CourtListener 10842914•Piazzi v. Laffey CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 4/14/26 Piazzi v. Laffey CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
DIANE E. PIAZZI B342738
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BP157757)
v.
GERALD J. LAFFEY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel Juárez, Judge. Affirmed.
Nelle S. Paegel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Keith S. Walker and Law Offices of Keith S. Walker, for
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant Diane Piazzi was the primary beneficiary of a
trust initially settled in 1991 by her late mother, Evelyn Piazzi.
Diane1 petitioned to invalidate several amendments Evelyn made
to the trust between 2002 and 2007, alleging Evelyn lacked
capacity to amend the trust and was unduly influenced by
respondent Gerald Laffey and other relatives. The probate court
denied the operative fourth amended petition (FAP) after trial,
and we affirmed in Piazzi v. Laffey (May 10, 2023, B305695)
[nonpub. opn.] (Piazzi).
Gerald then filed a petition to terminate the trust, alleging
the FAP violated the no contest clause contained in the 2002
trust amendment. After briefing and a hearing, the probate court
granted the petition to terminate. It found that the FAP was a
direct contest of a protected instrument, and Diane lacked
probable cause when she filed it.
Diane disputes these findings on appeal. She further
argues that the probate court was prejudiced against her, and its
denial of her FAP “requires a re-examination.” We reject her
contentions and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Trust and Trust Amendments
As we summarized in Piazzi, supra, “Due to disabilities,
Diane receives means-tested public benefits. In June 1991,
Diane’s mother Evelyn created the Revocable Living Trust of
Evelyn C. Piazzi. Through special needs trust provisions, the
trust expressed Evelyn’s intent that after her death, the trust
estate would be used to supplement Diane’s means-tested
benefits without disqualifying her from continuing to receive
1 We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity and
in accordance with their convention.
2
them. In March 1999, Evelyn executed a first amendment to the
trust, which deleted the special needs trust provisions and
provided for the estate to be distributed directly to Diane after
Evelyn’s death.”
“In November 2002, Evelyn executed the second trust
amendment, the heart of the parties’ dispute. In lieu of
a direct distribution to Diane, the amendment reinstated
provisions to supplement and safeguard Diane’s receipt of
public benefits after Evelyn’s death. It gave the successor
trustee discretion to terminate the trust if the trust’s existence
or any related change in law would otherwise disqualify
Diane from receiving any public benefits. The amendment
designated respondent Gerald and his mother (Evelyn’s
nephew and sister, respectively) as successor trustees.” (Piazzi,
supra.)
Like the original trust and first amendment thereto, the
second trust amendment included a no contest clause. It stated:
“If any beneficiary under this instrument, singularly or in
combination with any other person or persons, directly or
indirectly contests this instrument, any amendment to this
instrument, or the will of the settlor in whole or in part, or
opposes, objects to, or seeks to invalidate any of the provisions of
this instrument or the will of the settlor, or the validity of any
contract, agreement (including trust agreement), declaration of
trust, beneficiary designation, or other document executed by the
settlor or executed by another for the benefit of the settlor that is
part of the settlor’s integrated estate plan, or seeks to succeed to
any part of the estate of the settlor other than in the manner
specified in this instrument or in the will of the settlor, then the
right of that person to take any interest given to him or her by
3
this instrument or any amendment to this instrument shall be
void, and any gift or other interest in the trust property to which
the beneficiary would otherwise have been entitled shall pass as
if he or she had predeceased the settlor without issue. Settlor
specifically exempts petitions under California Probate Code
Sections 850 et seq. from the effect of this clause.”
“Between June 2004 and September 2007, Evelyn executed
three further trust amendments, adding one of Gerald’s sisters
(Evelyn’s niece) as a third successor trustee,” after Gerald and his
mother. (Piazzi, supra.) These amendments also modified the
trust provision governing distribution of assets after Diane’s
death. They otherwise “confirm[ed] and ratifie[d] the terms of
the trust as stated” in the second trust amendment, but did not
expressly refer to the no contest clause.
II. Diane’s Petition to Invalidate the Trust Amendments
“Evelyn died in September 2014. In November 2014, Diane
petitioned the probate court to invalidate the 2002 amendment
and each subsequent amendment (collectively, the Trust
Amendments). In May 2016, Diane filed her operative fourth
amended petition, naming Gerald, his mother, and two of his
sisters as defendants.” (Piazzi, supra.)
The FAP is not included in the appellate record before this
court. However, it is undisputed that “In Diane’s first cause of
action, she sought declaratory relief to invalidate the Trust
Amendments on the grounds that: (1) the Trust Amendments
were inconsistent with Evelyn’s intent to provide for Diane after
her death; (2) Evelyn lacked capacity to execute the Trust
Amendments at the time she signed them; and (3) the Trust
Amendments were the product of undue influence asserted on
Evelyn by Gerald and his relatives.” (Piazzi, supra.)
4
The FAP proceeded to trial in July 2019. During her
opening statement, Diane’s counsel summarized the evidence and
asserted that the Trust Amendments “need to be invalidated.”
Diane then presented her case-in-chief, introducing testimonial
and documentary evidence through a number of witnesses,
including herself and Gerald. “At the end of Diane’s case-in-chief,
Gerald’s counsel moved for judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 631.8.” (Piazzi, supra.) The trial court granted
the motion on the ground that Diane failed to satisfy her burden
of proof on all her claims. It found, “There was no evidence that
Settlor did not intend to amend the Trust as she did in 2002,
2004, 2006, or 2007. What evidence there was supported the fact
that Settlor intended to make all the amendments to the Trust
that were at issue in this proceeding. There was no evidence that
Settlor did not have the capacity to amend the Trust. . . . There
was no evidence that anyone unduly influenced Settlor to amend
the Trust. . . . Petitioner’s case-in-chief failed to establish any of
her claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” The trial court
denied Diane’s October 2019 motion for reconsideration, and on
February 11, 2020 “issued a final order granting Gerald’s motion
for judgment and denying Diane’s fourth amended petition.”
(Piazzi, supra.)
Diane appealed. We affirmed in Piazzi. We concluded that
“as to all three of Diane’s bases for challenging the Trust
Amendments—lack of capacity, undue influence, and intent—
substantial evidence supports the probate court’s findings that
Diane did not prove her claims.” (Piazzi, supra.) The Supreme
Court denied review. (See S280556.)
5
III. Gerald’s Petition to Terminate
In November 2019, Gerald filed a petition to terminate the
trust due to violation of the no contest clause. Gerald argued
that Diane’s FAP was a contest within the meaning of Probate
Code section 21310, subdivision (c),2 because it sought to
invalidate the second trust amendment. He further argued that
the second trust amendment was a “protected instrument” as
defined by section 21310, subdivision (e)(1), and Diane contested
it without “probable cause,” defined in section 21311, subdivision
(b) as a reasonable belief that there was a reasonable likelihood
her requested relief would be granted after an opportunity for
further investigation or discovery. Gerald asserted that Diane
lacked probable cause both when she filed the initial petition and
when she filed the operative FAP. He contended that “Diane’s
utter inability to establish even a prima facie case when her
contest finally went to trial in its fifth year, [demonstrated] that
she knew of no facts that would cause a reasonable person to
believe in the likelihood of her eventually prevailing at trial. She
certainly did not allege any such facts in any of the five iterations
of her petition, the first four having failed to withstand [Gerald’s]
demurrers.”
After the appeal in Piazzi was resolved and proceedings
below resumed, the court ordered simultaneous briefing on
Gerald’s petition. The initial briefs were filed on May 3, 2024. In
Gerald’s brief, he reiterated his contention that Diane’s FAP was
a direct contest of the second trust amendment because it alleged
the instrument was signed under incapacity and undue influence.
He further asserted that the FAP was filed “nearly eighteen
2 All further undesignated section references are to the
Probate Code.
6
months after Piazzi’s initial petition, giving her more than
enough time to investigate the facts and to conduct discovery” for
purposes of establishing probable cause. He contended that her
“allegations, and the evidence she adduced at trial, demonstrate
that she had no reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the issues
of lack of capacity and undue influence.”
In Diane’s opposition, she argued that the no contest clause
in the second trust amendment was “void” because the three
subsequent amendments did not incorporate it. She further
argued that she had probable cause when she filed the initial
petition in 2014 and “[e]ach and every iteration” thereafter,
Gerald had the burden to prove otherwise, and he could not rely
on the result of the 2019 trial to do so. Diane also asserted that
public policy disfavors enforcement of no contest clauses, and
characterized her petition as an effort to ensure the proper
interpretation of Evelyn’s estate plan.
The parties filed simultaneous response briefs on May 31,
2024. Gerald argued that the FAP was the first to make “an
express allegation” of undue influence and incapacity sufficient to
survive demurrer. He nevertheless contended that Diane “never
had a reasonable belief that she would be likely to prevail on any
of the grounds.” Gerald asserted that evidence at trial showed
that Diane “lived her entire life with her mother, whose financial
adviser testified to [Evelyn’s] ability to understand financial
matters years after the last challenged amendments had been
executed. She never considered seeking the appointment of a
conservator for her mother. Her claim that her mother lacked
testamentary capacity as early as 2002 was utterly without
merit, and any reasonable person would have understood that.
Similarly, her claims that her mother was somehow unduly
7
influenced by relatives in a distant state to make each of the four
challenged documents was also nonsense, especially in light of
Piazzi’s testimony that she accompanied her mother when she
went to discuss her trust with her attorney.”
Diane styled her May 31, 2024 brief as objections to
Gerald’s initial brief. She contended that Gerald and his counsel
committed “material misconduct” and “fraud” by misstating facts
and the law in the May 3 brief. She claimed the brief
“fraudulently twists, omits, jumbles statutory language in an
attempt to deceive the Court into becoming non-compliant with
public policy.” Diane further contended that the trial court’s
statement of decision after trial on her petition was “silent” as to
the “validity” of the second trust amendment; that Gerald “must
disprove Diane’s allegations, facts, discovery, testimonies
(including his own), and evidence Diane has laboriously
presented to the Court since 2014” to show she lacked probable
cause; and that “none of her assertions and/or claims have been
refuted by a reasonable person.” Diane claimed she had probable
cause “because she is a reasonable person, asserted disinheriting
facts in good faith and added many more later.”
Gerald filed a reply brief on June 21, 2024. He declined to
“comment on the ad hominem attack,” and disputed Diane’s
substantive contentions. He also reiterated his arguments,
including those regarding the lack of probable cause. In Diane’s
final brief, which disparaged Gerald’s briefing as a “screed of
opinions that are inaccurate to say the least,” she maintained
that her petition was not a contest and that the no contest clause
was inapplicable. Diane also argued that probable cause is
subject to a lower standard than preponderance of the evidence,
and the evidence she presented at trial “proved that she had a
8
reasonable likelihood of success had it been viewed from the
standpoint of a ‘reasonable person.’” She asserted that as long as
her counsel reasonably believed her position was correct, the no
contest clause could not be enforced against her.
After hearing argument on July 17, 2024, the probate court
issued a written ruling granting Gerald’s petition on September
3, 2024. The court found that Diane’s FAP was a “direct contest”
within the meaning of section 21310, subdivision (b) because it
alleged the Trust Amendments were invalid due to incapacity
and undue influence, and the challenged second trust
amendment was a “protected instrument” because it contained an
unambiguous no contest clause.
As to probable cause, the court cited the definition in
section 21311, subdivision (b) and observed that Diane “is correct
in arguing that probable cause is distinct from ultimate success”
of a petition at trial. The court agreed with Gerald, however,
that the key inquiry was not whether Diane “had subjective
beliefs about the settlor’s intention to maximize her beneficial
interest in the trust,” but whether she had a “reasonable belief
that the settlor lacked capacity at the time the instruments were
executed,” or “a reasonable belief that the execution of the trust
was improper.” The court found that Diane was “unable to
explain what facts would have supported a reasonable belief that
the settlor lacked capacity or that the execution of the trust was
improper at the time the fourth amended petition was filed. The
evidence is wholly lacking. As such, the court finds [Diane]
lacked probable cause to file the fourth amended petition.” It
accordingly granted the petition and overruled “the objections
thereto.”
9
Diane subsequently filed a peremptory challenge to the
probate court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6,
which the court denied as untimely. She also filed objections to
the court’s ruling, asserting the court made “numerous
statements that are wholly inapposite to the prevailing rules of
law, both statutory and precedential common law.”
On October 10, 2024, the probate court filed an order
terminating the trust and directing distribution of the trust
assets to remainder beneficiaries. Diane timely filed a notice of
appeal on November 25, 2024.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of Appeal
Throughout her briefing, Diane criticizes the probate
court’s ruling denying the FAP, asserting that it “omits” certain
information, “includes many wrong conclusions,” and “requires a
re-examination . . . within the parameters of this Appeal.” These
assertions are not well-taken. Diane’s FAP has been fully and
finally adjudicated. This appeal concerns only Gerald’s petition
to terminate the trust. We will not revisit any rulings we made
in Piazzi, supra. Nor will we address the contentions raised for
the first time on appeal that Gerald should forfeit both his
trusteeship and his interest in the trust. (See Newton v. Clemons
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.)
II. No Contest Clause
Diane contends the probate court erred in concluding that
her FAP violated the no contest clause in the second trust
amendment. She argues that neither her initial petition nor the
FAP was a “direct contest,” that the second trust amendment is
not a “protected instrument,” and that the probate court applied
10
incorrect legal standards to conclude that she acted without
“probable cause.” We disagree.
A. Governing Principles
A “no contest clause in a trust instrument ‘essentially acts
as a disinheritance device, i.e., if a beneficiary contests or seeks
to impair or invalidate the trust instrument or its provisions, the
beneficiary will be disinherited and thus may not take the gift or
devise provided under the instrument.’” (Donkin v. Donkin
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 412, 422 (Donkin).) No contest clauses “have
long been held valid in California” because they “promote the
public policies of honoring the intent of the donor and
discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are
frustrated by the donative scheme of the instrument.” (Ibid.)
However, because they may negatively affect countervailing
public policies “of avoiding forfeitures and promoting full access
of the courts to all relevant information concerning the validity
and effect of a will, trust, or other instrument,” no contest clauses
are strictly construed. (Ibid.) The current statutory framework
applicable to no contest clauses in instruments that became
irrevocable on or after January 1, 2001 limits “enforceability of
the no contest clause to (1) direct contests brought without
probable cause; (2) challenges to the transferor’s ownership of
property at the time of the transfer, if expressly included in the
no contest clause; and (3) creditor’s claims and actions based on
them, if expressly included in the no contest clause.” (Id. at p.
426, citing §§ 21311, subd. (a)(1)-(3), 21315.) The first scenario
described is the relevant one here.
The Probate Code defines a “contest” as “a pleading filed
with the court by a beneficiary that would result in a penalty
under a no contest clause, if the no contest clause is enforced.”
11
(§ 21310, subd. (a).) A “direct contest” is “a contest that alleges
the invalidity of a protected instrument or one or more of its
terms” based on enumerated grounds including forgery, undue
influence, and lack of capacity. (§ 21310, subd. (b).) A “protected
instrument” is one that “contains the no contest clause” or “is in
existence on the date that the instrument containing the no
contest clause is executed and is expressly identified in the no
contest clause, either individually or as part of an identifiable
class of instruments, as being governed by the no contest clause.”
(§ 21310, subd. (e).) As noted above, “probable cause exists if, at
the time of filing of a contest, the facts known to the contestant
would cause a reasonable person to believe there is a reasonable
likelihood that the requested relief will be granted after an
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (§ 21311,
subd. (b).)
The party seeking enforcement of a no contest clause bears
the burden of proof that it is applicable. (See Key v. Tyler (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 505, 529-531 (Key II).) “In the absence of
disputed facts, we review a court’s application of a no contest
clause de novo.” (Meiri v. Shamtoubi (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 606,
614; see also Key v. Tyler (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 365, 373 (Key
III) [“interpretation of a trust instrument is an issue of law
unless there is a conflict in extrinsic evidence”].) We presume the
probate court’s order was correct; as the appellant, Diane bears
the burden of demonstrating reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
B. The Second Trust Amendment is a Protected
Instrument
Diane contends that there can be no violation of the no
contest clause here because the Trust Amendments are not
12
protected instruments. She acknowledges that the second trust
amendment contains a no contest clause, but argues that it is
void and unenforceable because the subsequent trust
amendments made between 2004 and 2007 do not include or refer
to it. We disagree.
An instrument that contains a no contest clause is a
protected instrument. (§ 21310, subd. (a).) The second trust
amendment unambiguously contains a no contest clause and
therefore is a protected instrument. Diane contends that it
“literally evaporates as a result of its being followed by three
more amendments, each of which fails to refer to a no-contest
clause.” The primary authority on which she relies, Aviles v.
Swearingen (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 485 (Aviles) does not support
this proposition. In Aviles, petitioner Aviles was the trust
settlor’s boyfriend. The second amended version of the trust
provided that Aviles would receive the settlor’s real property and
the remaining trust assets would be divided among her family
and godchildren. The second amended trust also included a no
contest clause. The third amended trust, which the settlor
executed at the behest of her caregiver without the advice of
counsel, named the caregiver the sole remainder beneficiary and
successor trustee. It “incorporated by reference the unchanged
provisions of the second amendment,” but did not specifically
refer to the no contest clause. (Aviles, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 488-489.)
After the settlor died, Aviles filed a petition to invalidate
the third amended trust on the ground that it was the product of
undue influence and financial abuse. (Aviles, supra, 16
Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) The caregiver opposed the petition and
“filed a counterpetition to disinherit Aviles alleging that he
13
violated the no contest clause in the second amendment by
challenging the Third Amendment.” (Ibid.) The probate court
ruled that the challenged third amendment was not a protected
instrument because it did not contain a no contest clause or
“expressly reference” the no contest clause in the second
amendment. (Id. at p. 490.) The caregiver appealed, and the
appellate court affirmed. It found that the third amendment did
not contain its own no contest clause, and held that it could not
incorporate the no contest clause from the second amendment
without specifically mentioning it. (Id. at p. 491.) The appellate
court explained that no contest clauses are strictly construed, and
cannot apply to “future trust amendments . . . unless the
amendment specifically refers to the no contest clause.” (Ibid.)
The court observed that without an explicit reference, it could not
conclude that the settlor “unequivocally expressed her intent to
apply the no contest clause to petitions contesting trust
amendments that are the product of fraud or undue influence.”
(Id. at p. 492.)
Aviles stands for the proposition that a trust amendment
cannot incorporate a no contest clause from a previous
instrument through general incorporation language; it must
expressly do so. Aviles does not stand for the proposition that a
no contest clause in the previous version of the trust “evaporates”
or becomes void; it holds that future amendments do not
automatically incorporate it. Aviles accordingly is relevant only to
the extent that it precludes the later amendments in this case,
those executed between 2004 and 2007, from being protected
instruments. Gerald concedes those instruments are not
protected instruments in any event. Nothing in Aviles
14
undermines the validity of the no contest clause contained in the
second trust amendment. It is a protected instrument.
C. The FAP is a Direct Contest of a Protected
Instrument
Diane contends that the initial petition she filed in
November 2014 is the relevant petition here and was not a direct
contest. She alternatively contends that the FAP likewise was a
petition to reform the second trust amendment and therefore also
was not a direct contest. We conclude that the FAP is the
pertinent petition, and the probate court correctly concluded the
FAP was a direct contest.
Gerald’s petition to terminate alleged that the FAP violated
the no contest clause in the second trust amendment. Gerald
never sought to apply the no contest clause to Diane’s initial
petition, which was superseded by several intermediate petitions.
The FAP was the operative petition that went to trial. There is
no basis from which to conclude Diane’s initial, long-inoperative
petition is the relevant one for purposes of these proceedings.
The FAP, in both form and substance, plainly meets the
definition of “direct contest”: it alleges the second trust
amendment is invalid on several of the bases listed in section
21310, subdivision (b). The caption of the FAP requests a “court
declaration to invalidate 2002 Amendment and Restatement of
Trust and 2004, 2006, and 2007 Amendments Thereto based
upon: intent, incapacity and undue influence. . . .” During trial,
Diane’s counsel asserted that the Trust Amendments “need to be
invalidated,” and called witnesses who testified about the
creation and alleged forgery of the second trust amendment. (See
Piazzi, supra.) In the previous appeal, Diane argued that she
demonstrated that Evelyn lacked capacity and was unduly
15
influenced. (See Piazzi, supra.) The only rational conclusion on
this record is that the FAP sought to invalidate the protected
second trust amendment on grounds listed in section 21310,
subdivision (b) and therefore is a direct contest within the
meaning of that statute.
Diane nevertheless contends that the FAP was a petition to
reform the trust to comport with Evelyn’s intent. She attempts to
analogize the case to Packard v. Packard (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
1284 (Packard), but Packard is distinguishable. In Packard, the
settlor created a trust dividing his estate equally between his two
sons, Greg and Scott, upon his death. (Packard, supra, 108
Cal.App.5th at p. 1288.) The settlor subsequently amended the
trust to state that Greg would receive the settlor’s residence,
while Scott would receive a monetary sum equal to the value of
the residence. (Ibid.) Two years later, the settlor amended the
trust by handwriting the word “one-half,” altering the relevant
provision to suggest that Scott would receive a sum equal to only
one-half the value of the residence. (Id. at p. 1289.) After the
settlor died, Scott filed a petition “asking the probate court to
construe and reform the first amendment so that it accurately
reflected what he alleged to be [the settlor’s] intent, namely, “to
ensure that Greg and Scott received equal distributions from the
trust.” (Ibid.) Greg opposed the petition, arguing that it was a
contest that was not timely filed. (Ibid.) The probate court
agreed with Greg, but the appellate court reversed. It concluded
that Scott’s petition “is one for reformation of the trust to conform
to the trustor’s true intent, and he may prove it through use of
extrinsic evidence.” (Id. at p. 1294.) The court explained, “Scott
does not seek to nullify his father’s trust. He does not question
the validity of the amendment by contending, for example, that
16
[the settlor] did not have the capacity to make the amendment
and it was therefore void. [Citation.] Rather, he argues that [the
settlor] always intended his assets to be divided equally between
his two children, and the handwritten ‘one-half’ interlineation
reflects his mistaken belief that he was accomplishing his goal.”
(Id. at p. 1293.)
Here, as discussed above, Diane’s FAP specifically did what
Packard’s did not: it questioned the validity of the second trust
amendment by contending Evelyn did not have the capacity to
amend the trust and was unduly influenced to do so. These are
the hallmarks of a direct contest, not a request to reform the
document. Packard is not applicable.
D. Diane Lacked Probable Cause
The probate court found there were no facts demonstrating
a reasonable belief on Diane’s part that Evelyn lacked capacity or
was unduly influenced in 2002, when she executed the second
trust amendment. Diane contends the probate court erroneously
placed the burden of proof on her, applied the wrong legal
standard, and disregarded her evidence of Evelyn’s intent. We
find no error.
Diane argues that the probate court improperly relied on
the fact that it entered judgment against her on the FAP to
conclude that she lacked probable cause when she filed the FAP.
The probate court recognized, however, that Diane “is correct in
arguing that probable cause is distinct from ultimate success.”
As explained in Key II, “[t]he legal standard for invalidating an
instrument based upon undue influence and the standard for
finding a lack of probable cause to believe the instrument was
[in]valid are different.” (Key II, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 539.)
“[E]very case litigated to a conclusion has a losing party, but that
17
does not mean the losing position was not arguably meritorious
when it was pled” and “does not establish that the suit was
brought without probable cause.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 743.) A claim that is tenable
when filed may nevertheless fail “for reasons having to do with
the sufficiency of the evidence actually adduced as the litigation
unfolds.” (Id. at pp. 742-743.) For these reasons, a defendant
who prevails at trial does not automatically establish that the
suit was brought without probable cause. (Id. p. 743.)
This does not mean, as Diane suggests, that the evidence
adduced during trial and the probate court’s findings after trial
are irrelevant. “The definition of probable cause in section 21311,
subdivision (b) requires a court to consider what a ‘reasonable
person’ would believe based upon the ‘facts known to the
contestant’ at the time of filing a contest.” (Key II, supra, 34
Cal.App.5th at p. 536.) Evidence bearing on this inquiry may be
adduced at trial, and the probate court may make express
findings on issues actually litigated that support its decision.
(See ibid.) Unlike the probate court in Key II, the probate court
here was “asked to decide the issue of probable cause” and
properly drew “inferences specifically related to that issue.” (Id.
at p. 539.)
The probate court found that Diane failed to introduce any
evidence at trial that Evelyn “did not intend to amend the Trust
as she did in 2002, 2004, 2006, or 2007. What evidence there was
supported the fact that Settlor intended to make all amendments
to the Trust that were at issue in this proceeding. There was no
evidence that Settlor did not have the capacity to amend the
Trust.” The court cited testimony from both Evelyn’s attorney
who drafted the trust documents and her financial advisor that
18
Evelyn had capacity and understood her actions. The court found
no evidence, even from Diane’s testimony, that Evelyn was
unduly influenced.3 The forensic document examiner who
testified that various pages of the trust had been copied multiple
times “could not say what substantive text portions, if any, of the
Trust had been altered in any way that modified the substance of
the Trust.” The probate court found Diane’s evidence so
insufficient that it granted Gerald’s request for judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The probate court relied
on this “wholly lacking” evidence to conclude Diane lacked
probable cause when she filed the FAP.
Diane argues that we “should conclude that her evidence
presented at trial clearly shows that she had probable cause in
2014 [sic], at the time of filing [her initial petition].” She
contends her evidence shows that Evelyn intended to provide for
her in the trust, and “Gerald’s termination petition fails to
contradict Diane’s evidence of Evelyn’s intent.”4
The problem is that Evelyn’s intent to provide for Diane
was not what Diane needed to prove at trial. Diane alleged in her
FAP that the second trust amendment was invalid because
Evelyn lacked capacity and/or was unduly influenced. To have
probable cause when she filed the FAP, Diane had to have a
3 Diane testified at trial that she was “always present” at all
of Evelyn’s appointments, including when Evelyn met with her
attorney. The attorney corroborated this testimony and
specifically testified that Diane was present at the 2002 meeting
at which the second trust amendment was prepared.
4 She also asserts that her evidence was “neither disputed
nor impeached,” because Gerald moved for judgment under Code
of Civil Procedure section 631.8 rather than presenting a case-in-
chief.
19
reasonable belief that there was a reasonable likelihood the court
would invalidate the second trust amendment for one of those
reasons. (See § 21311, subd. (b).) None of the evidence adduced
at trial and summarized in the briefing here lends support to that
conclusion. Even if we credit Diane’s claims that Gerald and
other relatives took advantage of Evelyn on her deathbed in 2014,
which are not properly supported by citation to the record, that
does not give rise to an inference that Diane reasonably believed
they did so 12 years earlier, when Evelyn executed the second
trust amendment in Diane’s presence.
On the record in this case, no reasonable person could have
believed, at any point, that Evelyn lacked capacity or was unduly
influenced in 2002. Indeed, as the probate court observed, Diane
“is unable to explain what facts would have supported a
reasonable belief that the settlor lacked capacity or that the
execution of the trust was improper at the time the fourth
amended petition was filed.” While Gerald had the burden of
proof below, Diane bears the burden of showing error here. She
has not done so.
III. Alleged Judicial Bias
Diane contends the probate court was biased or prejudiced
against her. She contends the court evinced “extreme personal
prejudice” against her by dismissing or disregarding the evidence
of Evelyn’s intent that she presented at the FAP trial and
“misplac[ing] the burden of proof . . . on Diane’s shoulders.” In
her exhaustive recitation of the evidence presented during the
FAP trial, she characterizes various evidentiary rulings,
remarks, and other occurrences as “proof of judicial prejudice
against Diane” or “for Respondent” and his counsel. She further
asserts “there must be a personal reason” that the court
20
overruled her demurrer and denied her motion to strike Gerald’s
petition to terminate, because “[o]therwise, the probate court
would surely have followed basic procedure and applied law.”
Diane also suggests that the court “used Gerald’s termination
petition as a means by which to eliminate eight other petitions
from its docket that are mooted” by its ruling, and “[d]efiantly”
(italics in original) “chose to repeat” an error for which it was
previously reversed in a different case.5
“‘Bias or prejudice consists of a “mental attitude or
disposition of the judge towards [or against] a party to the
litigation. . . .’”” (Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 724, alterations in original.)
“When reviewing a charge of bias, ‘ . . . the litigants’ necessarily
partisan views should not provide the applicable frame of
reference. [Citations.]’” (Ibid.) “Potential bias must be clearly
established.” (Ibid.) We presume the honesty and integrity of
the trial court. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 364.)
When a party challenges judicial bias only at the conclusion
of the proceedings, the “only avenue for their bias argument is
the due process clause, which sets an exceptionally high
standard.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
570, 589.) “Mere expressions of opinion, based on observation of
witnesses and evidence, do not demonstrate judicial bias,” nor do
“continuous rulings against a party.” (Ibid.) This court’s role is
5 That previous case was Key v. Tyler. (See Key II, supra, 34
Cal.App.5th 505; Key III, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 365.) The
probate court that presided over the instant case only presided
over Key III, and as of that ruling had “not yet considered
whether the facts show that Tyler lacked probable cause.” (Key
III, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 381.)
21
limited to determining whether the trial court’s behavior was so
prejudicial that it denied an appellant a fair trial. (People v.
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.) “It is ‘extraordinary’ for an
appellate court to find judicial bias amounting to a due process
violation.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at
p. 589.)
That high standard is not satisfied in this case. Nothing in
the record supports Diane’s claims of judicial bias. We previously
found no error in the probate court’s ruling on Diane’s FAP, and
we currently find no error in its ruling on Gerald’s petition to
terminate. Even if we had, “the leap from erroneous rulings to
the appearance of bias is one we decline to make.” (Blakemore v.
Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 60.) “The mere fact
that the trial court issued rulings adverse to [Diane] on several
matters in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings
were erroneous, does not indicate an appearance of bias, much
less demonstrate actual bias.” (Brown v. American Bicycle
Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674; see also Garcia v.
Estate of Norton (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 413, 423 [“Errors of law
standing alone do not constitute bias or prejudice for purposes of
disqualification of a trial judge.”].)
IV. Civility
“Having resolved the merits of the appeal, we cannot allow
the tone of the briefing to pass without comment.” (WasteXperts,
Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 652,
666.) Diane’s appellate briefing is replete with unsupported
allegations impugning Gerald, including claims that he and his
relatives “invaded” and looted Diane and Evelyn’s home while
Evelyn “lay dying,” sought to “throw Diane into the streets,”
forged his mother’s signature to install himself as trustee, and
22
allegedly told the probate court that Diane did not “deserve[ ] to
live where she lives,” or “deserve[ ] to live,” period. As alluded to
infra, Diane’s briefing below took a similar tone.
Ad hominem attacks on the opposing party or opposing
counsel have no place in appellate briefing. (See Pierotti v.
Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 32-33 [“[A]n opening brief is not
an appropriate vehicle for an attorney to ‘vent his spleen’. . . .”].)
“Ad hominem attacks and other invective detract from counsel’s
legal arguments, signal inappropriate personal embroilment in
the dispute, and indicate an inability to engage in the reasoned
analysis the courts need and counsel’s clients deserve. When
counsel resort to name-calling and to unsupported claims of
misconduct, they risk obscuring any meritorious arguments they
may have.” (WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arkaelian Enterprises, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) They also impose “a real cost to the
opposing party and the state” (Pierotti v. Torian, supra, 81
Cal.App.4th at pp. 32-33), as both opposing counsel and the court
must “spend additional resources filtering out the hyperbole.”
(WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arkaelian Enterprises, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) Counsel can zealously dispute the facts of
a case or the merits of a ruling without resorting to
unprofessional vitriol, and would be well-advised to do so in the
future.
23
DISPOSITION
The order terminating the trust and distributing the real
property contained therein is affirmed. Gerald is awarded his
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
24
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