CourtListener 10847338•People v. Bringas CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 4/23/26 P. v. Bringas CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086917
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. FVI23003204)
DAVID JOHNATHON BRINGAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, John Peter Vander Feer, Judge. Affirmed.
Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted David Johnathon Bringas of forcible rape (Pen. Code,1
§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)); and false
imprisonment (§ 236). The jury also found true two aggravating factors
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)). The trial court sentenced Bringas to an aggregate
prison term of 16 years. Bringas timely appealed.
Bringas asserts the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to advise
the jury that the victim’s capacity to consent was not relevant to the charged
offenses of forcible rape and forcible oral copulation. Alternatively, Bringas
contends the trial court erred by not providing an instruction on legal consent
in response to a jury question. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Prosecution
On August 7, 2022, Z.C. consumed two to four alcoholic drinks at home
before going to a bar with her boyfriend, J.B. At the bar, Z.C. consumed one
or two more drinks and possibly two shots. At closing time, Z.C. and her
boyfriend attempted to call an Uber, but experienced difficulty with the Uber
app. As the couple stood outside the bar, Bringas stopped his car in front of
the bar. J.B. offered Bringas $30 and gas for a ride home. Bringas agreed
and the couple got into the backseat of Bringas’s car. During the drive, J.B.
asked Bringas to pull over because Z.C. was not feeling well and needed to
vomit. Once they were back on the road, Bringas stopped at a gas station so
J.B. could buy him gas. Bringas became upset when J.B. only put two
dollars’ worth of gas in the car and he yelled at J.B. to get out of the car.
Once J.B. was out of the car, Bringas drove away with Z.C. still in the
backseat.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Z.C. repeatedly asked Bringas to stop and go back, but Bringas told her
to “shut the fuck up.” Bringas then slowed down and Z.C. jumped out of the
car. Bringas exited the car, grabbed Z.C., and threw her back into the car.
The next thing Z.C. remembered was “ending up in a room” and “being
on the bed.” Her dress was pulled up and Bringas was on top of her, having
sexual intercourse with her. Z.C. told Bringas to stop multiple times, but
Bringas held her arms above her head and continued. Bringas also put his
hand on Z.C.’s neck and applied pressure. Bringas then turned Z.C. over onto
her stomach and continued raping her. Bringas then grabbed Z.C. by her
hair, threw her onto the ground and inserted his penis into her mouth. When
Z.C. was back on the bed on her back, Bringas inserted his fingers into her
vagina.
Some time later, there was a knock on the door and Bringas told Z.C. to
“shut the fuck up” and that she needed to go. Z.C. put her clothes back on
and ran out the door. Z.C. attempted to flag down motorists, but Bringas
pulled up in his car next to her, grabbed her by the arm, and put her in the
front seat. Bringas told Z.C. he had to get rid of her so she told him her kids
and work would be looking for her. Bringas pulled over, handed her his
phone, and told her to call her employer and tell them her kids were sick.
Z.C. exited the car, called her employer, and told them she was in trouble.
The employer called 911 and J.B. Bringas opened the car door for Z.C. to get
back in the car and as Bringas walked around the car to get into the driver’s
seat, she ran out toward a house. Z.C. knocked on three or four doors before
Bringas drove off. Z.C. flagged down a cyclist and asked him to call her cell
phone number. J.B. answered and the cyclist gave him the address of a
nearby house.
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J.B. picked up Z.C. and took her to the emergency room. Z.C. was
examined by a forensic nurse. Z.C. had soreness on her chest and genital
area, scratches on her breast and arm, bruises and a scratch on her thigh, an
abrasion on her knee, and a scratch and contusion on her cervix.
B. The Defense
Bringas testified in his defense at trial. He said he was drinking at a
bar with his brother. At around 1:30 a.m., Bringas left the bar but returned
shortly thereafter to “possibly pick up a girl.” On his way back to the car, he
saw Z.C. and J.B. sitting on the curb. J.B. approached Bringas and asked for
a ride home. J.B. offered Bringas “a lot of money” and Bringas agreed. J.B.
sat in the front passenger seat and Z.C. sat in the backseat of Bringas’s car.
Z.C. was not feeling well so Bringas pulled over. Z.C. tripped and fell
getting out of the car. When Bringas went over to Z.C. to help her up, she
told Bringas he was handsome. J.B. heard the comment, became angry, and
yanked Z.C. away from Bringas. J.B. threw Z.C. back into the backseat of
Bringas’s car. J.B. agreed to buy gas so Bringas drove to a gas station. While
J.B. was pumping gas, Z.C. told Bringas that she did not want to leave with
J.B. because of the way he was treating her. J.B. returned to the car and
Bringas realized he only pumped three dollars’ worth of gas. Bringas and
J.B. argued over the amount of gas and his treatment of Z.C. Bringas told
J.B. to get out of the car and as he did, Bringas drove away.
Z.C. got into the front passenger seat and talked with Bringas. Z.C.
then asked Bringas, “Do you want to fuck?” Bringas said, “Hell, yeah” and
Z.C. climbed onto Bringas’s lap. When they arrived at Bringas’s house, Z.C.
pushed Bringas against his car, groped him, and said sexual things to him.
Bringas led Z.C. to his bedroom and locked the bedroom door. Z.C. then took
off her clothes and performed oral sex on Bringas. Z.C. then got on the bed
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and Bringas got on top of her and they proceeded to have sexual intercourse.
Five minutes later, Bringas got up, told Z.C. he was hungry, and walked to
the door. Z.C. told Bringas to wait and asked, “Don’t you want me?” Bringas
went to his drawer to look for a condom, but Z.C. told him not to worry
because her tubes were tied. They proceeded to have sexual intercourse a
second time.
Bringas went to the kitchen, spoke to his mom and brother, prepared a
plate of food, and returned to his bedroom. Bringas and Z.C. ate. They
talked for a while about Z.C.’s work, her kids, her ex-husband, and problems
with J.B. They had sexual intercourse a third time. Bringas’s mom banged
on the bedroom door and yelled, “Get that bitch out of my house.” Bringas
told Z.C. they had to leave. Bringas told Z.C. to leave through the front door
of the house while he left through the garage. Bringas told Z.C. to go down
the street and he would meet her there. Bringas saw Z.C. wave a truck away
and heard her say, “No, thank you” before getting into Bringas’s car. Z.C.
asked Bringas for his phone so she could call off work. Z.C. asked Bringas to
drive her home, but they began to argue because Z.C. accused Bringas of
stealing her shoes and cell phone. Z.C. told Bringas to pull over and she got
out of the car. Bringas drove up next to Z.C., confirmed she did not want him
to drive her home, and drove away.
Bringas’s mother testified in his defense at trial. She stated she saw
Bringas warming up food in the kitchen and saw a woman exit the bathroom
and return to Bringas’s room. She stated she later heard a woman laughing,
giggling, and enjoying herself in Bringas’s room. She banged on Bringas’s
door and asked, “David, what are you doing?” She then saw Bringas exit the
house through the garage and get into his vehicle.
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DISCUSSION
Bringas asserts that in responding to a question from the jury about
consent while intoxicated, the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to
instruct the jury that lack of capacity due to intoxication was irrelevant to
the consent elements of forcible rape and forcible oral copulation.
Alternatively, Bringas contends the trial court erred by not responding with
an instruction on legal consent.
A. Additional Background
After a discussion with the parties, the trial court charged the jury with
several instructions, including CALCRIM No. 1000 addressing rape by force.
While the jury was deliberating, it sent the trial court a note which asked,
“What is the law in regards to the victim giving consent while intoxicated?”
In response to the note, the trial court discussed the matter with the parties.
The defense proposed the following instruction: “The prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim was so intoxicated that she
was incapable of understanding and appreciating the nature of the act she
was consenting to. And the defendant was unaware that the alleged victim
was so intoxicated that she was incapable of understanding and appreciating
the nature of the act she was consenting to.” The prosecution objected to the
proposed instruction. The court noted that the proposed instruction was from
CALCRIM No. 1002, rape of an intoxicated woman, and Bringas was not
charged with that offense.
The court explained that consent for the crime of forcible rape is
governed by CALCRIM No. 1000 which states: “To consent, a woman must
act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.” The court further
explained that CALCRIM No. 1002 describes legal consent as: “consent given
6
freely and voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act involved.”
The court thereby observed that the two provisions are “essentially the same”
in their description of “legal consent.” As a result, the court indicated that
the appropriate response to the jury question was to “respond with the
language from [CALCRIM No.] 1000.” The prosecution agreed, explaining
that what the defense proposed did not accurately reflect what the
prosecution had to prove. The defense recognized that CALCRIM No. 1000
offered guidance, but maintained that their proposed instruction would “help
the jury correctly apply the law to the situation.”
The court sent the jury the following response: “To consent, a woman
must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act. See
Instruction [CALCRIM No.] 1000.”
B. Legal Principles
Pursuant to section 1138, if jurors request information on any point of
law arising in the case, the information must be given. (People v. Gonzalez
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212 (Gonzalez), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 690.) Section 1138
imposes a “mandatory” duty to clear up any instructional confusion expressed
by the jury. (Gonzalez, at p. 1212.)
Where “the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the
court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional
explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.”
(People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97 (Beardslee); see also People v.
Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 522; Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1213.) Our
courts have repeatedly approved of responses to jury questions which refer
the jury to the instructions provided by the trial court. (Beardslee, at p. 97;
Davis, at pp. 521–522.)
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We review any error under section 1138 for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 65 (Kopp).)
C. Analysis
To begin, the Attorney General contends that Bringas forfeited his
claim that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that incapacity
to consent due to intoxication was irrelevant to the charged offenses because
Bringas did not request that instruction in the proceedings below. Instead,
Bringas requested that the trial court provide an instruction based on
CALCRIM No. 1002 for rape of an intoxicated woman.
Bringas asserts the claim was properly preserved when his defense
attorney requested a particular instruction and the trial court denied the
request. (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465 [“The defendant
had requested a particular instruction, and the trial court had denied that
request. Nothing further is necessary to preserve the issue for appellate
review.”].) He also contends that the trial court’s response to the jury
question affects his substantial rights under section 1259 and is thereby
reviewable on appeal.
We agree that Bringas’s claim is reviewable on appeal. (See § 1259
[“The appellate court may also review any instruction given, refused or
modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the
substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”]; Kopp, supra,
38 Cal.App.5th at p. 66, fn. 12 [“[section 1259] govern[s] the waiver issue
involving a trial court’s response to a jury question . . . triggering
section 1138”].) Because Bringas’s right to a fair trial would be implicated if
the trial court erred in the manner Bringas alleges, we will address the
merits of his argument. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1007,
8
disapproved on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390,
421, fn. 22.)
Here, the jury inquired about the law on consent while intoxicated. In
response, the trial court provided the jury full and complete instructions by
explaining that “to consent, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and
know the nature of the act” and referring them back to CALCRIM No. 1000.
The trial court considered how best to aid the jury and reasonably concluded
that the defense’s proposed instruction which addressed consent while
intoxicated was not appropriate because Bringas was not charged with rape
of an intoxicated person.
Bringas now asserts that the “correct response” to the jury’s question
was that “lack of capacity due to intoxication is irrelevant to forcible rape and
forcible oral copulation’s lack of consent elements.” Notably, Bringas agrees
that the court’s answer did “not technically misstate the law.” Thus, it is
undisputed that the jury was properly instructed on consent as it related to
the charged offenses. (Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1212 [the court need
not elaborate on the standard instructions].) The court’s instructions were
full and complete, and the court acted within its discretion in directing the
jury back to the relevant instructions. (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th
16, 25–26, [trial court responded to question about conspiracy by directing
jury to reread conspiracy instructions and consider them in the light of all the
other instructions], disapproved on another ground by People v. Nesler (1997)
16 Cal.4th 561, 582, fn. 5.)
Alternatively, Bringas asserts the trial court erred by failing to respond
to the jury question with an instruction on legal consent as defined in
section 261.6. We find no error as the trial court did instruct on legal consent
as defined in section 261.6. (See § 261.6 [“The person must act freely and
9
voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction
involved.”].) In considering Bringas’s proposed response to the jury question,
the trial court explained, “legal consent within [CALCRIM No.] 1002 . . . is
essentially the same as [CALCRIM No.] 1000” before responding with the
language from CALCRIM No. 1000. Both CALCRIM Nos. 1000 and 1002
define legal consent as provided by section 261.6. (See CALCRIM No. 1000
[“To consent, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of
the act.”], CALCRIM No. 1002 [“Legal consent is consent given freely and
voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act involved.”].)
Moreover, Bringas agrees the “court’s answer did not technically misstate the
law.” We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s response and decision
to refer the jurors back to the instructions which defined legal consent as it
related to the charged offenses.
Additionally, we do not find any possible prejudice in the trial court’s
reference to the original jury instructions as opposed to Bringas’s requested
instruction or his proposed explanation on appeal. (See Beardslee, supra,
53 Cal.3d at p. 97 [no prejudice where subject of question covered by
instructions provided].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
DO, J.
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