In re J.K. CA4/1

CourtListener 10814907Calctapp25 mar 2026

Testo completo

Filed 3/25/26 In re J.K. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re J.K. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN D087203
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. Nos. J518367A–D)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.K.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lilys
D. McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Objector and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, Natasha Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
S.K. (Mother), the mother of J.K., A.M., T.K., and D.W., appeals from
the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders declaring her children
dependents of the juvenile court and ordering drug testing after the court

sustained a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,1
which alleged the children were exposed to domestic violence as a result of
the parents’ failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the
children. Mother contends the jurisdictional findings are not supported by
substantial evidence and that the court abused its discretion in ordering her
to drug test as part of the court ordered case plan. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2025, the Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed
section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) petitions regarding minors J.K., A.M., T.K.,
and D.W. The petitions alleged that in January 2025, the children were

exposed to domestic violence between Mother and I.W., the father of D.W.2
I.W. punched Mother in the face, dragged her from a couch onto the ground,
attempted to drag her upstairs, and kicked her in the face and chest twice.
He threw Mother against a wall and dragged her by her arm on the ground
inside the apartment. Further, in June 2025, I.W. pushed Mother while she
was trying to enter her car and locked her out of her car while their child,
D.W., was inside. Following that incident, Mother and I.W. continued to
have contact with each other in the family home, disregarding the conditions
of I.W.’s parole.
At the July 2025 detention hearing, the court detained the minors in
Mother’s home.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 The other minors have different fathers who are not parties to this
appeal.

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In November 2025, the court held a contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. The court found the petition to be true, placed the
children in the home of Mother, and ordered the recommended case plan.
The case plan included on-demand drug testing, and Mother’s counsel did not
object.
When making jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, the court
considered the submitted evidence which consisted of the social worker
reports.
The detention report of July 2025 included the respective law
enforcement reports for the January and June incidents.
In the January police report, Mother reported to law enforcement that
I.W. punched her in the face, dragged her from the couch, and tried to drag
her up the stairs. He also kicked her about twice in the chest and face. He
threatened to kill her. He threw her against the wall and dragged her by the
arm on the floor.
Per the June sheriff’s report, a deputy sheriff observed I.W. and Mother
arguing by a car. I.W. pushed Mother and entered the car, essentially
locking her out of their car. I.W. reported he did not want Mother to drive
because she had been drinking and their child was in the back seat. Mother
told the deputy that prior to the deputy’s arrival, I.W. snatched the wig off
her head to embarrass her. Mother refused to answer further questions.
The social worker subsequently interviewed Mother and two of the
minors about the domestic violence. For the most part, Mother minimized
the incidents.
Regarding the January incident, Mother claimed I.W. and the maternal
grandmother were scuffling because he was trying to move out of the house.
However, A.M. disclosed to the social worker he knew Mother and I.W. got

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into a fight. A.M. was upstairs with his brothers. He overheard people
yelling and throwing things. He was scared and stayed in the room. A.M.
said his then 13-year-old brother J.K. went downstairs and told someone to
stop. It sounded like things were being thrown. A.M. heard J.K. saying,
“Stop let go. Stop it.” A.M. stated I.W. was a “bad man,” and “[h]e is mean to
my mom and hits her and makes her cry.” In his interview, J.K. reported he
remembered some yelling and arguing in the home while he was upstairs
with all three of his brothers.
Mother told the social worker that the sheriff’s deputy lied about the
June incident. She claimed I.W. told her politely to move and then got in the
car. Mother denied I.W. pulled her hair, and she denied having a wig on.
She explained I.W. always snatched her wig to be funny, but never to hurt or
embarrass her. She said that during the incident in front of the car, I.W. put
his hands up like he was going to shove her, but he never actually touched
her.
Mother also failed to take protective measures. She filed a temporary
restraining order against I.W. but did not attend the hearing to make it
permanent, so it lapsed. When the social worker asked Mother about an
ongoing restraining order, she responded, “I don’t need protection from no
one. He is not going to be in my house. He was in jail.” She was unwilling to
create a safety plan when asked in February and July.
In July 2025, the parole agent informed the social worker that he made
an unannounced visit to Mother’s home, and I.W. was there in violation of the
conditions of his parole. Mother told the parole agent she wanted I.W.’s
conditions removed. When the agent declined, she demanded this of the
parole agent’s supervisor. When the social worker asked Mother about this,

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Mother denied having spoken with the parole agent or having seen him
recently. Mother denied domestic violence between her and I.W.
When the social worker met with Mother in late August, Mother said
she did not see herself as a domestic violence victim. In September, Mother
acknowledged that I.W. abused her and T.K.
Mother had her first individual domestic violence therapy session on
September 16, 2025, and was scheduled to attend biweekly sessions in
person. However, on September 25, the therapist advised the social worker
that Mother missed her scheduled session in the morning and showed up late
in the afternoon virtually. As of October 1st, Mother was discharged because
the provider was no longer available. When the social worker rereferred
Mother to a different therapist, Mother refused to respond to assessment
questions. The provider explained that Mother demonstrated resistance to
treatment engagement, disrupting the session in the presence of her children.
The social worker reports also addressed concerns of possible drug use
by Mother.
Mother had a prior dependency case beginning in February 2012
because she left J.K. in a room alone with drugs, paraphernalia, and alcohol
within his reach. Mother successfully completed the drug program
requirement, and the court terminated jurisdiction with J.K. in her care in
April 2013.
In July 2025, Mother disclosed she used marijuana. In September,
Mother’s therapist reported she saw some substance abuse and mental health
related markers. In October, when the social worker asked Mother to drug
test, Mother advised she had no transportation but if she found a way she
would go. The social worker offered to set up a mobile test at Mother’s home,

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but Mother declined. Mother again declined to test when asked three days
later.
To Mother’s credit, she completed a parenting class and a crisis plan.
DISCUSSION
A. Court’s Jurisdictional Finding
Mother contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that
she is unable to supervise or adequately protect her children. Thus, she
argues, the jurisdictional findings and order sustaining the section 300
petitions must be reversed.
At the jurisdictional point of a dependency proceeding, the court
decides whether the minor is a person described by section 300. (In re C.S.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 635.) The petitioner has the burden to prove the
basis for jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Israel T.
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 47, 51.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) is applicable
when “ ‘[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the
child, . . . or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the
child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the
inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the
parent’s . . . mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.’
The three-part test for jurisdiction under [this section] includes: (1) inability
to provide the necessary supervision or protection of children; (2) causation;
(3) serious physical harm or illness, or the substantial risk of either.” (In re
Ma V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11, 21–22.)
Domestic violence in a household with children may constitute neglect.
(In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) Failure to protect the

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children from substantial risk of violence and serious physical harm or illness
is neglect, which causes the risk. (Ibid.)
We uphold the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings
if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means
“more than a smidgeon or trace; it must be meaningful and significant and
cannot be merely speculative.” (In re Ma V., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 22.)
Here, there is substantial evidence that Mother was unable to
adequately protect her children from domestic violence. The evidence shows
two of the minors were aware of the abusive dynamic occurring in the home.
For example, A.M. referred to I.W. as a bad man and reported I.W. would hit
Mother. He disclosed he knew I.W. and Mother got into a fight in January.
During this incident, he overheard yelling and throwing and was scared. J.B.
went downstairs to intervene. During the June incident, baby D.B. was
inside the car when I.W. pushed Mother.
Despite domestic violence occurring around the children, Mother
continued to have contact with I.W. and did not take the necessary protective
precautions to minimize their exposure to abuse. For example, she let a
restraining order lapse. She declined twice to make a safety plan. Mother
started, then restarted, domestic violence therapy, but she was resistant to
treatment and did not complete more than a few sessions. She let I.W. back
in the home and claimed the parole agent was lying about it. She tried to get
the parole agent and his supervisor to change the terms of I.W.’s parole so
she could continue contact with I.W. She also failed to show insight in that
she did not see herself as a victim of domestic violence.
Given all these issues remaining at the time of the contested
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, we conclude substantial evidence
supported a finding the children would be at risk of further domestic violence.

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B. Court-ordered Drug Testing
Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to
submit to drug testing for the Agency.
When we review the juvenile court’s dispositional case plan, we look for
abuse of discretion. (In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137, 155.) A
court-ordered program must be reasonably designed to eliminate the
conditions that led to the need for jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
Mother’s trial attorney did not object to the drug testing component of
the case plan but asked to dismiss the petition entirely. Mother argues that
this challenge to jurisdiction preserved any objection to the case plan and
relies on People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434–435. Partida held that
the requirement to object with specifics must be interpreted reasonably and
not formalistically. (Id. at p. 435.) However, it also concluded that the
objection must “fairly inform” the trial court and the other party of the
specific reason for the objection so that the other party can respond
accordingly and the court can make a fully informed ruling. (Id. at p. 434.)
Such was not the case here. A blanket request to dismiss the petition could
not reasonably put parties or the court on notice that Mother was also
contesting the drug testing requirement. Thus, any objection related to the
case plan is forfeited. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221–222
[forfeiture applies to juvenile dependency].)
Nonetheless, should we decide the issue on the merits, we would
conclude the drug testing was reasonably designed to eliminate the concern
about Mother’s inability to protect the children due to her drug use.
The evidence presents indicia of Mother’s drug use. She disclosed
present marijuana use. In September, Mother’s therapist reported substance
abuse related markers and that Mother was presenting as unstable. In

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addition, Mother’s first dependency case involved Mother leaving drugs and
alcohol within reach of J.K. when he was less than a year old. She was
ordered into drug treatment for that case. During the June incident in front
of the car, I.W. told the responding sheriff deputy that he did not want
Mother driving because she had been drinking and their child was in the
vehicle. Also, Mother twice declined to test for the social worker.
Mother misconstrues a statement from the detention report in which
the Agency said there was no evidence to support she was abusing drugs or
hindering her ability to safely parent. This assertion is from a
December 2020 child welfare referral that was deemed unfounded. In this
referral, the mother reportedly tested positive for cocaine twice (and one of
those times also for marijuana). This evaluation from 2020 obviously
predates more recent information that indicates Mother may have an ongoing
issue with substances.
The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering drug testing as
recommended.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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