In re E.P. CA2/6

CourtListener 10842654Calctapp14 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/14/26 In re E.P. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re E.P., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B341499
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 21JV00138)
Law. (Santa Barbara County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E.P. appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward of the
court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 602.) He contends the juvenile

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress (§ 700.1)
statements taken in violation of Miranda.2 We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The shooting and investigation
E.P. is a Carpas gang member. The Carpas gang territory
is predominantly located in Carpinteria, and one of their rivals is
the Eastside gang. In March 2020, Eastside gang members were
involved in a shooting at a Carpas hangout. A gang expert
testified this shooting was an “ultimate sign of disrespect” and
that Carpas would look to retaliate.
In January 2021, Angel Castillo and Omar Montiel-
Hernandez, two Eastside gang members, were murdered in a
shooting that took place in Eastside territory. Other individuals
were also shot. Surveillance videos showed that around 5:50
p.m., a Jeep circled the area of the crime scene and stopped on a
nearby street. The Jeep door then opened and closed, and shortly
thereafter, there were gunshots. Another video showed two
individuals running from the crime scene. A witness in the area
also saw two individuals with firearms running past her. The
two individuals were later identified as Carpas gang members
Oscar Trujillo and Angel Varela.
The Jeep was later “linked” to Varela. Surveillance videos
showed the Jeep arrive and park near Varela’s home in
Carpinteria after the shooting. E.P., who was the driver, and
Trujillo and Varela got out of the vehicle and went across the
street to E.P.’s uncle’s home.
Cell phone data showed that around 5:20 p.m. on the date
of the shooting, E.P.’s phone “traveled” from Carpinteria to Santa

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

2
Barbara in the area where the shooting occurred. Afterward,
around 6:20 p.m., the phone was back in Carpinteria. Varela and
Trujillo’s phones were all in the same location as E.P.’s phone.
E.P.’s cell phone contained photos of firearms and of him
“flashing” Carpas gang signs. The phone also contained texts on
the day of the shooting in which Trujillo asked E.P. to drive the
truck to the home of Varela’s friend. The text was sent around
5:15 p.m., which was around the same time E.P. left for Santa
Barbara. Days after the shooting, Varela sent E.P. a text asking
him to pack up his clothes for him. During a search of Varela’s
iCloud account, the police discovered a picture of him holding a
pistol that was identical to one of the weapons used in the
shooting.
The police station interview
In April 2021, Santa Barbara Police Officer Megan
Harrison testified that E.P. was arrested inside his home around
8:30 a.m. He was 18 years old at the time. Harrison “recited”
E.P.’s Miranda rights around 8:45 a.m. and asked E.P. if he
understood. E.P. said, “Yeah, I understand.” E.P. was seated in
the back of the patrol vehicle. He asked Harrison what he was
under arrest for, and Harrison responded that he would be taken
to the Santa Barbara police station and other officers would talk
to him there. E.P. was then transported to the police station.
About fifteen minutes after being Mirandized, Sergeant
Andre Miller and his partner interviewed E.P. in an interview
room at the police station. It was around 9:00 a.m. E.P. was not
handcuffed. Miller did not provide another Miranda advisement
before the interview. But he conferred with Harrison, who told
him E.P. had “been Mirandized and that [E.P.] had waived his

3
Miranda rights via implied waiver based on him understanding
his rights and then asking her a question.”
E.P. appeared “[l]aid back” and calm. At the beginning of
the interview, E.P. was “not very forthcoming with a lot of
information.” As questioning continued, however, E.P. began
providing more information about the day of the shooting. By the
end of the interview, E.P. was “very talkative,” relaxed, and
walking around the interview room. Miller believed E.P.
answered “freely and voluntarily” and did not show any distress
during questioning. Miller offered food and water. E.P. ate
throughout the interview, continued to ask for more food, and
made a special request for McDonald’s or Jack in the Box. He
appeared “smiley, almost laughing” when making the food
requests. There were also multiple breaks, and E.P. was allowed
to use the bathroom.
E.P.’s story changed throughout the interview. For
example, he first denied leaving Carpinteria but later said he
“drove through” Santa Barbara. He admitted that he drove to
the east side of Santa Barbara in Varela’s Jeep and that Varela
and Trujillo were with him. He admitted to dropping off Varela
and Trujillo in the neighborhood in the east side and admitted
that he knew they were going to “hit them up.”3 When asked why
he was up in Santa Barbara, E.P. responded, “I don’t want to
throw anyone under the bus, you know?” and “It wasn’t me.” E.P.
also stated, “It was a big mistake.”

3 Sergeant Miller testified that “hit them up” meant to

“have a fistfight.”

4
The entire interview lasted about seven hours. At the end
of the interview when he was alone, E.P. positioned himself near
the wall and attempted to hear what was being said in the
interview room next door, where Varela was being interviewed.
He began communicating with Varela through the wall to see
what was said during their respective interviews.
Procedural history
The prosecution filed a delinquency petition (§ 602) alleging
two counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 1 and
2); two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd.
(a); counts 3 and 4); street terrorism (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd.
(a); count 5); and acting as an accessory (Pen. Code, § 32; count
6). As to counts 1 through 4, it was further alleged that E.P.
committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b).) As to counts 1 and 2, the petition
also alleged two special circumstances of a multiple murder and
murder committed for gang purposes (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3) &
(a)(22)).4
E.P. moved to suppress (§ 700.1) his statements from the
police station interview on the ground they were taken in
violation of Miranda. The juvenile court denied the motion. The
court found that “based on the totality of circumstances that

4 In March 2022, the juvenile court granted the People’s
motion to transfer the matter to an adult criminal court, but after
the passage of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.),
our court remanded the matter for a new transfer hearing. The
matter was returned to the juvenile court, and after a new
transfer hearing, the court found E.P. fit to remain in the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction.

5
there was, in fact, a knowing and intelligent waiver by [E.P.]. It
was an implied waiver.”
At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing, the juvenile
court sustained all counts and allegations. The court ordered
E.P. committed to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility with a
baseline term of seven years.
DISCUSSION
E.P. contends his statements made during the police
station interview must be suppressed because the Miranda
advisement was inadequate. He asserts he neither waived his
rights nor was he re-warned prior to his interview. We are not
persuaded.
Before a custodial interrogation, law enforcement must
advise a suspect that they have “ ‘ “ ‘ “the right to remain silent,
that anything [they say] can be used against [them] in a court of
law, that [they have] the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if [they] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed . . .
prior to any questioning . . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Suarez (2020) 10
Cal.5th 116, 157.) Once this Miranda advisement is given, the
suspect may waive those rights explicitly or implicitly. (People v.
Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).) “ ‘To establish a valid
Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances
of the interrogation.’ ” (Suarez, at p. 160.)
A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v.
Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421.) “Determining the validity of a
Miranda rights waiver requires ‘an evaluation of the defendant’s

6
state of mind’ [citation] and ‘inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation’ [citation]. When a juvenile’s
waiver is at issue, consideration must be given to factors such as
‘the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand
the warnings given [to] him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.’ ” (People v.
Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Nelson).) In Nelson, our
Supreme Court held that a 15-year-old defendant “implicitly”
waived his Miranda rights “ ‘by willingly answering questions
after acknowledging that he understood those rights.’ ” (Ibid.)
“On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the trial
court’s legal determination and rely upon the trial court’s
findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence.”
(People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425.)
We conclude there was a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of rights. E.P. was 18 years old at the time of
his arrest. There is no dispute that Officer Harrison properly
advised E.P. of his Miranda rights before he was transported to
the police station. When Harrison asked him if he understood,
E.P. said, “Yeah, I understand.” E.P. then asked Harrison why
he was being arrested. Harrison told E.P. that other officers
would talk to him at the police station. About 15 minutes later,
police officers interviewed E.P. at the police station. He was not
handcuffed and at one point, he walked around the interview
room as he spoke to the officers. E.P.’s demeanor was “[l]aid
back” and calm, and by the end of the interview, he was
“talkative” and appeared “smiley, almost laughing” when he
made food requests. There is nothing to indicate the officers
raised their voice or threatened E.P. in any way.

7
When the interview was completed, E.P. moved closer to
the wall adjoining the other interview room to share information
with Varela about what was said in their respective interviews.
In our view, such conduct reflects a level of sophistication and
awareness of the situation. Based on the totality of
circumstances, E.P. appeared to understand the Miranda
warnings, was not coerced during his interview, and “ ‘willingly
answer[ed] questions after acknowledging that he understood’ ”
his rights. (Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 375.) Thus, E.P.
waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently by responding to the officers’ questions. (See Cruz,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 667 [a suspect’s willingness to answer
questions after acknowledging an understanding of their
Miranda rights has been held sufficient to constitute implied
waiver]; see Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 375 [same].)
E.P. contends that the Miranda advisement was
inadequate because he was never re-warned about his rights at
the time of his police station interview. We disagree.
“[R]eadvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent
interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior
knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.] The courts examine
the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time
that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of
the interrogator or the location of the interview, any official
reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect’s sophistication or
past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he
subjectively understands and waives his rights.” (People v.
Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170 (Mickle).)
We conclude that readvisement was unnecessary. E.P. was
in custody in the police car when he was informed by Officer

8
Harrison that he would be interviewed at the police station by
other officers, the subsequent interrogation took place a mere 15
minutes after E.P. was advised of his Miranda rights, it was clear
that E.P. was still in custody at the police station, and E.P.
showed no reluctance to speak to the interviewing officers. (See
Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 170–171 [subsequent
interrogation 36 hours later was “reasonably contemporaneous”
and no readvisement necessary where it was clear from the
circumstances that defendant was still in official custody]; People
v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 435 [no readvisement
necessary where second interrogation was 40 hours later and the
defendant showed no reluctance to be interviewed].)
E.P. also contends the circumstances surrounding the
interview were unduly coercive. He highlights that the interview
was about seven hours long, he was denied use of the restroom
when he requested to use it, and he was provided “minimal junk
food.” We again disagree. While the interview was about seven
hours long, the record shows that E.P. was given breaks and food
including chips, a candy bar, and a slice of pizza. And while E.P.
was not immediately taken to the restroom upon request, the
record does not reflect the officer’s actions were improper. When
E.P. asked to go to the restroom, the officer said, “Yeah, we’ll get
you there,” and continued the interview. When E.P. asked again,
the detective explained that there was “probably a little bit more”
before they take a break and asked if it was “okay” to continue.
E.P. responded, “Yeah.” Shortly thereafter when E.P. asked
again about the bathroom, he was taken to the restroom soon
after.
Later, when E.P. asked to use the restroom in another
instance, there was no bathroom availability, but the officers told

9
him, “We have other bathrooms, though. We’ll figure it out.” In
short, the record does not reflect the officers withheld basic
necessities such as bathroom use to coerce E.P. into confessing.
The totality of circumstances reflect that E.P.’s will was not
“ ‘overborne,’ ” but instead that E.P. was relaxed, talkative, and
willing to speak to the officers. (Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p.
669.) Thus, this case is distinguishable from In re Elias V. (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 568, 586, where the police used improper
influences including aggressive and intimidating interrogation
tactics on a 13-year-old minor.
We are mindful of E.P.’s youth and his lack of experience in
the criminal and juvenile justice system. But on balance, the
totality of circumstances support that E.P. waived his Miranda
rights. Because we conclude there was no error in denying the
motion to suppress, we need not discuss harmless error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

10
Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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