CourtListener 10846272•Evans v. Adderley CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 4/21/26 Evans v. Adderley CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
VICTORIA S. EVANS, as Trustee, etc., D085355
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-
00045558-CU-OR-CTL)
MARY ELIZABETH ADDERLEY, as
Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blaine K. Bowman, Judge. Remanded with directions but affirmed in all
other respects; cross-appeal affirmed.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall and
Megan E. Dawson; Steven L. Victor, Attorney at Law and Steven L. Victor for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Randall Coffee & Humphrey, William D. Coffee and Thuy M. Nguyen,
for Defendant and Appellant.
This neighbor dispute arose through no fault of either party. Mary
Elizabeth Adderley, Trustee of the Mary Elizabeth Adderley Trust Dated
April 26, 2002, and Victoria S. Evans, Trustee, Victoria S. Evans Trust dated
May 19, 2004, own abutting lots. Before either party acquired her lot, the
prior owners of Adderley’s lot expanded the home and built a concrete
masonry wall that unintentionally encroached onto Evans’ lot by 14 feet.
After discovering the encroachment, Evans sued to remove the
encroachments and to regain full use of her property. Instead, the court
created an equitable easement running with the land that allows Adderley to
maintain and keep the existing encroachments, including the wall. It also
determined Evans’ trespass and nuisance claims were time-barred.
On appeal, Evans challenges parts of the equitable easement only. She
argues the equitable easement (1) should not have included the wall,
particularly when Evans proposed a plant wall alternative; (2) should have
been subject to limits on its scope and duration; and (3) was insufficient,
along with the corresponding damages award, to compensate her for the
ongoing burdens of ownership.
Because Evans does not appeal other parts of the equitable easement,
most notably those covering part of Adderley’s home, she necessarily concedes
the elements of an equitable easement were met. As a result, her claims
about the wall are better understood as going to the easement’s scope, and so
we address her arguments in that context. We discern no abuse of discretion
in including the wall as part of the equitable easement, as (1) substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the land beyond the wall is of
limited utility to Evans given a city sewer easement that prohibits building
on most of the encroachment area and (2) Evans did not present evidence to
support her proposed alternative. Even so, we remand for the trial court to
clarify any condition(s) under which the equitable easement will terminate
and to consider any other potential limits to the scope or duration of the
equitable easement it deems appropriate under the circumstances. Because
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we affirm the equitable easement’s inclusion of the wall, the court’s judgment
on the trespass and nuisance claims stands irrespective of the statute of
limitations.
Evans has not persuaded us the $800,000 in damages the court
awarded to compensate her for the equitable easement is inadequate, as she
identifies no or insufficient record evidence of the issues she now raises.
In her cross-appeal, Adderley asks us to (1) create a bright-line rule
setting the date of the complaint as the valuation date for assessing damages
flowing from an equitable easement and (2) reduce the damages awarded to
Evans accordingly. We decline to do so, as a fixed rule would unnecessarily
constrain the trial court’s broad discretion to fashion an equitable remedy
tailored to the circumstances of an individual case.
We therefore remand with directions to the trial court to clarify and
potentially modify the scope and duration of the equitable easement
consistent with this opinion and affirm in all other respects.
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I.
A.
Evans and Adderley own adjacent properties, lots 87 and 86
respectively in the below image.
Decades ago, the two lots were owned by one woman who, when
transferring what would become Adderley’s property, moved the property line
between the two lots to reserve for herself in lot 87 a stretch of land 14-feet
deep and about 155-feet wide that was originally part of lot 86. Ten feet of
that 14-foot stretch of land is subject to a city sewer easement, shown above,
on which building is prohibited.
Much later, in the late 1990s, the prior owners of Adderley’s property
remodeled the home. The remodel included adding a bathroom popout—the
portion of the home on lot 86 in the above image where the arrow indicates
“3.4’ residential structure”—and a concrete masonry wall between lots 86 and
87.
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Although the prior owners hired a contractor and intended everything
to be on their property, the contractor apparently relied on the original lot
line, which resulted in the wall and 3.4 feet of the popout portion of the
residence encroaching onto what would become Evans’ property. The
encroaching popout area also includes part of the primary closet and another
bedroom’s closet. The wall is six feet tall along most of its length, with a
“little cutout” at the west end where the wall stands about four feet tall. The
encroaching area totals 2,168.74 square feet.
B.
Adderley bought lot 86 in 2002, without knowing the popout and wall
encroached onto her neighbor’s property.
Evans inherited lot 87 from her mother in 2003, but she did not reside
there fulltime until around 2019.
In 2016, when conducting a survey for a different project, Evans
discovered the encroachment. When efforts to resolve the matter failed,
Evans filed the underlying lawsuit.
In 2020, Evans sued Adderley for (1) trespass to real property,
(2) recovery of real property, (3) a permanent injunction to remove the
encroachment, (4) quiet title, (5) nuisance, and (6) declaratory relief. She
sought removal of the entire encroachment—the wall, the popout, and the
area in between—and damages for her ongoing loss of use and enjoyment of
her property.
In response, Adderley filed a cross-complaint for (1) equitable
easement, (2) declaratory relief, and (3) adverse possession.
C.
At a bench trial, Evans testified she could extend her home by building
up to the sewer easement if the concrete masonry wall were removed—yet
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she admitted she would “probably not, actually” do so. Adderley testified that
removing the wall would negatively impact her because she “would lose [her]
privacy and [her] security.”
Evidence at trial showed Evans paid property taxes on her lot,
including the 14-foot stretch of the encroachment area, but the tax
assessment would factor in the minimal value of the 10-foot portion of the
encroachment subject to the sewer easement.
Experts on both sides opined about the cost of removing all encroaching
features, which would include the concrete masonry wall and part of
Adderley’s home beyond the popout to account for setback requirements that
preclude building right up against a property line. Adderley’s construction
expert estimated it would cost $1,255,582.96 to demolish the existing
encroachments, replace the bathroom “in a different orientation consistent
with the setbacks,” and repair the landscaping and irrigation. Removing just
the wall would cost about $20,000 plus overhead and the cost of debris
disposal. Evans’ construction expert opined it would cost $130,631.14 to
remove and rebuild the wall and another $196,866.26 to reconstruct the
bathroom popout area. The residential construction estimate was a “box
concept” only, with drywall, a roof, and exterior stucco but without factoring
in any inside finishes.
Experts also weighed in on the value of Evans’ loss of the use of the
encroachment area. Evans’ expert calculated a loss of $991,616 as of
July 2024, the time of trial. Adderley’s expert calculated the loss of use value
as $405,000 as of December 2020, when Evans filed her complaint.
In both her trial brief and during counsel’s opening statement, Evans
expressed her desire to have the entire encroachment removed and the full
scope of her property returned to her. Only in closing argument, after the
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court tentatively informed the parties it was “not inclined to have
Ms. Adderley tear apart that whole bathroom, and the pop-out, and all of the
construction,” did Evans’ counsel propose removing only the wall and
replacing it with some sort of “plant wall” at an unspecified location “between
the two properties, closer to the Adderley residence.” Evans’ counsel
suggested “the fairest way to resolve this dispute” would be to order the wall
removed without replacement and “fashion some sort of equitable easement”
allowing Adderley to “maintain her residential structure.”
D.
The court found against Evans on her claims for trespass and nuisance
after concluding those claims were time-barred.
Judgment was entered against Adderley on her cross-claim for adverse
possession after the court found Evans had been paying taxes on “at least the
4-foot section of the” encroachment area not subject to the sewer easement.
The court granted Adderley “an equitable easement in perpetuity.” It
found Adderley was “absolutely innocent” and “did not act negligently” with
respect to the encroachment. No public rights would be affected by this
equitable easement, as any public rights would be governed by the city’s
sewer easement.
The court found the hardship of demolishing part of Adderley’s home to
remove the encroaching popout and comply with required setbacks, which
would cost “over a million dollars,” represented an “absolutely
disproportionate” hardship compared to “any benefit [Evans] would receive
by discontinuing the encroachment.” The court considered removing and
possibly rebuilding the “substantial” concrete masonry wall but concluded
doing so would place the wall in the middle of the sewer easement, which
could be problematic. And the court did not perceive “a whole lot of utility” in
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the property Evans would regain if only the wall were removed. Thus, in the
end, the court ordered the wall to “remain in place.”
In the court’s view, the “only hardship” Evans would experience from
the continuing encroachment was “financial.” It considered the $405,000
estimate by Adderley’s expert and adjusted it to “around $600,000” to account
for the substantial increase in property values since the complaint’s filing.
The court criticized Evans’ expert’s estimate given the lack of supporting
information and the court’s belief the expert did not consider the “full impact”
of the sewer easement on the value of the encroachment area. “[G]iven all
the equities and the lack of utility of that strip of land, based on the [sewer]
easement, the Court f[ound] that the reasonable compensation for the loss of
value to the Evans property [wa]s $800,000.”
Imposing the equitable easement disposed of the parties’ competing
declaratory relief claims and Evans’ claims for quiet title and a permanent
injunction.
As for Evans’ recovery of real property claim, in its statement of
decision the court “did not make a ruling” on that cause of action because
Evans “retains possession of that real property due to the easement.”
The judgment found against Evans on all of her causes of action and
granted Adderley “an exclusive equitable easement, which shall run with the
land in perpetuity, . . . to maintain and keep in place the existing
encroachments, including a portion of [Adderley’s] residence, an air
conditioning unit, a masonry wall with an iron gate, including all footings for
said wall and gate, landscaping irrigation, plumbing, lighting and at-grade
hardscape improvements, over, across[,] and through” Evans’ property. The
court ordered Adderley to pay Evans $800,000 to compensate for the loss of
use of her land.
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II.
A.
Evans challenges aspects of the equitable easement the trial court
imposed. But we must first emphasize what she does not appeal. Evans does
not appeal the portion of the equitable easement covering the encroaching
part of Adderley’s home.
In other words, Evans concedes an equitable easement was warranted
here, and thus she concedes all three elements required before a court may
impose an equitable easement were satisfied. (See Shoen v. Zacarias (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19 [trial court has discretion to craft equitable easement
if (1) trespass was innocent and not negligent, (2) neither property owner nor
public will be irreparably injured by easement, and (3) hardship to trespasser
from ceasing trespass is greatly disproportionate to hardship to property
owner from continuing encroachment].) Evans’ claim that the court abused
its discretion when it granted an equitable easement as to the wall only is
thus better understood as a challenge to the scope of the equitable easement.
Consequently, we address her arguments about whether the court should
have permitted the wall to remain in the context of the equitable easement’s
scope.
An equitable easement, as the name indicates, is an equitable remedy.
“The object of equity is to do right and justice.” (Hirshfield v.
Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 770 [affirming equitable easement
encompassing, among other things, concrete block wall].) Trial courts are
thus given “‘wide play’” in fashioning equitable remedies, as the “‘very
essence of equity [is] that its powers should be so broad as to be capable of
dealing with novel conditions.’” (Id. at pp. 770-771.)
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An easement “‘gives a nonpossessory and restricted right to a specific
use or activity upon another’s property, which right must be less than the
right of ownership.’” (Romero v. Shih (2024) 15 Cal.5th 680, 692 (Romero II).)
“[E]ffectively exclusive easements are not impermissible as a general matter.”
(Id. at p. 695.) But “[t]hough an easement may be broadly exclusive, it is
nonetheless necessarily limited in scope.” (Ibid.)
We review an equitable easement for abuse of discretion, resolving all
evidentiary conflicts in favor of the judgment. (Hirshfield, 91 Cal.App.4th at
p. 771.) Our task is to decide if the equitable easement “fell within the trial
court’s permissible range of options.” (Ibid.)
1.
Evans contends the trial court should have ordered the wall removed.
She faults the court for rejecting her proposed alternative: to remove the
concrete masonry wall and to replace it with a plant wall somewhere closer to
Adderley’s property line. In our view, on this record, including the wall in the
equitable easement fell within the permissible range of options.
Evans argues removing the wall would cost “no more than $30,000,” far
less than the $800,000 the trial court assessed as damages for the loss of use
of the entire encroachment area. Adderley counters that, even without the
wall, “Evans would still be substantially restricted in her use of any
reclaimed area because of the Sewer Easement.” And Adderley contends the
court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the plant wall alternative given
“Evans submitted no evidence of her last-minute proposal during trial.” As a
result, the record contains “no evidence of how much it would cost to design
and install a plant wall, what it would look like, who would pay for it, or
where it could go.”
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The trial court considered removing just the wall, and we discern no
abuse of discretion in its decision to include the wall in the equitable
easement. The wall could not simply be rebuilt farther back given the sewer
easement. And as Adderley notes, Evans did not provide the trial court with
evidence sufficient for it to compare the feasibility and cost of ordering a
plant wall to be installed instead. As for the cost of removing the wall
compared to Evans’ loss of use of her property, Evans does not quantify how
much of that $800,000 loss of use value she would regain based on the area
between the wall and the unspecified location of the proposed plant wall.
Although Evans criticizes the trial court for considering the sewer
easement and “discount[ing her] loss of exclusive use” of her property, she
has not convinced us doing so constitutes an abuse of discretion. Equity
empowers a court to address “‘novel conditions.’” (Hirshfield, 91 Cal.App.4th
at p. 771.) Here, the court acknowledged the sewer easement “create[d] a
unique twist,” presumably because it limited what could be done on most of
the land in the encroachment area. The court cited the sewer easement as
the reason why rebuilding the wall elsewhere “just doesn’t make sense.”
Indeed, Evans testified that she could expand her home only as far as, but
not beyond, the sewer easement if the wall were removed—and that she had
no actual plans to do so. Substantial evidence thus supports the trial court’s
finding that the land beyond the wall is of limited utility to Evans given the
sewer easement and the corresponding inference that losing access to that
land was not as great a hardship as might exist under other circumstances.
2.
That said, we agree with Evans that the equitable easement could be
more narrowly tailored.
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“An abundance of caution is warranted when imposing an easement on
an unwilling landowner.” (Linthicum v. Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
259, 269.) Thus, “[c]ourts limit the rights of the equitable easement holder
both in duration and scope.” (Romero v. Shih (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 326, 359
(Romero I), reversed and remanded on another ground in Romero II,
15 Cal.5th at p. 705.) “The scope of an equitable easement should not be
greater than is reasonably necessary to protect the use interest of the
purported dominant tenement owner.” (Romero I, at p. 360.)
In Romero I, the court rejected a challenge to the equitable easement’s
scope and duration because it specified the easement “‘should terminate if the
[property] were to cease its continued use of that land for a driveway,
planter[,] and wall/fence.’” (Romero I, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 360, italics
omitted.)
Here, the equitable easement runs with the land in perpetuity “to
maintain and keep in place the existing encroachments,” which are identified
in the judgment. Evans claims “Adderley as a practical matter has been
granted ownership” of the encroachment area because the equitable
easement is “exclusive, perpetual,” and “with no time limit.” She reads the
easement as lacking any “termination triggers tied to cessation of use or to
reconstruction that eliminates any conflict,” among other things. Adderley
disagrees because the equitable easement is limited to maintaining and
keeping in place the existing encroachments and runs with the land so any
new owner would not be forced to “immediately tear down the house.” A
necessary corollary of the “maintain and keep in place” easement is that,
should Adderley or a future owner of her property decide to rebuild a new
home in place of the existing structure, the easement would terminate. Yet
Evans’ appellate arguments to the contrary persuade us the “best solution is
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to remand so that the trial court can clarify” any condition(s) under which the
equitable easement will terminate. (Linthicum, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 269;
see, e.g., Dolske v. Gormley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 513, 521 [“[U]pon the removal of
the present Dolske house any ‘encroachment rights’ terminate.”].)
On remand, we direct the trial court to consider any other potential
limits to the scope or duration of the equitable easement it deems appropriate
under the circumstances. The court may solicit the input of the parties to the
extent it believes doing so may be necessary or helpful.
3.
Evans also contends the $800,000 in damages the court awarded her
“fails to address the ongoing and increasing harms tied to the permanent
encroachment,” making it “legally insufficient and inequitable.” We disagree.
Evans asserts, without any supporting record citation, that she
“remains potentially liable for injuries on the encroached land, pays property
taxes on land she cannot use, and faces a clouded title that impairs future
use and value.” She claims such harms and the loss of use of “the walled
property” are “not fully compensable by a one-time payment.”
Yet Evans does not identify record evidence to support the court either
addressing such issues in the equitable easement or incorporating them into
the corresponding damages award. Although Evans presented evidence and
the court found she paid property taxes on at least some portion of the
encroachment area, as far as we can tell, the record contains no evidence of
what amount of Evans’ property tax was attributable to the encroachment
area. Evans’ counsel mentioned concerns like taxes, insurance, and third-
party liability in closing argument, but counsel’s argument is not evidence.
(Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.) Without such
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evidence, Evans cannot establish an abuse of discretion on this basis. (See
Romero I, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.)
Evans also complains that federal and state income taxes “will consume
a significant percentage of any monetary award.” But because Evans did not
raise this point until her reply brief, the argument is forfeited. (Garcia v.
McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10.)
B.
Evans argues the trial court erred in concluding the wall was a
permanent nuisance or trespass, making those claims time-barred under the
three-year statute of limitations. Adderley contends “the issue of the statute
of limitations is irrelevant given the trial court awarded an equitable
easement to Adderley.” We agree with Adderley, and “we may affirm a trial
court judgment on any basis presented by the record whether or not relied
upon by the trial court.” (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, fn. 1.)
Creating an equitable easement permits a court, in its discretion, to
refuse to eject a trespasser or to enjoin a nuisance. (Romero I, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 355 [trespass]; Linthicum, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 [nuisance].) Evans
concedes a trial court may “deny ejectment” of the subject of a trespass or
nuisance claim if the requirements for establishing an appropriate equitable
easement are satisfied. Because we affirm the equitable easement’s inclusion
of the wall, the court did not err in entering judgment against Evans on that
aspect of her trespass and nuisance claims.
C.
In her cross-appeal, Adderley asks us to fix the date for valuing
damages attributable to an equitable easement as the date the complaint was
14
filed and to reduce the damages awarded to Evans accordingly. We decline to
constrain the trial court’s discretion as requested.
Here, the trial court assessed damages to compensate Evans for the
loss of use of her land subject to the equitable easement based on the value as
of the time of trial.
Adderley offers two reasons for setting the complaint date as the
“proper valuation date.”
First, she contends doing so is “consistent with the general rule
applicable to a quiet title action,” a cause of action that can accompany an
equitable easement. A complaint for quiet title must include the “date as of
which the determination is sought” and explain why the date should be any
“other than the date the complaint is filed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020,
subd. (d).)
Second, Adderley warns that using the trial date for valuation “creates
uncertainty and an opportunity for manipulation of the timing of the trial
date by the parties to try and take advantage of perceived positive or
negative trends in the market.” In support, she points to Ferraro v. Southern
Cal. Gas Co. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 33, a case involving property damage
from an explosion and fire. Ferraro rejected the appellants’ bid to use as the
measure of damages the present fair market value of the buildings had they
not been destroyed because “a rule that invites a plaintiff to use dilatory
tactics in order to take advantage of a rising market would encourage a type
of pretrial game[s]manship inconsistent with our judicial system.” (Id. at
p. 49.)
Neither reason persuades us. While Adderley styles this issue as a
matter of first impression, we find it telling that no court has set a specific
date for valuing an equitable easement. As noted above, the “‘very essence of
15
equity [is] that its powers should be so broad as to be capable of dealing with
novel conditions.’” (Hirshfield, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) We agree with
Evans that “[e]quitable remedies are fact-specific, and a rigid rule fixing the
valuation date would strip the trial court of the discretion the doctrine
requires.” Ferraro similarly explained that “‘there is no fixed, inflexible rule
for determining the measure of damages for injury to, or destruction of,
property.’” (Ferraro, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 49.) Instead, “‘whatever formula is
most appropriate in the particular case will be adopted.’” (Ibid.) So too for
equitable easements. The specter of manipulation Adderley raises is a false
equivalence. Our choice is not whether to set the valuation date at the time
of filing the complaint or the time of trial but rather whether to set a fixed
valuation date at all. And without a fixed valuation date, parties will not be
incentivized to manipulate the timing of trial because the court can assess
damages based on the equities of the individual case at hand.
Notably, Adderley does not suggest or present any evidence that Evans
manipulated the timing of trial to take advantage of market trends. Nor does
she challenge the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s damages
assessment. Because Adderley challenges the damages award based only on
the valuation date and has not shown the court abused its discretion in
selecting value as of trial, we will not disturb it.
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III.
We remand with directions to the trial court to clarify and potentially
modify the scope and duration of the equitable easement consistent with this
opinion. In all other respects, we affirm. The parties shall bear their own
appellate costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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