In re A.G. CA4/1

CourtListener 10845638Calctapp16 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/15/26 In re A.G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & D087317
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. NJ15518B)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather Elaine Tesdahl, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
K.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order placing her
daughter A.G. (Child) with a relative in Michigan without specifying a
minimum number of in-person visits. Mother argues the placement and
visitation order thwarted any possibility of successful reunification and, thus,
constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion. We disagree and affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Referral and Petition Under Section 3001
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the
Agency) received a referral for suspected child abuse after Child and Mother
tested positive for fentanyl and other dangerous drugs in the hospital when
Child was born. As a result of Mother’s drug use, Child suffered withdrawal
symptoms requiring methadone treatment in the Neonatal Intensive Care
Unit.
The Agency was concerned that Mother used substances for the last 15
years, including during pregnancy with her previous daughter, A.A.,
resulting in Mother failing to reunify with A.A. In that case, Mother did not
engage in substance abuse treatment, the juvenile court terminated her
parental rights, and her cousin, G.M., adopted A.A. Here, because of
Mother’s extensive substance abuse history, the Agency worried that Mother
would continue using substances and fail to prioritize Child’s safety and
needs. Although G.M. wanted to care for Child, Mother did not want Child to
live with G.M. but did not have another friend or relative to care for Child.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
unless stated otherwise.

2
As a result, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), alleging a substantial risk existed that Child would suffer serious
physical harm or illness if she remained in Mother’s care. The juvenile court
made a true finding on the petition, placed Child in a foster home, and
ordered the Agency to provide reunification services to Mother. The court
also directed the Agency to evaluate relatives for placement. This included
G.M. Since G.M. lived in Michigan, she needed Interstate Compact on the

Placement of Children (ICPC)2 approval for placement of Child with her.
B. Mother’s Treatment and Visitation
In the first few months of services, Mother completed a detox program
and then started a residential drug treatment program. But she continued to
test positive for substances, and the residential program discharged her for
having drugs delivered to her. Subsequently, Mother was arrested for drug
possession.
Upon Mother’s release from custody, she entered a second residential
drug treatment program. While in the second program, she consistently
tested negative for drugs and visited Child. The visitation supervisor
observed that Mother’s visits were appropriate.
Mother subsequently filed a section 388 petition, requesting an order
for expanded visitation. She also completed her inpatient treatment

2 The ICPC is an agreement, entered into by California and other
jurisdictions, which governs the “sending, bringing, or causing any child to be
sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a
preliminary to a possible adoption . . . .” (Fam. Code, § 7901, subd. (b).) The
ICPC prohibits sending a minor into the receiving state “until the
appropriate public authorities in the receiving state notify the sending
agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear
to be contrary to the interest of the child.” (Id., subd. (d).)

3
program. At the contested section 388 hearing, the juvenile court ordered
that Mother have liberal unsupervised visits with Child.
Over the next two months, Mother continued to consistently visit Child.
The Agency became concerned, however, that Mother lived with a friend who
had both a substance abuse and criminal history. Mother’s communication
with the Agency became sporadic, she failed to drug test consistently, and the
Agency could not confirm Mother’s enrollment in an outpatient substance
abuse treatment program.
C. Six-Month Review Hearing and Relative Placement
When G.M.’s home became an approved relative ICPC placement, the
Agency recommended placement of Child with G.M. in Michigan, along with
sibling A.A. The parties litigated Child’s placement in conjunction with the
six-month contested review hearing.
At the contested hearing, Mother testified that she consistently visited
Child. She also testified about some obstacles she faced moving into sober
living, drug testing, and communicating with the Agency. Mother opposed
Child’s placement in Michigan saying the distance would make it hard to
visit and reunify. The juvenile court ordered continued reunification services
and liberal unsupervised visitation for Mother, but the court placed Child
with G.M. in Michigan.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Relative Placement Order
On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it placed Child with the maternal relative in Michigan because placing
Child out of state was not in Child’s best interest and thwarted reunification.
We disagree.

4
1. Applicable Legal Principles
“We review a juvenile court’s custody placement orders under the abuse
of discretion standard of review; the court is given wide discretion and its
determination will not be disturbed absent a manifest showing of abuse.”
(Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863.) We will not
interfere unless we find that no judge could reasonably have made the same
placement order. (Ibid.)
When a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her
parents, relatives must be assessed and considered favorably before other
potential caregivers are explored. (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1); In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320 (Stephanie M.).) Relative preferential consideration
applies throughout the reunification period. (In re Joseph T. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 787, 790.)
When assessing relatives for placement, the Agency and juvenile court
must consider the eight factors outlined in section 361.3, subdivision (a),
which include, in pertinent part, “(1) The best interest of the child, including
special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs. [¶]
(2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate. [¶]
(3) The provisions of . . . the Family Code regarding relative placement
[including giving full consideration to the proximity of the parents to the
placement so as to facilitate visitation and reunification]. [¶] (4) Placement

of siblings and half siblings in the same home . . . .”3 Of these factors, the

3 The remaining factors include, “(5) The good moral character of the
relative . . . . [¶] (6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the
child and the relative, and the relative’s desire to care for, and to provide
legal permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful. [¶] (7) The
ability of the relative to do the following: [¶] (A) Provide a safe, secure, and
stable environment for the child. [¶] (B) Exercise proper and effective care
5
best interest of the child is primary. (In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
577, 592.)
2. Application of Section 361.3 Factors
Here, G.M. requested placement of Child. Since G.M. is Child’s

maternal second cousin,4 the juvenile court assessed placement of Child with
G.M., applying the relative placement factors described in section 361.3,
subdivision (a). As we explain, Mother has not shown the court abused its
discretion in applying these factors.
Despite Mother’s contention otherwise, the court properly considered
Child’s best interest, which is the first section 361.3 factor. Specifically, the
court noted the factor “cuts both ways.” The court observed there is a benefit

and control of the child. [¶] (C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for
the child. [¶] (D) Protect the child from their parents. [¶] (E) Facilitate
court-ordered reunification efforts with the parents. [¶] (F) Facilitate
visitation with the child's other relatives. [¶] (G) Facilitate implementation
of all elements of the case plan. [¶] (H)(i) Provide legal permanence for the
child if reunification fails. [¶] . . . [¶] (I) Arrange for appropriate and safe
childcare, as necessary. [¶] (8)(A) The safety of the relative’s home.”
(§ 361.3, subd. (a).)

4 In a footnote, Mother argues for the first time on appeal and without
legal authority that second cousins are too distant to be considered a relative
for the purposes of section 361.3. We consider this issue waived or forfeited.
(Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3
[“It is axiomatic that arguments not asserted below are waived and will not
be considered for the first time on appeal.”]; Holden v. City of San Diego
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419 (Holden) [“An appellant cannot bury a
substantive legal argument in a footnote and hope to avoid waiver of that
argument.”]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th
691, 699–700 [“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal
argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court
is unnecessary.”].)

6
to Child of having a relative caregiver and living with a sibling. And, on the
other hand, “there’s a psychological benefit to being close to parents,” to be
able to see a parent even if it is only once or twice a week.
Mother also argues the juvenile court did not properly consider the
third factor, specifically the proximity of the relative placement to Mother
and how that distance may impact visitation and reunification. But the
record demonstrates otherwise.
The juvenile court carefully considered whether “it is likely that,
despite this distance, reunification is still going to be a priority and possible.”
The court recognized that the distance was significant and “a challenge”, but
“that just means we have a lot more work to do . . . of making sure that
there’s a plan for continued contact with [the parents], and that we arrange
for travel to occur to California for [Child].” Further, the court stated the
parties may need to think “outside the box” and recognize that as Mother
“makes progress in her services” and demonstrates sobriety, the court can
order overnight or longer visits in California. These statements indicate that
the court determined reunification would still be possible and a priority.
Mother further argues that placing children far away from their
parents during reunification is an abuse of discretion under In re Luke L.
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670 (Luke L.). We disagree.
The mother in Luke L. suffered from emotional dysfunction and
cognitive limitations, which limited her ability to parent her children.
(Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 675.) Based on observations of the
mother’s visits, the social worker believed the mother could neither
consistently meet basic needs of the minors, protect them from strangers, nor
put into practice what she was learning in services designed to improve her
parenting abilities. (Id. at pp. 675–676.) Whether the mother had a

7
reasonable chance to reunify with her children turned on the amount of
visitation time she was offered because visitation was her opportunity to
practice and demonstrate her ability to apply new parenting skills, protect
her children, and meet her children’s needs. (Id. at pp. 674–676, 678, 681.)
Accordingly, the Luke L. court concluded that placing the children hundreds
of miles away from the mother would lead to such a substantial reduction in
visitation time that the mother would no longer have a reasonable
opportunity to achieve reunification. (Id. at p. 681.)
This case is distinguishable from Luke L. because reunification here is
not as dependent on visitation. Mother here has shown she is capable of
properly parenting and caring for Child during visitation. Mother has
consistently visited Child, and the visitation supervisor observed Mother’s
visits were appropriate, noting Mother played with Child, changed her
diaper, fed her, held and kissed her, and talked with her. At the six-month
review hearing, the Agency recommended, and the court ordered,
unsupervised visitation because Mother showed she was capable of safely
parenting Child when she is sober.
While Mother’s continued visitation is still important to successful
reunification, her success does not turn on the amount of visitation time she
has with Child because her challenge is sustained sobriety and problems
stemming from her drug use. Indeed, Mother can consistently communicate
with the Agency, test negative for drugs, move into a sober living home, and
engage in treatment regardless of visitation. Unlike Luke L., Mother here
can demonstrate she has eliminated the conditions that required juvenile
intervention outside of her visitation with Child. Thus, even if Child’s out-of-
state placement leads to a substantial reduction in visitation time, Mother
will still have a reasonable opportunity to achieve reunification.

8
After going through the section 361.3 factors, the juvenile court
determined that, ultimately, the factors weighed “in favor of placing [Child]
in Michigan with her sister in the home of the maternal cousin.” We conclude
the juvenile court properly applied the correct standard and did not abuse its

discretion in ordering placement of Child with G.M. in Michigan.5
B. Liberal Visitation Order
Mother argues the juvenile court’s visitation order was an abuse of
discretion because it delegates the power to the Agency and/or G.M. to
determine whether visitation will occur at all. We disagree.
“The power to regulate visits between dependent children and their
parents rests with the juvenile court and its visitation orders will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (In re D.P. (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.) “In fashioning a visitation order, the court may
delegate the responsibility of managing the details of visitation—including
time, place, and manner—but not the decision whether visitation will occur.”
(In re Kyle E. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.) “[T]he frequency and
length of visits are simply aspects of the time, place and manner of
visitation.” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376.) A juvenile
court may specify the frequency and length in a visitation order, but

5 On appeal, Mother neither addresses all the section 361.3 factors nor
clearly sets forth an argument that the factors weighed in favor of denying
relative placement with G.M. Thus, we consider that argument waived or
forfeited because it is not supported with proper substantive legal analysis.
(Holden, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 420 [an argument on appeal may be
considered forfeited or waived when it is not supported with proper
substantive legal analysis]). Moreover, in reviewing the juvenile court’s
order, we will not reweigh the evidence, substituting our judgment for that of
the trial court. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)

9
“compelling a juvenile court judicial officer to specify such detail in a
visitation order creates the risk that the order actually may work to the
detriment of the child whom the court must protect, and even to the
disadvantage of the parent or guardian who is making progress toward
eliminating the conditions which required juvenile court intervention.”
(Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court ordered, “mother shall have liberal
unsupervised visitation” and determined “it’s not prudent” for the court to try
to craft a more detailed visitation order. By mandating liberal visitation, the
court exercised its judicial authority in determining that Mother had the
right to visitation and ensured at least some visitation would in fact occur.
The court emphasized that visitation was subject to its continued supervision
and control when it directed the parties to discuss the plan for visitation
given the court’s placement order, and then, “if it becomes a situation where
there are challenges” and there needs to be a more specific visitation order
from this court, “we can always come back” on “an ex parte to actually spell
out a visitation order.”
Thus, we conclude that the court neither improperly delegated its
authority nor otherwise abused its discretion in crafting the visitation order.

10
III. DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the juvenile court’s placement
and visitation order.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

11

Filed 4/15/26 In re A.G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & D087317
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. NJ15518B)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather Elaine Tesdahl, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
K.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order placing her
daughter A.G. (Child) with a relative in Michigan without specifying a
minimum number of in-person visits. Mother argues the placement and
visitation order thwarted any possibility of successful reunification and, thus,
constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion. We disagree and affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Referral and Petition Under Section 3001
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the
Agency) received a referral for suspected child abuse after Child and Mother
tested positive for fentanyl and other dangerous drugs in the hospital when
Child was born. As a result of Mother’s drug use, Child suffered withdrawal
symptoms requiring methadone treatment in the Neonatal Intensive Care
Unit.
The Agency was concerned that Mother used substances for the last 15
years, including during pregnancy with her previous daughter, A.A.,
resulting in Mother failing to reunify with A.A. In that case, Mother did not
engage in substance abuse treatment, the juvenile court terminated her
parental rights, and her cousin, G.M., adopted A.A. Here, because of
Mother’s extensive substance abuse history, the Agency worried that Mother
would continue using substances and fail to prioritize Child’s safety and
needs. Although G.M. wanted to care for Child, Mother did not want Child to
live with G.M. but did not have another friend or relative to care for Child.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
unless stated otherwise.

2
As a result, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), alleging a substantial risk existed that Child would suffer serious
physical harm or illness if she remained in Mother’s care. The juvenile court
made a true finding on the petition, placed Child in a foster home, and
ordered the Agency to provide reunification services to Mother. The court
also directed the Agency to evaluate relatives for placement. This included
G.M. Since G.M. lived in Michigan, she needed Interstate Compact on the

Placement of Children (ICPC)2 approval for placement of Child with her.
B. Mother’s Treatment and Visitation
In the first few months of services, Mother completed a detox program
and then started a residential drug treatment program. But she continued to
test positive for substances, and the residential program discharged her for
having drugs delivered to her. Subsequently, Mother was arrested for drug
possession.
Upon Mother’s release from custody, she entered a second residential
drug treatment program. While in the second program, she consistently
tested negative for drugs and visited Child. The visitation supervisor
observed that Mother’s visits were appropriate.
Mother subsequently filed a section 388 petition, requesting an order
for expanded visitation. She also completed her inpatient treatment

2 The ICPC is an agreement, entered into by California and other
jurisdictions, which governs the “sending, bringing, or causing any child to be
sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a
preliminary to a possible adoption . . . .” (Fam. Code, § 7901, subd. (b).) The
ICPC prohibits sending a minor into the receiving state “until the
appropriate public authorities in the receiving state notify the sending
agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear
to be contrary to the interest of the child.” (Id., subd. (d).)

3
program. At the contested section 388 hearing, the juvenile court ordered
that Mother have liberal unsupervised visits with Child.
Over the next two months, Mother continued to consistently visit Child.
The Agency became concerned, however, that Mother lived with a friend who
had both a substance abuse and criminal history. Mother’s communication
with the Agency became sporadic, she failed to drug test consistently, and the
Agency could not confirm Mother’s enrollment in an outpatient substance
abuse treatment program.
C. Six-Month Review Hearing and Relative Placement
When G.M.’s home became an approved relative ICPC placement, the
Agency recommended placement of Child with G.M. in Michigan, along with
sibling A.A. The parties litigated Child’s placement in conjunction with the
six-month contested review hearing.
At the contested hearing, Mother testified that she consistently visited
Child. She also testified about some obstacles she faced moving into sober
living, drug testing, and communicating with the Agency. Mother opposed
Child’s placement in Michigan saying the distance would make it hard to
visit and reunify. The juvenile court ordered continued reunification services
and liberal unsupervised visitation for Mother, but the court placed Child
with G.M. in Michigan.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Relative Placement Order
On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it placed Child with the maternal relative in Michigan because placing
Child out of state was not in Child’s best interest and thwarted reunification.
We disagree.

4
1. Applicable Legal Principles
“We review a juvenile court’s custody placement orders under the abuse
of discretion standard of review; the court is given wide discretion and its
determination will not be disturbed absent a manifest showing of abuse.”
(Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863.) We will not
interfere unless we find that no judge could reasonably have made the same
placement order. (Ibid.)
When a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her
parents, relatives must be assessed and considered favorably before other
potential caregivers are explored. (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1); In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320 (Stephanie M.).) Relative preferential consideration
applies throughout the reunification period. (In re Joseph T. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 787, 790.)
When assessing relatives for placement, the Agency and juvenile court
must consider the eight factors outlined in section 361.3, subdivision (a),
which include, in pertinent part, “(1) The best interest of the child, including
special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs. [¶]
(2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate. [¶]
(3) The provisions of . . . the Family Code regarding relative placement
[including giving full consideration to the proximity of the parents to the
placement so as to facilitate visitation and reunification]. [¶] (4) Placement

of siblings and half siblings in the same home . . . .”3 Of these factors, the

3 The remaining factors include, “(5) The good moral character of the
relative . . . . [¶] (6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the
child and the relative, and the relative’s desire to care for, and to provide
legal permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful. [¶] (7) The
ability of the relative to do the following: [¶] (A) Provide a safe, secure, and
stable environment for the child. [¶] (B) Exercise proper and effective care
5
best interest of the child is primary. (In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
577, 592.)
2. Application of Section 361.3 Factors
Here, G.M. requested placement of Child. Since G.M. is Child’s

maternal second cousin,4 the juvenile court assessed placement of Child with
G.M., applying the relative placement factors described in section 361.3,
subdivision (a). As we explain, Mother has not shown the court abused its
discretion in applying these factors.
Despite Mother’s contention otherwise, the court properly considered
Child’s best interest, which is the first section 361.3 factor. Specifically, the
court noted the factor “cuts both ways.” The court observed there is a benefit

and control of the child. [¶] (C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for
the child. [¶] (D) Protect the child from their parents. [¶] (E) Facilitate
court-ordered reunification efforts with the parents. [¶] (F) Facilitate
visitation with the child's other relatives. [¶] (G) Facilitate implementation
of all elements of the case plan. [¶] (H)(i) Provide legal permanence for the
child if reunification fails. [¶] . . . [¶] (I) Arrange for appropriate and safe
childcare, as necessary. [¶] (8)(A) The safety of the relative’s home.”
(§ 361.3, subd. (a).)

4 In a footnote, Mother argues for the first time on appeal and without
legal authority that second cousins are too distant to be considered a relative
for the purposes of section 361.3. We consider this issue waived or forfeited.
(Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3
[“It is axiomatic that arguments not asserted below are waived and will not
be considered for the first time on appeal.”]; Holden v. City of San Diego
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419 (Holden) [“An appellant cannot bury a
substantive legal argument in a footnote and hope to avoid waiver of that
argument.”]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th
691, 699–700 [“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal
argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court
is unnecessary.”].)

6
to Child of having a relative caregiver and living with a sibling. And, on the
other hand, “there’s a psychological benefit to being close to parents,” to be
able to see a parent even if it is only once or twice a week.
Mother also argues the juvenile court did not properly consider the
third factor, specifically the proximity of the relative placement to Mother
and how that distance may impact visitation and reunification. But the
record demonstrates otherwise.
The juvenile court carefully considered whether “it is likely that,
despite this distance, reunification is still going to be a priority and possible.”
The court recognized that the distance was significant and “a challenge”, but
“that just means we have a lot more work to do . . . of making sure that
there’s a plan for continued contact with [the parents], and that we arrange
for travel to occur to California for [Child].” Further, the court stated the
parties may need to think “outside the box” and recognize that as Mother
“makes progress in her services” and demonstrates sobriety, the court can
order overnight or longer visits in California. These statements indicate that
the court determined reunification would still be possible and a priority.
Mother further argues that placing children far away from their
parents during reunification is an abuse of discretion under In re Luke L.
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670 (Luke L.). We disagree.
The mother in Luke L. suffered from emotional dysfunction and
cognitive limitations, which limited her ability to parent her children.
(Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 675.) Based on observations of the
mother’s visits, the social worker believed the mother could neither
consistently meet basic needs of the minors, protect them from strangers, nor
put into practice what she was learning in services designed to improve her
parenting abilities. (Id. at pp. 675–676.) Whether the mother had a

7
reasonable chance to reunify with her children turned on the amount of
visitation time she was offered because visitation was her opportunity to
practice and demonstrate her ability to apply new parenting skills, protect
her children, and meet her children’s needs. (Id. at pp. 674–676, 678, 681.)
Accordingly, the Luke L. court concluded that placing the children hundreds
of miles away from the mother would lead to such a substantial reduction in
visitation time that the mother would no longer have a reasonable
opportunity to achieve reunification. (Id. at p. 681.)
This case is distinguishable from Luke L. because reunification here is
not as dependent on visitation. Mother here has shown she is capable of
properly parenting and caring for Child during visitation. Mother has
consistently visited Child, and the visitation supervisor observed Mother’s
visits were appropriate, noting Mother played with Child, changed her
diaper, fed her, held and kissed her, and talked with her. At the six-month
review hearing, the Agency recommended, and the court ordered,
unsupervised visitation because Mother showed she was capable of safely
parenting Child when she is sober.
While Mother’s continued visitation is still important to successful
reunification, her success does not turn on the amount of visitation time she
has with Child because her challenge is sustained sobriety and problems
stemming from her drug use. Indeed, Mother can consistently communicate
with the Agency, test negative for drugs, move into a sober living home, and
engage in treatment regardless of visitation. Unlike Luke L., Mother here
can demonstrate she has eliminated the conditions that required juvenile
intervention outside of her visitation with Child. Thus, even if Child’s out-of-
state placement leads to a substantial reduction in visitation time, Mother
will still have a reasonable opportunity to achieve reunification.

8
After going through the section 361.3 factors, the juvenile court
determined that, ultimately, the factors weighed “in favor of placing [Child]
in Michigan with her sister in the home of the maternal cousin.” We conclude
the juvenile court properly applied the correct standard and did not abuse its

discretion in ordering placement of Child with G.M. in Michigan.5
B. Liberal Visitation Order
Mother argues the juvenile court’s visitation order was an abuse of
discretion because it delegates the power to the Agency and/or G.M. to
determine whether visitation will occur at all. We disagree.
“The power to regulate visits between dependent children and their
parents rests with the juvenile court and its visitation orders will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (In re D.P. (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.) “In fashioning a visitation order, the court may
delegate the responsibility of managing the details of visitation—including
time, place, and manner—but not the decision whether visitation will occur.”
(In re Kyle E. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.) “[T]he frequency and
length of visits are simply aspects of the time, place and manner of
visitation.” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376.) A juvenile
court may specify the frequency and length in a visitation order, but

5 On appeal, Mother neither addresses all the section 361.3 factors nor
clearly sets forth an argument that the factors weighed in favor of denying
relative placement with G.M. Thus, we consider that argument waived or
forfeited because it is not supported with proper substantive legal analysis.
(Holden, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 420 [an argument on appeal may be
considered forfeited or waived when it is not supported with proper
substantive legal analysis]). Moreover, in reviewing the juvenile court’s
order, we will not reweigh the evidence, substituting our judgment for that of
the trial court. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)

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“compelling a juvenile court judicial officer to specify such detail in a
visitation order creates the risk that the order actually may work to the
detriment of the child whom the court must protect, and even to the
disadvantage of the parent or guardian who is making progress toward
eliminating the conditions which required juvenile court intervention.”
(Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court ordered, “mother shall have liberal
unsupervised visitation” and determined “it’s not prudent” for the court to try
to craft a more detailed visitation order. By mandating liberal visitation, the
court exercised its judicial authority in determining that Mother had the
right to visitation and ensured at least some visitation would in fact occur.
The court emphasized that visitation was subject to its continued supervision
and control when it directed the parties to discuss the plan for visitation
given the court’s placement order, and then, “if it becomes a situation where
there are challenges” and there needs to be a more specific visitation order
from this court, “we can always come back” on “an ex parte to actually spell
out a visitation order.”
Thus, we conclude that the court neither improperly delegated its
authority nor otherwise abused its discretion in crafting the visitation order.

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III. DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the juvenile court’s placement
and visitation order.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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