People v. Garibay CA2/1

CourtListener 10846377Calctapp21 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/21/26 P. v. Garibay CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B342882
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA502430)
v. ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND DENYING
JOSE OROZCO GARIBAY, REHEARING; NO
CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on March 25, 2026 be
modified as follows:
1. The paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 13
with “Nevertheless” and ending on page 14 with “ ‘ follow my
instructions’ ” is modified to read as follows:
Nevertheless, we reject Garibay’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because he has failed to show
prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that “the result
would have been different” if his attorney had objected.
(People v. Winn, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) First,
“we presume that the jury relied on the instructions, not
the arguments, in convicting [the] defendant.” (People v.
Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47.) Garibay notes correctly
that this presumption is not conclusive, particularly where
the conflict between the instructions and the prosecutor’s
argument is not obvious. (See, e.g., People v. Centeno
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676-677.) But it remains relevant to
the analysis that the jury instructions correctly stated the
law regarding manslaughter under a heat-of-passion
theory,3 and that the court instructed the jury that “[i]f you
believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict[]
with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.”
2. On page 15, the first full paragraph beginning with “In
addition” and ending with “react out of anger” is modified to read
as follows:
More importantly, the evidence of provocation under
the proper standard was weak. We accordingly fail to see a
reasonable probability that the result would have been
different if Garibay’s attorney had objected during the
prosecutor’s argument. Although Propster grabbed
Garibay on his way into the convenience store, Garibay was
able to free himself and spent several minutes inside the
store, where he appeared unperturbed as he picked out
beer, waited in line, and left. He then walked past Propster
and Widjaja without incident on his way back to the truck.
Furthermore, although Propster was yelling threats,
Garibay and his coworkers outnumbered Propster and
Widjaja, and he never saw a weapon on either of them.
These factors were inconsistent with Garibay’s testimony
that he felt “scared” and “nervous,” and that he “panicked.”
Nor did Garibay claim that either Propster or Widjaja said
anything to outrage him or cause him to react out of anger.

2
There is no change in the judgment. Appellant Garibay’s
petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________
WEINGART, J. ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.

3
Filed 3/25/26 P. v. Garibay CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B342882
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA502430)
v.

JOSE OROZCO GARIBAY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Charles Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
Defendant and appellant Jose Orozco Garibay fatally
stabbed Seanna Widjaja in a fight outside a convenience store in
Los Angeles. A jury convicted him of second degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and the trial court sentenced him to 16
years to life in prison. He challenges his conviction, arguing his
attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
prosecutor’s statements during closing argument that, in
Garibay’s view, misstated the law on the presumption of
innocence and the heat of passion doctrine for voluntary
manslaughter. We find no prejudicial error and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case
Widjaja arrived at the convenience store just before
2:00 a.m. on January 15, 2022. He was accompanied by his
girlfriend, Neysa Robinson, and his best friend, Chrystopher
Propster, who was visiting for the weekend from San Diego.
They had been drinking at home, then went to a couple of
restaurants and bars in Koreatown where they had more drinks.
They planned to buy beer at the convenience store and then go
back to Widjaja’s apartment.
Robinson was not sure how intoxicated Widjaja was when
they arrived at the convenience store, but she described him as
“very . . . mellow.” Propster, on the other hand, was “clearly
drunk” and had been trying to instigate fights with people.
Inside the store, Propster began arguing with three men,
then followed them outside. Widjaja followed after Propster and
tried to defuse the situation, but Propster got into a physical fight

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
with the men despite Widjaja’s efforts to restrain him. The men
got into their car and left, leaving Propster visibly angry in the
parking lot.
Just as the men were leaving, a white truck pulled into the
parking lot, with Josue Alegria driving, Garibay in the passenger
seat, and Damien Dehorney in the rear seat. The three men
worked at a nearby restaurant and had just finished their shift.
Alegria, who was the restaurant’s lead chef, agreed to drive the
others home. According to Alegria, some of the cooks at the
restaurant brought their own knives to work each day.
Surveillance video footage showed Garibay getting out of
the truck and walking toward the store. As he walked past
Propster, Propster lunged at him. Garibay wrestled with
Propster as Widjaja tried to separate the two. Alegria and
Dehorney got out of the car and fought with Propster, and
Widjaja held Garibay from behind trying to restrain him.
Dehorney pulled Widjaja off of Garibay. Alegria told Garibay not
to worry about Propster and Widjaja because “they’re drunk,” and
to go inside and buy beer. While Garibay was inside, Propster
continued to taunt Alegria, as Widjaja tried to restrain him.
Alegria told Propster and Widjaja to leave, and told Propster he
should not be drinking if he could not handle his liquor.
Propster said something like, “shut the fuck up. I’ll fuck
you up.” At that point, Alegria put his fists up and said, “what’s
up then?” Alegria was hoping to scare Propster off. The
surveillance video showed Widjaja trying to get between Propster
and Alegria, when Propster swung at Alegria but missed. Alegria
put his arm up and walked away, telling Propster he was too
drunk. Alegria and Dehorney went back to their truck, where
they waited for Garibay to return with the beer.

3
Garibay was inside the store for about a minute and a half,
first waiting for a clerk to unlock the case containing the beer,
then paying. Just before he left the store, Propster walked in
front of Alegria’s truck, and Alegria and Dehorney got out again.
Garibay walked directly in front of Propster and Widjaja on his
way back to the truck, but he did not interact with them. As
Garibay handed the beer to Dehorney, Alegria went back toward
the front door of his truck, but then Propster gestured at Alegria,
as if to say goodbye, and continued taunting him. Alegria walked
toward Propster, punched him in the face, and then backed away.
The five men faced off, and Garibay held a pocketknife in his
hand as he walked toward Propster and Widjaja.
Alegria told Garibay and Dehorney that they should leave,
and they got back into the truck and prepared to drive away. But
once again Propster started walking toward the truck. Alegria
testified he was worried he might hit Propster with his truck as
he drove away, so he got out and again yelled for Propster and
Widjaja to get out of here. Widjaja was standing behind Propster
with his hand around Propster’s neck, but he let Propster go, and
Propster punched Alegria, knocking his glasses off.
Alegria was focused on Propster and was not paying
attention to Garibay’s interaction with Widjaja. Widjaja had not
been taunting or interacting with Alegria. Alegria punched
Propster, who fell down, and Alegria managed to get Propster in
a headlock. Dehorney came over to help, and he and Alegria
punched and kicked Propster.
As Alegria was getting out of the truck, Garibay opened the
door, but he hesitated, turned back toward the footwell, and
emerged from the truck carrying a seven- or eight-inch kitchen
knife. Widjaja moved toward Garibay, and Garibay brought the

4
knife down in a slashing motion. Widjaja attempted to grab hold
of Garibay, and Garibay stabbed him multiple times. Widjaja
fled inside the convenience store.
Alegria found his glasses on the ground, and he, Dehorney,
and Garibay got back into the truck and drove away. According
to Alegria, Garibay said nothing until Alegria dropped him off at
his house.
Shortly after the stabbing, Robinson went inside the store,
where she saw Widjaja behind the counter. He was struggling to
breathe, and she could see one of his internal organs outside his
body. An employee called 911. Paramedics arrived and took
Widjaja to a hospital, where he died of his wounds.
A medical examiner testified that Widjaja suffered five stab
wounds. The most severe wound was through his abdomen,
which exposed his intestines, struck his liver, and punctured his
vena cava, the largest vein in the body. This wound caused
Widjaja to bleed out. A second wound went to the left side of
Widjaja’s chest. It collapsed Widjaja’s lung and could have been
fatal on its own. The remaining three wounds, on the lower left
side of Widjaja’s flank, on his hip, and on his upper back, were
not fatal.
B. Defense Case
Garibay testified in his own defense. He stated that he
started working as a dishwasher at the restaurant but then
moved on to prep cook. He bought his own utensils, including a
kitchen knife, which he carried in his backpack to and from work
every day. He normally walked home, but on the night of the
stabbing, Alegria asked if he wanted to grab some beers and
offered to drive him home.

5
When they arrived at the convenience store, Alegria gave
Garibay $20 to buy some beer before the store stopped selling
alcohol at 2:00 a.m. As Garibay got out of the truck, Propster ran
up to him, grabbed him, and tried to pull him to the ground.
Widjaja grabbed Garibay’s collar and would not let go. One of the
two told Garibay, “We’re gonna fuck you up.”
Eventually Garibay’s coworkers helped him get free, and
Alegria told him to go inside and get the beer. When he exited
the store, he saw Alegria and Dehorney outside the truck, and
heard Alegria tell Propster and Widjaja to get out of there. He
walked back toward the truck and handed the beer to Dehorney.
As he did so, he heard one of the men say, “Let’s go. We’ll fuck
you up.”
Soon after Garibay handed off the beer, Alegria punched
Propster, and a scuffle ensued. Garibay walked toward them
holding a pocketknife, hoping to scare Propster and Widjaja and
defuse the situation. Garibay told the men to leave them alone.
Propster kept harassing and threatening them, and then Widjaja
partially took off his jacket, which Garibay interpreted as
meaning he wanted to fight. Garibay testified that he felt
“scared” and “nervous,” and that he “panicked.”
Garibay went back into the truck, believing Alegria was
going to drive away. He tossed his pocketknife into the backpack.
Then, Alegria got back out of the truck. Garibay was
“rummaging” through his backpack for the pocketknife, but he
could not find it, so he took out the much larger kitchen knife
instead.
As he got out of the truck, Garibay saw Propster fighting
Alegria, and he became concerned for all of their safety. Widjaja
was standing behind Propster, but then Widjaja started

6
“charging” toward Garibay. Garibay backed up, but Widjaja
grabbed him by his collar, his sweater, and his shirt. Garibay
“panicked” and “just reacted.” He remembered making two
stabbing motions. Widjaja ran away, and Garibay believed he
was okay. Alegria and Dehorney told Garibay to get into the
truck, and they drove away.
On cross-examination, Garibay acknowledged that after he
bought the beer, he walked past Propster and Widjaja without
being attacked. He also admitted that the surveillance video
showed he was still holding the pocketknife when he got back
into the truck just before he emerged with the kitchen knife,
contradicting his testimony that he threw the pocketknife inside
the truck.
DISCUSSION
Garibay contends his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to comments the prosecutor made
during closing argument suggesting that the presumption of
innocence no longer applied to him, and to additional comments
misstating the law on the mental state required for manslaughter
under a heat-of-passion theory. To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, “the defendant must show [both] that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]), and “that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense” (id. at p. 687). “To prove
prejudice, [the defendant] bears the burden to show a reasonable
probability that, but for his trial counsel’s errors, the result
would have been different. [Citation.] A reasonable probability
is one ‘ “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ”
(People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 866.)

7
We reject Garibay’s argument on the presumption of
innocence because the prosecutor did not materially misstate the
law on that subject. We reject his claim on heat-of-passion
manslaughter because he has not demonstrated prejudice.
A. Presumption of Innocence
Garibay contends the prosecutor misstated the law by
suggesting during closing argument the presumption of innocence
no longer applied to him. The prosecutor stated as follows:
“Now, before you heard any evidence in this case, the judge
read to you an instruction that said as the defendant sat here he
was presumed innocent. Now that you’ve heard all the evidence,
though, that has changed.
“You know, I can tell you right now, presume it’s snowing
outside. And then when you go outside on a break, you see that
the sun is shining. I haven’t been outside. I think it’s shining. I
know it’s warm today. You go outside, you feel it’s 80-plus
degrees. You see it’s not snowing. Doesn’t really snow in L.A.
The moment you see what it looks like outside and you feel that
warmth, that presumption I told you about, to presume it’s
snowing, is now contradicted and you don’t have to believe that
presumption. And just as you saw here, all of the evidence, you
heard all of the evidence, that presumption of innocence for the
defendant has now been overturned and it has been contradicted
by all of the evidence. He is now guilty of murder. Of the
charges here.”
It is of course a bedrock principle that “[a]bsent conviction
of a crime, one is presumed innocent.” (Nelson v. Colorado (2017)
581 U.S. 128, 130 [137 S.Ct. 1249, 197 L.Ed.2d 611].) Garibay
cites cases from other jurisdictions holding that a prosecutor
committed misconduct by stating during closing argument that

8
the presumption did not apply. (E.g., State v. Decker (Kan. 2009)
202 P.3d 669, 675-676; Morales v. State (Nev. 2006) 143 P.3d 463,
467.) Cases from other jurisdictions may be informative, but they
are not binding. Further, courts distinguish between genuine
misstatements of the law and mere rhetorical flourishes. In
People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141 (Booker), our Supreme
Court held that a prosecutor’s argument fell in the latter category
and rejected a claim of prosecutor error. We therefore begin by
focusing on Booker.
In Booker, the prosecutor told the jury during closing
argument, “The defendant was presumed innocent until the
contrary was shown. That presumption should have left many
days ago. He doesn’t stay presumed innocent.” (Booker, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 183.) The defense counsel objected, and the court
instructed the jury that “ ‘the presumption of innocence is the
point at which you start the case. At some point you come to the
conclusion the person is guilty, the presumption is gone.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 183-184.) The prosecutor then continued, “ ‘As the [c]ourt
instructed you, I was correct, that the defendant starts out with
the presumption of innocence. That doesn’t stay. That isn’t an
automatic thing forever. That’s why we have a trial. Once the
evidence convinces you he is no longer innocent, that
presumption vanishes.’ ” (Id. at p. 184.)
The court found no error in these comments, describing
them as “rhetorical restatements of the law as reflected in” the
relevant statute and jury instruction. (Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th
at p. 185.) The Supreme Court in Booker relied on People v.
Goldberg (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 170, where “the Court of Appeal
noted, ‘Once an otherwise properly instructed jury is told that the
presumption of innocence obtains until guilt is proven, it is

9
obvious that the jury cannot find the defendant guilty until and
unless they, as the fact-finding body, conclude guilt was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Goldberg, supra, . . . at pp. 189-190
. . . .) We agree. Although we do not condone statements that
appear to shift the burden of proof onto a defendant (as a
defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence until the
contrary is found by the jury), the prosecutor here simply argued
the jury should return a verdict in his favor based on the state of
the evidence presented.” (Booker, supra, at p. 185.)
Garibay attempts to distinguish Booker, arguing that in
that case, the trial court corrected the prosecutor’s misstatement,
and “[t]he prosecutor then adopted the correct view by arguing
that the presumption of innocence vanishes only when the
evidence convinces the jury that the defendant is no longer
innocent.” We do not see a meaningful difference between the
“correct” statement in Booker and the allegedly incorrect view the
prosecutor espoused in this case. In Booker, “[o]nce the evidence
convinces you he is no longer innocent, that presumption
vanishes.” (Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 184.) Here, the
“presumption of innocence for the defendant has now been
overturned and it has been contradicted by all of the evidence.
He is now guilty of murder.”
In addition, the court in Goldberg found no prosecutor error
in a situation similar to this case despite no correction by the
court. In that case, the prosecutor argued, “ ‘And before this trial
started, you were told there is a presumption of innocence, and
that is true, but once the evidence is complete, once you’ve heard
this case, once the case has been proven to you—and that’s the
stage we’re at now—the case has been proved to you beyond any
reasonable doubt. I mean, it’s overwhelming. There is no more

10
presumption of innocence. Defendant Goldberg has been proven
guilty by the evidence. Thank you.’ ” (People v. Goldberg, supra,
161 Cal.App.3d at p. 189.) Garibay argues Goldberg was wrongly
decided, but the Supreme Court cited Goldberg approvingly as
the basis for its reasoning on this point in Booker. (See Booker,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 185.)
The prosecutor’s comments in this case were perhaps
inartful, but their commonsense interpretation was that, in the
prosecutor’s view, the evidence at trial was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of innocence and prove Garibay guilty, not that
the presumption of innocence did not apply at this stage in the
proceedings. In addition, the court instructed the jury correctly
on the presumption of innocence based on the CALCRIM No. 220
pattern instruction.2 “We presume the jury understood and
followed this instruction.” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8
Cal.5th 548, 633.)
Because the prosecutor did not materially misstate the law
regarding the presumption of innocence, Garibay’s attorney did
not render ineffective assistance by failing to object.

2 The instruction read as follows: “The fact that a criminal
charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence that
the charge is true.· You must not be biased against the defendant
just because he has been arrest[ed], charged with a crime, or
brought to trial.
“A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be
innocent.· This presumption requires that the people prove a
defendant·guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.· Whenever I tell you
the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it
beyond a reasonable [doubt].”

11
B. Heat of Passion
“Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder” in
which the defendant kills without malice. (People v. Beltran
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) A jury may convict a defendant of
manslaughter if it finds he acted in a heat of passion, “a mental
state that precludes the formation of malice.” (Ibid.) In Beltran,
the Supreme Court held that for the heat-of-passion doctrine to
apply, the defendant must act in response to a provocation that
“would render an ordinary person of average disposition ‘liable to
act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from
this passion rather than from judgment.’ ” (Id. at p. 957, quoting
People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49.) The court rejected the
notion that “the provocation must be of a kind that would cause
an ordinary person of average disposition to kill.” (Beltran,
supra, at p. 938.) This is because “society expects the average
person not to kill, even when provoked. . . . However, if one does
kill in this state, his punishment is mitigated. Such a killing is
not justified but understandable in light of ‘the frailty of human
nature.’ [Citation.] The killing reaction therefore is the
extraordinary reaction, the unusual exception to the general
expectation that the ordinary person will not kill even when
provoked.” (Id. at p. 949.)
Garibay argues his attorney rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to object to several instances during the prosecutor’s
rebuttal argument when she misstated the law on heat-of-passion
manslaughter. The prosecutor told the jury that “in order to be
guilty of manslaughter in this case, under this heat of passion
sudden quarrel [doctrine], there has to be provocation, and it has
to be sufficient provocation. That’s what the jury instructions
say. It can’t be slight and it can’t be remote. It has to be

12
provocation that would cause an average person to kill somebody,
to take another human being’s life, to justify it. The provocation
here—I argue to you, there was no provocation.· And even if there
was, it simply does not rise to the level where it would justify
killing somebody, especially in this manner.”
Later, the prosecutor noted that at one point in his
testimony, Garibay said that he was “worried,” and remarked,
“[t]hat’s not an intense or violent emotion that would cause you to
kill.”
Still later, the prosecutor asked the jury, “When and where
[in the surveillance video] does [Widjaja] do this provocation that
would rise to the level of justifying a killing? A murder?· I didn’t
see it.” The prosecutor continued, noting that the sufficiency of
provocation “largely hinges on a person of average disposition.
When you’re all deliberating and discussing this, you have to
think for this—for a manslaughter, what would an average
person do in this scenario, under these set of facts?· Would they
kill?· Would an average person be so provoked that they would
pull out a chef’s knife and stab [Widjaja] five times?· In this
scenario. That is what the law says.”
Shortly afterward, the prosecutor invited the jurors to
“[t]hink of an average person you know, and then ask yourself
would so-and-so murder [Widjaja] in . . . this situation if they
were in that situation. That is the standard here.”
We agree with Garibay that the prosecutor misstated the
law in these statements, and we can conceive of no strategic
justification by a defense attorney to allow these statements to go
unchallenged.
Nevertheless, we reject Garibay’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because he has failed to show prejudice, i.e.,

13
a reasonable probability that “the result would have been
different” if his attorney had objected. (People v. Winn, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) First, “we presume that the jury relied on
the instructions, not the arguments, in convicting [the]
defendant.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47.) The
jury instructions correctly stated the law regarding manslaughter
under a heat-of-passion theory,3 and the court also instructed the
jury that “[i]f you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law
conflict[] with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.”

3 The court instructed the jury as follows, based on
CALCRIM No. 570: “A killing that would otherwise be murder is
reduced to . . . voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed
someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.
“The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel
or in the heat of passion if:
“1. The defendant was provoked;
“2. As a result of provocation the defendant acted rashly
and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured
reasoning or judgment; and
“3. The provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act [rashly] and without due deliberation, that is,
from passion rather than from judgment.
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any
specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that
causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection. In
order for heat of passion to reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct
and immediate influence of provocation. While no specific type of
provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not
sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long
period of time.”

14
In addition, the evidence of provocation was sufficiently
weak that it failed to meet the proper test set forth in the jury
instructions. We accordingly fail to see a reasonable probability
that the result would have been different if Garibay’s attorney
had objected during the prosecutor’s argument. Although
Propster grabbed Garibay on his way into the convenience store,
Garibay was able to free himself and spent several minutes
inside the store, where he picked out beer, waited in line, and
left. He then walked past Propster and Widjaja without incident
on his way back to the truck. He testified that he felt “scared”
and “nervous,” and that he “panicked,” but he was safe from any
attack both while inside the store and in the truck. He could
have stayed in either location rather than expose himself to
additional risk. Furthermore, although Propster was yelling
threats, Garibay and his coworkers outnumbered Propster and
Widjaja, and he never saw a weapon on either of them. Nor did
Garibay claim that either Propster or Widjaja said anything to
outrage him or cause him to react out of anger.
Finally, Garibay claimed to have taken out the kitchen
knife only after losing the pocketknife, but the video footage
showed he had the smaller knife in his hand just before he
retrieved the kitchen knife from the truck. Garibay got out of the
truck armed with the chef’s knife when Alegria and Propster
were fighting hand to hand. Garibay started swinging the knife
when Widjaja—who was unarmed and had consistently tried to
restrain Propster and keep things from escalating further—began
moving towards Garibay and the visible large knife he was
carrying. These facts would have made the jury more inclined to
believe he brought out the kitchen knife because of a considered
plan to do violence, and to disbelieve his claims that he was

15
acting as a result of any provocation. Nor did the jury likely
believe Garibay’s claim that he did not know Propster was drunk.
Alegria testified that he knew this immediately, and told
Propster he was drunk several times. Because of this inebriated
condition, Alegria did not perceive Propster or Widjaja as
anything more than an annoyance, and it is unlikely any rational
jury would have believed Garibay’s claims that he was so
frightened that he acted rashly and from passion in stabbing
Widjaja even if defense counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s
misstatements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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