CourtListener 10842897•In re E.V. CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 4/14/26 In re E.V. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re E.V., a Person Coming Under B345053
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01585B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.V.,
Minor and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court
Referee. Affirmed.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Minor and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Minor Elijah V. is an Indian child within the meaning of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. §. 1901,
et seq.) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA;
see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224, et seq.).1 Elijah appeals from the
juvenile court’s order of legal guardianship as his permanent
plan. Elijah’s parents do not appeal. Elijah does not contend a
different permanent plan would be more appropriate in his case,
and instead he argues the court erred when it failed to require
testimony from a qualified expert witness (QEW) at the
permanency planning hearing before ordering guardianship as
his permanent plan. The tribe at issue in this case essentially
waived any requirement that QEW testimony be presented at
such a hearing, and it agreed with the Department’s
recommendation that the paternal grandparents serve as Elijah’s
legal guardians. Accordingly, we affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Dependency Proceedings
Marci C. and Joe V. have two children, Elijah and his older
brother Anthony V.2 On September 20, 2022, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a petition pursuant to subdivisions (a), (b),
and (j) of section 300. The petition alleged Marci and Joe
engaged in domestic violence in Anthony’s presence and while
Marci was pregnant with Elijah; Joe shot the maternal aunt in
the foot when the maternal aunt stabbed him in the neck in
Anthony’s presence; Elijah tested positive for marijuana and
alcohol at birth; and Marci had a history of substance abuse and
was a current abuser of marijuana and alcohol. The petition also
alleged Anthony was a current dependent of the juvenile court
due to the parents’ domestic violence and each parent failed to
protect Elijah from the other.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations of substance
abuse against Marci under subdivision (b) of section 300 and the
allegations of domestic abuse against Joe as well as the failure to
protect allegations against Marci under subdivision (j) of
section 300. It ordered Elijah placed with the paternal
grandparents, who also had custody of Anthony. The juvenile
court terminated family reunification services on September 6,
2023, after the parents failed to comply with their case plans.
Elijah remained with the paternal grandparents throughout the
dependency proceedings and the Department reported he and
2 For ease of reference, we refer to the parties by their first
names with no disrespect intended.
3
Anthony were thriving in their home. After reunification services
were terminated, the Department recommended legal
guardianship as the permanent plan for Elijah. The paternal
grandparents had also become legal guardians to Anthony. The
court ordered Kin-GAP guardianship for Elijah and terminated
jurisdiction on February 19, 2025.3
B. ICWA Compliance
Marci is a registered member of the Manda, Hidatsa,
Arikara (MHA) Nation also known as the Three Affiliated Tribes
through the maternal grandmother, who is also a member.4 At
the September 21, 2022 detention hearing, the juvenile court
ordered the Department to provide notice of the dependency
petition to the MHA Nation and inquire whether Elijah was
eligible for enrollment and whether the MHA Nation would
provide a QEW. Shelby Fox, the ICWA representative for the
MHA Nation, responded that Elijah was not a current member
but was eligible for membership. Fox stated the MHA Nation
would move to intervene and requested notice of all court
hearings as well as any service documents and notices of any
3 “The Kin-GAP program is a state program that provides
ongoing funding for children who exit the dependency system to
live with relative legal guardians. In order to receive funding
under the program the county welfare agency must enter into a
written binding agreement with the relative guardian and
dependency jurisdiction must be terminated. (§§ 11386, 11387.)”
(In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211 & fn. 2;
accord In re N.F. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 170, 175, fn. 6.)
4 Joe and the paternal relatives denied any Native American
ancestry.
4
change in placement. The Department provided notice to the
MHA nation as requested throughout the proceedings. The tribe
appointed Paula Snow as the QEW for this case on September 27,
2022.
On December 21, 2022, Fox filed a tribal information form
(ICWA-100) stating the MHA Nation was intervening in Elijah’s
case. Fox checked the box stating there had been ongoing
communication between the Department and the tribe and the
tribe was consulted regarding appropriate services for and
placement of Elijah. Fox stated the tribe knew of and agreed
with Elijah’s current placement with the paternal grandparents.
Fox also checked the box stating the tribe “has been consulted
regarding the appropriate permanent plan for the child should
reunification with the parent(s), legal guardian(s), or Indian
custodian(s) fail.” Fox also stated the Department had discussed
the option of a tribal customary adoption of Elijah.
At the February 8, 2023 jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, the parties stipulated to Snow testifying as a QEW for
the MHA Nation. Snow testified she was familiar with the family
because she was also the QEW in Anthony’s dependency case.
She further testified the parents’ actions and choices “d[id] not
meet the cultural standards of parenting for [the] MHA Nation in
the past or at this time.” Snow opined that Elijah would be “in
danger” if placed back in the parents’ care and that the
Department had made reasonable and active efforts to prevent
separation of the family. Snow further opined, “The child is
placed with immediate family, and that is a placement preference
for the Indian Child Welfare Act, and I believe the child is where
he should be with family. I support that placement.” All parties,
including Elijah’s counsel, supported his removal from the
5
parents and indicated he was doing well in his placement with
the paternal grandparents.
In June and July 2023, the Department invited Fox to child
and family team meetings with Marci, but Fox did not or was
unable to attend. In August 2023, the Department recommended
termination of reunification services and attempted to contact
Fox multiple times to obtain the MHA Nation’s position on the
issue. At the six-month review on August 16, 2023, Joe’s counsel
requested and received a continuance of the court’s termination
of reunification services ruling to allow the MHA Nation time to
respond.
On August 18, 2023, Fox filed a second ICWA-100,
affirming there had been ongoing consultation and
communication with the Department, particularly with regard to
Elijah’s placement. Fox stated the tribe agreed with Elijah’s
placement with the paternal grandparents and that the
Department had made active efforts to prevent separation of the
family. Fox stated the MHA Nation agreed with the
Department’s recommendation to terminate family reunification
services for the parents. Fox confirmed the tribe agreed with a
permanent plan that called for the paternal grandparents
acquiring legal guardianship of Elijah.
After the juvenile court terminated reunification services,
the Department continued to communicate with the tribe
regarding the permanent plan. On February 16, 2024, when the
Department had been unable to speak with Fox, the children’s
social worker spoke with Fox’s superior, Nicole Poitra. Poitra
stated the tribe agreed with the permanent plan of legal
guardianship with the paternal grandparents and that a
6
representative of the MHA Nation would be present at the
permanency planning hearing on March 13, 2024.
The March 13, 2024 hearing was continued to allow the
Department to confirm Kin-GAP eligibility and to obtain Elijah’s
birth certificate. On September 11, 2024, Fox appeared remotely
for the MHA Nation and had no objections or any comments
regarding the court’s finding that “the Department continues to
provide active efforts to the child to plan toward permanence in
his life and is working in collaboration with the MHA nation and
maintaining contact and insuring culturally appropriate services
of the child. [¶] The court anticipates the permanent plan to be
recommended to be guardianship . . .” The court then granted
the Department’s request for a continuance of the permanency
planning hearing to allow the Department to finalize Kin-GAP
eligibility and to obtain Elijah’s birth certificate.
The juvenile court commenced the permanency planning
hearing on December 18, 2024. Neither Snow nor Fox was
present for this hearing and the court noted that in an off-record
discussion, the parties discussed whether a permanency plan
recommendation of guardianship for an Indian child required
testimony from a QEW. The court issued a briefing schedule and
continued the hearing.
Elijah’s counsel relied on section 361.7, subdivision (c) to
argue that QEW testimony was required when “foster care
placement or guardianship” was ordered. The Department took
the position that QEW testimony was not required where the
permanent plan was for guardianship, citing particular sections
of ICWA, Cal-ICWA, and the California Rules of Court,
rule 5.486, which all required QEW testimony only when the
child was removed from his parents’ custody and when the court
7
terminated parental rights. The Department submitted evidence
that the State of California’s Department of Social Services and
the MHA Nation interpreted the relevant statutes and rules to
require QEW testimony only at removal and termination of
parental rights. The Department additionally submitted a last
minute information to the court of its attempts to contact the
MHA Nation regarding the issue: In January 2025, the
Department emailed Fox regarding the potential need for a QEW
for the recommendation of legal guardianship. “On 1/28/25,
Ms. Fox responded that their tribe does not require a QEW
testimony to be presented for a guardianship proceeding.” When
the Department continued to ask whether the MHA Nation could
provide a QEW, Fox directed the inquiries to Poitra.
On February 19, 2025, the juvenile court concluded a QEW
was “absolutely necessary” at disposition if a child was removed
from the parents’ custody and at termination of parental rights.
The court noted there were no published cases addressing
whether a QEW was required to testify when a guardianship was
recommended at a permanency planning hearing, but based on
its review of the law and the policy statements by the MHA
Nation and various agencies, it concluded a QEW was not
required in this case. The juvenile court ordered a permanent
plan of legal guardianship with Kin-GAP funding and terminated
jurisdiction. Elijah timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Congress enacted ICWA “in response to ‘rising concern in
the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian
8
families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that
resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care
placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128 (Dezi C.); see In re Claudia R. (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 76, 84 (Claudia R.).)
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards. [Citations.]
Indeed, ICWA expressly yields to state laws that provide ‘a
higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian
custodian of an Indian child . . . ’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1129.) “ICWA gives ‘Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over
state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children
living off of a reservation.’ [Citation.] The tribe also has the
power to petition the court to invalidate any action taken in a
custody proceeding if the action violated ICWA. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1914; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224, subd. (e).) Thus, when
ICWA applies, ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to
intervene at any point’ in a proceeding involving the removal of
an Indian child from their family. [Citation.]” (Dezi C., at
p. 1129.)
In 2006, the California Legislature passed Cal-ICWA
(Senate Bill No. 678 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.)), “which ‘enacted
provisions that affirm ICWA’s purposes (§ 224, subd. (a)) and
mandate compliance with ICWA “[i]n all Indian child custody
proceedings” (§ 224, subd. (b)).’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1130.)
9
Under Cal-ICWA, section 224.6, subdivision (b) addresses
when the testimony of a QEW is required: “In considering
whether to remove an Indian child from the custody of a parent
or Indian custodian or to terminate the parental rights of the
parent of an Indian child, the court shall . . . [¶] . . . Require that
a qualified expert witness testify regarding whether continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”5
In support of his position, Elijah relies on section 361.7,
subdivision (c), which states: “A foster care placement or
guardianship shall not be ordered in the proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing
evidence, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, as
defined in Section 224.6, that the continued custody of the child
5 Cal-ICWA is consistent with ICWA, which also requires
QEW testimony at “foster care placement” and termination of
parental rights stages. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f); 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903, subd. (1)(i) [“ ‘foster care placement’ which shall mean
any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian
custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution
or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or
Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand,
but where parental rights have not been terminated”].) Elijah
does not contend ICWA requires QEW testimony when a legal
guardianship is recommended as a permanent plan. He instead
relies on Cal-ICWA, specifically section 361.7, subdivision (c), to
support his argument. As stated, “ICWA expressly yields to state
laws that provide ‘a higher standard of protection to the rights of
the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child . . . .’ ” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1129.)
10
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.”
“ ‘We review applicable legal principles de novo, but apply a
deferential standard of review to the court’s exercise of discretion
and resolution of disputed facts.’ ” (In re Rebecca S. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.) We review the trial court’s
selection of a permanent plan in a child dependency proceeding
for an abuse of discretion. (In re A.S. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
131, 144; In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.)
B. Analysis
Elijah argues a QEW was required at the section 366.26
hearing because section 361.7, subdivision (c), requires the
testimony of a QEW if guardianship is ordered. (§ 361.7,
subdivision (c).) Lacking any case law that supports his
argument, Elijah relies on out-of-state authorities interpreting
ICWA to support his argument. (See Jude M. v. State (2017)
2017 Alas.LEXIS 51 [394 P.3d 543]; Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.G.
(In re C.G.) (2014) 260 Ore.App. 500.)
The Department counters that section 361.7 is inapplicable
given the procedural posture of this case. The Department states
that section 361.7 concerns the initial removal of Indian children,
not permanency planning. Guardianship may be ordered at a
disposition hearing. (§ 360, subd. (a).) The Department thus
concludes section 361.7, subdivision (c)’s reference to “foster care
placement or guardianship” means the child’s placement at
disposition and not at the permanency planning hearing.
According to the Department: “This explains why section 361.7
does not have a subdivision requiring the testimony of a QEW
before parental rights are terminated. (See § 361.7, generally.) If
11
section 361.7 applied to permanency planning hearings, the
Legislature would undoubtedly have created a subdivision
requiring the testimony of a QEW before terminating parental
rights similar to the subdivision requiring the testimony of a
QEW when making a foster care placement or guardianship
order. It is also nonsensical to believe the Legislature drafted
Cal-ICWA to require a QEW for removal and termination of
parental rights only (see § 224.6, subd. (b)(1)), but elsewhere
created a requirement for the testimony of QEWs for
guardianships that it did not include in the Cal-ICWA.”
The Department also highlights that the MHA Nation took
the position during the underlying proceedings in the juvenile
court that a QEW was not required under these circumstances.
When asked whether the MHA Nation would provide a QEW for
the permanency planning hearing, Fox told the Department that
“their tribe does not require a QEW testimony to be present for a
guardianship proceeding.” And, the tribe’s unwavering position
after reunification services were terminated was to support the
Department’s recommendation of legal guardianship for Elijah
(and Anthony). When Fox appeared at the September 11, 2024
hearing, she made no objection to the court’s statement that the
permanent plan would be guardianship.
Under these circumstances, we need not decide whether a
QEW is required to testify at a permanency planning hearing
when the recommendation is for legal guardianship because, even
assuming Elijah’s reading of section 361.7 is correct, the MHA
Nation waived any right to testimony by a QEW at the
permanency planning hearing. The MHA Nation was entitled to
do so under California Rules of Court, rule 5.485(a)(2), which
permits the waiver of a QEW’s testimony as follows: “Stipulation
12
by the parent, Indian custodian, or tribe, or failure to object, may
waive the requirement of producing evidence of the likelihood of
serious damage only if the court is satisfied that the person or
tribe has been fully advised of the requirements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act and has knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived them. Any such stipulation must be agreed to
in writing.” (Italics added.) (Cf. In re Liliana S. (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 585, 589 [“We agree that the Tribe has waived
the issue of the children’s placement”]; In re Santos Y. (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1282 [recognizing that ICWA placement
preferences are subject to waiver].)
Here, the MHA Nation was fully advised of the ICWA and
Cal-ICWA requirements, having received notice and service
copies of all relevant proceedings and documents in the juvenile
court. Moreover, Fox is the ICWA representative for the MHA
Nation. She failed to object to the juvenile court’s statement that
guardianship was the likely permanent plan during the
September 11, 2024 hearing to ask for QEW testimony.
Additionally, when directly asked about a QEW at a permanency
planning meeting considering legal guardianship after the court
requested supplemental briefing, “Fox responded that their tribe
does not require a QEW testimony to be presented for a
guardianship proceeding.” The record demonstrates the MHA
Nation knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived any QEW
requirement. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ordered legal guardianship as the
permanent plan for Elijah without QEW testimony.
13
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order for legal guardianship and
termination of jurisdiction is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
14
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