CourtListener 10829980•REF Apartments v. Heredia CA1/4
Testo completo
Filed 3/30/26 REF Apartments v. Heredia CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
REF APARTMENTS, LLC, as
successor in interest to
STRATEGIC ACQUISITIONS, A171985
INC.,
Plaintiff, Cross- (Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
HG19002938)
v.
GILBERT HEREDIA, an
individual, et al.
Defendants, Cross-
Complainants and Appellants.
This action involves competing claims by REF Apartments,
LLC (REF) and Lori and Gilbert Heredia to quiet title to
residential property in Livermore (the property). Sitting without
a jury, the trial court quieted title to the property in the names of
Lori Heredia and Gilbert Heredia. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
The Foreclosure Sale and Subsequent Lawsuits
In 2007, the Heredias entered into a residential loan
agreement with Countrywide Bank, N.A. (Countrywide) for
1
$712,000.1 The loan documents listed an incorrect address for
the property. The notary conducting the loan document signing
advised the Heredias to sign the documents as-is and then notify
the bank of the error. The Heredias signed the loan documents
and immediately thereafter notified Countrywide of the incorrect
address. Countrywide updated its internal records so
communications were sent to the Heredias at the correct address,
but Countrywide recorded a deed of trust with the incorrect
property address.
Sometime later, Gilbert2 contacted Countrywide about a
loan modification, and Countrywide advised him that he would
need to default on the loan before the bank would process a
request for a loan modification. The Heredias accordingly
defaulted on their loan, and Countrywide recorded a notice of
default on March 6, 2009. That same day, Countrywide assigned
the loan to Bank of America, and the deed of trust to Recontrust
Company (Recontrust) on behalf of Bank of America.
After receiving the notice of default, the Heredias contacted
Countrywide to obtain a loan modification, but Countrywide
stated that it had no record of the loan and could not process a
loan modification. Gilbert also contacted Bank of America and
Recontrust to pay off the loan and/or obtain a loan modification.
Bank of America was unable to assist the Heredias because Bank
1 The facts set forth herein are taken from the judgment.
2 When we refer to Lori or Gilbert individually, we will use
their first names since they share a last name.
2
of America could not locate the loan documents. Recontrust (on
behalf of Bank of America) issued two notices of trustee’s sale.
Before the trustee’s sale took place, the note and the deed
of trust were assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
(Deutsche Bank). Deutsche Bank executed and recorded a
substitution of trustee and assignment of the deed of trust. On
October 29, 2010, a new notice of trustee’s sale on Deutsche
Bank’s behalf was recorded for a foreclosure sale on February 16,
2011. Notices for this trustee’s sale were mailed to the wrong
address and posted on the door of a neighbor’s house (the wrong
house). The Heredias did not receive notice of the trustee’s sale.
Deutsche Bank bought the property at the foreclosure sale
on February 16, 2011, and obtained a trustee’s deed of sale
(trustee’s deed). The Heredias were unaware of the trustee’s sale
until they were sued by Deutsche Bank in an unlawful detainer
action in 2011.
At some point, the Heredias obtained private financing and
offered to pay the full $712,000 outstanding loan balance to
Deutsche Bank, an offer that was rejected. In 2013, the Heredias
filed a lis pendens.
On April 3, 2014, Deutsche Bank executed a quitclaim deed
for the property in favor of Strategic Acquisition, Inc. (Strategic).
On September 11, 2023, Strategic transferred the property to
REF Apartments, LLC (REF) by grant deed.
Between 2011 and 2018, Deutsche Bank and Strategic filed
five unlawful detainer actions against the Heredias. The trial
court found, “In response to each of these actions, the Heredias
3
alleged that the defects in the trustee sale rendered the bank’s
title (and later, Strategic’s title) invalid. The Heredias prevailed
in each of these actions, either because the plaintiff dismissed the
action or – in one case – after the trial court issued a decision in
the Heredias’ favor, finding that Strategic was not a bona fide
purchaser, and that Strategic had failed to demonstrate
ownership of the Property. That decision is res judicata.”3
The Heredias remained in possession of the property at all
relevant times.
On January 16, 2019, Strategic filed an action for quiet
title, trespass, and ejectment, and Strategic’s action was later
consolidated with the Heredias’ November 2021 action to quiet
title. In 2024, the court allowed REF to file an amended
complaint substituting itself in as plaintiff as Strategic’s
3 Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude the trial court
here found that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the
bona fide purchaser issue only. The court in the unlawful
detainer action concluded that Strategic was not a bona fide
purchaser and that Strategic had failed to show a prima facie
case that it owned the property, purchased the property from a
purchaser at a trustee’s sale, had standing, and was entitled to
possession. Reviewing the arguments made at trial in the
current litigation, the record does not show that the Heredias
contended that the unlawful detainer action precluded
relitigation of whether Strategic held title to the property
through a purchase from Deutsche Bank, who in turn purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale. Instead, the Heredias
argued below, as they do on appeal, that the unlawful detainer
action had conclusively determined that Strategic was not a bona
fide purchaser. Furthermore, the court here made factual
findings that Deutsche Bank obtained title to the property at the
foreclosure sale and quitclaimed its interest to Strategic.
4
successor-in-interest. The 2024 trial of the parties’ claims was
bifurcated, with the first stage limited to the competing quiet
title claims. The court conducted a bench trial lasting less than
one day.
The Statement of Decision and Judgment
The court concluded that REF’s quiet title claim failed
because REF failed to trace a clear chain of title to the property,
and quieted title in favor of the Heredias.
Regarding REF’s claim, the court stated, “REF obtained the
Property from Strategic. At the time it did so, REF was on notice
of defects in title held by Strategic and that the Heredias claimed
title, claimed that the foreclosure and trustee sale was invalid,
and that the Heredias had prevailed [through voluntary
dismissal or favorable judgment] in at least five unlawful
detainer actions on this basis. REF was not a bona fide
purchaser for value.
“Strategic purchased the Property from Deutsche Bank. At
the time of Strategic’s purchase, the Heredias had already
recorded a lis pendens, and had successfully defended unlawful
detainer actions brought by Deutsche Bank, alleging Deutsche
Bank was not the rightful owner of the Property because of
defects in the trustee’s sale. Strategic was on notice about the
defects in the title held by Deutsche Bank and it was not a bona
fide purchaser for value.
“Deutsche Bank was the holder of the deed of trust at the
time of the trustee sale and also the purchaser of the Property at
the foreclosure sale. As such, it was responsible for and on notice
5
about the serious defects in the trustee sale; namely, that the
notice of trustee sale was never mailed or posted to the Heredias
as required by statute. Deutsche Bank was not a bona fide
purchaser for value. [¶] Because REF fails to trace a clear chain
of title, REF’s quiet title claim fails.”
The court also found that the “conclusive presumption
language” in the trustee’s deed did not establish REF’s claim.
Here, the court reasoned that the trustee’s deed was voidable and
there were grounds for equitable relief against Deutsche Bank,
who was the foreclosing party and purchaser and who was
presumptively aware of the notice defects. The court added,
“Moreover, only a bona fide purchaser can enforce a voidable
deed,” and “REF is not a bona fide purchaser.”
The court next addressed REF’s arguments that the statute
of limitations and laches barred the Heredias’ claim to quiet title
and that the Heredias could not prevail because they failed to
prove a valid tender. Regarding tender, the court said, “[T]he
Heredias provided uncontroverted testimony that they offered to
pay the entire amount of their indebtedness both before and after
the foreclosure sale, and that the banks turned away their offers.
(See Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 531–532.)”
The court concluded that no statute of limitations had begun to
run on the Heredias’ quiet title claim because they were in
undisputed possession of the property. The court rejected REF’s
invocation of equity and laches because it found the equities
favored the Heredias and any harm from delay was attributable
to both parties.
6
The court entered a judgment stating that “title shall be
quieted in [Lori Heredia’s and Gilbert Heredia’s] favor. [Lori
Heredia and Gilbert Heredia] are declared to have full legal and
beneficial ownership interest in the premises . . . .” However, the
court also ordered that the Heredias would be returned to the
position they were in prior to the foreclosure. The court
reinstated the deed of trust in effect at the time of foreclosure,
and it awarded REF a lien superior to all other liens for property
taxes that REF and Strategic had paid.
DISCUSSION
REF and the Heredias both contend that they are entitled
to a judgment quieting title in the property. A quiet title action
finally settles and determines the parties’ conflicting claims to
property (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
266, 298), and a plaintiff must establish title to the property in
dispute to prevail. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) The plaintiff
“may recover only upon the strength of his or her own
title . . . and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s title.”
(Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 Cal.2d 702, 706.)
“The cases . . . more accurately state that plaintiff must prove a
title in himself superior to that of defendant.” (Gerhard v.
Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 918.) “[A] plaintiff who relies
solely on a paper or record title must trace his chain of title back
to the government or to a predecessor shown to have been in
possession.” (San Diego Improvement Co. v. Brodie (1932)
215 Cal. 97, 100.)
7
The crux of REF’s complaint to quiet title is that it acquired
title to the property (through Strategic) from Deutsche Bank,
which acquired title through the trustee’s deed after the
foreclosure sale. The crux of the Heredias’ defense and of their
own claim to quiet title is that they should be deemed to hold
superior title because the foreclosure sale and trustee’s deed were
void or voidable in equity given that the trustee’s notice of sale
was not properly posted or served. Because the foreclosure sale
lies at the center of this dispute, we briefly review the law
governing nonjudicial foreclosure.
Nonjudicial Foreclosure
“A deed of trust to real property acting as security for a
loan typically has three parties: the trustor (borrower), the
beneficiary (lender), and the trustee.” (Yvanova v. New Century
Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 926.) If the trustor
defaults on the loan secured by a deed of trust, the beneficiary
may demand that the trustee conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale. (Ibid.) To proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, a
beneficiary or trustee must first record a notice of default. (Civ.
Code4, § 2924, subd. (a)(1).) If the default is curable, the notice
must specify the sums that are required to cure the default.
(§§ 2924, subd. (a)(1)(D), 2924c.) After the notice of default is
given, at least three months must elapse before notice of a
trustee’s sale may be given. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1)(D),(2)–(3).) The
notice of trustee’s sale must be given at least 20 days before the
4 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code
unless otherwise specified.
8
sale, and this notice must be recorded, published, posted on the
property, and mailed as required by statute. (§§ 2924b, 2924f,
subd. (b).)
Where a trustee’s deed to the buyer at a foreclosure sale
recites that all procedural requirements for the notices of default
and sale have been satisfied, there is a statutory rebuttable
presumption that such notice requirements have been fulfilled;
there is also a common law presumption in favor of the regularity
of the sale. (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc., (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1255; § 2924, subd. (c).) In addition, there
is a conclusive statutory presumption created in favor of a bona
fide purchaser who receives a trustee’s deed that contains a
recital that the trustee has fulfilled its statutory notice
requirements. (§ 2924, subd. (c).) The party challenging the
trustee’s sale has the burden to prove prejudicial irregularity
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the sale’s regularity.
(Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 103, 105.)
Furthermore, where there are notice defects related to the
foreclosure sale, the trustee’s deed after sale may be void or
voidable. (Little v. CFS Service Corp. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d
1354, 1358–1360.) The factors that determine whether the sale
under a deed of trust with notice defects is void or voidable are
the existence and effect of conclusive presumption language in
the trustee’s deed with respect to the foreclosure sale’s regularity
and the status of the buyer. (Homestead Savings v. Darmiento
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 424, 436.) “The sale is void where there is
a notice defect and no conclusive presumption [language].
9
[Citation.] A sale is void where there is a notice defect and
conclusive presumption language and recitals in the deed which
establish on its face the irregularity of the sale. This could occur
where there were postponements of a sale which show that
proper notice could not have been given. [Citation.] A sale is
voidable where there is a notice defect and conclusive
presumption language and there is no bona fide purchaser for
value. [Citation.] Where the evidence establishes that the
trustee conveyed title to a bona fide purchaser and the trustee’s
deed contains the language specified in section 2924, the sale is
not voidable. [Citation.] Any failure to comply with the
procedural requirements does not affect the validity of a sale to a
bona fide purchaser for value.” (Homestead Savings, at p. 436.)
Here, the trustee’s deed is voidable because it is undisputed
that Deutsche Bank, Strategic, and REF were not bona fide
purchasers and the deed contains a recital that the trustee has
fulfilled its statutory notice obligations. (Little v. CFS Service
Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1358–1360.)
Analysis
REF argues that the judgment must be reversed because:
(1) the Heredias’ claim to title depended on their ability to obtain
affirmative relief in equity setting aside the voidable foreclosure
and that claim was time-barred; (2) the Heredias were required
to, but failed to, establish a valid and viable tender; and (3) the
judgment reinstating the deed of trust and providing nothing to
REF except a lien for property taxes exceeds the bounds of equity
10
given that Deutsche Bank and Recontrust were indispensable,
but absent, parties.
We first turn to REF’s indispensable party argument
because we are troubled by the remedy crafted by the trial court.
Citing Washington Mutual Bank v. Blechman (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 662 (Washington Mutual), REF urges us to
reverse the judgment based on alleged inequities that were
caused by the absence of Deutsche Bank (the lender) and
Recontrust (the trustee) from the lawsuit at the time of trial.
REF’s contention that Deutsche Bank and Recontrust were
indispensable parties has merit. In Washington Mutual,
California Reconveyance Company (CRC), as trustee of a deed of
trust, foreclosed on Blechman’s property and sold it to Gladmac.
(Washington Mutual, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 664.)
Blechman sued Washington Mutual, the deed of trust’s
beneficiary, CRC, and Gladmac to set aside the sale and quiet
title, Gladmac defaulted, and Blechman dismissed Washington
Mutual and CRC and obtained a default judgment against
Gladmac declaring the foreclosure sale “null and void.” (Id. at
p. 666.) Washington Mutual and CRC then filed a new action
collaterally attacking the default judgment and seeking a
declaration that the foreclosure sale was valid, and Gladmac
cross-complained for a declaration that it had clear title. (Ibid.)
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
allowing the collateral attack on the default judgment,
determining that the foreclosure sale was valid, and declaring
Gladmac the owner of the property. (Washington Mutual, supra,
11
157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 666–667, 669, 671.) “[I]t [took] little
analysis or discussion to conclude that [Washington Mutual] and
CRC were indispensable parties” to the first action who could
collaterally attack the judgment. (Id. at p. 668.) Essentially
conceding this, Blechman nonetheless argued it was “ ‘too late for
Gladmac to complain,’ ” as it was bound by the default judgment.
(Ibid.) Disagreeing, the Washington Mutual court noted that a
“consequence of failing to join (or dismissing) an indispensable
party is to invite an inconsistent judgment.” (Ibid.) The
judgment did not bind Washington Mutual and CRC, who were
free to seek a contrary judgment affirming the foreclosure sale,
rendering the default judgment secured in their absence
“essentially illusory.” (Ibid.) The court stated, “It was never
legally or practically possible for Blechman to obtain nullification
of the trustee’s sale in the absence of [Washington Mutual] and
CRC.” (Ibid.) And the court found that Blechman’s suggestion
that the default judgment should nonetheless be allowed to stand
as to Gladmac “ludicrous.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court’s remedy is troubling because it
effectively set aside the foreclosure sale and reinstated the deed
of trust, a remedy that is “essentially illusory” in the absence of
the lender and trustee. (Washington Mutual, supra,
157 Cal.App.4th at p. 668.) A court has broad authority to grant
equitable relief in a quiet title action (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.040,
subd. (b); Estates of Collins & Flowers (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
1238, 1246), but that authority is not boundless. A court notably
cannot bind a party to a “ ‘ “a judgment in an action in which he
12
was not joined.” ’ ” (Washington Mutual, at p. 667.) The court’s
remedy also provided no relief to REF except for a lien for
property taxes, though REF paid Deutsche Bank for the property.
On the other hand, we acknowledge this case’s convoluted
history created a procedural quandary. Both parties dismissed
Deutsche Bank below, and Deutsche Bank disclaimed an interest
in the property, apparently when it believed that the court would
not allow the foreclosure sale to be challenged in the litigation.
We also acknowledge that failure to join indispensable parties
does not render a judgment void as to parties before the court
(Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
282, 305), although that judgment may be collaterally attacked
by indispensable parties. (Washington Mutual, supra,
157 Cal.App.4th at p. 668.) We nonetheless cannot see how the
trial court’s remedy could be effectually implemented, and REF’s
argument that the remedy is inequitable is not without force.
Ultimately, however, we need not decide how this issue should be
resolved because we agree with REF’s tender argument, to which
we now turn.
In this case, the Heredias sought to counter the evidence of
title from the REF-Strategic deed, the Deutsche Bank-Strategic
quitclaim deed, and the trustee’s deed containing language
stating that all notice requirements for the notices of default and
sale were satisfied, by showing the trustee’s deed should be set
aside for lack of proper notice. (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 103 [“Generally, a challenge to the validity
13
of a trustee’s sale is an attempt to have the sale set aside and to
have the title restored”].)
When a party invokes equity to set aside a voidable
trustee’s sale, he or she must allege and prove tender of the debt
for which the real property served as security, whether the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale is the lender or a third party.
(Py v. Pleitner (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 582 [“The rule in this
state is settled that a tender of the indebtedness is a prerequisite
to a judgment canceling a sale under a deed of trust”]; Karlsen v.
American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117
(Karlsen); Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 49, 59, 86–87; Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank National
Assn. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 552, 568 [applying tender rule to
quiet title action based on wrongful foreclosure]; see also
American Trust Co. v. De Albergaria (1932) 123 Cal.App. 76, 78.)5
“A valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness
owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a
deed of trust.” (Karlsen, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 117.)
“ ‘ “ ‘Equity will not interpose its remedial power in the
accomplishment of what seemingly would be nothing but an idly
and expensively futile act, nor will it purposely speculate in a field
where there has been no proof as to what beneficial purpose may
5 There are some exceptions to the tender rule, including
that tender is not required when the foreclosure transaction is
void. (Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank National Assn., supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at p. 568.) The void transaction exception does
not apply here, and we agree with REF that the Heredias have
not argued that any other exceptions to the tender rule apply.
14
be subserved through its intervention.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 118.) “[O]ne
who is relying upon equity in overcoming a voidable sale must
show that he is able to perform his obligations under the contract
so that equity will not have been employed for an idle purpose.”
(Dimock v. Emerald Properties (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 868, 878.)
Karlsen affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings in an action to set aside a trustee’s sale because the
plaintiff failed to allege a valid and viable tender. (Karlsen,
supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at pp. 114, 121.) There, the plaintiff’s
property was sold at a foreclosure sale pursuant to a deed of trust
after he defaulted on his loan payments. (Id. at pp. 114, 116.)
Prior to the sale, the plaintiff and the lender had discussed
refinancing and reconveyance of part of the property secured by
the deed of trust to the plaintiff for sale to a third party as a
means to cure the plaintiff’s default. (Id. at p. 115.) However,
the lender never agreed to refinancing or to the reconveyance and
resale, and the plaintiff did not allege that he had consummated
any deal for sale of the property. (Id. at p. 116.) In his original
complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he offered to pay his full
indebtedness days after learning about the foreclosure sale.
(Ibid.)
Karlsen held that the plaintiff did not set forth a valid and
viable tender offer because there were no facts alleged to show
that the plaintiff had the ability to pay. (Karlsen, supra,
15 Cal.App.3d at p. 118.) Karlsen analogized the situation to
Leonard v. Bank of America etc. Assn. (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 341,
343–346, wherein the plaintiff sought to set aside a foreclosure
15
sale on various grounds, including inadequate notice, but the
court rendered judgment for the defendants because the plaintiff
failed to prove an offer to pay her debt and her ability to pay
should the court set aside the sale. (Karlsen, at p. 117.) Karlsen
similarly found that the tender before it was insufficient where it
consisted of the plaintiff borrower’s hope that the defendant
lender would release part of the property covered by the deed of
trust, that an identified prospective purchaser would buy this
part of the property, and that certain entities would agree to
refinance the remaining debt that would not be satisfied from the
sale. (Id. at pp. 118–119.)
In Napue v. Gor-Mey West, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 608,
612–613, 620, the plaintiffs’ house was sold at foreclosure to
defendant Gor-Mey West, Inc. in January 1981, and the plaintiffs
filed an action to quiet title and cancel or set aside the foreclosure
sale. The trial court concluded that the three-month
reinstatement period mandated by section 2924 was not properly
provided to the plaintiffs, and, in April 1982, the court entered a
judgment quieting title in favor of the plaintiffs conditioned on
certain payments to the defendants. (Id. at p. 613.) The
defendants appealed. (Ibid.)
The appellate court reversed the judgment, holding that
the plaintiffs had received the required period of reinstatement,
notwithstanding their bankruptcy filings. (Napue v. Gor-Mey
West, Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at pp. 615–620.) For guidance
on remand with respect to tender, the appellate court stated, “ ‘A
valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is
16
essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of
trust.’ [Citation.] A tender of payment is of no effect if the offeror
does not have the present ability to make the tender good.” (Id.
at p. 621.) Thus, while the record showed that the trial court had
found that plaintiffs made a sufficient offer to tender whatever
amount the court found was due and owing to cure their default,
the appellate court directed the trial court on remand “to consider
[plaintiffs’] present ability to make their tender good taking into
account the additional advances made by defendants during the
pendency of this appeal and taking into account [plaintiffs’]
apparent inability to obtain financing.” (Id. at pp. 621–622.)
Here, the Heredias do not dispute that they were required
to establish a valid and viable tender for a voidable foreclosure
transaction, and we conclude that they failed to do so because no
evidence was introduced regarding their present ability to tender.
The trial court found that the Heredias offered to pay their
indebtedness at some point before the foreclosure sale, but the
banks turned them away. This finding may have assisted the
Heredias in establishing tender had they pursued a wrongful
foreclosure theory premised on the bank’s failure to accept a
tender to reinstate their loan. (Turner v. Seterus, Inc., supra,
27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 528–533 [tender of amount required to cure
trustor’s default, not full amount of mortgage debt, is required to
plead a claim based on failure to reinstate].) The Heredias,
however, pleaded and pursued a wrongful foreclosure claim
premised on inadequate notice of the trustee’s sale, not on the
bank’s alleged wrongful refusal to reinstate their loan.
17
With respect to post-foreclosure tender, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (Kao v. Joy
Holiday (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 199, 206), the Heredias’ testimony
supports the trial court’s conclusion that they contacted Deutsche
Bank and offered to pay a mortgage indebtedness of $712,000 in
2013. The evidence also shows that the Heredias were able to
pay the mortgage debt at that time because Gilbert had lined up
private financing from a man whom Gilbert referred to at trial as
a friend in past tense. But the suits at issue here began in 2019
and 2021, with trial in 2024. The Heredias did not mention
tender in their verified quiet title complaint, and they did not
introduce any evidence regarding the current state of their
finances or their ability to borrow or liquidate assets. (See In re
Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1230–1231 [tender
sufficient under California law where debtor offered to repay her
indebtedness and asked bankruptcy court to sell the property,
which the record showed was “worth many times the amount
owed,” to do so].) There was accordingly no evidence showing the
Heredias’ present ability to make their tender good, such that the
trial court could conclude that the Heredias had established that
equity would not be employed for an idle act. (Karlsen, supra, 15
Cal.App.3d at p. 118.) The lack of evidence of a viable tender is
fatal to the Heredias’ ability to defeat REF’s evidence of title and
to their own quiet title claim.
18
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court is
instructed to enter a judgment quieting title in the property in
REF’s name.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
MOORMAN, J.
REF Apartments, LLC v. Heredia (A171985)
Judge of the Superior Court of Mendocino County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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