent with a .44-
caliber Magnum cartridge and that based on this caliber of the bullet, the
firearm used was most likely a revolver. The victim’s DNA was found on the
fired bullet.
f. Gang Evidence
Detective Raul Ibarra testified as a gang expert. He identified
defendants as members of the South Side Compton Crips. The South Side
Compton Crips had approximately 130 members and 20 associates. Detective
Ibarra described the boundaries of the gang’s territory. He also testified that
the gang’s primary activities included narcotics sales, gun possession,
robberies, burglaries, carjacking, murder, and shootings. The Neighborhood
Compton Crips is a rival gang. Given a hypothetical based on the facts of this
case, Detective Ibarra opined that the shooting was committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with the South Side Compton Crips.
II. Prosecution Evidence Against Kessee Only
Terrence Harrison was a member of the South Side Compton Crips. In
May 2013, Jackson called Harrison and asked for a gun but never told him
what he was going to do with it. Harrison met up with Jackson in Compton
and gave him a “long,” “big,” stainless steel revolver. Harrison later heard
that someone had been killed and that the car used in the murder was caught
on camera. He recalled seeing Kessee “all up in that car.”
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III. Defense
a. Kessee’s Defense
On May 23, 2013, Ruther Daniels was a code enforcement officer. He
was driving in his patrol car when he heard three or four gunshots in front of
him. Daniels continued to drive towards the direction of the gunshots and
saw several people standing in the middle of the street with a body on the
ground. Daniels approached and the victim was on the ground barely
breathing.
Kessee’s girlfriend testified that in July 2014, she went to work and her
boss told her that a detective left a crime flyer. She later spoke with a police
detective who told her that the flyer “had something to do with [Kessee].”
She then called Kessee and told him about the flyer. She testified that her
comment, “Don’t say nothing,” in the recorded conversation on July 9, 2014,
referred to the fact that she was pregnant.
Kessee’s mother testified about the phone call Kessee made to her
while he was in police custody on June 27, 2013, when she asked whether the
murder occurred in Los Angeles or Compton. Kessee’s mother said she asked
that question because Kessee was calling from a “323” telephone number.
She admitted she rented a Jeep for Kessee while his car was getting repairs
at the dealership.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2018, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
filed an information charging defendants with murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)).3 The information also alleged principal use of a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), (e)(1)), and personal use of a firearm by Jackson
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). Finally, the information included gang
allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
After a jury trial, Jackson was found guilty of first degree murder, with
true findings on the firearm and gang allegations. The jury found Kessee not
3 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
7
guilty of first degree murder but deadlocked as to the lesser included charge
of second degree murder. The trial court declared a mistrial as to Kessee.
A second jury trial was held on the charges against Kessee; the jury
again deadlocked on the second degree murder charge, and the trial court
again declared a mistrial. Shortly thereafter, the court granted Jackson’s
motion for a new trial based on a finding that the prosecution withheld
exculpatory material, described in more detail below, in violation of Brady v.
Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady). The People then tried defendants
together again, but with two separate juries.
On March 6, 2020, Jackson’s jury found him guilty of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with true findings on the gang allegation (§ 186.22)
and three firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). The trial court
sentenced Jackson to 25 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years for the
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), for a total of 50 years to life in
state prison. The court stayed the gang enhancement as well as the
remaining firearm enhancements.
Kessee’s jury found him guilty of second degree murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)), with true findings on the gang allegation (§ 186.22) and three gang-
related firearm allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), (e)(1)). The trial court
sentenced Kessee to 15 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years for one
gang-related firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), for a total
of 40 years to life in state prison. The court stayed the gang enhancement as
well as the remaining gang-related firearm enhancements.
Defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Brady Violation
Jackson argues that his conviction must be reversed and the charges
against him dismissed because the Brady violation amounted to outrageous
government misconduct. We disagree.
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a. Relevant Background
During Kessee’s second trial, Sergeant Gray testified that the police
used a “StingRay”4 to locate Kessee’s cell phone. He stated that another
detective (later identified as Detective Kasey Woodruff) wrote the StingRay
search warrant. Kessee’s counsel informed the trial court that he was not
aware of the StingRay search warrant and that no information about this
warrant was disclosed in discovery. The court ordered, and Sergeant Gray
provided, a copy of the warrant for defense counsel. As relevant here,
Detective Woodruff attested in the affidavit accompanying the warrant that
during the week of June 2, 2013, through June 9, 2013, a confidential
informant (CI) spoke to Kessee, and Kessee told the CI that “he shot and
killed the victim.”
After reviewing the warrant, Jackson moved to set aside his guilty
verdict from the first trial and dismiss the case against him. Jackson claimed
the warrant contained materially exculpatory evidence, specifically Kessee’s
purported admission to being the shooter. Alternatively, Jackson sought a
new trial based on the People’s failure to disclose this exculpatory
information (§ 1181) and requested disclosure of the CI’s identity. The People
opposed the motion. The People filed the audio recording and transcript of
Sergeant Gray’s May 31, 2013 interview with the CI, under seal.
At the hearing, Sergeant Gray testified that on May 31, 2013, he
interviewed the CI with Detective Woodruff. The CI said defendants were
responsible for the victim’s murder. The CI believed Kessee was the driver
and Jackson was the shooter. The CI claimed the weapon used was a .44-
caliber firearm with a scope and defendants were in a gray Jeep at the time.
The CI did not indicate that Kessee was the shooter or acting alone. When
asked to disclose the CI’s identity, Sergeant Gray asserted the privilege
created by Evidence Code sections 1040, 1041, and 1042. Sergeant Gray
4 A StingRay, also known as a cell-site simulator, “ ‘is a device that
locates cell phones by mimicking the service provider’s cell tower (or “cell
site”) and forcing cell phones to transmit “pings” to the simulator. The device
then calculates the strength of the “pings” until the target phone is
pinpointed.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 26, 63, fn.
13.)
9
explained the CI would likely be killed if his or her identity was known.
Sergeant Gray testified that he first obtained a copy of the StingRay warrant
during Kessee’s second trial.
Detective Woodruff also testified at the hearing. He confirmed he was
present when the CI indicated defendants were responsible for the shooting.
When asked to explain his statement in the affidavit, Detective Woodruff
testified that the CI said “they did it” during the interview. According to
Detective Woodruff, the CI elaborated that, “Kessee was—he referred to them
as ‘we,’ that they did it, that they did it.” Because the StingRay warrant was
only for Kessee’s phone, Detective Woodruff intentionally omitted Jackson
from the affidavit. The CI never told Detective Woodruff that Kessee acted
alone. The trial court ordered the People to provide the defense with a
redacted version of the CI interview transcript.
The trial court found Detective Woodruff’s statement in the affidavit
was exculpatory “on [its] face” as to Jackson and “the plain reading of it is
that Kessee was the shooter in this case.” In addition, the court found that
this evidence was material within the meaning of Evidence Code section
1040. The court explained that Detective Woodruff’s statement was
“material with respect to whether or not Mr. Jackson personally used the
firearm.” The court then held an in-camera hearing with the prosecution to
discuss what information should be disclosed to defense. After the hearing,
the court stated it was inclined to grant Jackson’s request to disclose the CI’s
identity but gave the prosecution time “to figure out how to make th[e]
disclosure[] in the most significant manner and without jeopardizing
anybody’s safety.” The court put off ruling on Jackson’s motion for a new
trial.
The People filed a supplemental opposition to the disclosure of the CI’s
identity and to Jackson’s motion for a new trial under section 1181. The
People also provided a further revised transcript of the CI interview to the
defense.
At the continued hearing, the court invited Jackson’s counsel to argue
the motion for a new trial. After argument, the court again found Detective
Woodruff’s statement in the affidavit materially exculpatory “on its face”
because it directly implicated Kessee as the shooter, which was contrary to
10
the jury’s finding that Jackson personally used a firearm. The court did not
believe Detective Woodruff’s testimony led to a different result. The court
concluded that his statement in the affidavit was negligent but did not reach
the level of “a reckless disregard for the truth.” The court noted that
Detective Woodruff should have referenced both defendants by writing “they”
killed the victim, rather than stating that Kessee or “he” did it.
In assessing the reasonable probability that the statement in the
affidavit would have affected the outcome of the trial, the court believed that
“ultimately the [CI’s] information . . . is inculpatory to Mr. Jackson, [and] in
the end it will hurt him.” However, the court found that the prosecution’s
failure to disclose the statement in the StingRay warrant injected other
problematic issues into Jackson’s trial. The court explained the CI was a
material and percipient witness and their statements in the May 31, 2013
interview contradicted Harrison’s testimony in a significant way. The CI
stated that defendants told Harrison “what it [was] they intended to do” and
asked him “for a firearm so that they could complete their mission.” The CI
personally witnessed this exchange. The CI’s statements conflicted with
Harrison’s testimony at trial. Harrison denied any knowledge of what
defendants were going to do with the firearm. Thus, the CI could impeach
Harrison’s testimony. The court found “[t]hat [this] impeachment [evidence]
arguably . . . would have made [Harrison] an accomplice as a matter of law.”
The court also noted that Sergeant Gray knew the CI’s statements conflicted
with Harrison’s testimony but did not disclose this information.5 The court
found that the failure to disclose the CI’s conflicting statements to defense
affected Sergeant Gray’s credibility. Thus, the Brady violation had “a
cascading effect” that was clearly “problematic.” The court concluded there
was a reasonable probability of a different result “given the fact that Ms.
Palmer was so unequivocally clear that [the shooter’s vehicle] was not a
Jeep,” and granted the motion for a new trial.
The trial court then turned to the issue of disclosing the CI’s identity.
The court stated that the question was whether the CI’s identity was
“material to the issues of innocence or guilt.” Again, the court found the CI
5 The court found, however, that Sergeant Gray did not withhold this
information “to gain a calculated advantage.”
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was a material and percipient witness. Therefore, the court ordered the
People to disclose the identity of the informant as well as a full, unredacted
transcript of the CI’s interview.
The People later informed the trial court that they would not disclose
the CI’s identity. In response, the court held a hearing on the prosecution’s
failure to comply. At the outset, the court found that LASD’s privilege had
been properly claimed, but that nondisclosure of the CI’s identity would deny
Jackson a fair trial. The court declined Jackson’s request to dismiss the case
against him because it would be contrary to the interests of justice given the
ample evidence that he committed the murder. The court also denied
Jackson’s request to exclude or limit Evans’s testimony as it was completely
unrelated to the initial Brady violation and to the disclosure of the CI’s
identity. The court further denied Jackson’s request to exclude the wiretaps
and for a jury instruction that Sergeant Gray failed to disclose Brady
information. The court noted that the requested jury instruction was “a trial
issue” and therefore defense could later seek to request it at trial.
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1042,6 the court ordered that
Detective Woodruff’s statement in the affidavit would be admissible at
Jackson’s trial, and Harrison’s testimony would be excluded. However, the
court denied the defense request to “preclude rehabilitation or rebuttal” as to
Detective Woodruff’s statement, because that would be contrary to Evidence
Code section 1202.7 The court noted that these orders did not apply to
Kessee.
6 Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a) states that “if a claim of
privilege under this article by the state or a public entity in this state is
sustained in a criminal proceeding, the presiding officer shall make such
order or finding of fact adverse to the public entity bringing the proceeding as
is required by law upon any issue in the proceeding to which the privileged
information is material.”
7 Evidence Code section 1202 provides: “Evidence of a statement or other
conduct by a declarant that is inconsistent with a statement by such
declarant received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not inadmissible for the
purpose of attacking the credibility of the declarant though he is not given
and has not had an opportunity to explain or to deny such inconsistent
12
b. Analysis
Jackson asserts that, to remedy the Brady error, the trial court should
have dismissed this case, rather than granting him a new trial. Whether we
review the issue independently or for abuse of discretion, we conclude the
trial court correctly denied the motion. (Compare People v. Uribe (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 836, 857 (Uribe) [independently reviewing the trial court’s
granting of a motion to dismiss for outrageous government misconduct on
remand after appellate reversal for Brady error] with People v. Velasco-
Palacios (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 439, 445 [reviewing motion to dismiss for
prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion] and People v. Jenkins (2000)
22 Cal.4th 900, 951 (Jenkins) [recognizing that “courts have broad discretion
in determining the appropriate sanction for discovery abuse”].)
“Pursuant to [Brady], and its progeny, the prosecution has a
constitutional duty to disclose to the defense material exculpatory evidence,
including potential impeaching evidence.” (People v. Harrison (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 704, 709.) “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady
violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued.’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031,
1043; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176.) It is undisputed
that the prosecution’s belated disclosure of the StingRay warrant, which
contained material exculpatory evidence, constituted a Brady violation.
When the prosecution has committed a Brady violation, the trial court
has discretion to determine an appropriate remedy to ensure the defendant
receives a fair trial. (See People v. Fultz (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 395, 432
(Fultz) [after affirming the trial court’s findings of Brady error and other
prosecutorial misconduct, remanding the case to the trial court “because it is
in the best position to fashion a remedy adequate to ensure defendant’s fair
trial”]; see also Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 951.) Although a new trial is
usually the most serious remedy for a Brady violation, additional or
statement or other conduct. Any other evidence offered to attack or support
the credibility of the declarant is admissible if it would have been admissible
had the declarant been a witness at the hearing.”
13
alternative remedies may be necessary where a new trial, by itself, will not
ensure a fair trial. (See People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382,
1387 (Kasim); Virgin Islands v. Fahie (3d Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 249, 254–255.)
For example, outright dismissal may be appropriate in Brady cases where a
fair trial is impossible due to the prosecution’s “gross and intentional”
misconduct. (People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1183; see Fultz,
supra, at p. 431; see also People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501,
1503, fn. 1 [recognizing that “bad faith Brady errors may warrant dismissal”];
Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 [“A court may dismiss an information
in an extreme case to address outrageous governmental conduct”]; Jenkins,
supra, at p. 951 [recognizing that “appropriate” sanctions for the
prosecution’s suppression of evidence may include dismissal].) Section
1054.5, subdivision (c), which addresses sanctions for discovery violations in a
criminal case, similarly recognizes the “judicial power to dismiss charges for a
Brady violation.” (People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352.)
Nevertheless, “[d]ismissal of charges is an extraordinary remedy . . .
reserved for the few cases where conduct by the prosecution has completely
eliminated the possibility of a fair retrial.” (Kasim, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1387; see United States v. Pasha (D.C. Cir. 2015) 797 F.3d 1122, 1139
[“dismissal is appropriate only as a last resort, where no other remedy would
cure [the] prejudice against a defendant” caused by a Brady violation];
Mendibles v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1191, 1198 [“lesser
sanctions must be utilized by the trial court,” in lieu of dismissal, “unless the
effect of the prosecution’s conduct is such that it deprives defendant of the
right to a fair trial”].)
Jackson’s argument for dismissal rests on the premise that there
“appear[ed] to be a pattern of recurring [Brady] violations,” which amounted
to “outrageous government conduct.” Although the trial court found only one
Brady violation, the prosecution’s belated disclosure of the StingRay warrant,
Jackson maintains that a further Brady violation occurred. Specifically,
Jackson argues Sergeant Gray failed to disclose the CI’s statements during
the May 31, 2013 interview, which would have impeached Harrison’s
credibility.
14
Even assuming (without deciding) this constituted an additional Brady
violation, we are not persuaded that dismissal would be justified. Jackson
does not assert on appeal that the Brady violations were intentional or
committed in bad faith, nor would the record support such a conclusion. In
fact, the violations might not have been committed knowingly at all. The
trial court found nothing to show that the prosecution intentionally withheld
evidence. It found that Sergeant Gray did not withhold the CI information
“to gain a calculated advantage.” Finally, the trial court found dismissal of
the case contrary to the interests of justice given the ample evidence that
Jackson committed the murder.
Accordingly, we conclude that the appropriate remedy for the Brady
violation was a new trial, which is precisely what Jackson received.
II. Disclosure of Confidential Informant’s Identity
LASD, through Sergeant Gray, refused to disclose the CI’s identity,
asserting privilege under Evidence Code section 1041, which permits a public
entity to refuse to disclose the identity of an informer when disclosure “is
against the public interest because the necessity for preserving the
confidentiality of his or her identity outweighs the necessity for disclosure in
the interest of justice.” After sustaining the claim of privilege, the trial court
held a hearing to determine the appropriate remedy pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1042. The court denied Jackson’s request to dismiss the case
but issued the orders against the prosecution detailed above.
On appeal, Jackson contends the adverse orders issued by the trial
court were insufficient to ensure him a fair trial. We review the trial court’s
ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Bradley (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 607,
621.)
“The purpose of compelling disclosure of an informant who is a material
witness on the issue of guilt, and of the remedy of dismissal if the People
invoke confidential privilege, is to assure the defendant a fair trial on the
offense charged. However, the trial court’s orders should go no further than
necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. (People v. Superior
Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 522, 533–534.)” (People v. Borunda (1976) 58
Cal.App.3d 368, 375.)
15
Here, the trial court ordered the admission of Detective Woodruff’s
statement in the affidavit that Kessee admitted to the CI that he was the
shooter. This allowed Jackson to present evidence that contradicted his own
admissions to Evans that he was the shooter and Kessee was the driver.
Because Detective Woodruff’s statement could be used to undercut Evans’s
credibility, it was not necessary to exclude Evans’s testimony in its entirety
as Jackson suggested. Further, Jackson’s request to exclude any evidence
that contradicted Detective Woodruff’s statement would overcorrect the
Brady error and unfairly tip the scales in his favor. The court also ordered
Harrison’s testimony excluded in its entirety against Jackson, which
prevented the prosecution from using it to prove Harrison provided Jackson
with the murder weapon.
The court’s denial of the request to instruct the jury that Sergeant Gray
failed to disclose favorable evidence to the defense did not render the trial
fundamentally unfair. We note that the court invited the defense to request
this instruction at trial. It does not appear from the record that defense
made such a request. Moreover, as the court pointed out, dismissal would be
contrary in every respect to the interests of justice, because there was ample
evidence Jackson committed the murder. Therefore, we conclude the trial
court issued an appropriate remedy to ensure Jackson’s right to a fair trial in
light of the prosecution’s refusal to disclose the CI’s identity.
Jackson contends the prosecution’s refusal to disclose the CI’s identity
amounted to a Brady violation because the CI could have been used to
impeach Evans’s testimony that Jackson admitted to being the shooter.
Jackson is essentially repackaging the argument that Detective Woodruff’s
statement in the affidavit was materially exculpatory and therefore its
suppression constituted a Brady violation. We agree that the delayed
disclosure of this evidence was a Brady violation. But we reject Jackson’s
attempt to assert multiple Brady violations for the same underlying evidence.
The nondisclosure of the CI’s identity is a wholly separate issue and more
appropriately analyzed in the context of Evidence Code section 1042, as
discussed above.8
8 Jackson asserts for the first time on appeal that Sergeant Gray and
other detectives tampered with evidence through coaching witnesses.
16
Jackson requests that this court independently review the sealed
transcript of the in camera hearing on the disclosure of the CI’s identity. The
Attorney General does not oppose this request. We have independently
examined the transcript of the court’s in camera hearing, and find the record
is adequate for appellate review. We discern nothing in the in camera
proceedings that meaningfully affects the issues raised on appeal. 9
III. Motion to Suppress
Kessee moved to traverse the StingRay warrant, dated June 20, 2013,
and to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his subsequent arrest on
June 27, 2013. Kessee argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the motion. Jackson joins in the argument.
a. Relevant Background
In his motion, Kessee contended that the prosecution admitted
Detective Woodruff made material misrepresentations in his affidavit,
specifically about the CI’s statements pertaining to the identity of the
shooter. The People opposed the motion, arguing that no suppression was
required because “Detective Ibarra independently obtained a separate Ramey
Because Jackson did not present this issue to the trial court, it is forfeited on
appeal. (See Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591–592
[“arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed
forfeited”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“The purpose of this
[forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the
trial court, so that they may be corrected”].)
9 Kessee contends that the trial court violated his “state and federal due
process rights when it did not dismiss the case upon the prosecution’s refusal
to turn over Brady information.” As discussed above, the Brady evidence at
issue was exculpatory for Jackson only because the CI implicated Kessee as
the shooter. Kessee further contends the trial court erred in failing to
dismiss “the case” when the prosecution refused to disclose the identity of the
CI. While Kessee filed a motion to disclose the CI’s identity, he subsequently
withdrew it. Accordingly, we do not address Kessee’s arguments pertaining
to the Brady violation or the prosecution’s failure to disclose the CI’s identity.
17
warrant[10] for . . . Kessee’s arrest on June 26, 2013.” The prosecutor provided
the trial court with a sealed copy of Detective Ibarra’s warrant. The
prosecutor also provided the defense with a redacted copy of Detective
Ibarra’s affidavit.
Kessee made an oral motion to disclose the identity of the CI discussed
in Detective Ibarra’s affidavit and to traverse the related warrant. Jackson
joined in the motion. The prosecutor requested an in camera hearing with
Detective Ibarra to review his affidavit for the search warrant. After the in
camera hearing, the court denied defendants’ motion to disclose Detective
Ibarra’s CI or to provide an unredacted version of the detective’s affidavit.
A few days later, the trial court held a hearing on Kessee’s motion to
traverse the StingRay warrant and to suppress all evidence obtained as a
result of his arrest. After argument, the court granted the motion to traverse
the StingRay warrant. The court found Detective Woodruff’s statement
about the CI’s identification of the shooter was “clearly a negligent disregard
for the truth,” because by his own admission, the conversation between the
CI and Kessee detailed in the affidavit never occurred. However, the court
denied Kessee’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following his arrest
because Detective Ibarra’s warrant provided an independent basis for
Kessee’s arrest, search of his person, “and many, many other things,
including locations.” In doing so, the court also denied defendants’ motion to
traverse Detective Ibarra’s warrant. The court reasoned that Detective
Ibarra’s in camera testimony was credible and there was “nothing about the
warrant that [was] even remotely false.” The court further found Detective
Ibarra’s redacted affidavit contained “acceptable disclosures, meaning that no
further disclosures are necessary.”
b. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kessee’s motion
to suppress because the evidence was obtained after his arrest from a source
independent of the unlawful StingRay warrant.
10 A Ramey warrant is a warrant authorizing a residential arrest of a
suspect before the filing of criminal charges. (Goodwin v. Superior Court
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 215, 218, citing People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263.)
18
Under the independent source doctrine, the exclusionary rule will not
be applied if tainted evidence is also obtained through a source that is wholly
independent of a constitutional violation. (See Nix v. Williams (1984) 467
U.S. 431, 443; People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081; People v. Tousant
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804, 818.) “The independent source doctrine teaches
us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the
public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are
properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position
that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.
[Citations.] When the challenged evidence has an independent source,
exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they
would have been in absent any error or violation.” (Nix v. Williams, supra, at
p. 443, fn. omitted.)
The independent source here was Detective Ibarra’s search warrant,
which was dated one day prior to the arrest. On appeal, Kessee posits that
the arresting officer had no knowledge of Detective Ibarra’s warrant prior to
his arrest. We reject Kessee’s assertion as he provides no record citation to
support it. Moreover, the trial court found Detective Ibarra credible and
found nothing about the warrant even “remotely false.”
Kessee further contends that all the evidence obtained as a result of his
arrest should have been suppressed because Detective Woodruff lied to obtain
the StingRay warrant and such flagrant misconduct must be deterred. We
disagree with Kessee’s characterization of Detective Woodruff’s conduct.
While the trial court found that Detective Woodruff acted with negligent
disregard for the truth, it did not find intentional deception. As discussed,
the Brady violation was already remedied by the trial court ordering a new
trial. No further remedy was warranted. Because Detective Ibarra’s warrant
provided an independent source for the discovery of evidence, the trial court
acted within its discretion in denying Kessee’s request to suppress all
evidence obtained after his arrest.
Defendants request that this court independently review the sealed
transcript of the in camera hearing on Detective Ibarra’s search warrant to
determine whether it identified Kessee’s location. We decline to do so. The
issue presented is whether Detective Ibarra’s search warrant supplied
19
independent legal authorization to arrest and search Kessee and his
property. It is irrelevant to our analysis that the StingRay device was
utilized to locate Kessee to effectuate his arrest and the Ramey search
warrant allegedly was not.11
IV. Admission of Jackson’s statements to Evans Against Kessee
Kessee argues the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting Jackson’s
statements to Evans regarding defendants’ participation in the shooting.
Kessee claims the statements were hearsay and inadmissible under Evidence
Code section 1230 as a declaration against interest and asserts that
admitting the statements violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. We disagree.
a. Relevant Background
Prior to trial, Kessee filed a motion in limine to exclude Jackson’s
conversation with Evans about defendants’ involvement in the shooting. The
trial court denied the motion.
The trial court found that admission of Jackson’s statements did not
implicate the Confrontation Clause because the statements were not
testimonial. The court further found Jackson’s statements admissible under
Evidence Code section 1230 as a declaration against interest. The court
reasoned Jackson was unavailable, and “the bulk of his statement [was]
disserving to his own interests.” The court went on to explain that
defendants are friends and in the same gang. Jackson’s report of the crime to
Evans was “consistent with the People’s theory that both of the defendants
wanted to make a name for themselves [and] show their allegiance to the
11 Kessee further contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the motion to traverse Detective Ibarra’s warrant without providing defense
an unredacted version of the warrant. We agree with the Attorney General
that this is a conclusory assertion of error without any citation to legal
authority. Therefore, we decline to consider it. (People v. Mayfield (1993) 5
Cal.4th 142, 196 (Mayfield) [defendant’s claims “largely are asserted
perfunctorily and without argument in support”]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2
Cal.4th 86, 150 (Hardy).)
20
gang by committing . . . the most serious violent crime one can commit.” The
court continued, “The circumstances under which [the statements] were
uttered [are] clear that . . . Jackson thought he was in a safe place, . . .
uttering a crime to a fellow gang member[, (Evans)].” While Jackson
implicated himself in the murder, he did not attempt to shift blame to
Kessee.
b. Declaration Against Interest Exception
“Although hearsay statements are generally inadmissible as evidence
(Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b)), California law recognizes several exceptions to
this rule.” (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 668 (Jasso).) Evidence
Code section 1230 provides an exception for statements against interest:
“Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the
subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary
to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to
the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . , that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.”
To demonstrate that the hearsay statement is admissible as a
declaration against interest, the proponent of the declaration must show that
the declarant is unavailable,12 that the declaration was against the
declarant’s interest when made, and that the declaration was sufficiently
reliable. (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 668.) To determine whether a
statement is against the declarant’s interest, the trial court looks at the effect
of the statement as a whole and considers the circumstances under which the
statement was made, in addition to the words used. (Ibid.) We review a trial
court’s application of Evidence Code section 1230 for abuse of discretion.
12 Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1), defines “unavailable as a
witness” to mean the declarant is “[e]xempted or precluded on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement
is relevant.” “One such privilege, the exercise of which makes a person
unavailable as a witness, is the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616.) It is undisputed
that Jackson was “unavailable as a witness” under Evidence Code section
240.
21
(Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 669; People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698,
711–712.)
Jackson’s statements to Evans fall squarely within this exception.
Jackson incriminated himself in a murder that had occurred the day before.
Any reasonable person in Jackson’s position would not have exposed his
direct participation unless he believed it to be true.
Kessee argues that the statements were not made against Jackson’s
interest because he “shift[ed] the ultimate blame” to Kessee. (See People v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 [the content of a declarant’s
statement “is most reliable in th[e] portion that inculpates” him or her, and
“[i]t is least reliable in that portion which shifts responsibility”].) We
disagree. Jackson was bragging when he spoke to Evans. Jackson said he
was picked up by Kessee and together they decided to go to look for a rival
gang member to shoot. Jackson was the one carrying the firearm that he
obtained from a fellow gang member. After Kessee incorrectly identified the
victim as a rival gang member, it was Jackson who got out of the car and
fatally shot the victim. Jackson’s statements equally inculpate him and
Kessee in the murder. Jackson in no way minimizes his role or shifts the
bulk of responsibility to his cohort.
In addition, the circumstances demonstrated the statements’ reliability.
The statements were “volunteered to an acquaintance” (People v. Samuels
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 121), Jackson’s friend and fellow gang member, Evans.
It was therefore made in “the most reliable circumstance[,] . . . one in which
the conversation occurs between friends in a noncoercive setting that fosters
uninhibited disclosures,” rather than “the least reliable circumstance[,] . . .
one in which the declarant has been arrested and attempts to improve his
situation with the police by deflecting criminal responsibility onto others.”
(People v. Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.)
For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted Jackson’s statements to Evans as a declaration
against interest.
22
c. Confrontation Clause
The admission of testimonial statements by a nontestifying witness
without a prior opportunity for cross-examination violates the defendant’s
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. (Crawford v. Washington
(2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 (Crawford).) This right to confrontation “bars the
admission at trial of a testimonial out-of-court statement against a criminal
defendant unless the maker of the statement is unavailable to testify at trial
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (People v.
Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 580–581; accord, Crawford, supra, at p. 68.) A
testimonial statement has two critical components. “First, to be testimonial
the statement must be made with some degree of formality or solemnity.
Second, the statement is testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in
some fashion to a criminal prosecution.”13 (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th
608, 619.) Jackson’s statements bear none of these characteristics. The
statements lacked any degree of formality and solemnity as they were made
in a casual setting to a fellow gang member. It is settled that such “ ‘informal
statement[s] to a person not affiliated with law enforcement,’ fall outside the
scope of the confrontation clause, which is concerned with ‘formal and solemn
accusatory statements . . . in the context of criminal investigations or
inquiries.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1065–1066;
see also People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 527 [statements made to
fellow gang members not testimonial].)
Accordingly, because Jackson’s statements cannot be deemed
testimonial, there was no Sixth Amendment confrontation clause violation.
V. Murder Convictions
Defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence to support
their murder convictions. We disagree. There was substantial evidence to
support Jackson’s first degree murder conviction and Kessee’s second degree
murder conviction as an aider and abettor.
13 Our Supreme Court has noted that “ ‘[a] comprehensive definition of
the term “testimonial” awaits articulation’ ” by the United States Supreme
Court. (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 398.)
23
a. Standard of Review
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] This determination ‘presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ”
(People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821.) “ ‘We must also “accept
logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.” ’ [Citation.] We do not question the credibility of a witness’s
testimony, so long as it is ‘not inherently improbable,’ nor do we reconsider
the weight to be given any particular item of evidence.” (People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) “The substantial evidence standard of review is
generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it
should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine
the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)
b. Legal Principles
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) First degree murder includes the additional
elements of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41
Cal.4th 139, 151; § 189 [degrees of murder].) A decision to kill is
premeditated if considered beforehand and deliberate if resulting from
careful thought and weighing of competing considerations. (People v. Lee
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636.) Second degree murder is an unlawful killing
with malice, but without premeditation or deliberation. (People v. Hernandez
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332.)
“Guilt as an aider and abettor is guilt ‘based on a combination of the
direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental
24
state.’ ” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710.) “A person aids
and abets the commission of a crime when [the person], (i) with knowledge of
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of
committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or
advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
c. Analysis
We conclude that there was ample evidence to support defendants’
murder convictions. Defendants were South Side Compton Crips gang
members and the Neighborhood Compton Crips was their rival gang.
Defendants drove into rival gang territory with the purpose and intent of
killing a Neighborhood Compton Crips gang member. Kessee facilitated the
killing by identifying the victim as such a person, albeit incorrectly. Jackson,
already armed, exited the vehicle and fatally shot the victim in the back
before fleeing the scene. Palmer testified she heard a gunshot and then saw
a “box-shaped gray” car driving away. Kessee’s mother had rented a silver
Jeep Patriot prior to the shooting and Kessee was listed as a secondary driver
on the rental agreement. The same vehicle was captured by an ALPR camera
system driving near the crime scene approximately an hour before the
shooting. In reconciling the different locations of Kessee’s cell phone and the
rental vehicle, Agent Easter opined that the ALPR system could have been a
few minutes off. Moreover, defendants’ cell phone data put them both at the
crime scene at the time of the shooting, as well as their travel to and from the
crime scene.
In addition, Evans testified that Jackson bragged about how he had
committed the murder together with Kessee. Specifically, Jackson said that
Kessee picked him up on the morning of the shooting and they decided to
drive together to rival gang territory. Kessee was driving and Jackson was in
the front passenger seat. While driving through rival gang territory, Kessee
mistakenly identified a person on a bicycle as a rival gang member. Kessee
stopped the car and Jackson got out and fatally shot the victim at point blank
range. Kessee’s jury heard from Harrison, another South Side Crips gang
member, who testified that in May 2013 he gave Jackson a “long,” “big,”
25
stainless steel revolver. Reviewing the entire record in a light most favorable
to the judgment, there was substantial evidence to support the findings that
Jackson committed first degree murder and Kessee committed second degree
murder as an aider and abettor.
On appeal, defendants in essence ask this court to reweigh the evidence
and make credibility determinations. While defendants concede that they
were “together on the day of the murder and in the area of it,” they contend
that is not enough. Defendants further argue that the recorded jail
conversation between them was mostly (but not completely) “inaudible” and
“unintelligible,” and that the wiretapped phone calls did not inculpate
defendants in the murder. Next, defendants attack the credibility of Evans’s
testimony based on alleged inconsistent statements and his leniency
agreement with the prosecution. Lastly, defendants point out that Palmer
denied the vehicle she saw after the shooting was a Jeep.
We do not parse through these contentions because weighing the
evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses fall within the jury’s
province. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) The jury clearly
believed the version of events as presented by the prosecution, with Evans as
the key witness, and rejected the version presented by defendants. The fact
that evidence presented at trial might also support a conclusion contrary to
the one the jury reached does not mean the evidence is insufficient to support
the conclusion the jury did reach. (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th
1, 11.)
VI. Assembly Bill No. 333
Assembly Bill No. 333 (AB 333), which amended section 186.22, was
enacted in 2021 and became effective on January 1, 2022. (People v. Burgos
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Burgos); People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–
1207 (Tran).) Defendants contend, and the Attorney General agrees, that the
amendments AB 333 made to section 186.22 apply retroactively to their case.
We agree with the parties that the substantive amendments to section 186.22
are retroactive and require us to vacate the jury’s findings on the gang
allegations and gang-related firearm allegations. We remand the matter to
26
afford the prosecution the opportunity to retry these allegations, should it
choose to do so.
AB 333 added “ ‘new elements to the substantive [gang] offense and
[gang] enhancements in section 186.22—for example, by requiring proof that
gang members “collectively engage” in a pattern of criminal gang activity,
that the predicate offenses were committed by gang members, that the
predicate offenses benefitted the gang, and that the predicate and underlying
offenses provided more than a reputational benefit to the gang. . . .’
[Citations.] These changes ha[d] the effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for
conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the
enhancement.’ ” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207; Burgos, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 9; People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749.)14
The parties agree, and our Supreme Court has held, that these changes
ameliorate punishment and thus apply retroactively to all cases not yet final
as of the statute’s January 1, 2022 effective date. (See Tran, supra, 13
Cal.5th at pp. 1206-1207, citing In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740
(Estrada).) “When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense
and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission
implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment,
and reversal is required unless ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt’ that
the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.”
(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) Here, the Attorney General concedes
reversal is required, reasoning that the evidence presented at trial failed to
establish that the predicate offenses commonly benefitted the gang in a way
that was more than merely reputational, as required by the newly amended
section 186.22. We agree. On this record, reversal of the gang enhancements
14 In addition to amending section 186.22, AB 333 added section 1109,
which requires that the trial of a gang enhancement charged under section
186.22, subdivision (b), be bifurcated from and follow trial of the underlying
offenses when requested by the defendant. (§ 1109, subd. (a); People v.
Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129, disapproved of on other grounds in
Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 31.) AB 333’s enactment of section 1109
became effective almost two years after defendants’ trial. Kessee concedes
section 1109 is not retroactive and therefore does not apply. (See Burgos,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 7.)
27
is required, and the prosecution must be given the opportunity to establish
the additional elements on remand, should it choose to do so. (See People v.
Eagle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 275, 280.)
The same rationale applies to the jury’s findings on the section
12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) firearm allegations, which require findings under
section 186.22, subdivision (b). (See People v. Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 346-348.) Section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) provides for enhanced
firearm penalties for “any person who is a principal in the commission of an
offense” if the prosecution pleads and proves that (1) the person violated
section 186.22, subdivision (b), and (2) any principal in the offense committed
a firearm violation specified in section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), or (d).
(§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).) Here, the jury found three section 12022.53,
subdivision (e)(1) allegations true as to Kessee. Because this enhancement
depends on a finding pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b) (§ 12022.53,
subd. (e)(1)(A)), the changes to section 186.22 made by AB 333 require that
the true findings on these allegations also be vacated and the matter
remanded to the trial court.15 We note that the jury found true three firearm
allegations that Jackson personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). These findings, which Jackson does not
challenge, remain intact.
VII. Motion to Bifurcate
Before trial, Kessee moved to bifurcate the gang and gang-related
firearm allegations from the murder charge. Kessee contends the trial court
abused its discretion in denying that motion. Jackson, for his part, failed to
request bifurcation or join in Kessee’s motion below, and therefore has
forfeited this issue on appeal. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040,
1050–1051 [defendant bears the burden to show bifurcation should be
15 In light of our conclusion, we need not address Kessee’s contention that
there was insufficient evidence to support the gang and gang-related firearm
enhancements. We also do not discuss Kessee’s argument regarding the trial
court’s authority to strike his gang-related firearm enhancements under
section 1385.
28
granted]; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 653 [issue not raised below
is forfeited].)
Below, Kessee argued that the gang evidence had little probative value
on the question of guilt and was highly prejudicial. In opposition, the
prosecutor argued the gang evidence and the murder were inextricably
intertwined. He stated that this evidence was necessary to establish the
motive for the murder. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and denied
the motion. The court explained that “[t]he entire motive as described by the
People’s witnesses, and to some extent the defendants themselves . . . is that
they believe this person was a rival gang member.” The court concluded that
the gang evidence was “inextricably intertwined” with the murder and its
admission was more probative than prejudicial.
The trial court has discretion to bifurcate the trial of a gang
enhancement from the trial of the substantive offenses. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1044, 1048–1051.) Bifurcation is
unnecessary when the evidence supporting a gang enhancement would be
admissible at trial of the substantive offenses. (Id. at pp. 1049–1050.) The
party seeking bifurcation must “ ‘clearly establish that there is a substantial
danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.’ ” (Id. at p.
1051.) “[E]vidence of gang membership is often relevant to, and admissible
regarding, the charged offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—
including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs
and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or
fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.” (Id. at p. 1049.)
We review denial of a motion to bifurcate a gang allegation for abuse of
discretion (id. at pp. 1050–1051), based on the record before the court when it
ruled on the motion (cf. People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575).
The gang evidence in this case was relevant in establishing a motive for
the murder and in helping to identify the perpetrators. Defendants were
South Side Compton Crips and the Neighborhood Compton Crips was a rival
gang. As noted, Evans testified that Jackson said he decided to drive into
rival gang territory for the specific purpose of targeting a rival gang member.
Kessee pointed out the victim as the target based on his belief the victim was
29
a Neighborhood Compton Crips gang member named Ray-Ray. We conclude
that the trial court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in denying
Kessee’s motion to bifurcate.
VIII. Judicial Misconduct
Kessee contends the trial judge committed misconduct by allowing his
own bias to affect his duties as a judicial officer. Kessee identifies six
instances of alleged misconduct by the court. Jackson joins in the claim. We
agree with the Attorney General that defendants forfeited their contentions
by failing to raise them below. “As a general rule, a specific and timely
objection to judicial misconduct is required to preserve the claim for appellate
review.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1320; People v. Sturm
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237.)
Kessee acknowledges that “no objections were made as to judicial
misconduct,” but asserts that any objection “would have been fruitless.” It is
true that defendant’s failure to object may not preclude review where an
objection would have been futile. (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p.
1237.) But to avail himself of this exception, Kessee must explain why an
objection would have been futile; the bald assertion that it would be is
insufficient. (Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 196; Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at
p. 150.) In the absence of such an explanation, we decline to apply the
exception. This issue is forfeited.
IX. Transcripts of the Jail Recordings
Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion in permitting
transcripts of the jail recordings in the jury room even when the
corresponding audio was not being listened to by the jury. Jackson forfeited
the claim by failing to object below. In any event, we conclude the contention
lacks merit.
a. Relevant Background
During trial, the prosecutor sought admission of multiple exhibits,
including defendants’ recorded jail conversation (People’s Exh. No. 79). While
the trial court discussed admission of the People’s exhibits into evidence,
30
Kessee’s counsel objected to “all of the transcripts for the various recordings.”
The trial court stated, “I think I’ve said it five times at least, if not more: The
transcripts are not admitted into evidence. They are not evidence in the
case.” The court further stated, “What I intend to do with the transcripts,
because oftentimes jurors annotate or write on them, is I intend to allow
them to take them into the jury room, to remind them again that they’re not
evidence, and to let them know that they should not rely on the transcripts as
evidence [and] to rely on the oral recordings.” The court noted that “the jury
had been admonished on numerous occasions, but there will be another
admonishment that the transcripts are not evidence, and that if they need to
rely on the evidence of the recordings, they need to listen to the recordings.”
In response, Kessee’s counsel stated that it was only natural for the
jury to just look at a transcript as opposed to listening to a recording over
again because it’s “just right there at their fingertip[s].” Therefore, the jury
“shouldn’t get things that aren’t evidence.” However, counsel understood
that if the jury was listening to an audio recording, they would be given the
transcripts “at that time.” Over counsel’s objection, the court said it would
allow the jury to have the transcripts, with the proper admonitions. During
closing argument, Kessee’s counsel reminded the jurors that the transcripts
of the audio recordings were not evidence. Prior to deliberations, the court
gave the jurors the same reminder.
b. Analysis
A trial court ordinarily does not abuse its discretion in allowing the
jury to have a transcript to follow along as an aid to a recording, especially
where the trial court admonishes the jury that the transcript is only an aid
and not evidence. (See People v. Polk (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 944, 955–956.)
On appeal, Kessee claims a particular transcript of a jail recording (People’s
Exh. No. 79-A) “was not believed to be an accurate account of what was said”
given the poor quality of the audio. Kessee, however, cites no example of
inaccuracy in the transcript that might mislead the jury. Furthermore, the
jury was directed by the trial court and Kessee’s counsel that they were to
rely on the recording, not the transcript, as evidence. (See People v. Brown
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 585, 599, citing People v. Fujita (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d
31
454, 472-473 [“[t]ranscripts of admissible tape recordings are only prejudicial
if it is shown they are so inaccurate that the jury might be misled into
convicting an innocent man”].) Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the transcripts in the jury room during
deliberations. In light of that conclusion, we need not address whether it was
prosecutorial misconduct to introduce the audio recording of the jail
conversation and accompanying transcript.
X. Evidence of First Degree Murder as to Kessee
Kessee contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to
present evidence relevant to the first degree murder charge and instructing
the jury on first degree murder, after the jury in the initial trial found him
not guilty of that charge.
Prior to his third trial, Kessee filed a motion in limine to exclude the
prosecution from “presenting evidence of first degree murder” because he was
acquitted of the charge in the first trial. In response, the prosecutor stated
that this issue would be “effectively addressed by jury instructions,” in that
there would “be no instruction on willfulness, premeditation, or deliberation.”
Moreover, the evidence to support first degree murder is relevant for a second
degree murder charge. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, the court
orally instructed the jury only on second degree murder.16
We agree with the Attorney General that the evidence to support first
degree murder and second degree murder is one and the same. The evidence
pertaining to Kessee’s activities prior to the murder was directly relevant to
prove malice. On appeal, Kessee fails to articulate any argument to the
contrary. The jury was only instructed by the trial court on second degree
murder. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Kesse’s motion.
16 While the appellate record includes both CALCRIM No. 431 (first
degree murder) and CALCRIM No. 640 (deliberation and completion of
verdict forms: for use when defendant is charged with first degree murder
and jury is given not guilty forms for each level of homicide), it appears to
have been a clerical error in assembling the clerk’s transcripts.
32
XI. Instructional Error
Kessee contends the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM Nos. 252, 334, 401, 500, 520, 521, 640, 1401, 1402, and
1403. We agree with the Attorney General that Kessee fails to provide any
substantive legal argument supported by authority for a claim of error
related to CALCRIM Nos. 334, 500, 520, 521, 640, and 1402. Therefore, we
decline to consider these claims. (People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p.
196; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 150.) As to the claims of error
related to CALCRIM Nos. 252, 1401, 1403 (gang-related instructions), we
have already concluded that defendants are entitled to the benefit of AB 333’s
amendments to section 186.22 as their judgments are not yet final.
Therefore, the only remaining instruction is CALCRIM No. 401. We review
an allegation of instructional error de novo. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22
Cal.4th 690, 733; People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111.)
Kessee asserts that CALCRIM No. 401 did not require the jury to find
that he personally harbored a specific intent to kill as an aider and abettor.
We disagree. The jury was instructed: “To prove that the defendant is guilty
of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant
knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or
during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet
the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s
words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the
crime. [¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does
in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime.” The only crime charged here was murder. Under
CALCRIM No. 401, the jury could not have convicted Kessee as an aider and
abettor without finding he knew Jackson intended to kill the victim, and
Kessee intended to aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate that
killing—that is, that Kessee also intended to kill. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1111, 1118 [accomplice shares the specific intent of the perpetrator
when he or she “ ‘ “knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose
and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the
33
perpetrator’s commission of the crime” ’ ”].) The trial court did not err in
using CALCRIM No. 401.
XII. Withdrawal of Kessee’s Plea Deal
Before his third trial, Kessee moved to dismiss the case against him
pursuant to section 1385. Kessee’s counsel explained that after the second
mistrial, the prosecutor presented a plea offer to Kessee, which he accepted.
While they waited for a hearing to submit the plea for the court’s approval,
Jackson was granted a new trial. Thereafter, the prosecutor withdrew the
plea offer and decided to move forward with a third trial.
Kessee challenges the prosecutor’s withdrawal of the plea offer before
proceeding to retry him on the second degree murder charge. In the context
of plea bargains, “ ‘[t]he prevailing doctrine is that “the [prosecution] may
withdraw from a plea bargain agreement at any time prior to, but not after,
the actual entry of the guilty plea by the defendant or other action by him [or
her] constituting detrimental reliance upon the agreement.” ’ ” (People v.
Rhoden (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352.) Kessee acknowledges this rule
but urges this court to “change the standard” by not requiring detrimental
reliance before finding that a plea deal is binding on all parties. We see no
compelling reason to depart from the current standard.
There is no dispute that the prosecutor withdrew the plea offer prior to
court approval. Kessee makes no attempt to demonstrate any detrimental
reliance. Most importantly, despite Kessee urging this court to enforce the
plea deal, he made no such request in the trial court. Therefore, we find the
issue forfeited on appeal.
XIII. Motion for a New Trial
Kessee argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new
trial based on juror misconduct, specifically that one juror improperly relied
on a transcript of the audio in People’s Exhibit No. 79 in rendering her
verdict.
34
a. Relevant Background
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Kessee filed a motion for a new
trial pursuant to section 1181 on the grounds that one of the jurors (Juror No.
6000) engaged in misconduct during deliberations. Following the verdict,
defense counsel spoke with Juror No. 6000 and an alternate juror (Juror No.
6737). During their conversation, Juror No. 6000 stated that she consistently
cast a vote of not guilty during deliberations. However, Juror No. 6000
changed her vote to guilty “after reading the transcripts of the audio
recording [(Exh. No. 79)] of the two defendants in the [jail] cell.” Juror No.
6000 “expressed she found the transcript[] to be incriminating,” but “she
could not understand the audio recording.” Despite knowing the transcript
was not evidence, she relied on it when changing her verdict.
At the hearing, Juror No. 6000 testified that she recalled having a
conversation with Kessee’s counsel and one or two other jurors. She recalled
listening to defendants’ jail conversation during deliberations, but not in its
entirety “because it was very hard to understand.” Juror No. 6000 did not
recall reading a transcript of the conversation, but she did recall listening to
it. Juror No. 6000 testified the jail conversation did not have any effect on
her verdict. Juror No. 6000 did not recall telling Kessee’s counsel that the
transcript of the jail conversation convinced her to change her verdict.
Rather, she testified that the “timeline” of the events changed her verdict to
guilty.
Juror No. 6737 also testified at the hearing. She was an alternate juror
and did not participate in the jury deliberations. Juror No. 6737 recalled
having a conversation with Kessee’s counsel and other jurors, including Juror
No. 6000. According to Juror No. 6737, Juror No. 6000 stated that on the last
day of deliberations, “they played the recording again, and that recording is
what made her change her decision.” Juror No. 6737 did not recall saying
that Juror No. 6000 “changed her mind after reading the transcripts.”
After argument, the trial court concluded “that there was absolutely no
juror misconduct.” The court explained, “Juror 6000 testified openly,
honestly. She testified that contrary to the assertions by the defense[,] . . .
[s]he essentially corroborated the conclusion that the Court draws, that there
was no misconduct.” The court stated that “Juror 6000 did not, as asserted
35
by the defense, solely read the transcripts and rely on the transcripts as
evidence,” and “both of the witnesses [(Juror Nos. 6000 and 6737)]
corroborated each other in that regard.” The court denied Kessee’s motion for
a new trial.
b. Analysis
When reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial based
on juror misconduct, we accept a trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations, including as to whether misconduct occurred, “if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731,
809; People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 194–195 [finding that substantial
evidence supported trial court’s finding that no misconduct occurred].)
The trial court properly denied the motion for a new trial because
Kessee failed to present credible evidence of any juror misconduct. At the
hearing, Juror No. 6000 testified that she did not use the transcript of the jail
conversation during deliberations. While she listened to the audio recording,
Juror No. 6000 testified that the jail conversation ultimately had no effect on
her verdict. Additionally, Juror No. 6000’s testimony was corroborated by
Juror No. 6737, who did not recall telling Kessee’s counsel that Juror No.
6000 “changed her mind after reading the transcripts.” In light of the
testimony, the court found both jurors credible and that there was no truth to
Kessee’s allegation that Juror No. 6000 impermissibly relied on the
transcript of the jail conversation in reaching her verdict. There was nothing
to show that Juror No. 6000 relied on any extrinsic evidence during
deliberations. Because there was no juror misconduct, the trial court
properly denied the motion for a new trial.
XIV. Factual Innocence
Kessee argues that he is factually innocent based on “all the reasons
already detailed throughout [his] [b]rief.” “There are three classes of persons
who may petition the court for a finding of factual innocence. (§ 851.8, subds.
(a), (c), (d) & (e).) ‘Those classes are (1) persons who have been arrested but
no accusatory pleading has yet been filed [subd. (a) ]; (2) persons who have
been arrested and an accusatory pleading has been filed but no conviction
36
has occurred [subds. (c) & (d)]; and (3) persons who are “acquitted of a charge
and it appears to the judge presiding at the trial . . . that the defendant was
factually innocent” [subd. (e)].’ ” (People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
732, 738.) Neither defendant falls under any category articulated in section
851.8. Moreover, defendants failed to file a petition for a factual innocence
finding in the trial court and they cannot raise this issue for the first time on
appeal. (§ 851.8, subds. (c)-(e).)
XV. Verdict Form
Kessee argues that his verdict form failed to specify the degree of
murder. He asserts that the form was confusing and/or misled the jury.
Kessee forfeited this issue by “failing to object to the form of the verdict when
the court proposed to submit it or when the jury returned its finding.”
(People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1259, citing People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 330.)
In any event, we reject Kessee’s contention on the merits. There was
no need to specify the degree of murder on the verdict form because Kessee
was previously acquitted of first degree murder and second degree murder
was the only murder charge Kessee was still facing. The jury was also fully
aware of this fact as the court instructed them, “If you decide [Kessee]
committed murder, it is murder of the second degree.” In closing, the
prosecutor also reminded the jury that Kessee was “charged with murder,
second degree murder.” Kessee fails to articulate how the verdict form as
written could have confused or misled the jury. There were only two possible
verdicts: guilty or not guilty of second degree murder.
Even assuming the verdict form was deficient, there is no prejudice. If
the jury fails to determine the degree of the crime, the defendant will be
deemed guilty of the lesser degree. (§ 1157.) Kessee was already found guilty
of the lesser degree of murder.
XVI. Senate Bill No. 1437
Kessee argues he is entitled to resentencing relief under Senate Bill
No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) because he was convicted of second degree
murder based on an imputed malice theory. We disagree.
37
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 “amend[ed] the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) In addition, Senate Bill 1437 added what is
now section 1172.6, which provided the requirements and applicable
procedure for a person convicted of murder under prior law to retroactively
challenge their convictions. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 775 further amended section
1172.6 “to provide that a person with a qualifying conviction that is not final
may challenge the validity of that conviction on direct appeal based on Senate
Bill 1437's changes to the murder statutes.” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 859, 865–866, italics omitted; § 1172.6, subd. (g).) Under section
1172.6, a defendant may seek relief if a murder conviction was based on a
natural and probable consequences theory, a felony-murder theory predating
Senate Bill 1437, or some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1).)
The record demonstrates that the jury could not have convicted Kessee
of second degree murder on a theory made invalid by Senate Bill 1437. The
jury did not receive instructions on felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45,
52 [“if the record shows that the jury was not instructed on either the natural
and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].) Instead, the jury instructions
required the jury to find Kessee personally harbored express or implied
malice to convict him of murder. (See CALCRIM No. 520.) Moreover, in
closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Kesse “acted with
express malice” because “he unlawfully intended to kill.” The instructions,
coupled with the prosecutor’s closing argument, show that the jury
necessarily found Kessee guilty of murder under a valid theory. We conclude
Kessee is not eligible for relief under Senate Bill 1437 as a matter of law.
38
XVII. Jackson’s Firearm Enhancements
Jackson contends that the trial court, in imposing sentence, failed to
recognize its discretion under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado)
to substitute his firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision
(d) with a lesser included firearm enhancement in subdivisions (b) or (c) of
section 12022.53.
a. Relevant Background
At Jackson’s sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following
facts in aggravation: the manner in which the crime was carried out indicates
a significant amount of planning; Jackson engaged in violent conduct that
indicates a serious danger to society; the crime exhibited a high degree of
viciousness; and the victim was particularly vulnerable.
As discussed above, the court sentenced Jackson to 25 years to life on
count 1, with a consecutive 25 years to life for the gun enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court stayed the gun enhancements
under subdivisions (b) and (c), as well as the gang enhancement. The court
made it “abundantly clear” that it considered dismissing or striking the
firearm allegation under section 1385 but elected not to. Also, the court
“made a conscious decision to run the [firearm] allegation consecutive to the
murder.” The court emphasized that the crime was a “completely senseless
act of violence for no reason whatsoever other than you just thought [the
victim] was from the wrong gang.” The crime was “willful, premeditated and
deliberate.” The court found the imposition of a consecutive term of 25 years
“appropriate.”
b. Analysis
Section 12022.53 requires the court to impose an additional,
consecutive sentence of 10, 20, or 25 years to life for use of a firearm,
discharge of a firearm, or discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury,
respectively. (§ 12022.53, subs. (b)-(d).) Effective January 1, 2018, section
12022.53 was amended to provide the court with discretion to strike or
39
dismiss an enhancement that was otherwise required. (§ 12022.53, subd.
(h).)
Under Tirado, the trial court has discretion to substitute penalties
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), or (d) if the facts required within
the applicable subdivision were alleged and found true. (Tirado, supra, at pp.
696, 702.) The court also has general discretion to impose a sentence for a
charged or uncharged lesser enhancement when the facts supporting the
lesser enhancement have been alleged and found true. (Id. at p. 697.) For
example, a court can strike a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement
and impose the sentence outlined under subdivisions (b) or (c), or it can even
impose the sentence applicable to the enhancements in section 12022.5,
subdivision (a).17 (Tirado, supra, at p. 700.)
This discretion applies retroactively to nonfinal cases (People v. Chavez
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663). Therefore, the court here could have imposed a
significantly shorter sentence for the firearm enhancement had it chosen to
exercise its discretion in that manner. Although the court was aware of its
discretion to strike or dismiss an otherwise-required enhancement, there was
a split of authority regarding the extent of that discretion, which was not
resolved until after the court sentenced Jackson. (See Tirado, supra, at pp.
697-702.)
Assuming the trial court was unaware of its discretion to reduce his
sentencing term, as Jackson claims, remand is unnecessary if “ ‘the record
shows that the trial court clearly indicated when it originally sentenced the
defendant that it would not in any event have [reduced the] enhancement’
even if it had the discretion.” (People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883,
892, quoting People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.) That is
the case here.
The trial court gave three clear indications that it would not reduce the
enhancement term. Specifically, the court (1) found multiple factors in
aggravation and none in mitigation; (2) declined to strike any of the
enhancements despite knowing the consequences of doing so; and (3)
17 Section 12022.5 subdivision (a) provides for sentences of 3, 4, or 10
years for personal use of a firearm in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony.
40
described its basis for doing so in terms that illustrated its belief that a 25-
year-to-life term for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement was
precisely the appropriate term. It is abundantly clear from the court’s
comments that, if specially called upon to rule on a request for reduction of
the enhancement, it would deny such relief. (People v. McVey (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 405, 419 [“In light of the trial court’s express consideration of the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, its pointed comments on the record,
and its deliberate choice of the highest possible term for the firearm
enhancement, . . . remand in these circumstances would serve no purpose but
to squander scarce judicial resources”].)
XVIII. Racial Justice Act
Kessee argues that he suffered discrimination based on his race in
violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Jackson joins in the argument.
Because we are reversing the gang and gang-related firearm enhancements,
and remanding for potential retrial on those enhancements, we need not
reach the merits of the RJA claim in this appeal.
“ ‘The Legislature enacted the [RJA] with the express intent “to
eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure
that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in
sentencing.” ’ ” (Sanchez v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 617, 628.)
The statute prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal
conviction or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence on the basis of race,
ethnicity or national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) And prior to entry of
judgment, the statute provides “ ‘a comprehensive procedure for making and
adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level.’ ” (People v. Howard
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 657; § 745, subd. (c).) Thus, where a judgment is
reversed on appeal for independent reasons, an appellate court need not
address the merits of an RJA claim because the defendant “may on remand
raise his . . . RJA claim to the trial court, should he choose to do so.” (Id. at p.
658.)
Given our conclusion that defendants’ judgment must be reversed, in
part, we believe it is the better course to permit defendants the opportunity
to raise the RJA claim with the trial court in the first instance and develop a
41
full record on the matter instead of addressing the merits for the first time on
appeal.18 We express no opinion as to whether defendants are entitled to
relief under the RJA or what remedy might be appropriate if defendants
ultimately prove any alleged violation.
DISPOSITION
The jury’s findings on the sections 186.22 and 12022.53, subdivision
(e)(1) enhancement allegations are vacated, and the related sentences
thereon are stricken. On remand, the prosecution shall have the option to
retry both defendants on the section 186.22 enhancements and Kessee on the
section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) enhancements. After the status of those
enhancements is resolved (either by no retrial or by retrial and final
resolution), the trial court shall resentence. Defendants may also file a
motion for relief under section 745, should they choose to do so. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MORI, J. TAMZARIAN, J.
18 While a party is permitted to raise an RJA claim for the first time on
appeal for claims based on the trial record (§ 745, subd. (b)), a motion brought
before the trial court potentially provides the parties with a more robust
opportunity to develop a record on the issue with a full evidentiary hearing in
an adversarial context (§ 745, subd. (c)). In fact, the statute specifically
contemplates that even when an RJA claim is raised after entry of judgment,
it may be more advantageous to stay an appeal and remand the issue to the
trial court to consider an RJA motion in the first instance. (§ 745, subd. (b).)
42
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