People v. Rubio CA4/2

CourtListener 10840440Calctapp9 apr 2026

Testo completo

Filed 4/9/26 P. v. Rubio CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084574

v. (Super.Ct.No. FVI23000184)

LUIS ENRIGUE RUBIO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Nicole Quintana

Winter, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Matthew C. Mulford and

Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Luis Enrique Rubio of attempted murder

(Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), finding it true it was deliberate and premeditated

(§ 189, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that defendant personally inflicted great

bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)),

and he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, to wit, a knife (§ 12022,

subd. (b)(1)). Defendant’s sole challenge on appeal is the trial court gave a legally

erroneous jury instruction on voluntary intoxication that precluded jurors from

considering voluntary intoxication evidence as it relates to premeditation and

deliberation. We conclude the voluntary intoxication instruction was legally erroneous,

but the error is harmless. Therefore, we affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

In 2023, John Sharp was living in Victorville with Diane Goldberg, who was

friends with the victim, T.L. T.L. lived with them “on and off.” In January 2023, T.L.

brought defendant to stay at the house.

On January 12, 2023, around 10:00 a.m., Sharp was in the living room watching

TV, T.L. was in her bedroom, and defendant was back and forth between the bathroom,

bedroom, and kitchen. At one point, defendant went to the kitchen briefly, then Sharp

heard a woman screaming from T.L.’s room. Prior to the screams, Sharp did not hear any

argument or commotion; he only heard the two “conversing.” During T.L.’s screams,

Sharp heard the word knife and sounds that she was being stabbed. He went to her

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2
bedroom door and saw defendant standing over her as she was curled up sitting in the

corner. Sharp told defendant to get out; he was argumentative but left.

Sharp went to check on T.L. and saw a knife sticking out of her face. He described

what he saw as “a massacre” or “something like that out of a horror movie.” Sharp called

911. When police arrived, they found T.L. on the floor of her bedroom; her head was

lying on top of a laundry hamper where there was a pool of blood. They observed blood

splatter on the wall, “a butcher knife with a black handle impaled on the right side of

[T.L.’s] head near the right eye,” and a wine bottle in the trash can.

Sharp told officers that shortly before the stabbing he heard slamming in the

kitchen. A search of the knife drawer in the kitchen revealed that it was in disarray.

Sharp testified that the knives were generally placed neatly under a rubber mat. He did

not create the disarray in the drawer and did not know who did. Sharp assumed

defendant retrieved a knife from the drawer because those were the only knives in the

house.

Shortly after the stabbing was reported, a deputy sheriff located defendant running

on Burning Tree Road near a golf course. The golf course is “about 10-to-15 minutes by

foot” from Sharp’s house. Defendant was wearing only blue jeans and white shoes; he

seemed tired and was sweating “like he had been running.” When defendant saw the

deputy get out of the patrol car, he ran into the golf course. The deputy identified

himself, pursued defendant, and told him to stop. Eventually, he was apprehended; the

deputy found a box cutter with an exposed blade in defendant’s waistband. A search of

the area around the golf course produced a T-shirt next to some bushes that are between

3
Sharp’s house and the location where defendant was detained. Near the collar of the T-

shirt were red stains, which appeared to be blood.

At the time of defendant’s arrest, a sheriff deputy noted that he (defendant) was

shirtless and had blood splatter toward the bottom of his shoes. There appeared to be

blood drops on his left hand and scratches on his left chest and left rib cage. The deputy

opined that the scratches could have been defensive wounds caused by the victim.

Defendant also had a laceration on his right palm, consistent with a knife cut. The deputy

did not check or test the blood for DNA and did not know its origin.

T.L. received sutures for a cut above her eye, a cut to her nose, and a cut to the

right side of her face. She also had bruising to her nose and eye, and her injuries required

surgery.

On January 29, 2023, defendant called T.L. from jail. During the call, he

apologized for hurting her and said that he was not himself that night because he was

hearing voices telling him to hurt her. He stated he just “flipped out” and “snapped” and

did not recall what happened. Defendant told T.L. that before he stabbed her, he was

“tripping” and promised her “no more drugs. No more alcohol, no. None of that shit.”

He said he wanted “to learn from” this incident. T.L. repeatedly forgave him and told

him she loved him. Before the call ended, he told her that his preliminary hearing is

coming up and they will ask her if he was hearing voices. He told her to be honest with

them about him hearing voices and tripping. After repeatedly telling her he loved her,

defendant said, “It was just, you know, we were arguing. It was just a mess, you know?”

4
On May 16, 2024, defendant was charged with premeditated and deliberate

attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 1); assault with intent to commit a felony

(§ 220, subd. (a)(1), count 2); and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1),

count 3). The People dismissed counts 2 and 3 before the jury retired for deliberations. It

was further alleged that defendant committed the attempted murder with a deadly weapon

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).

The jury found defendant guilty of premeditated and deliberate attempted murder, and

found true the deadly weapon and personal infliction of great bodily injury

enhancements. The trial court sentenced him to five years plus seven years to life in state

prison.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court’s instruction on voluntary intoxication was

legally erroneous because it expressly, and improperly, precluded the jury from

considering evidence of his intoxication when deciding premeditation and deliberation.

The People argue the evidence of intoxication was so weak that no instruction was

warranted; furthermore, any error in precluding premeditation and deliberation in its

voluntary intoxication instruction was harmless. We agree the court erred by precluding

premeditation and deliberation in its voluntary intoxication instructions, but conclude the

error is harmless.

A. Relevant Background Facts

At trial, it was noted that a wine bottle was located in the trash can in T.L.’s

bedroom; however, no evidence was introduced as to when and who consumed the wine.

5
During his phone call with T.L., defendant apologized for hurting her, claiming he was

not himself because he was hearing voices tell him to hurt her; he stated he wanted to

learn from this incident and promised her no more drugs or alcohol. No evidence was

introduced to show that defendant was under the influence of any substance at the time of

the incident, nor did the defense offer any expert testimony that defendant’s behavior was

in line with someone who was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Moreover, neither

Sharp, T.L., nor any member of law enforcement observed defendant talking to himself.

Over the prosecution’s objection, the trial court found sufficient evidence to allow

the defense to argue voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent. Accordingly, the

jury was given CALCRIM No. 3426: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the

defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence

only in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill [T.L.] [¶] A person is

voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any

intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating

effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect. [¶] In connection with the charge of

Attempted Murder, the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill. If the People have not met this burden,

you must find the defendant not guilty of Attempted Murder.” The court did not instruct

the jurors that they could also consider defendant’s intoxication when determining

whether he acted with the heightened mental state of premeditation and deliberation.

During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that intoxication may

negate the specific intent for attempted murder, but argued the evidence was insufficient

6
to show that defendant was intoxicated. Specifically, she noted the only evidence was a

wine bottle in the trash can, defendant’s statement to T.L. that he would stay away from

drugs and alcohol, and his claim that he was hearing voices. She pointed out that there

was no evidence defendant had been under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of

his attack on T.L., no evidence of anyone observing him hearing voices, and no expert

testimony to correlate his behavior with intoxication.

Defense counsel argued the prosecution must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that intoxication played no part in” defendant’s attack. In contrast, he claimed

defendant’s voluntary intoxication affected premeditation and deliberation. Counsel

noted that during a jail call to T.L., defendant said he would not do drugs or alcohol

anymore; in response, T.L. stated that she did not know what she had done. According to

counsel, these statements show defendant acted suddenly when he attacked T.L. such that

his attack failed to rise to the level of willful or deliberate.2 Referencing CALCRIM No.

3426, counsel further asserted the phone call conversation demonstrates that drugs or

alcohol played a role in defendant’s actions.3 Regarding the allegation whether he

2 “All of a sudden, all of a sudden, right, nothing in all of a sudden rises to the
level of willful, deliberate, where you went reflected on the consequences of your actions,
what you’re trying to do, right. . . . [¶] Now, when we talk about willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, that’s not just a whim.· That’s not just in the moment.· I was thinking, I
was feeling it, that takes time.· That takes calculation.· And in that moment, even in the
call, [T.L.] mentioned, I don’t know what happened all of a sudden.· I thought everything
was okay.”

3 “And I will show you Jury Instruction No. 3426. All right, which says that the
defendant acted with the intent to kill.· However, a person is voluntarily intoxicated or
other substance.· All right.· So when you listen to the call, . . . you’ll hear [T.L.] agree,
[footnote continued on next page]

7
deliberately and with premeditation attempted to murder T.L., defense counsel reasoned

that to conclude there was deliberate premeditation, the jurors had to conclude “the

voices didn’t matter. [Defendant] wasn’t on drugs. That’s all a ruse, right. He had

planned this all along, right.”4

not as a yes, right, suggesting the way that the People are saying he’s trying to convince
her. That’s far from it.· Everything happened pretty quick. He was talking to the TV.·
He was hearing voices.· And when he said, yeah, we’re going to do the cleansing, she
agreed, yeah, that’s what we’re going to do.·. . . [¶] So, it’s my position, and I believe
that whatever was happening in that bedroom, whatever drugs, alcohol, whatever else
might also be there, played a role.· And for that, while it may be unreasonable to us, in
that moment he was absolutely afraid, right.”

4 “So now going to that willful, deliberate, premeditation.· This is going to be that
first allegation.· So let’s just say you believe that the District Attorney has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the fact [defendant] did intend to kill her.· That this is an extra
step. You can find [defendant] guilty of Count 1 and still find not true of the first
allegation, which is, was it done willfully, with deliberation, with premeditation.
“If you find that he intended to kill, did he weigh the consideration for and against
his choices, knowing the consequences, decided to kill, acting with premeditation.· All
right.· That’s more than just something that—that’s more than just the moment.· It was
the hearing of the voices.· Don’t know what came over him.
“So this is what the People have to do.· The District Attorney has to get to beyond
a reasonable doubt in every single one of those circumstances.· That leaves you with the
only possible reasonable explanation for what happened.· And the only possible
reasonable explanation of what happened is that the voices didn’t matter.· He wasn’t on
drugs.· That’s all a ruse, right. He had planned this all along, right.· Because Mr. Sharp
had explained, I think, that he had mentioned that [T.L.] had either invited him over, or
they’re at the house for maybe a couple of days they were hanging out. But what the
People are suggesting is that he planned this from the very get go.· He knew what he was
going to do.
“Now, I understand one of the things that this says is that you look at the reflection
of time.· So time isn’t necessarily a factor, but the reflection is.· And I don’t believe that
there’s enough evidence here to support that there was enough reflection to the point that
it’s beyond a reasonable doubt, to the point that it leaves you with no other reasonable
possible other option.·
“So if you guys go back there, and you have your discussions, and you realize it is
possible that he intended to kill her, that was done with premeditation, deliberation.·
[footnote continued on next page]

8
In response, the prosecutor argued the evidence was insufficient to show defendant

had consumed any drugs or alcohol, but even if the jurors believed he had, he knew what

he had done as evidenced by the fact that he apologized to T.L. and told her she had done

nothing wrong (which shows he was not so intoxicated that he did not know what was

going on, nor was he defending his family due to some delusion she was attacking him).

Regarding premeditation, counsel maintained there “is no time requirement. Things can

happen all of a sudden.· Even premeditation can happen all of a sudden.·. . . There’s no

evidence of the exact moment he decided to kill [T.L.].· There’s evidence that he did

form that intent before he started stabbing her because what else did he intend to do?”

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Attempted murder is punishable by five, seven, or nine years in state prison. But

if the trier of fact finds the attempted murder was “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,”

the punishment is “imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of

parole.” (§ 664, subd. (a).)

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the effect of voluntary intoxication on

the mental states required for attempted murder. (§ 28, subd. (b); People v. Saille (1991)

54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119-1120 (Saille); People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016

(Castillo) [includes attempted murder].) Rather, voluntary intoxication is more like a

Sure.· You have to come back with guilty. But at the same time, if you come back with
saying, you know what, I think he, I think he was there, he attacked her, he apologized,
but I do believe he was under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or both, or that, yeah, he
does feel bad, he is sorry, he was hearing voices.· He did believe, and it may not be our
reasonable belief, right, his reasonable belief, . . .”

9
“pinpoint” instruction to which a defendant is entitled upon request. (Saille, at p. 1119

[“They are required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the

theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte”]; People v. Ricardi (1992)

9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication but

must give this instruction on request]; Castillo, at p. 1014.) Evidence of voluntary

intoxication is “‘admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually

formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice

aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.’” (Castillo, at p. 1013; see Saille,

supra, at pp. 1111-1112; § 29.4, subd. (b) [jury may consider evidence of voluntary

intoxication and its effect on the defendant’s required mental state].)

“A trial court must instruct the jury, even without a request, on all general

principles of law that are ‘“closely and openly connected to the facts and that are

necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.”’” (People v. Burney (2009)

47 Cal.4th 203, 246.) “Even if the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on a particular

legal point, when it does choose to instruct, it must do so correctly.” (Castillo, supra,

16 Cal.4th at p. 1015.) We review instructional error arguments de novo. (People v.

Lucero (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 750, 758; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733

[“Whether or not to give any particular instruction in any particular case entails the

resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that, we believe, is however predominantly

legal. As such, it should be examined without deference.”].)

10
C. Analysis

Here, the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 3426, which told the jury they may

consider evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication “only in a limited way. You may

consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill

[T.L.].” This instruction did not relate voluntary intoxication to mental state or

premeditation and deliberation. Accordingly, defendant contends the instruction was

erroneous because it unlawfully precluded the jury from considering the intoxication

evidence in deciding whether he acted with premeditation and deliberation. (People v.

Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 (Mendoza); Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at

pp. 1014, 1016.) We agree.

In Castillo, there was evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication prior to the

murder. The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication according to

CALJIC No. 4.21, which provided: “‘In the crimes of murder and attempted murder . . .

a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the perpetrator of the specific intent to

kill. [¶] If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the

alleged crime, you should consider that fact in determining whether the defendant had

such specific intent or mental state. . . .’” (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1014, fn. 2,

italics added.) Jurors also received CALJIC No. 4.21.1 that stated “‘where a specific

intent or mental state is an essential element of the crime’” “‘you should consider the

defendant’s voluntary intoxication in your determination of whether the defendant

possessed the required specific intent or mental state at the time of the commission of the

alleged crime. [¶] Thus in the crimes of murder and attempted murder . . . a necessary

11
element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of a certain specific intent or mental

state which is included in the definition of the crimes set forth elsewhere in these

instructions.’” (Ibid., italics added.) The defendant was convicted of first degree murder,

where the sole theory was premeditation and deliberation. (Id. at pp. 1012-1013.)

On appeal, the defendant faulted trial counsel “for failing to request a ‘pinpoint’

jury instruction specifically relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and

deliberation.” (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1012.) The appellate court agreed, but

our Supreme Court did not. (Id. at p. 1016.) After considering the instructions as a

whole, the court noted that even though the trial court did not include “mental state”

when it told the jury what voluntary intoxication could be considered for, it did relate

voluntary intoxication to “‘specific intent or mental state’” elsewhere in the instructions.

(Ibid.) Thus, the court found that no reasonable juror would have understood them to

permit consideration of “intoxication in determining whether defendant specifically

intended to kill but to prohibit [consideration of] that same intoxication in determining

whether [the defendant] premeditated and deliberated. Premeditation and deliberation are

clearly mental states; no reasonable juror would assume otherwise.” (Id. at p. 1017; see

People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 342 [“‘by relating intoxication to “mental state,”

a reasonable jury would have understood deliberation and premeditation to be “mental

states” for which it should consider the evidence of intoxication’”].)

Defendant correctly notes that the same may not be said here because even when

considering the instructions as a whole, the trial court failed to expressly instruct that the

jury could consider intoxication “‘where a specific intent or mental state is an essential

12
element of the crime.’” (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1017 [“Premeditation and

deliberation are clearly mental states”].) Voluntary intoxication was only linked to

specific intent; the jury was not directed to also consider voluntary intoxication in regard

to mental states. In fact, they were instructed that they may “only” consider intoxication

in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill. By so instructing the jury,

the court effectively precluded them from being able to consider evidence of voluntary

intoxication for premeditation and deliberation. Thus, we cannot conclude that “[n]o

reasonable juror would understand the instructions to permit the jury to consider

intoxication in determining whether defendant specifically intended to kill but to prohibit

it from considering that same intoxication in determining whether he premeditated and

deliberated.” (Ibid.)

Having concluded the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding voluntary

intoxication, we must determine whether it was reasonably probable that the error

affected the verdict adversely to defendant, per People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,

836-837. (See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1134-1135 [error in

voluntary intoxication instruction subject to state law standard of review].) We conclude

that it did not.

The jury was properly instructed on voluntary intoxication as it related to

defendant’s ability to form the specific intent to kill. By finding him guilty of attempted

murder, the jury necessarily rejected any theory that his intoxication prevented him from

forming the specific intent to kill. We also agree with the People that the evidence of

intoxication was scant. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary

13
intoxication only when there is substantial evidence both that the defendant was

voluntarily intoxicated and that his intoxication “affected [his] ‘actual formation of

specific intent.’” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 (Williams); see People

v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 295.)

There is no evidence defendant ingested any controlled substances prior to

attacking T.L., nor did he appear to be under the influence at the time of his arrest.

Although an empty wine bottle was found in the trash can in T.L.’s bedroom, no one

testified that it was defendant who had consumed the wine, how much he had consumed,

or when he had consumed it. Regarding defendant’s jail call to T.L., he claimed to have

heard voices telling him to hurt T.L.; however, he never attributed the voices to his

intoxication. He only mentioned drugs and alcohol when he told T.L. that he wanted to

stop using them and learn from this experience. Still, he never attributed his attack to

being intoxicated. Rather, during his apology to T.L, he said, “It was just, you know, we

were arguing. It was just a mess, you know?”

Nonetheless, assuming the above amounts to substantial evidence of defendant’s

voluntary intoxication, there is still no evidence it had any effect on his mental state.

(See Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 677-678 [no instruction for voluntary intoxication

required where evidence of intoxication was scant]; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th

799, 848 [evidence did not require requested voluntary intoxication instruction where the

record did not support conclusion that at time of offense defendant was unable to

premeditate or form intent to kill].) Evidence of defendant’s acknowledgement that he

was arguing with T.L., coupled with his decision to go to the kitchen, open the knife

14
drawer, lift the mat that covered the knives, select a butcher knife, return to the bedroom,

and then repeatedly stab her, demonstrates he had the mental state to premeditate and

deliberate his actions. Therefore, on this record, we conclude the erroneous instruction

that precluded the jury from considering evidence of defendant’s intoxication when

deciding premeditation and deliberation was harmless. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46

Cal.2d at p. 837 [reasonably probable that a result more favorable would have been

reached absent the error].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. J.

FIELDS
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

J.

15

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.