Camper v. Paramount Global CA2/4

CourtListener 10816070Calctapp26 mar 2026

Testo completo

Filed 3/26/26 Camper v. Paramount Global CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JAMES CAMPER B339150

Plaintiff and Appellant,

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV13425)
v.

PARAMOUNT GLOBAL et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Kristin S. Escalante, Judge. Affirmed.
James Camper, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jassy Vick Carolan, Jean-Paul Jassy, Jordyn Ostroff, and Kevin L.
Vick, for Defendants and Respondents.
Appellant James Camper viewed a trailer for the reality television
show College Hill: Celebrity Edition, which referenced, but did not show, a
physical altercation between two cast members. Camper claims he was
misled by the trailer and other promotional materials to believe the show
would include the full altercation. He therefore paid for a subscription to the
online streaming service BET Plus for the primary purpose of accessing
College Hill and watching the promised fight. When the show did not include
any additional footage of the altercation, Camper sued the producers and
distributors of the show, respondents Paramount Global, Black
Entertainment Television, LLC, Edmonds Entertainment, Inc., and This Way
Out Media, Inc. His complaint alleged false advertising and related claims.
Respondents filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the
anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1 The trial court
granted the motion, finding that Camper’s claims were based on respondents’
protected conduct, and that Camper had not shown a probability of success
on the merits of his claims.
Camper appears in propria persona on appeal, as he did below. He
argues that the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion. He
contends that the advertisements at issue were not protected activity under
the statute. He also contends that he met his burden to show a probability of
prevailing on the merits because he presented evidence that a significant
portion of viewers were deceived by the trailer. We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Complaint
Camper filed his complaint in June 2023 and the operative first
amended complaint (FAC) the following month. He alleged six causes of
action against respondents: (1) unfair competition under the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), (2) false
advertising under the False Advertising Law (FAL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, §

1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuits against public
participation.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133,
139.) All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
17500 et seq.), (3) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA)
(Civ. Code, § 1750), (4) fraudulent misrepresentation, (5) breach of implied
contract, and (6) unjust enrichment. The FAC alleged that Camper viewed a
trailer for season two of College Hill, a reality show “where multiple
celebrities are put under one roof to potentially gain college credentials that
they did not earn in their younger years, due to pursuing fame and fortune.”
According to Camper, the trailer showed an argument between two of the
show’s stars, Amber Levonchuck2 and Joseline Hernandez, and then
“conveyed” that a physical altercation followed. Specifically, the FAC alleged
that the trailer showed Levonchuck and Hernandez arguing about racial
identity, then showed Levonchuck getting up to confront Hernandez, then cut
to other cast members yelling.
Based on the trailer, “media interviews regarding the season, and a
circulated screenshot of a physical fight released by” respondents, Camper
bought a subscription to BET Plus so he could watch College Hill. He alleged
that the trailer suggested to viewers that the physical fight would be shown
during an episode of the show and that he “would not have been interested in
watching College Hill absent the disagreement and physical fight between
the cast being shown in its entirety.” In support of his belief that the
altercation would be shown in an episode, Camper also cited a screenshot of
the physical altercation, alleging that it was released by respondents on May
11, 2023 and “disseminated all over social media.” He additionally cited an
interview by Hernandez given on May 25, 2023 discussing the fight.
Camper alleged that he watched episode six, the episode containing the
argument, on June 11, 2023. To his disappointment, respondents did not
include footage of the physical altercation in the show. Instead, at the
moment of the fight, the show displayed the following message, “Out of
respect for all parties involved, we have chosen not to show this fight.”
Camper attached to the FAC a copy of the purported screenshot of the fight
and the message displayed during the episode.
Camper alleged that respondents intentionally engaged in false
advertising to mislead viewers and induce them to purchase subscriptions.

2 Levonchuck is popularly known as Amber Rose.
3
He further alleged that he would not have subscribed to BET Plus or watched
the show “if he had known the promotional materials were inaccurate and
misleading.” Camper claimed that in addition to the $19.98 he paid for his
subscriptions, he also “invested hours of time” watching the first five and a
half episodes of College Hill, before discovering that the fight was not going to
be aired. Camper sought compensatory damages, punitive damages of
$2,000,000, and an injunction requiring respondents to show footage of the
full altercation to Camper.
II. Anti-SLAPP Motion
In September 2023, respondents filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to
strike pursuant to section 425.16. “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion
involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged
claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the
defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) Section 425.16,
subdivision (e) describes categories of protected activities “‘in furtherance of a
person’s right of petition or free speech,’” including “(3) any written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Respondents moved to strike the entire complaint, arguing that all of
the causes of action arose from protected speech in a public forum, in
connection with the creation and dissemination of a television series starring
celebrities. Respondents also argued that Camper could not show a
probability of success on the merits of his claims because, among other
reasons, he could not establish causation.
In support of the motion, respondents provided evidence including
several declarations from members of the production and marketing teams
for the show, as well as the footage from the trailer and the episode at issue.
Respondents acknowledged that during filming of a class on the campus of
Alabama State University (ASU), Levonchuck and Hernandez got into an

4
argument that “escalated into a physical altercation.” Respondents aired
footage of the argument in episode six of the series, but “exercised their
editorial discretion not to air the physical altercation between [Levonchuck]
and Hernandez, out of respect for the cast members, crew, and [ASU], as
[respondents] did not want to put the school in the position of appearing to
condone physical fights in its classrooms or among its students.”
Respondents released the trailer on April 25, 2023. They noted that all of the
footage appearing in the trailer also appeared in the series and that the
trailer was the only promotion they released “that alluded to the possibility
that there may have been a physical fight.”
Respondents denied releasing the screenshot presented by Camper, or
“any other screenshot depicting a physical altercation” between the cast
members, “as part of an official marketing campaign or for any other
purpose.” They also stated that they did not exercise any control over the
interview given by Hernandez during which she discussed the fight, since by
the time the interview was recorded, Hernandez had been expelled from ASU
and had left the cast of College Hill.
Season two of College Hill premiered on BET on May 11, 2023, the
same day Camper claims respondents released the screenshot of the fight on
social media. Respondents presented evidence that Camper subscribed twice
to BET Plus, first on May 17, 2023 and then on June 13, 2023. Both
subscriptions began with a free seven-day trial, followed by a paid account
charging $9.99 monthly. Hernandez’s interview was broadcast on May 25,
2023, after Camper subscribed the first time. Camper’s first subscription was
terminated due to non-payment. At the time he opened the second account,
BET Plus viewer data showed that he had already watched episode six (the
episode at issue) several days earlier on June 8, using his first account. In
total, Camper paid $19.98 for his subscriptions before his second account was
terminated on August 17, 2023.
Camper opposed the motion to strike, arguing that respondents’ speech
was not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute because it was “false”
commercial speech. Camper also argued that he had established a
probability of success on the merits of his claims because he had shown that
respondents made “actionable misrepresentations” in the advertisements for

5
College Hill. He also contended that he had shown that a “significant
portion” of reasonable consumers were misled regarding whether the footage
of the physical altercation would be included in the show. He attached as an
exhibit purported messages from other social media users expressing
agreement with his position. He also included the declaration of another
subscriber, who stated that he watched the trailer and believed that the
physical fight would be included in the show. Camper also requested
discovery in support of his opposition.
Respondents objected to Camper’s evidence, including to several
paragraphs of the subscriber declaration. They also objected to all of the
social media posts compiled by Camper.
On December 22, 2023, the court granted in part Camper’s request for
discovery. The court found that Camper was entitled to discovery regarding
whether respondents had any role in publicly disseminating the screenshot
depicting Hernandez and Levonchuck apparently engaging in a physical
altercation. The court continued the hearing on the motion to strike and
permitted supplemental briefing limited to any evidence obtained in
discovery.
Camper filed a supplemental opposition based on the deposition of
Jason Harvey, Senior Vice President of Business Operations and
Subscriptions for BET. He pointed to Harvey’s testimony that although BET
did not release the screenshot, it was “possible” that a subordinate employee
could have done so because he did not know everyone who handled the
footage before it got to the marketing team. Harvey also testified that the
marketing team did not distribute or disseminate the screenshot.
Respondents objected to the entirety of the deposition excerpts attached
as lacking foundation and to numerous deposition questions. Respondents
also argued that Camper’s evidence, to the extent it was admissible, did not
establish a probability of prevailing on his claims.
III. Ruling
The court held a hearing on April 12, 2024,3 then took the matter under
submission. The court issued a written ruling on May 29, 2024 granting the

3 There is no reporter’s transcript of the hearing.
6
motion to strike. First, the court sustained all of respondents’ objections to
the evidence Camper submitted with his original opposition. The court
overruled most of the objections to the deposition excerpts Camper submitted
with his supplemental opposition, but noted that some of Harvey’s testimony
was “of limited value.”
Turning to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court found
that all of Camper’s claims “arise directly from the advertising for and
alleged promotion of College Hill.” The court further concluded that the
television program and associated promotional activities constituted
protected speech. Moreover, the court found that speech was made in
connection with an issue of public interest, as the episode involved
“discussions of issues regarding race and racial identity, and the physical
fight that is at the center of [Camper’s] claim arose out of a dispute on that
topic.”
Turning to the second step, the court found Camper’s claims under the
UCL, FAL, and CLRA failed because he could not establish that “it is
probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or
targeted consumers could be misled by the trailer.” Contrary to Camper’s
suggestion, the court found that the physical altercation “was depicted in the
episode, with a level of graphic detail that was greater than that in the
trailer.” The court described the relevant portion of the episode, including
that it showed an “opening swing” by Levonchuck toward Hernandez,
followed by “an extended segment of violent and disturbing audio that leaves
no doubt that a physical fight is occurring,” as well as “audio of other
classmates’ reactions during and after the event.” The court found that the
scene “is much more dramatic than what is shown in the trailer, and nothing
that is in the trailer is left out of the scene.” The court further noted that
“there is nothing in the trailer that indicates how the fight would actually be
depicted in the episode,” and found that because the trailer and the episode
“both truthfully convey to the viewer that a physical fight between the two
women occurred, there is nothing about the trailer and episodes in
themselves that would justify a conclusion that a substantial portion of the
viewing public would be deceived.”

7
The court also found that Camper had not provided any evidence that
he relied on either the screenshot of the fight or the interview by Hernandez
in deciding to subscribe to BET Plus. Thus, Camper failed to make a prima
facie showing “as to reliance or causation as to these materials.” In addition,
the court found that Camper failed to establish that the screenshot was
disseminated by respondents, noting that numerous students with cellphones
were visible in the portion of the episode leading up to the fight, among
others who might have had access to the image.
The court concluded that the remainder of Camper’s claims failed for
the same reasons so he had not established a probability of prevailing on the
merits. The court granted the motion to strike and dismissed the FAC with
prejudice. Camper timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 425.16 and Standard of Review
“A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the
‘right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability’ that the claim will prevail.” (Monster
Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788, citing § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).) As noted above, first, “the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected
activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park); see also
Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p.384.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’”
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
[Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based
on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected
activity. [Citations.] In addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits
concerning the facts upon which liability is based. [Citations.] We do not,
however, weigh the evidence, but accept plaintiff’s submissions as true and
consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes

8
its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p.
1067.) The appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.
(Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
II. Step One: Arising From Protected Activity
In the first step under the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court determines
whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity. (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) A defendant
meets its first step burden “‘by demonstrating that the act underlying the
plaintiff’s cause [of action] fits one of the categories spelled out in section
425.16, subdivision (e).’” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (Hunter); see also Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
1009.) As relevant here, a cause of action “arises from protected activity
within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) if the plaintiff’s
claims are predicated on conduct that is: (1) in furtherance of the right of free
speech, and (2) in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest.”
(Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520.)
Camper’s claims arise from the creation of College Hill and the
advertising of that show. It is well-established that the creation of a
television show “is an exercise of constitutionally protected expression.”
(Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 816; see
also Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521; Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting,
Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 133, 143 (Tamkin).) Activities taken to advance
such constitutionally protected expression, including advertising and
promotion, are also protected speech within the meaning of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4). (See Tamkin, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143; Ojjeh v.
Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1039-1040.)
The speech also was made “in connection with” a public issue or issue of
public interest. The trial court found that the portion of the College Hill
episode at issue involved a “topic of widespread, public interest,” namely
discussions involving race and racial identity. Camper does not dispute this
finding, and we agree that it satisfies respondents’ burden to establish that
the challenged trailer and episode constituted speech made in connection
with an issue of public interest. (See Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 [statement protected under section 425.16,

9
subdivision (e)(4) “when it involves ‘a topic of widespread, public interest’”],
quoting Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, AFL–CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 919.)
Camper’s only challenge to the trial court’s first step analysis is his
argument that the court should have applied the exception for commercial
speech set forth in section 425.17. That section exempts from protection
under the anti-SLAPP statute “any cause of action brought against a person
primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services.”
(§ 425.17, subd. (c).) However, there is a carve-out from the commercial
speech exception for an action “based upon the creation, dissemination,
exhibition, advertisement, or other similar promotion of any dramatic,
literary, musical, political, or artistic work, including, but not limited to, a
motion picture or television program.” (§ 425.17, subd. (d)(2).)
Camper recognizes that under section 425.17, subdivision (d)(2), speech
involving the advertisement of a television program is protected under the
anti-SLAPP statute. He argues, however, that the speech at issue here
should not be protected because it constituted false advertising. The cases he
cites do not support his argument. For example, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27
Cal.4th 939 does not involve the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute at
all. Next, in Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 872
(Serova), the Supreme Court analyzed the content of the defendant’s
commercial speech in assessing the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis,
the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. The court did not discuss the first
step or the commercial exception under section 425.17, subdivision (c). (Ibid.)
To the contrary, whether a statement is false is considered in the second step
of the analysis, not the first. (See DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566 [holding that the allegation
that the statements were false “should be considered in the second part of the
analysis; whether there is a probability plaintiffs will prevail. In determining
whether the alleged conduct is constitutionally protected it is sufficient to
determine the conduct constituted” protected speech].)
Lastly, Camper relies on Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 294, in which the Court of Appeal discussed the applicability of
the commercial speech exception under section 425.17, subdivision (c). But

10
the court concluded that the speech at issue—Yelp’s statements about the
efficacy of its review filter—fell squarely within the exception. (Id. at p. 311.)
The court did not discuss the applicability or scope of the carve-out at issue
here for speech related to advertising for a television program under section
425.17, subdivision (d)(2). (Ibid.) Thus, the case has no bearing on the issues
presented here.
As such, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that
respondents met their burden to establish that their conduct was protected
under the anti-SLAPP statute.
III. Step Two: Likelihood of Success
Once the defendant satisfies the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis,
“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim
based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.
The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether
the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken.” (Baral, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 396.) “The showing must be made through ‘competent and
admissible evidence.’” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26.) A
plaintiff “‘cannot simply rely on the allegations in the complaint.’” (Alpha &
Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
656, 664.)
The trial court found that Camper could not establish a likelihood of
prevailing on any of his claims because he had not presented evidence that
the trailer misled the public or that respondents’ conduct caused his alleged
damages. We agree with both conclusions. To prevail on his claims under the
UCL, FAL, and CLRA, Camper was required to show that “members of the
public are likely to be deceived.” (See Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 951
[claims under UCL and FAL]; v Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1360 [applying “reasonable consumer” standard to
CLRA claims].) “‘Likely to deceive’ implies more than a mere possibility that
the advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by some few
consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner. Rather, the phrase
indicates that the ad is such that it is probable that a significant portion of
the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in

11
the circumstances, could be misled.” (Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co. (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 496, 508.)
Here, Camper presented no evidence that a significant portion of
reasonable consumers viewing the College Hill trailer could be misled to
believe that the show would include additional footage of the physical fight.
The court sustained respondents’ objections to Camper’s primary evidence,
the purported collection of social media posts, and Camper does not challenge
that evidentiary ruling on appeal. The declarations from Camper and one
other viewer regarding their expectations are insufficient to meet Camper’s
burden. This is particularly true given the evidence that all of the footage in
the trailer related to the fight was shown during the episode, as well as audio
recordings capturing the fight and onlookers’ reactions to it. Further,
Camper points to no other indications in the trailer that additional footage
would be shown. Thus, Camper cannot make a prima facie showing that it is
probable that the trailer was likely to deceive a significant portion of
reasonable consumers.
Moreover, Camper failed to present evidence to establish causation, a
required element for each of his claims. (See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322 [UCL and FAL claims require showing that the
“injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false
advertising that is the gravamen of the claim”]; Hale v. Sharp Healthcare
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1386 [“Relief under the CLRA is specifically
limited to those who suffer damage, making causation a necessary element of
proof.”]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 [fraud claim must
show resulting damage]; Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51
Cal.4th 811, 821 [breach of contract must show damages to plaintiff resulting
from the breach]; Professional Tax Appeal v. Kennedy-Wilson Holdings, Inc.
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 230, 238 [unjust enrichment requires showing of
“unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another”].) The evidence in
the record demonstrates that all of the footage from the trailer was shown
during the episode. Further, Camper started his second subscription to BET
Plus after he watched the episode at issue.4 As such, he cannot establish that

4 In accepting Camper’s version of events, as it was required to do, the
trial court found that Camper disputed that his original subscription was cut-
12
the content of the trailer falsely suggested that further footage would be
shown or that such a suggestion caused him to subscribe to the platform.
We also agree with the trial court that Camper cannot rely on the
screenshot or Hernandez’s interview. The latter aired after Camper
subscribed to BET Plus, thus he could not have relied on it in deciding to
subscribe. As for the screenshot, Camper has provided no evidence that
respondents were responsible for its dissemination. The screenshot he
submitted to the trial court contains no evidence regarding where or when he
obtained it. Respondents have denied responsibility for the screenshot or
knowledge of how it was disseminated. Moreover, as the trial court noted,
there were numerous people present for the altercation who were not
employed by the production. Notably, in his own declaration Camper fails to
state that he relied on either the screenshot or the interview in deciding to
subscribe to BET Plus.
Camper argues that his claims are like those in Serova, supra, 13
Cal.5th 859 and Woulfe v. Universal City Studios LLC (C.D. Cal., Dec. 20,
2022) 2022 WL 18216089 (Woulfe), but neither case is analogous to this one.
In Serova, the plaintiff purchased an album of music promising “9 previously
unreleased vocal tracks performed by” Michael Jackson. (Serova, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 867.) For the purposes of the anti-SLAPP motion, the defendant
conceded that several of the tracks were not performed by Jackson. (Id. at p.
870.) Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant’s marketing would
induce consumers to rely on the false promise of Jackson’s vocals to purchase
the album. (Id. at p. 876.) Similarly, in Woulfe, the plaintiffs claimed a
movie trailer was misleading because it contained a scene featuring the
actress Ana De Armas that never appeared in the final movie. (Woulfe,
supra, at *1.) The court found that the plaintiffs had established that a

off or that he opened a second account. We do not reach the same conclusion.
In his declaration, Camper stated that respondents’ claim that he created two
streaming accounts was “untrue.” However, he then stated that “[i]f two
accounts do exist, it is only because this streaming service is known to
malfunction. However, in no way was the second account made to deceive.
[Respondents] are trying to imply that I somehow planned this lawsuit.”
Camper’s denial that he intended to deceive undermines his denial that he
never initiated a second subscription.
13
significant portion of reasonable consumers could be led to believe that De
Armas would appear in the movie based on her presence in the trailer. (Id. at
p. *8.) By contrast, the evidence here established that the episode contained
the same footage of the argument and altercation that was shown in the
trailer.
Accordingly, we find that Camper failed to establish a probability of
prevailing on his claims.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the motion to strike is affirmed. Respondents are
entitled to their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.

14

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.