People v. Shaw CA2/7

CourtListener 10829966Calctapp30 mar 2026

Testo completo

Filed 3/30/26 P. v. Shaw CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B347023

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA054450-
v. 02)

EMANUEL KEON SHAW,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa M. Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
Emanuel Keon Shaw, in pro. per.; Allen G. Weinberg,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Emanuel Shaw appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.61 after the court ruled he was ineligible for relief
because he was the actual perpetrator of the attempted murders.
(See People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 690 [actual killer is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6]; People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 710 [relief under section 1172.6 “is unavailable if
the defendant was . . . the actual killer”].) We appointed counsel
to represent Shaw on appeal. After reviewing the record counsel
for Shaw filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions in
Shaw’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either.
Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. A Jury Convicts Shaw on Two Counts of Attempted
Premeditated Murder
As described in this court’s opinion in People v. Shaw et al.
(Nov. 18, 2013, B239817) [nonpub. opn.]) (Shaw I), Emanuel and
Irvin Shaw are brothers and members of the Inglewood Family
Bloods Gang.2 Treven Hicks had been close friends with Shaw
and Irvin since he was 13 or 14 years old, but their friendship
ended when Shaw accused Hicks of exposing himself to Shaw’s
sister and hit Hicks in the eye.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to Irvin Shaw by his first name to avoid confusion.

2
Hicks lived in an apartment in Lancaster with
Brandon Williams, who also knew Shaw and his brother Irvin.
At some point Salima Shutes stayed with Hicks and Williams in
their apartment.
During February and March 2010 Hicks and Williams
witnessed multiple arguments between Irvin and Shutes,
including a dispute over a tax refund. Irvin apparently had
referred Shutes to a tax preparation company and hoped to
receive a finder’s fee when Shutes received her tax refund. Irvin
claimed Shutes lied to him and said she did not receive the
refund check. On March 8, 2010, while Shutes was living with
Hicks and Williams, Williams again observed Irvin arguing with
Shutes. On March 13, 2010 Williams saw Irvin slap Shutes and
heard him call her a “bitch.” Shutes said to Irvin, “I’m going to
get my cousin. You don’t know who you are fucking with.”
(Shaw I, supra, B239817.)
On March 15, 2010 Tiffanie Taylor drove Shutes and her
cousin Ervin Ford to Lancaster, where Ford’s brother Bernard
lived. While they were at Bernard’s apartment Shaw, Irvin, and
several other men arrived in a black SUV. Ford and Bernard got
into several fights with the men who got out of the black SUV.
(Shaw I, supra, B239817.)
Taylor, Shutes, and Ford drove back to Hicks and Williams’
apartment; Shutes and Ford were excited, and Ford bragged he
had just beaten up Irvin. After hearing about the fight, Hicks
asked them to leave the apartment. Hicks and Williams went
outside to the driveway to watch them leave. (Shaw I, supra,
B239817.)
As Taylor, Shutes, and Ford got inside Taylor’s car, Irvin
drove his black SUV in front of the driveway and blocked Taylor’s

3
car from leaving. Irvin was driving, Shaw was in the front
passenger seat, and two other men were in the back seat. Shaw
and Irvin acknowledged Hicks and Williams with a head gesture,
and Shaw fired a handgun multiple times at Taylor’s car. The
bullets went through the backseat window and hit Ford in the
head, and Irvin drove away from the scene. Hicks and Williams
escaped to their neighbor’s home, and Taylor drove Ford and
Shutes to the hospital. Williams returned to his apartment after
an hour because the police wanted to talk to him and he felt
Shaw and Irvin would not return while the police were at the
apartment. Hicks stayed with his neighbor until midnight, and
he did not report the incident to the police. (Shaw I, supra,
B239817.)
Two months after the shooting incident, Irvin went to
Hicks and Williams’ apartment and asked, “Who is snitching?”
and “Who is talking to the police?” Irvin seemed paranoid, not
angry. Shortly after Irvin left the apartment, a police detective
arrived and knocked on the door. Hicks told the detective that he
had just missed Irvin. (Shaw I, supra, B239817.)
The police eventually arrested Shaw and Irvin, and the
People charged them with four counts of attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 187, subdivision (a), 664), shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle (§ 246), and possessing a firearm as a felon (former
§ 12021, subdivision (a)(1)). The People alleged that Shaw and
Irvin committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific
intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang
members, within the meaning of section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1)(C), and that Shaw personally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury, within the meaning of

4
section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e)(1). (Shaw I, supra,
B239817.)
A jury convicted Shaw and his brother on two counts of
attempted premeditated murder and one count of shooting at an
occupied vehicle. The jury also found Shaw guilty of possessing a
firearm as a felon. On the attempted murder convictions, the
trial court sentenced Shaw and Irvin to two consecutive terms of
life in prison with a minimum parole eligibility of seven years,
plus for Shaw two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancements. The trial court imposed concurrent
terms, or imposed and stayed under section 654 execution of
terms, on Shaw’s and Irvin’s other convictions. (Shaw I, supra,
supra.)

B. The Superior Court Denies Shaw’s Petition for
Resentencing
In November 2024 Shaw, representing himself, filed a form
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Shaw checked the
box indicating he “could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes made to Penal Code
sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019” and asked the
court to appoint counsel for him, which the court did.
The People opposed the petition for resentencing, arguing
Shaw was not entitled to relief “because he was prosecuted and
convicted as the perpetrator of the attempted murders of” Ford
and Shutes. The People attached to their opposition this court’s
2013 opinion, the verdict forms, the jury instructions, trial
transcripts, a juror question, and the information.
Before the court heard the petition for resentencing, Shaw
filed a motion to replace his appointed counsel under People v.

5
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Shaw argued that he had a conflict
with his appointed counsel because “[t]he court appointed
attorney holds that . . . [Shaw] being the actual shooter holds no
weight” and that his appointed counsel did not agree the gunshot
injury was only “superficial . . . a known scratch to the skin only
stated by the victim to be a gun shot wound with no evidence that
the alleged victim was shot.” The court denied the motion
without a hearing.
The superior court denied Shaw’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, ruling he had not made a prima facie
showing he was entitled to relief. In denying the petition the
court stated that, “even though the jury instructions included
aiding and abetting and natural and probable consequences,
those coupled with the jury questionnaires . . . are questions
relating to Irvin. . . . [Shaw] was being tried under the theory as
being the actual perpetrator and the person that fired the gun.
In addition, the jury’s verdicts in finding that he personally,
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
during the attempted murders . . . further supports the
conclusion that the [People] proceeded under a theory that Shaw
was the actual perpetrator of the attempted murders of the two
victims in the case. Additionally, the People’s theory at trial was
the petitioner was the perpetrator of the crimes, including in the
closing argument of the district attorney. The prosecutor made it
clear that the People’s theory was that the petitioner in this case
was the perpetrator of the crimes and the codefendant was
prosecuted as an aider and abettor.”
The court also stated that questions from the jury at trial
“were very helpful to determining whether [Shaw] has made a
prima face showing, the jury questionnaires were responsive to

6
that. The jury asked, at the time of the trial, a question, quote, if
[Irvin]—that’s the codefendant—became aware of shooting after
the fact and drove away and did not call the police, is that aiding
and abetting in attempted murder. And the question does exhibit
the jury’s finding that the codefendant was the driver during the
shooting, not the actual shooter, which the jury found to be this
petitioner, [Shaw]. Moreover, the court advised the jury that the
codefendant [Irvin] was charged in each count as an aider and
abettor. . . . And the jury additionally asked the following
question of this petitioner, [Shaw], if [Shaw] did not intend to kill
the two victims in this case, or to kill one of the victims in the
case, but that particular victim was in the kill zone, is [Shaw]
guilty of attempted murder? And the court in the case referenced
them back to the attempted murder, CALCRIM [No.] 600,
without any more, showing that this petitioner was prosecuted as
the actual perpetrator in the attempted murder. . . .
Furthermore, the petitioner was also charged with possession of a
firearm by a felon on the same date of the offense of the
attempted murders. And lastly, again, the jury found this
petitioner guilty of personally, intentionally discharging a
firearm causing great bodily injury during the attempted
murders.”

DISCUSSION

As stated, we appointed counsel to represent Shaw in his
appeal from the order denying his petition for resentencing.
After reviewing the record, appointed counsel advised this court
he could not identify any arguable issues. Appointed counsel
advised Shaw on December 19, 2025 that he was filing a brief

7
stating he was unable to find arguable issues and that Shaw
could personally submit any contentions he believed the court
should consider. Counsel also sent Shaw a copy of his brief, as
well as the record on appeal.
On January 9, 2026 we received a five-page supplemental
brief from Shaw. In his supplemental brief Shaw argues that the
superior court abused its discretion in denying his petition
because he “was not identified by eyewitness/victim as being the
shooter, but that his brother . . . was identified as being the
actual shooter,” and that the “jury questions, the closing
argument, and the instructions” should apply to him as much as
they did to his brother, whom the court later found was entitled
to relief under section 1172.6, even though they were both
“charged and convicted of the very same allegations and counts.”3
Shaw argues in the alternative that, even if he was the actual
shooter, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under this
court’s decision in People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 844
(Nino), that he was a “youth offender at the time of the offense,”
and that the superior court did not consider any “youth offender
mitigation” before denying his petition.

3 Attached to Shaw’s five-page supplemental brief were
exhibits relating solely to Irvin, including this court’s opinion in
People v. Shaw (Apr. 11, 2022, B306212) [nonpub. opn.]), as well
as copies of minute orders on Irvin’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. According to one of the minute orders,
Irvin “was charged with attempted murder and jury instructions
were given as to aiding and abetting and natural and probable
consequences [and] the court will appoint counsel to investigate
whether [a] prima facie showing has been made that he falls
within the provisions of” section 1172.6.

8
Even though Shaw was tried as the actual shooter, he
argues his brother was the actual shooter.4 Section 1172.6,
however, does not “permit wholesale relitigation of findings
supporting murder convictions in the context of section 1172.6
resentencing.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715; see
People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458 [“Appellant
cannot use a [section 1172.6] resentencing hearing to relitigate
facts already determined, whether by plea, admission, or
verdict.”]; People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 678 [“We
cannot agree that [section 1172.6] authorizes a defendant to
present new evidence to undermine a jury’s finding of guilt under
a particular theory of murder, effectively retrying the case.”].)
Equally unavailing is Shaw’s argument the jury
instructions, closing arguments, and jury questions that applied
to his brother, who was tried under an aiding and abetting
theory, should have applied to him too. “Section 1172.6 does not
create a right to a second appeal, and [Shaw] cannot use it to
resurrect a claim that should have been raised in his . . . direct
appeal.” (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865.) In
other words, “[t]he mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does

4 During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that, “in a
criminal case, you can be guilty of a crime in multiple ways. You
can be a perpetrator or you can be an aider and abettor. . . . But
for our proposes here, we’ve got a perpetrator and an aider and
abettor. . . . But we’ve got Mr. Emanuel Shaw as the shooter. He
would be the perpetrator in our case here. And we’ve got
Mr. Irvin Shaw as the driver. He would be the aider and abettor
in our situation. So perpetrator Emanuel Shaw committed the
crime. The defendant Irvin Shaw . . . knew the perpetrator
intended to commit the crime.”

9
not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947.) Thus, if Shaw wanted to argue the jury instructions were
in some way erroneous, he had to make that argument in his
direct appeal. (See People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936.)5
Also lacking in merit is Shaw’s argument that, even if he
was the actual shooter, he is entitled to relief under Nino, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th 844. In Nino this court held an actual shooter
may be entitled to relief under section 1172.6 if he or she “could
have been convicted of second degree felony murder based on a
now-invalid theory of imputed malice.” (Nino, at p. 854.) But
Shaw was not convicted of second degree felony murder based on
a now-invalid theory, and as we stated in Nino, a defendant
remains ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 “with respect to
a defendant’s conviction of first degree murder or attempted
murder.” (Nino, at p. 849; see People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [resentencing statute “applies by its
terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”].)
Finally, Shaw argues the superior court failed to take into
account that he was 23 years old when he committed his crimes.
Youth can be a relevant factor in determining whether a

5 In his direct appeal Shaw argued that he had a conflict
with his counsel at the time the jury rendered its verdict, that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty
phase of the trial, and that the trial court erred in failing to
conduct a Marsden hearing when Shaw indicated he wanted a
different court-appointed counsel for sentencing.

10
defendant had the mental state necessary for felony-murder or
implied malice murder. (People v. Jimenez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001-1004; People v. Pittman (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416-418.) But that is not the case where the
jury found the defendant acted with express malice and had the
intent to kill. (See People v. Diaz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 545, 560
[“Each of the cases [the defendant] cites, however, concerned
whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life, a different mental state than intent to kill/express malice”].)
Moreover, we generally “presume the trial court followed the law
in exercising its duties and duly considered the evidence
presented to it,” and “the fact that a court did not specifically
mention certain evidence does not mean that the court “ignored”
that evidence.” (People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076,
1092; see People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 905
[“‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the
court “knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.”’”].)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J.

11

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.