CourtListener 10839468•People v. Joseph CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 4/8/26 P. v. Joseph CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B338771
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA085387)
v.
MICHAEL JOSEPH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Remanded with
direction.
Benjamin A. Owens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Michael Joseph of various sex offenses.
On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion
and violated his constitutional rights by admitting evidence of a
sex offense he committed in 1996. We reject that contention and
conclude that the trial court properly admitted evidence of that
offense. However, we agree with Joseph’s other contention, that
remand is necessary for the trial court to reconsider whether to
strike one of his prior convictions.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at trial
Joseph was charged with sexual assault offenses against
Ariana R. with allegations under the “One Strike” law, Penal
Code1 section 667.61, which sets forth an alternative and harsher
sentencing scheme for certain sex crimes perpetrated by force.
Ariana, her neighbor, her husband, and a sexual assault response
team (SART) nurse testified at trial, and the trial court admitted
evidence that Joseph had a conviction for a prior sex offense.
Joseph and other witnesses testified in his defense.
A. The sexual assault of Ariana
In June 2023, Ariana was living in an apartment with her
husband Ricky and their ten-month-old daughter. Joseph lived
two apartments down from them. When Joseph moved into his
apartment in November 2022, he introduced himself to Ariana as
“Bear.” Once, while Ariana was getting her mail, Joseph asked
her, “What’s the deal?” and when was she going to let him
“holler” at her. Interpreting Joseph to be referring to something
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
sexual, Ariana told him that she was married, and Joseph
responded that he knew that.
On the evening of June 18, 2023, Ariana and her husband
saw Joseph walking “a bit funny,” “bouncing and kind of putting
his hands in the air.” Thinking that Joseph was trying to be
funny, Ariana laughed and he looked at her.
The next morning, a Monday, Ariana left for work at about
7:40 a.m. Joseph was at his front door. Ariana bade him “Good
morning” and said, “Excuse me,” and then everything “went
black.” The next thing she remembered was fighting and feeling
like she had been tackled. Ariana realized she was in Joseph’s
apartment, and Joseph was behind her with his arm around her
neck, choking her. He released her, and Ariana bit him. Joseph
turned Ariana onto her stomach, held her arms behind her back,
and punched her in the rib area. Joseph told Ariana to do what
he said if she wanted to see her daughter again.
The next thing Ariana remembered was being in the
bathroom and Joseph tying her arms behind her back and her
legs together. He tied what looked like an orange garden hose
that had “PVC” written on it around Ariana’s ankles and neck,
and down to her stomach.
Joseph asked Ariana, “You felt that disrespected?” and said
that she had laughed at him. When Ariana asked if she could see
her daughter one last time, Joseph told her he did not give a
“ ‘fuck’ ” and that he was a sadist, asking if she knew what that
meant. He then told her it meant he got “off on fear.” Joseph put
a sock into Ariana’s mouth and duct taped her mouth. He told
Ariana that he should kill her husband and baby so that nobody
would know what he had done.
3
Joseph left the bathroom but returned with Ariana’s purse.
He asked if she had cash, and she gave a muffled “No.” He then
smashed her phone against the counter and demanded her bank
card pin number, which she gave to him. Joseph came and went
several times and also left for about 10 minutes.
At some point, Joseph returned and “hump[ed]” Ariana
from behind. Joseph then asked Ariana if she had ever been
tortured, put a pillowcase over her head and tied it, and then
threw her into the bathtub. Joseph turned on the water, which
he left running for five to ten minutes. He then took Ariana out
of the bathtub, removed the pillowcase, and asked if she knew
what was going to happen. She answered that he was going to
have sex with her. Joseph pointed a gun at her temple and told
her that he would kill her if she screamed.
Joseph penetrated her anus with his penis, and Ariana
passed out. When she came to, Joseph asked if she remembered
his rules. Ariana repeated that he would kill her if she screamed
or moved or did something he did not like. At some point, Joseph
put the gun in her mouth. Joseph cut off her restraints and told
her to undress. Telling Ariana that she would be “my porn star
for tonight,” he told Ariana to suck his penis. Ariana did as he
demanded. He then bent her over the sink and penetrated her
vagina with his penis. After about ten minutes, he told her to get
onto the floor, and then he again penetrated her vagina with his
penis. Ariana told him he was “so good,” in an attempt to get him
to free her.
Ariana then engaged Joseph in conversation, and they
talked about parenting because Ariana could hear a child in the
background. Joseph also told her he had been arrested in the
past. After talking for about 20 minutes, Joseph said he could
4
not believe what he had done to Ariana. Ariana assured him she
was fine and that they would “get past this.” Joseph began to
cry, and he handed her a knife with jagged edges, saying, “Here.
If it makes you feel any better.” She said no and put the knife
down. Ariana told Joseph she would not say anything and asked
if she could go home. Joseph gave Ariana an Arizona tea jug that
he had filled with water for her to drink from. He told her she
could leave but asked her to shower first. Ariana asked him for a
hairbrush, he gave her a gray one, and she brushed her hair with
it. She then got in the shower and washed her hair and body
with small amounts of shampoo and body wash, not wanting to
scrub away any evidence. Ariana got dressed and exited the
bathroom. Joseph was holding a little boy. Ariana retrieved her
purse from the bathroom and left the apartment.
After realizing her husband was not home, Ariana went to
her neighbor Darrian Walton’s apartment. When Walton opened
the door, Ariana ran inside and told Walton to call her husband.
Walton testified that Ariana had circular burn-like marks on her
wrists. When Ricky arrived, he took Ariana to the hospital,
where a SART nurse examined her. Ariana noticed that it was
11:45 a.m. when they were en route to the hospital.
Ricky testified that he left their apartment at about
9:00 a.m. When he saw Ariana’s car still in the parking lot, he
became concerned and called and texted her multiple times, but
she never responded. He called Ariana’s mother and sister, but
they too had not heard from her. Ricky was driving to the
hospital where Ariana worked when Walton called him and said
Ariana was at his apartment. When Ricky arrived at Walton’s
apartment, Ariana said she did not know what had happened to
her. As she and Ricky walked by Joseph’s apartment on their
5
way to the hospital, Ariana said, “Shush.” Ricky asked if “it was
him,” referring to Joseph.
When Joseph was arrested the day after Ariana was
assaulted, he had a loaded pellet gun that had been modified to
fire .357 rounds. He was also wearing a black and blue glove,
and he had an abrasion to his left palm area.
After his arrest, Joseph told the investigating officer,
Detective Justin Waites, that Ariana had been cheating on her
husband with him since November 2022. He and Ariana had
been having sex twice a week. But the week before the incident,
Joseph told Ariana he was seeing someone else, which upset her.
B. The investigation
The SART nurse who examined Ariana testified that when
she first encountered Ariana, Ariana was crying, her hair and
clothing were wet, and she said, “All I saw was dark.” The nurse
immediately observed petechiae on Ariana’s face, neck, the palate
of her mouth, and ears consistent with strangulation; bruising on
her mouth and face; and linear marks or redness on her neck.
Ariana had pattern injuries from her head down to her legs that
were consistent with being tied up, and her fingernails were
broken and one fingernail had been ripped from the nailbed.
Ariana also had redness in her cervical area, multiple lacerations
to her anal verge (the area going into the anal canal and rectum),
and extensive lacerations going into her anal area. Injuries to
Ariana’s genitals and anal area were consistent with the sexual
assault Ariana reported.
The investigating detective testified that he spoke to
Ariana at the hospital. She told him that her assailant wore a
blue cloth glove and had a gun and a hunting-type knife with a
jagged edge. Law enforcement found various items that Ariana
6
had described in Joseph’s apartment: orange-yellow rope, duct
tape, a gray hairbrush,2 a knife with a jagged edge, an empty
Arizona tea jug, and a shampoo bottle. When the detective
entered the bathroom, the smell of bleach overwhelmed him, and
the bathtub was full of what the detective thought were cleaning
chemicals.
DNA likely to have originated from Joseph was found on
Ariana’s body.
C. Propensity evidence
Nicole D. testified that on April 27, 1996, she was living in
an apartment in Utah with her husband and three children, aged
three, two, and four weeks. Nicole asked a downstairs neighbor
to help her with a broken cable box. Her neighbor came over
with two men, including Joseph, whom she did not know. Nicole
thought that Joseph had been drinking. The men were unsure
how to fix the cable box, so the neighbor and one of the men left
to go to the gas station, leaving Joseph behind. Nicole told
Joseph that she needed to attend to her children and she went to
her bedroom, thinking he would leave. However, when she came
out of her bedroom, Joseph was in the hall. He pointed a gun at
her head and told her to be quiet and they were going to “do this.”
Joseph pushed her onto her bed and tried to undo her pants. Two
of the children came in and started screaming. Joseph waved the
gun at Nicole’s daughters to shut them up. Nicole begged Joseph
not to do this in front of her kids, that she had just had an
episiotomy, and that he could rip her open causing her to bleed to
death.
2 The hairbrush had no hair in it.
7
Nicole then heard a knock on her door, and her neighbor
Amanda entered the apartment. Joseph told Nicole to act like
nothing had happened. He put the gun in his pocket and
followed Nicole to the front room, where Amanda was waiting.
Amanda asked to use Nicole’s phone, and Nicole whispered to
Amanda not to leave. Soon after, Nicole’s neighbor and the other
man returned from the gas station and told Joseph that he
needed to go. When Joseph said he did not want to go, the men
“got a little ruder” until Joseph left. Amanda then called 911.
D. Defense evidence
Davion Davis testified that he lived in the same apartment
complex as Joseph, who was like a brother to him. On the day of
the incident with Ariana, Davis was at Joseph’s apartment from
7:14 a.m. to about 8:30 a.m. Davis left but returned at 10:00 a.m.
and stayed for about another hour. The only people in the
apartment were Davis, Joseph, and the child.
Another neighbor of Joseph’s who lived on the same floor
testified that on the day of the incident she saw Joseph between
7:10 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. Joseph was carrying a “beverage fridge”
to a car. The neighbor left to take her children to school. Based
on the neighbor’s routine, if it was a Monday, she would have
returned to her apartment between 11:45 a.m. and 12:15 p.m.,
and she saw Joseph repairing a dresser outside his apartment.
A defense investigator testified that Walton’s mother told
her that three weeks before the incident, Walton saw Ariana
smile at Joseph in a flirty way. However, both Walton and his
mother denied that Walton said this about Ariana.
Joseph testified that he was convicted of sexual abuse in
Utah in 1996 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. After serving
his sentence, he moved to California, where he was convicted of
8
two robberies in 2016 and again sentenced to prison. In
November 2022, Joseph moved to the apartment building where
Ariana lived. He met Ariana the day he moved in and they
talked frequently, but they stopped talking when Joseph’s wife
moved in with him in December 2022.
Joseph and Ariana became “intimate” in February 2023,
and she went to his apartment every day. They had sex four
times during their affair. The body wash and hairbrush in his
apartment belonged to Ariana. Ariana told Joseph that she and
her husband were having problems, and they talked about her
medical issues, his prior conviction in Utah, and that he had
received a letter informing him that he had satisfied
“requirements under Utah law for that particular charge” and
was “being removed from any type of documentation.”
On June 17, 2023, which was two days before the incident,
Joseph and Ariana had sex. But Ariana got upset when Joseph
told her he was reconciling with his wife, who had moved out that
April.
On June 19, 2023, Davis stopped by in the morning to help
Joseph childproof the apartment. Joseph took a refrigerator to
the car at about 7:30 a.m., and he worked on setting up his
surround sound in the living room until about 9:30 a.m. A
carpenter by trade, Joseph kept tools in his apartment, including
an orange compression hose and rope. He frequently wore gloves
when working.
Joseph denied forcing Ariana into his apartment, having
sex with her, sodomizing her, or assaulting her.
9
II. Verdict and sentence
A jury convicted Joseph of sodomy by use of force (§ 286,
subd. (c)(2)(A); count 1), forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd.
(c)(2)(A); count 2), forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4).
As to counts 1, 2, and 3, the jury found true special allegations
that he kidnapped the victim, personally used a firearm, and tied
or bound the victim (§§ 667.61, subd. (e), 207, 209, 209.5, 12022,
12022.5, 12022.53).
On June 14, 2024, the trial court found that Joseph had
two prior strike convictions in the same case. Defense counsel
argued that one strike had to be dismissed under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) because
Joseph engaged in a single act that resulted in the two strikes.
The facts, based on the probation report as relayed by defense
counsel, were that Joseph was driving a vehicle in which two
accomplices were passengers. His accomplices took a phone from
Victim No. 1. When Victim No. 2 tried to get the phone back,
force was used to keep the phone. The prosecutor countered that
the two victims were in a car, a codefendant took the phone from
a victim and ran, the second victim ran after him and retrieved
the phone, and then three men attacked the second victim and
took the phone. It was unclear whether Joseph was one of the
three men who attacked the second victim. But it was not a
single act but separate acts, and Joseph aided and abetted those
acts.
The trial court agreed with the prosector’s argument,
denied the motion to dismiss a prior strike, and sentenced Joseph
under the “Three Strikes” law to 25 years to life on counts 1, 2,
and 3, each, tripled to 75 years to life, and to eight months
10
doubled to 16 months on count 4, for a total prison term of 225
years to life plus 16 months.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility of Joseph’s prior conviction for forcible sexual
abuse
Joseph contends that the trial court abused its discretion
and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair by admitting
evidence of his conviction for forcible sexual abuse against Nicole.
A. Additional background
Before trial, the prosecutor said he would seek to admit
evidence of Joseph’s prior 1996 conviction in Utah for forcible
sexual abuse. Defense counsel objected that the conviction had
low probative value because Joseph committed the offense when
he was 15 years old (he was 43 years old when he assaulted
Ariana), the prior offense was a “nighttime opportunistic incident
with a stranger” whereas the current incident was a planned
morning attack, and the prior offense did not involve penetration.
Also, the prior offense was remote in time, inflammatory, and it
was not possible to investigate it given the passage of time, as
one witness had died and another did not remember the events.
The trial court found that the prior offense was admissible
under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1108 because the past
and current offenses involved similar facts such as use of a
firearm and “a willingness to carry out the act with minor
children present.”
At trial, Nicole testified about the sexual assault as
described above. The trial court also admitted documents
regarding Joseph’s prior conviction: the charging document, the
11
minute entry of the preliminary hearing, and the minute entry of
the judgment.
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting propensity evidence or violate Joseph’s
constitutional rights
Evidence of prior criminal acts is generally inadmissible to
prove the defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (a).) But where a defendant is charged with a
sexual offense, evidence the defendant committed other sexual
offenses is admissible to prove the defendant’s propensity to
commit crimes of a sexual nature if the evidence is not
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. (Evid. Code,
§ 1108, subd. (a); see generally People v. Falsetta (1999) 21
Cal.4th 903, 911; People v. Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
781, 795–796.) Accordingly, evidence a defendant committed
other sexual offenses should be excluded under Evidence Code
section 352 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
Otherwise, admissibility of uncharged acts depends on
(1) whether the propensity evidence is similar enough to the
charged behavior so that it tends to show the defendant
committed the charged offense, (2) whether the propensity
evidence is stronger and more inflammatory than evidence of the
defendant’s charged acts, (3) whether the uncharged conduct is
remote or stale, (4) whether the propensity evidence is likely to
confuse or distract the jurors from their main inquiry, and
(5) whether admitting the propensity evidence will require an
12
undue consumption of time. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 1096, 1117.)
We review a challenge to a trial court’s admission of
Evidence Code section 1108 evidence for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 824.)
As we now explain, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence of the uncharged offense.
1. Similarity of the offenses
The uncharged offense involving Nicole was similar to the
current offense involving Ariana. In both cases, Joseph used a
gun and did more than just display it: he pointed a gun at
Nicole’s head and waved it threateningly at her children, and he
put a gun in Ariana’s mouth. In both cases, Joseph’s victims
were mothers, and the crimes took place with children present.
Nicole’s three children were in the apartment, and two of them
came into the room where Joseph was abusing Nicole. Similarly,
Joseph’s son was in the apartment while he was assaulting
Ariana, who could hear the child at times. And in both cases,
Joseph threatened children: he waved a gun at Nicole’s children
when they came into the room, and he told Ariana he would kill
her baby, as well as her husband.
Joseph counters that the offenses were dissimilar because
Nicole was a stranger, but he knew Ariana. Although Ariana and
Joseph had some minimal interaction as neighbors, those bare
contacts in no way elevated Ariana to something more than a
stranger to Joseph. Indeed, in both incidents, Joseph took
advantage of unplanned situations in which both victims found
themselves alone: Joseph was in Nicole’s apartment to help fix a
cable box and Ariana happened to pass Joseph as she was on her
way to work.
13
This case is therefore not like People v. Harris (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 727, which Joseph cites. In that case, the
prosecution charged defendant, a nurse, with sex offenses against
two patients. (Id. at pp. 731–732.) One victim had consensual
sex with defendant once and he raped her a second time. The
second victim was on heavy medications when the defendant
sexually assaulted her. (Ibid.) The trial court admitted a highly
sanitized version of a violent sexual assault that the defendant
had committed 23 years earlier. Although the actual facts were
that the defendant had entered the victim’s apartment, used a
sharp instrument to rip her muscles from her vagina to rectum,
and stabbed her in the chest with an ice pick, the jury only heard
that the bloodied victim was found in her nightgown with injuries
to the head and face. (Id. at pp. 734–735.) On appeal, the court
found that the prior offense should have been excluded because
the charged crimes involved breach of trust whereas the prior
crime involved a violent and perverse attack on a stranger, the
incomplete version of the prior offense might have caused jurors
to speculate about the true nature of the earlier crime, the prior
offense was remote, and the evidence had little probative value
because the incidents were so dissimilar. (Id. at pp. 738–741.)
Harris is distinguishable because, as we have detailed,
Joseph’s prior and charged sex offenses were similar. (See People
v. Callahan (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 356, 367–368 [Evid. Code,
§ 1108 does not require precise or exacting equivalence as long as
prior offense is “ ‘rationally probative’ ”].) Moreover, Harris was
also concerned about the sanitized version of the prior offense
given to the jury which allowed them to speculate about it. That
was not an issue here.
14
2. Strength and inflammatory nature of prior
offense
The propensity evidence was not stronger and more
inflammatory than evidence of the charged acts. Joseph did not
punch or tie up Nicole for an extended time as he did to Ariana.
Also, he did not penetrate Nicole, albeit likely because a neighbor
interrupted him. However, Joseph penetrated Ariana anally and
vaginally. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1287
[trial court did not abuse its discretion where uncharged offense
was “less inflammatory” than charged offenses].) Also, the
presence of Nicole’s children while he was abusing her did not
render that crime more inflammatory. Rather, Joseph also
assaulted Ariana while a child—Joseph’s son—was present. For
these reasons, we do not agree that Joseph’s sexual abuse of
Nicole was likely to invoke an improper emotional bias or cause
jurors to prejudge him based on extraneous factors. (See id. at
pp. 1287–1288 [“Although evidence of the prior offense would
elicit a negative emotional response from the jurors …, it was less
inflammatory than the charge that defendant raped, strangled,
and cut the throat of” the victim “while her children slept
upstairs”].)
3. Remoteness
Joseph assaulted Nicole in 1996, about 25 years before he
committed his crimes against Ariana in 2023. A defendant’s
incarceration is relevant to whether criminal conduct is remote
because incarceration decreases a defendant’s opportunity to
commit additional crimes. (See, e.g., People v. Loy (2011) 52
Cal.4th 46, 62–63 [defendant’s prior crime not remote under
Evid. Code, § 1108 where defendant spent years in prison during
15
intervening period]; People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1245
[17-year gap between prior and current murders explained by
incarceration during substantial part of gap].) Joseph was
sentenced to and, according to him, served 15 years in prison for
his crime against Nicole in 1996. Based on that timeline, he
would have been released in 2010 or 2011. He then committed
robberies in 2016, was sentenced to prison, and paroled in
January 2023. Therefore, although about 25 years separated his
sexual abuse of Nicole and his sexual assaults against Ariana, he
was incarcerated for at least 20 years of that time. (See People v.
Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 133 [crimes occurring 13 and 18
years before charged crime were admissible]; People v. Spector
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1389 [28-year-old prior offense
admissible].) He therefore lacked opportunity to commit other
sexual-related crimes, and this lack of opportunity mitigates any
remoteness of the prior offense.
4. Evidence Code section 352
Propensity evidence regarding Nicole was unlikely to
confuse or distract jurors from their main inquiry. Rather, Nicole
was the sole witness to testify about the uncharged evidence, and
her testimony did not consume an undue amount of time.
Joseph, however, argues that the trial court abused its discretion
under Evidence Code section 352 by allowing Nicole to testify at
all, because his prior conviction resulted from a plea and counsel
was unable to locate witnesses due to the passage of time.
However, our Legislature enacted Evidence Code section 1108 to
“relax the evidentiary restraints” imposed by Evidence Code
section 1101, to “expand the admissibility of disposition or
propensity evidence in sex offense cases,” and “assure that the
trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sex
16
offenses in evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s
credibility.” (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 911.)
Therefore, while the trial court could consider any difficulty the
passage of time had on Joseph’s ability to counter Nicole’s
testimony, this was merely one factor for the trial court to
consider.
Nor do we agree that the evidence had little probative
value based on Joseph’s young age when he sexually abused
Nicole. He asserts that his “actions at the age of 15 are not
particularly probative of his intent and actions as an over the age
of 40 years adult.” Joseph’s age when he committed the prior
offense could be a factor to consider in conducting an analysis
under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352. However, cases
about juvenile criminal culpability focus on why we treat
juveniles differently for purposes of sentencing; for example, their
still developing brains and social situation make them less
culpable than adults. (See generally Miller v. Alabama (2012)
567 U.S. 460, 471–474.) Joseph’s age when he sexually abused
Nicole certainly might help to explain why he committed his
crime and speak to what his punishment should have been for it.
But his age is less relevant to, for example, his modus operandi or
to similarity between the crimes, which are the factors at issue
here. Moreover, defense counsel cited Joseph’s age when he
sexually abused Nicole as a ground to exclude the uncharged
conduct. The trial court therefore knew and, we must assume
absent evidence to the contrary, considered that fact but
nonetheless found Nicole’s testimony admissible.
Given the balance of factors, we cannot find that the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the propensity evidence.
Thus, even if we agreed that Joseph’s sexual assault against
17
Nicole was remote, we would not conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion. Rather, Evidence Code sections 352 and
1108 do not contain rigid requirements (People v. Cordova, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 133), and “significant similarities between the
prior and the charged offenses” may balance out any remoteness
(People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 285).
C. Fundamental fairness
Joseph also contends that the admission of propensity
evidence undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial and
violated his constitutional rights. However, admission of
propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1108 does not
violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. (People v. Falsetta,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 907.) We therefore reject this contention.
II. Sentencing
Joseph next contends that the trial court erred in
sentencing him as a third strike offender because his two prior
strike convictions for robbery were based on a single act.
In a series of cases, our California Supreme Court has
addressed how many strikes should be counted when a defendant
has multiple convictions arising from related acts. In People v.
Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930 (Fuhrman), the defendant had
multiple strike convictions stemming from an incident in which
he stole a car, collided with another car and brandished a gun at
that car’s driver, and then forced his way at gunpoint into a truck
and made the truck driver take him from the scene. Although
the court held that qualifying strike convictions can be brought
and tried in the same case and counted as separate strikes, the
court left open whether the Three Strikes law allows “separate
strikes to be imposed for offenses that in a prior proceeding were
18
determined to have been committed as part of an indivisible
transaction, and as to which it was concluded that imposition of
separate punishment for each offense would constitute multiple
punishment proscribed by” section 654. (Fuhrman, at p. 941.)
The court addressed that issue in People v. Benson (1998)
18 Cal.4th 24. In that case, the defendant entered an apartment
and stabbed its occupant, resulting in strike convictions for
residential burglary and assault with intent to commit murder.
(Id. at p. 27.) The court held that crimes sustained in one action
and arising from the same facts are separate strikes, even if the
crimes were closely connected and punishment on one had been
stayed under section 654. (Benson, at p. 26.)
Next, People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 637 (Vargas),
on which Joseph relies, held that two prior convictions arising out
of a single act against a single victim cannot constitute two
strikes under the Three Strikes law. The single act in Vargas
was forcibly taking the victim’s car, which resulted in convictions
for robbery and carjacking. (Id. at p. 645.)
Finally, while this matter has been pending on appeal, our
California Supreme Court issued People v. Shaw (2025)
18 Cal.5th 1089 (Shaw), which involved two victims. In that
case, the defendant had two prior convictions for gross vehicular
manslaughter arising from an incident in which Shaw struck a
car, killing two passengers. (Id. at p. 1093.) The court found that
its rationale in Vargas applied, notwithstanding that multiple
victims were involved. That is, voters in enacting the Three
Strikes law would have reasonably “ ‘understood the “Three
Strikes” baseball metaphor to mean that a person would have
three chances—three swings at the bat, if you will—before the
harshest penalty could be imposed. The public also would have
19
understood that no one can be called for two strikes on just one
swing.’ ” (Shaw, at p. 1098.) The dispositive point thus is
whether the convictions stem from a single act, and not how
many people are harmed by that singular act. (Id. at pp. 1101–
1102.) The court said, “It is true that an act that harms multiple
people is more serious than an act that does not and may be
punished accordingly. But the purpose of Three Strikes
sentencing is not (and, for double jeopardy reasons, cannot be) to
impose additional punishment for prior criminal acts that have
already been punished. The purpose is instead to fix the
appropriate punishment for the defendant’s current offense—an
offense the law considers ‘ “ ‘to be an aggravated offense because
a repetitive one.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1101.)
Justice Groban, joined by Justices Liu and Evans,
concurred in Shaw. Although Justice Groban agreed with Vargas
and the majority’s conclusion in Shaw, he suggested that the
cases called into question the court’s prior determination, among
others, that “two offenses committed in quick succession against
two separate victims should qualify as separate strikes. (See
People v. Fuhrman, [supra,]16 Cal.4th 930[.]” (Shaw, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 1104 [conc. opn. of Groban, J.].) Justice Groban noted that a
“divide” “in our case law makes little sense: commit two acts in
quick succession against a single victim, as in Benson, (two
strikes); commit two acts separated by mere seconds against two
victims, as in Fuhrman (two strikes); commit a single act against
a single victim that results in two convictions, as in Vargas (one
strike); commit a single act that kills two victims, as described in
today’s majority opinion (one strike). The line separating each of
these scenarios is blurry at best.” (Ibid.) Justice Groban
concluded that defendants who commit a violent felony after two
20
prior failed attempts at reform should be subject to the Three
Strikes law, implying that he would overrule Benson and
Fuhrman.
This case presents one of those “blurry” scenarios Justice
Groban referred to, especially because Joseph’s role in the
robberies was not clearcut. Joseph’s two strikes were for two
robberies committed close in time against two victims.3 That
case involved the robbery of a cellphone from two victims,
Rebecca Fox and her husband Salim Halabi. Fox and Halabi
were in their car waiting for a friend. (People v. Joseph, supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) A young man approached and took Fox’s
cellphone after a struggle with her. Halabi chased the young
man. Two other men exited a car, and one kicked Halabi. The
three assailants got into the car and left. A witness saw the
three passengers beating Halabi while a fourth man, the getaway
driver, waited in the car. Another witness also never saw the
getaway driver get out of the car. The getaway car was
registered to Joseph, and surveillance video taken about an hour
before the robbery showed Joseph, alone, driving his car at a fast
food drive-thru and then getting out of the car and talking to
several young men, who got into the car.
Based on this, defense counsel argued at the sentencing
hearing that Joseph was the getaway driver who committed a
single act of aiding and abetting the robbery of a cellphone. The
3 The facts underlying the robberies were accurately
summarized in the opinion affirming in part and reversing in
part the judgment, People v. Joseph (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 943.
We take judicial notice of that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd.
(a).) We also grant the Attorney General’s request for judicial
notice of the record in that appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d),
459, subd. (a).)
21
prosecutor countered that it was unclear whether Joseph was one
of the three men who attacked the second victim and, in any
event, Joseph aided and abetted separate and distinct acts,
snatching the cellphone from Fox and then beating Halabi to get
the cellphone back. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor
and denied the Romero motion to strike one of robbery
convictions.
Although the trial court here said it was adopting the
prosecutor’s argument, it is unclear what it meant by that
statement. It is unclear whether the trial court based its decision
on a finding that Joseph committed separate acts, that Joseph
did something more than just drive the getaway car, or that there
were two victims. Moreover, the trial court did not have the
benefit of Shaw, and it therefore may have applied the wrong
legal standard, which constitutes an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) We therefore remand this
matter to the trial court to reconsider Joseph’s Romero motion.
We express no opinion on what the outcome should be on remand.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with
the direction to the trial court to reconsider Joseph’s motion to
strike a prior conviction. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
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