CourtListener 10845609•People v. Castro CA6
Testo completo
Filed 4/17/26 P. v. Castro CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053045
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1906644)
v.
JEREMY JAMES CASTRO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jeremy James Castro appeals the trial court’s order following a
resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Appellate
counsel filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 and People v. Delgadillo (2002) 14 Cal.5th 216, requesting this court to
conduct an independent review of the record. After conducting our
independent review, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties on
the application of People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp) to this matter.
Having received and reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs, we reverse
the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In September 2019, Castro pleaded no contest to one count of
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and admitted an allegation that he
personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). Castro also admitted that he had previously been convicted of a
violent or serious felony (§§ 667.5, subd. (c) & 1192.7, subd. (c)) (strike prior)
and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to a plea
agreement negotiated with the People, Castro agreed to serve a prison term
of 12 years.
On December 20, 2019, the trial court sentenced Castro to a term of 10
years on count 1, a consecutive term of one year on the section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1) enhancement, and a consecutive, one-year term on the prior
prison term enhancement, for a total aggregate sentence of 12 years. The
court awarded 262 days of actual custody credits and 39 days of good
time/work time credits (§ 2933.1) for a total of 301 days. The court awarded
restitution to the victim’s father in the amount of $456,000 and $2,000 to the
California Victim Compensation Board (the latter amount ordered jointly and
severally with a codefendant). The court imposed the following fines and
fees: a restitution fine of $3,600 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(2)), a suspended parole
revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a court security fee of $40 (§ 1465.8), a criminal
conviction assessment of $30 (Gov. Code, § 70373), and a booking fee of
$129.75 to the City of San Jose (Gov. Code, §§ 29550, 29550.1, 29550.2).
There is no indication in the record that Castro appealed from the judgment.
On October 19, 2023, on his own behalf Castro filed in the trial court a
request for “modification and resentencing under [] section[s] 1170.1,
2 The record on appeal does not describe the facts underlying Castro’s
conviction.
2
1172.75, 1170[, subdivision] (d)(2), 1170.1[, subdivision] (d)(3), 1170.22, 1385,
and 1170[ subdivision] (d)(1).”3 (Capitalization omitted.) The court
subsequently issued an order finding that Castro was not entitled to be
resentenced under section 1172.75 prior to December 31, 2023 (see § 1172.75,
subd. (c)(2)). The court denied the motion but appointed counsel “to assist
[Castro] in pursuing relief under Senate Bill [No.] 483.”4
On October 23, 2024, counsel for Castro filed in the trial court a
petition under section 1172.75 to strike a legally invalid enhancement and for
resentencing. Counsel declared that Castro was sentenced on December 20,
2019, his sentence included a now invalid enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), and Castro was eligible for resentencing. In their
resentencing brief filed in the trial court, the People agreed that Castro
3 There is no indication in the record that the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Castro as having a legally invalid
prior prison term enhancement in his sentence, although no party in the trial
court objected to the court’s consideration of Castro’s section 1172.75 claim on
that basis. (See § 1172.75, subd. (b).)
4
As described by our Supreme Court, “In 2019, in an effort to reduce
the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the Legislature passed
Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136), which
amended section 667.5[, subdivision] (b) to eliminate prior-prison-term
enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent offense[s] as
defined in subdivision (b) of [s]ection 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.’ (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) made this change retroactive. It enacted Penal Code section
1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), later renumbered without substantive
change as Penal Code section 1172.75 . . . (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), which
declares: ‘Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as
defined in subdivision (b) of [s]ection 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code is legally invalid.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17
Cal.5th 1050, 1054.)
3
should be resentenced under section 1172.75. The People requested that the
court sentence Castro to 11 years in state prison and cited factors related to
Castro’s criminal history, the nature of the current counts of conviction, and
Castro’s rules violations in prison in support of this request.
On December 20, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on Castro’s
section 1172.75 resentencing request. The court found that Castro was
entitled to be resentenced under section 1172.75 because his 12-year prison
sentence included “one now invalid prison prior.” The court indicated that,
other than the one-year prison prior, it did not “see any interest of justice to
vacate anything that [the court] could vacate.” The court stated that its
“inclination” was to resentence Castro to an aggregate term of 11 years. The
court asked both parties whether they wished to be heard on the indicated
sentence, and both sides declined.
The trial court sentenced Castro on count 1 to a term of five years,
doubled to 10 years pursuant to the strike prior, and imposed a consecutive
one-year term on the section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement. The
court “dismissed” the prison prior. The court awarded Castro’s original
custody credits of 262 actual days and 39 days pursuant to section 2933.1 and
additionally awarded 1,828 days of actual credit. The court directed the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to calculate any post-
December 31, 2023 good time/work time credits.
With respect to fines and fees, the trial court found “based upon the
sentence imposed, and the credits that were just awarded, the court does find
Mr. Castro does not have an ability to pay fines and fees. They are stayed
under the dictates of the Due[ñ]as case.[5] This in no way modifies the
5 People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, overruled by Kopp,
supra, 19 Cal.5th 1.
4
restitution orders previously ordered by the [c]ourt.” The trial court issued
an abstract of judgment for the December 20, 2024 sentencing that indicated
the trial court had stricken the punishment for the section 667.5, subdivision
(b) enhancement but had not fully stricken the enhancement.
Castro appealed from the 2024 judgment. This court appointed counsel
to represent Castro on appeal and granted Castro’s unopposed motion to
deem the notice of appeal timely filed. Castro’s appellate counsel wrote to the
trial court, noting that the 2024 abstract of judgment erroneously indicated
that the trial court had stricken only the punishment associated with the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement and not the enhancement itself.
Counsel requested the trial court prepare an amended abstract of judgment
to reflect the striking of the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. The
trial court subsequently did so.
After Castro’s appellate brief had been filed, the California Supreme
Court issued its decision in Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1. This court requested
supplemental briefing on whether this court should remand this matter to
the trial court to address the fines and fees imposed and stayed at Castro’s
December 20, 2024 sentencing in light of Kopp and the relevance, if any, of
section 1237.2,6 to this question.
6 Section 1237.2 provides, “An appeal may not be taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the
imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or
costs unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the
time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the
defendant first makes a motion for correction in the trial court, which may be
made informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice
of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the imposition or calculation of
fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs upon the defendant's
request for correction. This section only applies in cases where the erroneous
5
In his supplemental brief, Castro contends that the matter should be
remanded to the trial court to address the fines and fees imposed at his
resentencing. Castro asserts that, on remand, the trial court should find an
inability to pay any restitution fund fine over the $300 minimum fine and
should impose that amount for the restitution fund fine and for the parole
revocation fine. Castro additionally argues that the trial court should find an
inability to pay and decline to impose the court operations assessment under
section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) or the court facilities assessment under
Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1). Castro states that
section 1237.2 does not apply because Kopp made a change in the law
regarding the appropriate standards for considering a defendant’s ability to
pay regarding punitive fines and ancillary costs. Castro makes no argument
that imposition of the minimum $300 restitution fine for his conviction for
attempted murder would constitute excessive punishment under the
excessive fines clause. Castro also does not challenge his order to pay victim
restitution.
In his supplemental brief, the Attorney General agrees that the
judgment should be modified and Castro ordered to pay the statutory
minimum restitution and parole revocation fines of $300 and that all other
fees (including the booking fee) should be vacated. The Attorney General
argues that, because the trial court stayed at resentencing the previously
imposed fines and fees based on its finding that appellant did not have the
ability to pay, remand is not required under Kopp. The Attorney General
requests that this court modify the judgment to order the statutory minimum
restitution and parole revocation fines of $300 and to vacate the booking fee.
imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or
costs are the sole issue on appeal.”
6
Finally, the Attorney General asserts that any claim of error in the
imposition or calculation of fines, fees, assessments, or costs is barred under
section 1237.2 because Castro did not first move in the trial court to correct
the error. Moreover, the Attorney General maintains that section 1237.2
does not bar imposition by this court of the statutory minimum restitution
and parole revocation fines because that provision applies solely to appeals
taken by the defendant on the ground of an error in the imposition or
calculation of fines and fees.
II. DISCUSSION
In Kopp, our Supreme Court explained the constitutional framework
for assessing the array of “ ‘court-ordered payments’ ” typically imposed at
criminal sentencings. (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 11.) It stated that a
restitution fine is a “punitive fine” that must be assessed under the excessive
fines clause (but not the due process clause). (Ibid.) (See id. at p. 13 [“A
restitution fine under section 1202.4 constitutes punishment.”]; id. at p. 23
[“[W]e do not find a due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing
before imposing every punitive fine. . . . [W]e clarify that the excessive fines
analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge
punitive fines.”].)
By statute, a sentencing court must impose the minimum restitution
fine ($300 for felonies (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)) unless the court “finds
compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so,” which may not
include an inability to pay. (§ 1202.4, subds. (b) & (c).) A defendant has a
statutory right to challenge any restitution fine assessed above the minimum
amount, including on grounds that they are unable to pay it. (Kopp, supra,
19 Cal.5th at pp. 23–24.)
7
As for “ancillary costs,” which include the mandatory court operations
(§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and court facilities assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373,
subd. (a)(1)), the Kopp court held that these fees should, for indigent
defendants, be assessed under equal protection principles. It decided, “in
light of the Legislature’s provision of fee waivers to indigent civil litigants,
equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a
defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment
under Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) or a court facilities
assessment under Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1).”
(Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 30.) Our Supreme Court confirmed in Kopp
that “[a] victim restitution order is neither a fine nor an ancillary cost.” (Id.
at p. 16.)
Although Castro and the Attorney General differ on whether this
matter must be remanded, they agree on the application of Kopp to Castro’s
fines and fees. They agree that, in light of the trial court’s previous finding
that he is unable to pay any fines or fees, he should be ordered to pay the
minimum restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)) and that a parole
revocation restitution fine in the same amount must be imposed and
suspended (§ 1202.45, subds. (a) & (c)). They also agree that Castro should
not be ordered to pay any ancillary costs because any such order would
violate equal protection principles.
We accept the parties’ application of the principles announced in Kopp
to the facts of this case. We also accept Castro’s request that we remand the
matter to the trial court for it to consider the appropriate fines and fees to
impose given the procedural history of this matter. (See People v. Rivera
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 348–349; People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764,
8
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572,
583, fn. 1.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded to the superior court solely for
further proceedings as to the imposition of fines and ancillary costs. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
9
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________________
Kulkarni, J.*
H053045
People v. Castro
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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