People v. Russell CA2/7

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Testo completo

Filed 4/23/26 P. v. Russell CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B345716

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA052902)
v.

COREY THEODORE RUSSELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Corey Theodore Russell, in pro. per.; William L. Heyman,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Corey Theodore Russell appeals from a postjudgment order
following a Franklin1 proceeding at which the superior court
accepted a mitigation packet regarding Russell and ordered the
packet forwarded to the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) for a future youth offender parole
hearing. We appointed counsel to represent Russell on appeal.
After reviewing the record counsel for Russell filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 that did
not identify any arguable issues. Russell filed a supplemental
brief arguing he was entitled to resentencing. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Russell’s Conviction of Second Degree Murder
We described the factual background of this case in
Russell’s direct appeal. (See People v. Russell (July 20, 2005,
B172100) [nonpub. opn.].) On September 4, 2002, Samuel Briggs
was having a family birthday party in Los Angeles. Russell, who
was 21 years old at the time, arrived at the party and became
involved in an argument with another partygoer. The two argued
loudly, and after a few minutes Russell announced he was “going
home to get his shit,” which bystanders understood to mean that
Russell was going home to get a weapon. Russell rode away on
his bicycle.
Approximately 10 minutes later Russell returned to the
party. Several party attendees spoke with Russell outside to
ensure that there would be no problems and invited Russell back
into the party. After Russell responded, “Everything [is] cool,”
and the others turned to return to the party, Russell began firing

1 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.

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a gun. A bullet hit Briggs in the back, killing him. Russell fled to
his nearby home, where he hid in the attic until the police
apprehended him.
A jury convicted Russell of second degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 and found true the allegation that he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Russell to
15 years to life for the murder and 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement, for a total sentence of 40 years to life in prison.
This court affirmed the judgment in a 2005 unpublished decision.
(People v. Russell, supra, B172100.)

B. The Superior Court Holds a Franklin Proceeding
Because Russell was 21 years old when he committed the
murder, and given his particular sentence, he is eligible for
release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during his
25th year of incarceration. (See § 3501, subds. (a)(1)(B), (b)(3).)
It appears he will be eligible for such a hearing in 2027.
On December 1, 2023 Russell filed a motion to augment the
record to include mitigating evidence pertaining to youth-related
factors pursuant to section 1203.01 and People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). Franklin authorized postjudgment
evidence preservation proceedings at which prisoners eligible for
youthful offender parole hearings can place on the record
mitigating evidence that “demonstrates the juvenile offender’s
culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the
influence of youth-related factors.” (Franklin, at p. 284; see In re

2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449-450, 452-453 (Cook); People v.
Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 149.)
The superior court appointed counsel for Russell and
conducted a Franklin proceeding on March 26, 2025. At the
Franklin proceeding, the court indicated that “[t]he case is here
for submission of the Franklin package to go to [CDCR] for the
Parole Board’s consideration.”
Defense counsel for Russell indicated that the submitted
packet included “a mitigation brief, a defense brief of my
making. . . . I also attached two expert reports, a forensic social
worker, and a 730 expert. In my brief I . . . included a synopsis
and review and analysis pursuant to interviews and reviews of
voluminous CDCR documents. I had ordered and received,
during this process, all medical, mental health, central file, and I
even managed to [obtain] past juvenile hard copy documents. All
totaled over 30,000 documents. Around 25,000 were the
medical/mental health [documents]. I personally reviewed all
those documents. Within the central file I found the previous
first Franklin brief that had been filed back in Torrance under
Judge Carter. I reviewed that also. I then prepared a summary
of each separate review as to the medical, central file, and
juveniles and . . . sen[t] that summary to the experts with the
exact pages of the most relevant to review – they, of course, can
review additional pages – and that assisted them in their
analysis and review. Their reports are attached to this
mitigation brief and total[] 51 pages.”
The court responded, “I’m not aware [of any] attorney
putting in this much time and effort into a Franklin package, so
job well done. . . . Then that will be submitted to [CDCR]. There
are no further hearings on the Franklin matter.”

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Russell appealed from the submission of the Franklin
packet claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
violation of due process.

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Russell on appeal. After
reviewing the record, appointed counsel did not identify any
arguable issues and so informed us. Counsel requested that we
determine whether this matter is appealable because Russell’s
Franklin motion “was not denied.” Counsel advised Russell on
January 15, 2026 that he was filing a brief stating he was unable
to find any arguable issues and that Russell had a right to file a
supplemental brief. Counsel also sent Russell a copy of the brief
and the record on appeal.
On February 9, 2026 we received a handwritten two-page
supplemental brief from Russell contending the superior court
should have dismissed his sentencing enhancement. As appellate
counsel failed to raise this issue, Russell also argues that he was
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Attached to the
supplemental brief is an 18-page form motion requesting a
Franklin proceeding and the appointment of counsel.3

3 To the extent Russell requests we consider this “new”
Franklin motion for the first time on appeal, we decline to do so.
Such motions must be filed in the superior court in the first
instance. (See Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 452, 458.) In any
event, we note the grounds asserted in the motion are
inapplicable to Russell because they pertain to defendants
sentenced to life without parole. Further, Russell has already

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Russell’s primary contention is that in connection with the
Franklin proceeding he was entitled to a resentencing, and
specifically, that the court should have stricken his 25-years-to-
life enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), based
on retroactive changes to the criminal sentencing statutes.
However, granting and conducting a Franklin proceeding did not
reopen Russell’s final judgment or allow resentencing. (See Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 450-451 [“Neither the entitlement to a
youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation
process ‘disturb[s] the finality of state convictions’ ”]; People v.
White (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238. fn. omitted [“a Franklin
hearing does not reopen a final judgment or sentencing.
[Citation.] Rather, it is an ‘evidence preservation process’ to
gather evidence for the eventual determination of parole”].)
“When a youth offender receives a Franklin hearing, the offender
‘need not be resentenced’ because the sentence remains valid,”
and the superior court does not have jurisdiction to reconsider the
offender’s sentence. (White, at pp. 1238-1239.) Thus, Russell was
not entitled to resentencing.
To the extent Russell’s supplemental brief further argues
that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
because his counsel failed to raise the issues Russell discusses in
his supplemental brief, his appellate counsel’s failure to raise
those issues was not deficient representation and did not

been afforded the relief he seeks: the superior court appointed
counsel for Russell and conducted a Franklin proceeding at which
his counsel submitted voluminous youth-related mitigation
evidence to supplement the record. Russell does not complain
that the submission was inadequate or incomplete or that it was
not transmitted to the CDCR.

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prejudice Russell, because Russell’s contentions in his
supplemental brief lack merit. (See People v. Lucero (2000)
23 Cal.4th 692, 732 [counsel does not render deficient
performance by failing to raise meritless issues].)

DISPOSITION

The order forwarding his Franklin packet to CDCR is
affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

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