People v. Dennis CA4/1

CourtListener 10840824Calctapp10 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/10/26 P. v. Dennis CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085219

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SCD296661,
SCD302592)
GREGORY DAMON DENNIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Albert T. Harutunian III, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In case number SCD302592, a jury convicted Gregory Damon Dennis,
who represented himself at trial, of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code
§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court then found Dennis suffered two prior
serious felony convictions and three prior strike convictions. The court also
found two aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt. In case
number SCD296661, Dennis pled guilty to felony vandalism (§ 594(a) &
(b)(1)).
In November 2024, the court struck two of Dennis’ three prior strike
convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
and sentenced him to a combined prison term of 18 years and eight months,
comprised of the upper term of four years, doubled for the strike prior, plus
two five-year prior serious felony enhancements for the assault; and eight
months, representing one-third the middle term, for the vandalism,
consecutive.
On appeal, Dennis claims his conviction of assault with a deadly
weapon must be reversed due to insufficient evidence. He also argues a
remand for resentencing is required because the court abused its discretion
by applying an erroneous legal standard in assessing whether to dismiss his
prior serious felony enhancements. Resolving this matter by memorandum
opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm.
I.
Dennis argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction of assault
with a deadly weapon. We disagree.
We examine claims of insufficient evidence under the substantial
evidence standard. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We thus
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment for
substantial evidence that would allow any reasonable trier of fact to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) To be “substantial,” the evidence must be “reasonable,
credible, and of solid value.” (Ibid.) Such evidence can include not only
circumstantial evidence but also all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

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from such evidence. (People v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278, 286.)
Reversal is appropriate only if “upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” the conviction. (People v.
Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
A.
In March 2024, Benjamin Rodriguez Velasco, a young man, and his
mother were working at a restaurant while Dennis, an older man, sat at a
table on the restaurant’s patio. Velasco told Dennis they were closing and he
had to leave, but Dennis ignored him.
About ten minutes later, Velasco went outside, touched Dennis’
shoulder to get his attention, and again told him to leave. Dennis
aggressively told Velasco not to touch him or he would hit him.
Fifteen minutes later, Velasco again touched Dennis on the shoulder
and told him he had to leave, prompting Dennis to exit the patio gate, which
Velasco then closed behind himself. Dennis approached Velasco and told him
he was going to hit him. Velasco pushed Dennis, who then picked up his
metal walking cane and swung it at Velasco, hitting him on the upper left ear
and head. Velasco belatedly tried to block the blow.
On impact, the cane flew out of Dennis’ hand, and Dennis went to grab
it. Velasco’s mother tried to grab Dennis, and Velasco ran after him because
he was worried Dennis would hurt his mother. Velasco fought Dennis, who
regained the cane and swung it at Velasco as he fled, hitting him on the back.
Dennis broke the cane hitting Velasco.
Velasco sustained a cut to his ear and a large, swollen, line-shaped welt
on the side of his face. When first struck, his vision blurred for about
five seconds. He felt pain around his ear and the side of his head for about
two weeks afterwards.

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Video of the incident was played at trial. The cane and a photograph of
it were also admitted into evidence.
B.
Section 245(a)(1) criminalizes “‘assault upon the person of another with
a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm.’” A “deadly weapon” is
either (1) an object that is deadly per se or (2) an “‘object, instrument, or
weapon’” that is wielded such that it is capable of producing and likely to
produce death or great bodily injury. (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th
1023, 1028-1029, 1037, fn. 10.)
The deadly nature of an instrument in the second category may be
established if it is “capable of being used in a dangerous or deadly manner,
and it may be fairly inferred from the evidence that its possessor intended . . .
to use it as a weapon.” (People v. Reid (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 354, 365.) A
jury may consider “the nature of the weapon, the manner of its use, and all
other factors that are relevant to this issue[]” in deciding whether a weapon
is deadly. (In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 276.)
“Great bodily injury is significant or substantial injury.” (People v.
Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087.) Under section 245(a)(1),
“whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is immaterial.” (Aguilar,
16 Cal.4th at p. 1028.) But “if injuries result, the extent of such injuries and
their location are relevant facts” to the deadly weapon inquiry. (Beasley,
105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.)
C.
Dennis claims “there is not substantial evidence establishing that the
composition of the walking cane, the application of force[,] and degree of
injuries resulted in the walking cane being used as a deadly weapon,”
requiring reversal of that conviction. We disagree.

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First, a reasonable jury could conclude the cane was a deadly weapon
because substantial evidence supports finding it was capable of being used in
a deadly and dangerous manner and Dennis intended to use it that way. In
arguing otherwise, Dennis emphasizes the cane was neither sharp nor solid
metal. He claims the cane was “lightweight and hollow,” as it “snapped in
two upon impact with Velasco’s back,” and analogizes to Beasley. Dennis also
relies on the fact that he is elderly while Velasco was “young” and “fit.”
But the cane here was metal. A jury could reasonably conclude a metal
cane, hollow or not, is capable of inflicting significant harm. As the People
argue, the video shows “Dennis whipped his cane with considerable force at
[Velasco], striking him in the head. Dennis used so much force during his
attack that it caused the cane to snap in two.” Dennis also hit Velasco
multiple times, once in the head, a vulnerable and critical part of the body.
Second, while Velasco’s injuries were not extreme, a rational jury could
conclude they constituted great bodily injury. Dennis suggests “Velasco was
not affected by the cane” because he immediately pursued Dennis and
“suffered minimal injuries.” But “[a] fine line can divide an injury from being
significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the
description.” (People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 836.) In
Jaramillo, the appellate court found “multiple contusions[,] . . . abrasions and
swelling, all caused by [a 1-inch diameter] stick . . . still evident the day after
the blows had been administered” sufficient to support a finding of great
bodily injury. (Id. at p. 837.) And in People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th
519, 529, the court affirmed a great bodily injury enhancement where the
victim sustained an injury requiring three stitches that “‘hurt for a few days,’
resulted in ‘a little scar,’ and loosened [the victim’s] ‘false tooth.’” Given this,
we cannot say as a matter of law Velasco did not suffer great bodily injury.

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This case is distinguishable from Beasley and In re B.M. (2018)
6 Cal.5th 528, on which Dennis relies.
Beasley determined insufficient evidence supported the defendant’s
convictions of assault with a deadly weapon premised on his use of a
broomstick and vacuum cleaner attachment to hit the victim’s arms,
shoulders, and back. (Beasley, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1087-1088.) There, the
victim’s testimony was too “cursory” to establish whether the broomstick was
used in a manner capable of causing and likely to cause great bodily injury or
death, given (1) the victim did not describe the degree of force the defendant
used, (2) neither the broomstick nor a photograph of it were introduced into
evidence, and (3) there was no evidence of the broomstick’s composition,
weight, and rigidity. (Ibid.) The court further noted the vacuum cleaner
attachment was made of hollow plastic and neither it nor a photograph was
introduced into evidence. (Id. at p. 1088.) In contrast, here, testimony, video,
and the cane itself allowed the jury to assess the cane’s metal composition
and the force with which Dennis swung it. Dennis also struck Velasco on the
head and back rather than his appendages and back. The jury thus had
ample evidence to determine Dennis used the cane in a manner capable of
causing and likely to cause great bodily injury. Because of this, we are
unpersuaded by Dennis’ contentions that it is somehow significant (1) the
prosecution did not allege a great bodily injury enhancement under
section 12022.7(a); (2) the court instructed on assault as a lesser included
offense; or (3) the jury submitted questions regarding deadly weapons and
great bodily injury.
B.M., meanwhile, found insufficient evidence supported the defendant’s
conviction of assault with a deadly weapon premised on his use of a butter
knife to slice at the victim’s legs, which were covered with a blanket. (B.M.,

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6 Cal.5th at p. 536.) As the People note, however, “Dennis did not use a
small, dull, largely harmless instrument to ‘attack’ fully protected and
covered appendages.” B.M. is thus inapt.
In sum, adequate evidence supports Dennis’ conviction of assault with
a deadly weapon.
II.
Dennis also contends the court abused its discretion by applying the
wrong legal standard in assessing whether to dismiss his two serious prior
felony enhancements under section 1385(c). We conclude Dennis forfeited
this claim, which also fails on the merits.
As relevant here, under section 1385(c)(1), “the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” In exercising its
discretion, the trial court must give great weight to evidence demonstrating
the presence of enumerated mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385(c)(2).) Such
evidence weighs heavily in favor of dismissal unless the court finds dismissal
would endanger public safety. (Ibid.; see also People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036.)
The People argue Dennis forfeited his argument by failing to request
relief under section 1385 or object to his sentence on this ground. We agree.
“‘[A]ny failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to dismiss under
section 1385 . . . forfeits his right to raise the issue on appeal.’” (People v.
Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724, quoting People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) Having failed to seek dismissal of his serious prior
felony enhancements, Dennis forfeited this challenge.
Even so, Dennis’ claim fails on the merits. “Defendants are entitled to
sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the
sentencing court.” (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8.)

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“Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a
denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights,
and thus requires reversal.” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298,
306.) But “in light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is
aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we
cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the
trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.)
Here, the record is silent as to whether the court understood its
discretion as to dismissing Dennis’ serious prior felony enhancements under
statutory changes in existence for nearly three years at the time of Dennis’
sentencing. On this record, we cannot presume the court abused its
discretion in the manner alleged. Dennis’ sentencing challenge thus fails.
III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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