People v. Duarte CA5

CourtListener 10847276Calctapp23 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/23/26 P. v. Duarte CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089272
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F19901415)
v.

DANIEL HERNANDEZ DUARTE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly A.
Gaab, Judge.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Daniel Hernandez Duarte pled guilty to committing a lewd or
lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years without admitting a factual basis for
the plea. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court dismissed another count for the same
offense alleged against a second child victim. Defendant now appeals, asserting he did
not agree to pay restitution on the dismissed count because he did not enter a waiver
under People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey), which requires a defendant’s
agreement before any adverse consequences may result “by reason of the facts
underlying, and solely pertaining to, the dismissed count.” (Id. at p. 758.) We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2024, the District Attorney of Fresno County filed a second amended
complaint charging defendant with two counts of a lewd or lascivious act upon a child
under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a); counts 1, 3) as to Jane Doe 1 and
Jane Doe 2, respectively, and one count of indecent exposure (§ 314(1); count 2) as to
Jane Doe 1. The second amended complaint also alleged defendant had suffered a prior
strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), as well as three aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(3), (11) & (b)(2)).
At a hearing the same day, the parties relayed their negotiated plea agreement, and
the trial court indicated it would strike the prior strike conviction and grant probation
contingent on a positive evaluation under section 288.1. Defendant pleaded guilty to
count 1, without admitting a factual basis pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595
(West), and admitted the prior strike conviction and one aggravating factor. The
prosecution moved to dismiss the remaining counts and aggravating factors “with right to
comment, restitution and a Harvey waiver.” (Italics added.) The plea form noted that

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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defendant may have to pay between $300 and $10,000 in restitution but did not
specifically mention restitution on the dismissed counts.
The California Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) submitted a restitution
request for $6,778.74 in a letter dated April 3, 2024. The request recommended ordering
restitution as follows: $5,403.75 for “Mental Health” for “Confidential Victim”; $978.99
for “Residential Security” for “Confidential Victim”; and $396.00 for “Mental Health”
for Jane Doe 1’s mother. The parties agree that the $978.99 for residential security
related to Jane Doe 2. On May 23, 2024, the probation officer submitted a report
recommending restitution in the same amounts and with the same distribution requested
by the CVCB.
On July 22, 2024, defendant successfully moved to withdraw his plea after the
psychologist conducting defendant’s evaluation pursuant to section 288.1 found he was
an “above average risk for sexual recidivism.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.)
On August 21, 2024, defendant again entered a West plea on count 1, admitted the
prior strike conviction and one aggravating factor, and agreed to pay between $300 and
$10,000 in restitution in exchange for a sentence of three years. The prosecutor moved
“[t]o dismiss the remaining counts with right to comment and restitution and a Harvey
waiver.” (Italics added.) The court replied: “[M]y understanding is that you [defendant]
are wanting to stay out of custody until your sentencing. And the People have no
objection to that with a Harvey waiver.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor confirmed this
was the arrangement. The court listed other conditions of release, and defendant
confirmed he understood, had no questions, and agreed to the conditions. Defendant was
released from custody.
On October 25, 2024, the probation officer submitted a follow-up report
continuing to recommend restitution of $6,778.74.
On November 8, 2024, the court intended to proceed with sentencing but stated it
wanted to confirm, “given the restitution that was requested, that [defendant] is clear

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about the Harvey waiver.” (Italics added.) The court addressed defendant: “[A]s part of
your plea agreement, the People required that you pay restitution, not only for the count
that you pled guilty to, but also for the dismissed counts. Do you understand that?”
Defendant responded, “Yes. Not really.” The court gave defense counsel time to speak
with defendant. Defense counsel then told the court he “had a chance to explain that”
and believed defendant understood. Defendant asked if knowledge of the restitution
provided grounds to withdraw his plea. The court believed a valid Harvey waiver had
previously been given, but deferred to the prosecutor, who asserted she was prepared to
proceed with a restitution hearing; the court recessed to review the transcript. Upon
resuming the hearing, defense counsel indicated defendant wanted to relieve him as
defendant’s attorney. The prosecutor argued defendant was engaging in a delay tactic
because he did not request to withdraw his plea and relieve counsel until he was told
“about the restitution amount.” The court stated:

“There is a request for restitution in this case that is pretty
significant. And when I took [defendant’s] plea, two of the counts were
dismissed, and there is restitution being sought on two of those counts. So I
inquired today, this morning, to make sure that he understood that he was
liable for restitution on those two amounts, because I did not specifically
explain that to him when I took his plea. And at that point he indicated that
he wanted to withdraw his plea.”
The trial court permitted defendant to dismiss his attorney, and new counsel was
appointed.
On December 6, 2024, defendant again moved to withdraw his plea, asserting he
was not adequately advised and felt coerced to enter a plea because he believed he would
receive probation. The motion and defendant’s declaration in support focused on
defendant’s purported “unaware[ness] of much of the facts and circumstances of the
allegations and charges” and his surprise when he entered his second guilty plea that the
agreement would require a prison term. The only mention of restitution was in
defendant’s declaration, which read as follows: Prior defense counsel “did not provide

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[defendant] with any copies of the pleadings or charges in this case and [he] did not know
there were two victims in this case until [he] was at the settlement conference and was
told [he] would have to pay for another person’s expenses.”
At a hearing on December 11, 2024, the trial court heard from the parties on
defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea but found no good cause. Turning to sentencing,
the parties agreed there were no required changes or corrections to the probation report,
and defense counsel stated he had given defendant copies of all information he had,
including the probation reports; the court indicated its intent to follow the probation
officer’s recommendation. After hearing from several witnesses and from defendant, the
court asked defense counsel if he had anything else to assert on behalf of his client, and
counsel stated he did not. The court then struck defendant’s prior strike conviction and
sentenced him to three years in state prison. The court ordered defendant to pay
$6,778.74 in restitution to the named victims in the second amended complaint, as per the
CVCB restitution request and probation report. Neither defense counsel nor defendant
raised any objection, despite the prosecutor and court’s comments and despite the minute
orders from the April 3 and August 21, 2024 hearings reflecting that defendant agreed to
a Harvey waiver.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 31, 2025.
FACTUAL SUMMARY2
Defendant exposed his penis to Jane Doe 1 about four times and forced her to
touch it, beginning when she was approximately eight years old. He also exposed his
penis to Jane Doe 2 and touched her inappropriately on several occasions, starting when
she was about five years old.

2 Because this matter was resolved by plea agreement and defendant entered a West plea,
admitting no factual basis for the plea, we draw the factual summary from the probation officer’s
report.

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DISCUSSION
As his sole point on appeal, defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering restitution for Jane Doe 2. Defendant contends he “did not enter a valid
Harvey waiver” (capitalization omitted) on dismissed count 3. Defendant also contends
his argument should not be considered forfeited because he had no meaningful
opportunity to object.
The People argue defendant’s appeal is inoperative because he failed to obtain a
certificate of probable cause. (See § 1237.5, subd. (b) [disallowing appeal from a
judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea unless, among other things, the trial court
“executed and filed a certificate of probable cause” for the appeal].) However, this
presupposes restitution to Jane Doe 2 was included in the plea agreement and not, as
defendant contends, an issue that arose after he entered his plea. (See People v. Maultsby
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 296, 299, fn. 2 [“a defendant who has pleaded guilty … need not …
obtain a certificate of probable cause if the appeal is based on … ‘[g]rounds that arose
after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea’s validity’ ”].) Thus, we must first
resolve the question of whether restitution for Jane Doe 2 was included in the parties’
plea agreement.
The People also contend defendant forfeited the issue by failing to object to
restitution for Jane Doe 2. We resolve the merits of defendant’s core claim to forestall
any future claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Torres (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92.)
For the reasons stated below, we find restitution to Jane Doe 2 was contemplated
as part of defendant’s plea agreement.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a challenge involving a plea bargain, we apply the standards of
review applicable to contracts, generally. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930.)
“ ‘[T]he “interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation

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does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.” ’ ” (In re Ricardo C. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 688, 696.) If, on the other hand, the interpretation of a contract involves
resolution of disputed facts or credibility determinations, we review the trial court’s
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Paredes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 496, 507.)
B. Analysis
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides: “[I]n every case in which a victim has
suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that
the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims ….” Direct victim restitution is
available only for losses resulting from the commission of a crime, from a defendant
convicted of that crime. (Crump v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 222, 248.) However, as one court summarized:

“In [Harvey], our Supreme Court held that facts underlying charges
dismissed as part of a negotiated plea may not, absent contrary agreement
by the defendant (now called a Harvey waiver), be used to impose adverse
sentencing consequences. The principle expanded to cover victim
restitution (e.g., People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 74–75) and
was soon codified. (Stats. 1988, ch. 287, § 1, p. 989, adding Pen. Code,
§ 1192.3, subd. (b) [‘If restitution is imposed which is attributable to a
count dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain, … the court shall obtain a
waiver pursuant to [Harvey] from the defendant as to the dismissed
count.’].)” (People v. Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 678,
fn. omitted.)
As has been long recognized, section 1192.3 “clearly recognizes that restitution ordered
on dismissed counts is valid provided the plea under which payment of restitution is
made a condition was ‘freely and voluntarily made, there is factual basis for the plea, and
the plea and all conditions are approved by the court.’ ” (People v. Beck (1993)
17 Cal.App.4th 209, 216.)
Here, defendant contends he did not enter a valid Harvey waiver on either April 3
or August 21, 2024, as to restitution on dismissed count 3 for Jane Doe 2. He correctly
notes the written plea form contains no discussion of restitution for victims of dismissed

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counts nor any text indicating the court could “consider the facts underlying dismissed
counts” when ordering restitution. (People v. Munoz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.)
We agree it would have been better practice for the written plea agreement to state that
restitution would be ordered for dismissed count 3 and to secure defendant’s written
waiver. But defendant cites no authority stating a particular form of words must be used,
and as the parties note, Harvey does not require a personal waiver by the accused; it
requires an “agreement.” (Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 758.)
Plea agreements are interpreted by courts to “carry out the parties’ reasonable
expectations.” (People v. Knox (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1458.) Relevant to this
determination are “ ‘the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of
such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties
negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the
contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.’ ” (People v. Shelton (2006)
37 Cal.4th 759, 767 (Shelton).) The established test for the validity of waivers attending
guilty pleas is whether the plea is determined to be voluntary and intelligent under the
totality of the circumstances. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 167.)
Here, the record makes clear that under the totality of the circumstances,
restitution on count 3 for Jane Doe 2 was contemplated as part of the plea agreement and
was agreed to by defendant. At the August 21, 2024 hearing, the court confirmed the
core details of the agreement, which included victim restitution between $300 and
$10,000 in exchange for a sentence of three years on count 1 and dismissal of counts 2
and 3. Defendant’s initialed and signed plea form on this date is ambiguous as to whom
the restitution would be paid, so we turn to extrinsic evidence surrounding the plea
agreement. (People v. Paredes, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 507.)
When the prosecutor moved to dismiss the remaining counts—including count 3,
which pertained to defendant’s alleged conduct against Jane Doe 2—she did so “with
right to comment and restitution and a Harvey waiver.” (Italics added.) The August 21,

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2024 hearing was not the first time Harvey was discussed, as the prosecutor made
dismissal of counts 2 and 3 contingent on such a waiver at the first plea hearing on
April 3, 2024. This indicates defendant would have had “an actual and demonstrable
knowledge of the very right being waived.” (Jones v. Brown (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 513,
519.)
After the prosecutor’s requested restitution and a Harvey waiver, the court replied:
“[M]y understanding is that you [defendant] are wanting to stay out of custody until your
sentencing. And the People have no objection to that with a Harvey waiver.” (Italics
added.) The prosecutor confirmed this was the arrangement. Then the court listed other
conditions for defendant to remain out of custody, and defendant confirmed he
understood, had no questions, and agreed to the conditions. Defendant remained out of
custody through his sentencing on December 11, 2024. At no time during the August 21,
2024 hearing, nor in the months after he was on release, did defendant object to
restitution on the dismissed counts, despite the August 21, 2024 hearing minute order
reflecting he entered a Harvey waiver. Though defendant did briefly mention the
restitution issue in December 2024, when he attempted to withdraw his plea before his
sentencing, the court found it was a case of “buyer’s remorse” lacking good cause (a
finding defendant does not challenge here). Thus, the conduct of the parties after
defendant’s change of plea at the August 21, 2024 hearing demonstrates restitution for
Jane Doe 2 was contemplated as part of the plea agreement. (See Shelton, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 767.)
Further, we find defendant reasonably could have wanted to pay restitution on
count 3 in order to resolve the entire case. Doing so prevented his exposure to a second
count of a lewd or lascivious act on Jane Doe 2, a child under the age of 14 years.
Convictions on counts 1 and 3 under section 288 could have resulted in a sentence
upwards of 32 years in state prison. (See §§ 288, subd. (a) [setting potential term of
imprisonment at three, six, or eight years], 667, subd. (e)(1) [doubling the base term with

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one prior strike conviction], 669, subd. (a) [direction for concurrent or consecutive
sentences]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425 [factors affecting concurrent or consecutive
terms]; see, e.g., People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552 [“Only one criterion or
factor in aggravation is necessary to support a consecutive sentence.”].) These
“surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the
contract” counsel a conclusion that restitution for Jane Doe 2 was part of the plea
agreement. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767.)
Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the “reasonable expectations” of
the parties’ included an agreement to allow restitution for Jane Doe 2 and find evidence
of defendant’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver pursuant to Harvey.
(See People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167; People v. Knox, supra,
123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

PEÑA, J.

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