In re A.J. CA2/2

CourtListener 10814910Calctapp25 mar 2026

Testo completo

Filed 3/25/26 In re A.J. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.J. et al., Persons Coming B343593
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP03159A-B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather Tesdahl, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Senior Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, A.W. (mother)
challenges the juvenile court’s sole jurisdictional finding
pertaining to her. In particular, mother argues substantial
evidence does not support the court’s finding that she put her
children, A.J. (daughter) and I.J. (son), at risk by failing to
protect them from their father’s domestic violence against her.
After mother filed her appeal, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and granted sole physical custody of the children to
mother and joint legal custody to the parents. Thus, as an initial
matter we address whether mother’s appeal is moot. Although
we determine it is, we exercise our discretion to consider it on the
merits nonetheless. We conclude substantial evidence supports
the jurisdictional finding pertaining to mother and affirm.
BACKGROUND
This is not the first time this case has come before us.
Although mother and father both appealed the juvenile court’s
November 18, 2024 orders, we considered father’s appeal first.
Father did not challenge the jurisdictional findings pertaining to
him. Rather, he challenged the court’s removal and visitation
orders. In a nonpublished opinion, we affirmed the juvenile
court’s November 18, 2024 orders removing the children from
father. We dismissed as moot father’s challenge to the court’s

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monitored visitation orders. (In re A.J. (Dec. 23, 2025, B342504).)
Because mother’s instant appeal arises from the same November
18, 2024 orders, rather than repeat the factual and procedural
background of this case, we incorporate by reference our previous
opinion.
We briefly summarize the juvenile court’s findings and
orders as relevant to the instant appeal. At the combined
November 18, 2024 adjudication and dispositional hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300 petition and declared daughter and son dependents of
the court under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300.1 The
court found the underlying domestic violence incident “was a
very, very serious incident of domestic violence” and not the first
incident of domestic violence between the parents. The court did
not believe it “was an isolated incident that would go
immediately from nothing to choking to the point of almost
making mom lose consciousness.” The court found there was
“some prior domestic violence in this family,” noting maternal
aunt confirmed this. Additionally, given the parents’ stated goal
to reunify as well as father not having yet completed his criminal
court programs, the court found a current risk existed. The court
explained until it was “satisfied that father has resolved his
issues, a desire by the mother to reunify does give rise to a
concern about current risk.”
The court released the children to mother under
supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (Department). Mother was ordered to
participate in a domestic violence group for victims, individual

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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counseling to address, among other things, domestic violence and
its impact on children and her relationship with father. If
mother intended to reconcile with father, and therapists
recommended it, the court also ordered mother to participate in
conjoint counseling.
Mother appealed the juvenile court’s November 18, 2024
orders. Almost one year later, on October 28, 2025, the juvenile
court terminated its jurisdiction and entered a final custody order
granting sole physical custody of the children to mother and joint
legal custody to both parents.2
DISCUSSION
1. Mootness
As noted above, after mother filed the instant appeal, the
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and granted mother sole
physical custody of the children. Mother argues those postappeal
orders did not render her appeal moot. First, mother claims the
sustained subdivision (a) count will result in her inclusion in
California’s Child Abuse Central Index, which would affect her
legal rights. However, both parties agree the subdivision (a)
count does not pertain to mother. Accordingly, we do not address
that count and mother’s argument as to justiciability based on
that count is not persuasive.
Second, mother argues the sustained subdivision (b) count
could affect her ability to obtain employment in certain childcare-
related fields. However, there is no indication mother is looking
for, or will be looking for, employment in such fields. Thus, her
position is based on pure speculation, which is insufficient to

2 We granted mother’s request for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s October 2025 final custody order.

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demonstrate her appeal is not moot. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 278, 282.)
Mother makes no further argument, and we can think of
none, as to why the October 2025 postappeal orders did not
render her appeal moot. Accordingly, we conclude mother’s
appeal is moot. Nonetheless, we exercise our inherent discretion
to consider the merits of mother’s appeal, a result the
Department does not oppose. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 285.)
2. Jurisdiction
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Although the juvenile court exercised its discretion under
both subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300, only the subdivision
(b) finding pertains to mother. Under that subdivision, a juvenile
court may assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when,
among other things, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) (subdivision (b)).)
“The legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to
provide maximum safety and protection for children who are
currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) ‘The court need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction
and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘The purpose of dependency

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proceedings is to prevent risk, not ignore it.’ ” (Jonathan L. v.
Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1104.)
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings [and disposition order] of
the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In determining whether substantial
evidence exists such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
order challenged on appeal is appropriate, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the challenged order. (Ibid.)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact
could make such findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th
187, 199.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any
evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)

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b. Substantial evidence supported dependency
jurisdiction under subdivision (b).
Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the
finding that the children were at risk due to her failure to protect
them from father’s domestic violence against her. We disagree.
As an initial matter, it is undisputed the children were
present during the August 2024 domestic violence incident
(August incident) and that mother and father desired eventually
to reunify. Further, the record includes evidence that the August
incident was not an isolated event and involved severe domestic
violence. For example, the police report from the August incident
reflects that mother told responding officers “there have been
multiple reported/unreported incidents of DV in the past but was
unable to provide an exact number.” There also was a 911 call
the previous year from mother’s apartment building involving a
“violent struggle” with a male, although no crime was reported
and mother denied she made the call or that the incident
involved her. In addition, mother revealed to maternal aunt that,
six months before the August incident, father had slapped her.
Maternal aunt also reported mother told her “ ‘[s]he blacked out
and thought her life was going to end’ ” during the August
incident. When initially interviewed, mother and daughter
similarly described a violent encounter that involved father
choking mother, lifting her off the ground by her throat, and
headbutting her.
Soon after the August incident, mother began minimizing
what had occurred. Mother retreated from her initial statements
about the severity of the domestic violence, stating, for example,
father neither forcefully choked her nor headbutted her. Mother
believed she had escalated the situation by referencing a rival

7
gang. Moreover, mother did not appear to appreciate the
negative effect domestic violence could have on the children.
Additionally, father and daughter gave conflicting statements
about the August incident. Although daughter told a
Department social worker that she saw father shoot a gun
immediately following the August incident, daughter later
changed her story and said that did not happen. Father initially
and repeatedly insisted he did not have a gun, only later to admit
he did have a gun and indeed had fired it the night of the August
incident.
On appeal, mother points to evidence in the record that
suggests the August incident was an isolated incident and there
was no history of domestic violence between mother and father.
For example, mother notes she told a Department social worker
the August incident was the first domestic violence incident with
father. Mother said she did not tell law enforcement otherwise.
Mother also highlights evidence in the record demonstrating
commendable actions she and father took following the August
incident. For example, mother and father participated in
services, were willing to take steps to protect against future
domestic violence, and were abiding by the criminal protective
order.
In sum, the record contains evidence supporting the
challenged jurisdictional finding as well as evidence supporting
mother’s position on appeal. Mother wants us to reweigh the
evidence and side with her. However, this is inconsistent with
the applicable substantial evidence standard of review. We
cannot reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.
(In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Despite contradictory and
changing statements, substantial evidence supports a finding

8
both that mother failed to protect the children from domestic
violence that appeared to be escalating between her and father
and that the risk to the children remained because mother
minimized the domestic violence, did not appear to understand
the dangers domestic violence posed to her children, and wanted
to reunite with father, who only recently had begun his court-
ordered services through his criminal case. Thus, on the record
before us, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could find the
challenged jurisdictional finding was appropriate. (Ibid.)
Finally, we are not persuaded by the cases on which mother
relies because they are either factually or procedurally distinct,
or both. (See In re R.L. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 221; In re Daisy
H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713; In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
1010.)

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DISPOSITION
As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the
challenged finding, and the orders entered pursuant thereto are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

GILBERT, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second

Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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