In re N.D. CA6

CourtListener 10842110Calctapp13 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/13/26 In re N.D. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re N.D., a Person Coming Under H053027
the Juvenile Court Law. (Monterey County
Super. Ct. No. 24JV000522)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

In this appeal we consider whether police officers had probable cause to
search a vehicle during a traffic stop based on the behavior of a trained drug-
sniffing dog.
Minor N.D. moved the juvenile court to suppress drugs seized from his
vehicle during the traffic stop. The court denied the motion. N.D. later
admitted an allegation that he possessed a controlled substance (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The court sustained a juvenile wardship
petition and declared N.D. a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602,
subd. (a).1) At a dispositional hearing, the court placed N.D. on probation in
the custody of his mother.
On appeal, N.D. claims the juvenile court erred by denying his motion
to suppress the drugs because the prosecution failed to establish that the
dog’s sniff of the vehicle’s interior did not amount to a search or that the
police had probable cause for the search.
For the reasons explained below, we uphold the juvenile court’s ruling
on the search and seizure, modify the court’s dispositional order by striking
the maximum time of confinement, and affirm the judgment as modified.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
In July 2024,2 the Monterey County District Attorney filed a juvenile
wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) against N.D. alleging two misdemeanor
counts of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350,
subd. (a); count 1 [cocaine] & count 2 [“unprescribed prescription
medication”]).
N.D. filed a motion under section 700.1 to suppress all evidence
obtained by the police through a warrantless search and seizure (suppression
motion or motion).
The district attorney filed an opposition to N.D.’s suppression motion.
The district attorney argued, inter alia, that “the use of [a detection canine]
was not a search under the Fourth Amendment as it did not expose any
noncontraband items.” The district attorney further asserted the canine “is a
trained, certified narcotics detection dog and thus his alert is reliable. The

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2024.

2
canine alerted to the presence of narcotics in the car, particularly coming
from center console. This alert alone is sufficient to establish probable cause
to search [N.D.]’s car.”
In December, the juvenile court held a hearing on N.D.’s suppression
motion. (§ 700.1.) The district attorney presented the testimony of two police
officers about the traffic stop and dog sniff. Based on the evidence presented,
the court denied the motion.
In January 2025, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, N.D. admitted
count 1 (possession of cocaine), and the juvenile court dismissed count 2
(possession of an unprescribed prescription medication).
On February 10, 2025, the juvenile court declared N.D. a ward of the
court “for a period of 24 months.” The court placed N.D. on probation with
terms and conditions and ordered N.D. to reside in the custody of his mother.
The court also ordered that N.D.’s “probation and wardship would terminate
on February 10, 2026” (i.e., one year from the date of the dispositional
hearing).
B. Factual Background Regarding the Vehicle Search and Denial of the
Suppression Motion
1. Hearing Evidence on the Traffic Stop and Search
Around 5:30 p.m. on May 17, Salinas Police Department Officer Isodoro
Medrano saw a black SUV make “an abrupt turn without using a turn signal”
and violate the speed limit. N.D. was driving the SUV and had a passenger
in the vehicle. Medrano effected a traffic stop on the SUV in “a high crime
area” of Salinas that had “a lot of gang activity.” When Medrano approached
the SUV (which N.D. had parked in a driveway of a residence), N.D.
“appeared very nervous” but not “under the influence.” N.D. did not have a
driver’s license or any identification on him. N.D. provided his name and

3
date of birth to Medrano.3 Medrano asked N.D. to exit the SUV and sit on
the bumper of a patrol car. Another officer at the scene similarly asked the
passenger to step out of the SUV.
Officer Medrano pat searched N.D. for weapons but did not find
anything on him. Medrano asked for permission to search the SUV. N.D.
declined the request. Medrano summoned a canine unit believing “there may
have been narcotics or firearms inside the vehicle.” Medrano learned that the
SUV was registered to N.D.’s mother.
While Officer Medrano was completing a record check and traffic
citation for N.D., the canine unit arrived. The canine officer eventually told
Medrano that the dog “alerted inside the vehicle.” Medrano searched the
SUV and found suspected cocaine and “Farmapram medication.”
Officer Cameron Mitchell (a detection canine handler) testified that he
began working with his canine (“Checo”) in November 2022. Officer Mitchell
and Checo participated in two, four-week training sessions on narcotics and
firearms detection. Mitchell explained that Checo “is trained in smelling the
narcotics odors of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and [] firearms and
ammunition.” Checo had assisted Mitchell with searches “at least 200
times.”
Before Officer Mitchell took Checo out of his patrol vehicle to perform
the dog-sniff examination, Mitchell closed the SUV’s open front doors.
Mitchell testified that, with Checo on a leash, he began the examination near
the SUV’s left rear bumper. Mitchell described the examination (which was
recorded by Mitchell’s body-worn camera) as follows: “As we go towards the
front of the front left bumper of the vehicle, [Checo] begins to pull away from

3 The record indicates that N.D. was 17 years old at the time of the

stop.
4
the garage [of the residence]. I direct [Checo] back towards the vehicle, at
which point he comes back down the driver’s side and immediately jumps
into the driver’s window. Once [Checo] gets inside the vehicle, he begins to
spin a few times, then jumps toward the back all the way over the backseats
towards like I guess you would call it the trunk of the vehicle and then works
his way back to the front.”
Officer Mitchell explained that “[Checo] began to spin in the area of the
center console. Based on [Mitchell’s] training and experience of canines, as
they begin to spin repeatedly in the same spot, there’s generally an odor and
they’re trying to target where that odor scent is emitting from.” Mitchell
noticed that Checo “showed excitement” and “started to whine.” “At that
point, [Mitchell] then opened the driver’s door, had pulled [Checo] out, and
put him into the left rear passenger door. [Mitchell] then observed [Checo] go
directly underneath the driver’s seat towards that center console area.
[Checo] stuffed his nose under there and was in that area for some time.
[Checo] got out of the vehicle, looked up at [Mitchell], and then sat down.”
Mitchell added, “At that point in time, once I observed Checo showing some
changes in behavior, I believe there was a possible target odor presence in the
vehicle. I then informed the officers the vehicle was good for a hand search
by the remaining officers on the scene as I was placing Checo back in the
[patrol] car.” Less than five minutes elapsed between Mitchell’s arrival at
the scene (around 5:48 p.m.) and Checo’s alert.
On cross-examination, Officer Mitchell testified that at one point while
Checo was inside the SUV, Mitchell had said “[c]ouche” (which he described
as “French for down”) and put his “arms up just in case” Checo jumped out of
the SUV. Mitchell did this to protect Checo against any injury from a fall
and prevent Checo from “jumping out directly onto” Mitchell. Mitchell agreed

5
with defense counsel that, in the body-worn camera video, Checo appeared to
try to exit the SUV. But Mitchell explained, “At that point, I’d seen
everything I needed to see. I was going to search, regardless. It’s now me
trying to locate exactly where that target odor source is emitting from.”
Mitchell also agreed with counsel that Checo appeared to be “kind of running
around the whole vehicle.” Mitchell explained that the SUV’s open windows
and the dog’s movements and breathing “waft odors around for [Checo] to
eventually try to pinpoint and locate.”
On cross-examination by defense counsel about whether there were
“multiple” alerts by Checo, Officer Mitchell stated, “So, [Checo] just purely
showing me a change in behavior to jump right into a vehicle is already
enough for me to give me a big cause to believe that there’s a target odor
present in the vehicle. For [Checo] to actually jump approximately up four or
five feet up into the vehicle of a two by two foot space opening already says
enough. That’s a huge change in behavior for him to go on his own accord.
[¶] Secondly, as I explained earlier, it’s not a static environment. You have
windows down. Air is going to blow through. You have a dog that’s
breathing. You have him wagging his tail. Odors can change and move as
he’s moving through a vehicle, but he’s eventually alerting to an area where
it could be or had been. [¶] In past cases, we’ve seen someone have a gun in
a backpack, take it out of the backpack and place it somewhere else. He’s
going to handle the backpack because that’s where the odor was sitting the
longest and it spent the most time, but it was underneath the seat. [¶] So,
the dog is a tool and is going to be not in a static environment. It’s going to
possibly cause odors in different areas if it has been touched or moved.”
Mitchell additionally explained that Checo “is excited to do” “his job” and this
was not the first time that Checo had jumped into a window.

6
On redirect examination, Officer Mitchell reiterated that after he had
directed Checo toward the left front bumper of the SUV (i.e., before Checo
entered the vehicle), Mitchell saw Checo “go to the door and immediately just
go into the vehicle.” When the prosecutor asked, “What does that indicate
again?” Mitchell answered, “Just a change in behavior. [Checo]’s making a
furtive [sic] movement to follow an odor that isn’t, you know, emanating from
outside the vehicle. It’s emanating from inside the vehicle.” The prosecutor
next asked if Checo’s behavior was consistent with his detection training,
Mitchell responded, “He’s going to go as close as possible to be next to that
target odor source.”
The juvenile court admitted into evidence the video footage recorded by
Officer Medrano’s and Officer Mitchell’s body-worn cameras (exhibit Nos. 1 &
2, respectively).4
2. Juvenile Court’s Ruling
After the prosecution rested, N.D.’s defense counsel argued, inter alia,
that the traffic stop was a “prolonged detention” and “this sniff test did not
qualify to do a wholesale search.”5 Counsel maintained that the
circumstances in the instant case were distinguishable from those in People
v. Stillwell (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 996 (Stillwell), because the canine in
Stillwell “seem[ed] much clearer in terms of his behavior and signs” of an
alert. Counsel asserted that Checo, by contrast, was “happy and excited and
running around the vehicle. There was nothing particularly distinct about

4 The two videos have been transmitted to this court for our review.

Exhibit No. 2 is from Officer Mitchell’s body-worn camera and shows Checo
approaching the SUV and then entering it.
5 N.D. makes no argument on appeal that the traffic stop was unduly

prolonged.
7
any one place. And it was pretty clear that officer wasn’t going to let that dog
out of the car until he found something.”
The juvenile court denied N.D.’s suppression motion, explaining: “I’ve
listened to the evidence like we all did. Officer Medrano observes this vehicle
while on regular patrol. . . . It makes an abrupt left turn onto Alamo Way.
The driver wasn’t using the turn signal. And then at some point the vehicle
sped up in violation of the speed law. . . . [¶] The vehicle then finds itself on
Pino Way, [and stops at an address on] Pino way, which was obviously not
[N.D.]’s residence. I think the significance of the officer pulling -- asking the
driver and the passenger to get out of the car for the pat down search, I think
the significance of that was the fact that the area was -- 5:40, . . . in the
afternoon. It was a high crime area, according to the officers, a gang area.
There was testimony as to the Las Casitas gang in that area. The officer
then approached the driver, and it’s [N.D.]. [¶] The officer indicates when he
was there he believed that [N.D.] was nervous, and he based a lot of that
upon ‘Where are you going?[’] ‘I’m going home.’ I believe there was
testimony he lived on Pino Way at some point. [¶] . . . [¶] So, anyways, the
officer says, ‘Where do you live?’ [¶] [N.D.] was able to say where he lived.
So the officer at that point I believe was justified in asking the driver and
asking the passenger to get out of the car and to give the pat down search. I
didn’t hear the officer give the passenger a pat down search or at least testify
to that. [¶] In any event, the officer testifies that at that point no weapons
are found in the pat down search. What is clear to the [c]ourt is that the
officer initiated the record check on [N.D.] because [N.D.] didn’t have a
license, didn’t have registration. Simultaneously, while filling out the
citation for the above code violations, this other patrol car comes onto the
scene. The other patrol car had a canine that was going to do the search. So,

8
the search happens. [¶] I think that’s a big part of where the [c]ourt is going.
As far as the timing goes, I mean, obviously that is important, but I think
what really highlights the [c]ourt was that [Officer Medrano] was writing the
citation down when the canine came to do the search. And then the canine
officer testified that it takes about less than five minutes to conduct the
search. [¶] So, with all that being said, the [c]ourt is going to respectfully
deny the motion to suppress.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Challenge to Vehicle Search and Seizure of Drugs
N.D. contends the juvenile court erred in denying his suppression
motion because the prosecution failed to establish that the police officers had
probable cause to search the SUV. N.D. asserts that “when Checo entered
[N.D.]’s vehicle in response to Officer Mitchell’s redirection to the driver’s
door and its open window, a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes
commenced.” N.D. further asserts that even if Checo’s entry into the SUV
could be deemed “instinctual and not facilitated or encouraged by law
enforcement,” “Checo’s sniff of N.D.’s vehicle would be a search: Checo
entered the car after Mitchell’s direction to the open window; [and] his
continued search of it was facilitated by Mitchell repeatedly preventing
[Checo’s] exit from the vehicle and further directing his search.” N.D.
additionally claims that “Checo’s jump into N.D.’s vehicle does not indicate
an alert that could establish probable cause.” N.D. asserts that Checo did not
engage in “his formal alert behavior of sitting down and looking up at
Mitchell . . . until after he had sniffed N.D.’s vehicle from front to back for
about 1.5 minutes” and “Checo’s behavior prior to jumping into [N.D.]’s car
fails to provide the requisite probable cause to justify his extensive search of
the vehicle’s interior.”

9
The Attorney General responds that Checo’s “instinctual entry into
[N.D.]’s vehicle was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.” The
Attorney General contends that Checo’s “jump was done ‘without assistance,
facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler,’ so it cannot be said
that the government intended to have the dog jump inside [N.D.]’s vehicle,
much less that the government intended that jump be the precursor to
obtaining information inside the car.” The Attorney General additionally
contends Checo’s entry and sniffing inside the SUV was supported by
circumstances establishing probable cause, including N.D.’s traffic violation,
his failure to present a driver’s license, his nervousness, and Checo’s stop
alongside and leap into the SUV, which was a “ ‘huge change in behavior.’ ”
The Attorney General asserts that “the dog’s behavior outside the vehicle
demonstrated its detection of a target odor emanating from inside the
vehicle.”
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings,
express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining
whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] ‘Although our review of factual determinations is deferential, it is
not without limit. Factual determinations must be supported by substantial
evidence.’ [Citation.] To satisfy the substantial evidence standard, the
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings must be ‘ “reasonable, credible,
and of solid value.” ’ ” (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937; see
also id. at pp. 943–944 [conducting an independent review of video evidence
in an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress].)

10
“ ‘[W]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to the order denying
the motion to suppress’ [citation] and ‘[a]ny conflicts in the evidence are
resolved in favor of the [trial] court’s ruling.’ [Citation.] Moreover, the
reviewing court ‘must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
its assessment of credibility.’ ” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.)
2. Legal Principles
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
individuals the “right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”6 (U.S. Const., 4th
Amend.) “It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used
in the Amendment.” (United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 404
[holding that the government’s installation and use of a GPS device to
monitor the movements of a target’s vehicle “constitutes a ‘search’ ”]; see also
Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 404–405 [explaining that a person
who lawfully possesses a vehicle and exercises control over it has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the vehicle].)
“Warrantless searches are ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ [Citations.] One
such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception,
which allows for warrantless searches of automobiles where an officer has
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a
crime. [Citations.] Probable cause to search exists ‘where the known facts

6 “The California Constitution similarly protects the ‘right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable seizures and searches.’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) But under
the so-called truth-in-evidence provision of the state Constitution, ‘ “issues
relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches
and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.” ’ ” (People
v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 437, fn. 2.)
11
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence
in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’ [Citation.]
An officer who has probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile
exception may then conduct a probing search of all ‘compartments and
containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.’ ” (People
v. Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 297 (Moore).) “The prosecution bears the
burden of establishing an exception applies.” (People v. Hall (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 946, 951.)
“As the United Stated Supreme Court has noted, ‘probable cause is a
fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’
[Citation.] Further, ‘[a]n officer is entitled to rely on his [or her] training and
experience in drawing inferences from the facts he [or she] observes, but
those inferences must also “be grounded in objective facts and be capable of
rational explanation.” ’ [Citations.] When considering the validity of the
evidence, it is to be analyzed ‘ “as understood by those versed in the field of
law enforcement.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The principal components of a determination
of . . . probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop
or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount . . . to
probable cause.’ [Citation.] As such, we consider the totality of the
circumstances, and analyze these facts as would a reasonable police officer, in
assessing the officer’s probable cause, rather than looking to singular facts in
a vacuum.” (Moore, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 297–298; see also People v.
Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1052 [“[A]n officer’s subjective intent plays no
role in the Fourth Amendment inquiry.”].)

12
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the use of a well-
trained narcotics-detection dog—one that ‘does not expose noncontraband
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,’ [citation]—
during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy
interests.” (Illinois v. Caballes (2005) 543 U.S. 405, 409 (Caballes), quoting
United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 707; see also People v. Mayberry
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 335, 341–342; United States v. Olivera-Mendez (8th Cir.
2007) 484 F.3d 505, 511 (Olivera-Mendez) [“A dog sniff of the exterior of a
vehicle does not constitute a search.”]; cf. Florida v. Jardines (2013) 569 U.S.
1, 11–12 [“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the
home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”].)
Moreover, “ ‘[a] dog alert can provide the probable cause needed for a
search warrant.’ ” (Stillwell, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, quoting
People v. Bautista (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 236.) “Evidence of a dog’s
satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself
provide sufficient reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has
certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can
presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert
provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of
formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a
training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.” (Florida
v. Harris (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 246–247 (Harris).) “The question—similar to
every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a
dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a
reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or

13
evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” (Id. at
p. 248.)
3. Analysis
We begin by considering whether prior to Checo’s entry into N.D.’s
SUV, an objectively reasonable police officer would have had probable cause
to believe the vehicle contained contraband. As we will explain, the answer is
yes.
N.D. has raised no challenge to Officer Mitchell’s testimony that Checo
was trained in the detection of narcotics and firearms. Thus, the evidence
provides sufficient reason to trust an alert by Checo. (See United States v.
Collier (8th Cir. 2024) 116 F.4th 756, 761, citing Harris, supra, 568 U.S. at
pp. 246–247 [“A dog is presumptively reliable at detecting illicit drugs—and
its alert establishes probable cause for a search—if the dog has satisfactorily
completed a bona fide certification or training program.”].)
Considering Officer’s Mitchell’s body camera video along with his
hearing testimony, we are persuaded there is substantial evidence supporting
an implied finding that Checo demonstrated an alert for contraband through
his change in behavior prior to jumping into the SUV. Preliminarily, we
agree with the Attorney General that Mitchell never testified that Checo was
trained to alert through a particular alert behavior. Rather, Mitchell
testified that changes in Checo’s behavior serve as his detection alert. Thus,
based on Mitchell’s testimony, and in accord with the opinions of other courts,
we conclude that behavioral changes exhibited by Checo can serve as a basis
for probable cause. (See United States v. Moore (10th Cir. 2015) 795 F.3d
1224, 1232 [“We have held that an alert, or a change in a dog’s behavior in
reaction to the odor of drugs, is sufficient to establish probable cause to
search a vehicle, and that a final indication is not necessary.”]; see also

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United States v. Thomas (9th Cir. 2013) 726 F.3d 1086, 1098 [“Evidence from
a trained and reliable handler about alert behavior he recognized in his dog
can be the basis for probable cause. Whether a particular dog displays
enough signaling behavior will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case.”]; People v. Bailey (Colo. 2018) 427 P.3d 821, 828 [noting a lack of
authority supporting the trial court’s disregard of evidence related to the
canine’s “initial alert because it was not a ‘final’ indication of the odor of
narcotics”]; United States v. Braddy (11th Cir. 2021) 11 F.4th 1298, 1314
[noting that “other circuits have [] rejected a stricter rule requiring a final
response, indication, or alert for a drug dog to be sufficiently reliable”]; cf.
State v. Randall (2021) 496 P.3d 844, 855 (Randall) [explaining it was
necessary for the dog’s handler to explain why the dog’s “behavior was an
objectively reliable indication that narcotics were present”].)
Officer Mitchell’s body camera video shows a significant change in
Checo’s behavior immediately before he jumped into N.D.’s SUV. As
discussed ante (see pt. I.B.1.) and depicted in the video, Mitchell began the
dog-sniffing examination at the left rear corner of the SUV by directing Checo
to sit (which he did). Mitchell then pointed to the left rear wheel area of the
SUV and Checo stood up. Checo briefly lifted his front paws off the ground to

15
about the height of the rear wheel.7

7 The video does not definitively show whether Checo’s paws made

contact with the SUV at this point. Nevertheless, a “ ‘minimal and incidental
contact with the exterior of the car [i]s not a tactile inspection of the
automobile’ ” that amounts to a “ ‘ “constitutionally cognizable
infringement.” ’ ” (Stillwell, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007, quoting
Olivera-Mendez, supra, 484 F.3d at pp. 511–512; see also State v. Mumford
(Iowa 2024) 14 N.W.3d 346, 352 [concluding that a drug dog’s placement of its
paws on a car door did not violate the Fourth Amendment].)
16
Checo returned his paws to the ground, walked along the driver’s side
of the SUV, and then turned in front of the vehicle (with Officer Mitchell
trailing behind holding Checo’s leash). While Checo was in front of the SUV,
Mitchell pointed to the front left corner/bumper area of the SUV as Checo
turned around. Checo walked toward Mitchell and moved his nose near the
spot toward which Mitchell pointed.

Checo continued forward, walking past the SUV’s left front wheel.
When Checo got to the area of the SUV’s left sideview mirror, he rose up on
his hind legs without any prompting from Mitchell. Checo’s head reached the
height of the mirror and one or both of his front paws briefly contacted the
exterior of the SUV (in the area forward of the mirror).

17
Checo next lowered his paws and jumped into the SUV through its
open driver’s door window.

18
According to Officer Mitchell’s testimony, Checo’s movement toward the
SUV’s door was a “change in behavior” that was consistent with Checo’s
training “to go as close as possible to be next to that target odor source.”
Based on Officer Mitchell’s explanation of Checo’s typical alerting
behavior and Checo rising toward the driver’s door mirror and open window
without any prompting from Mitchell, we conclude there is substantial
evidence supporting an alert by Checo before he leapt through the window of
N.D.’s SUV. Checo’s behavior outside the SUV immediately prior to Checo’s
entry into the SUV would make a reasonably prudent person think a search
of the vehicle would reveal contraband. (See United States v. Pulido-Ayala
(8th Cir. 2018) 892 F.3d 315, 319 [concluding that police had probable cause
before the dog “actually crossed the threshold into the interior” of the vehicle
“given the strong reaction of the trained drug dog while it was outside the
car, together with [defendant’]s suspicious reaction to the drug checkpoint”].)
Because we decide that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
police had probable cause to search N.D.’s SUV before Checo entered it, we
need not consider whether a canine’s “instinctive entry” into a vehicle during
an exterior sniffing examination converts what would be a nonsearch under
Caballes, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 409, into a search that must be supported by
probable cause. (See Randall, supra, 496 P.3d at p. 853.)
B. Correction to Dispositional Order
Paragraph No. 25 of the juvenile court’s dispositional order specifies a
maximum time of confinement of “[one] year.” Because the court did not
remove N.D. from the custody of his parents (and instead ordered him to
reside in his mother’s custody), the court should not have specified a
maximum time of confinement in its dispositional order. (See In re G.C.
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129; In re P.A. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23, 32; In re

19
Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541; § 726, subd. (d)(1).)
Accordingly, we will modify the dispositional order to strike the provision
setting a maximum confinement time. (See In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
590, 592; Matthew A., at p. 541.)
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s February 10, 2025 dispositional order is modified
to strike the provision setting the maximum time of confinement at one year
(¶ No. 25). With this modification, the judgment is affirmed.

20
______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Chung, J.

H053027
People v. N.D.


Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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