People v. Davis CA2/5

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Filed 3/25/26 P. v. Davis CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B338872

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA097439)
v.

ROY DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Kathryn Solorzano, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian Dresel-Velasquez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Roy Davis appeals from a judgment of conviction
on two counts of second degree murder, arguing the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct by allowing the jury to review unredacted
transcripts of defendant’s telephone conversations from jail that
contained prejudicial admissions. He also contends the trial
court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included
offense of involuntary manslaughter and further erred by
preventing him from arguing to the jury that mental impairment
evidence could negate a finding of implied malice. We affirm.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. Murder of John Hautz

On December 28, 2017, around 8:45 a.m., defendant awoke
at the site of a partially demolished house in Santa Monica. He
walked into the backyard, grabbed a pickax and a shovel, and
used the pickax to break through the side fence and enter the
adjacent property. Next door, the occupants came outside and
defendant asked them for food. Both observed that defendant
was carrying a pickax. When they asked him to drop it,
defendant responded, “‘I have not broken into your house to get
this pickax.’” Defendant appeared to be under the influence of a
drug based on his behavior, his shaky hands, and the way his
eyes looked. He dragged his feet as he walked.

1 We recite the facts from the trial record in the light most
favorable to the judgment. (People v. McGehee (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 (McGehee).)

2
On January 1, 2018, the Santa Monica Fire Department
responded to the apartment of 88-year-old John Hautz. When
they found the front door locked from the inside with a chain,
they forced entry and found the body of Hautz lying on the floor.
A deputy medical examiner determined the cause of death to be
multiple traumatic injuries, including “massive fatal chopping
wounds to the left skull and the left chest” consistent with the
use of a pickax.
Hautz’s next-door neighbor reported to the Santa Monica
Police Department that he had found a pickax on his property
under some bushes a couple of days earlier. He remembered that
the home’s sensor lighting was triggered during the early
morning hours on December 29, 2017; he found the pickax the
next day. The police found Hautz’s blood on the head of the
pickax.2 They also found a shovel from the demolition site in the
driveway of a nearby property. Defendant’s DNA was on the
handle.
In addition, the police found Hautz’s blood on his living
room floor and on the front door chain which, as previously noted,
was locked from the inside. The police observed that “the back
window, which was open and the screen, the seal around the
screen had been removed which would have been able to fit a
person inside or outside.” Defendant’s DNA was found on the
metal window frame and the rubber window screen lining. After
his arrest, defendant allowed officers to take his fingerprints, but
he refused to allow them to take palm prints. A forensic
specialist lifted a palm print from the sliding closet door of

2 A forensic specialist retrieved a partial profile of DNA from
the handle of the pickax that matched defendant as a possible
contributor.

3
Hautz’s bedroom and matched it to defendant’s right palm using
a print previously lifted from defendant and stored in a police
database.

B. Murder of Kenneth Schmitt

On January 13, 2018, around 9:00 a.m., a man bicycling
past the iron fence of a nightclub on Hollywood Boulevard
observed defendant strike a woman3 four times on the head with
a water bottle while she lay on her side under a blanket behind
the fence. He heard the woman say “No. No. No. No,” as
defendant struck her. A few hours later, Los Angeles Police
Department officers found the body of Kenneth Schmitt lying
behind the same iron fence. A deputy medical examiner
determined the cause of death to be multiple stab wounds.4
Schmitt sustained defensive wounds to both hands. Defendant’s
DNA was underneath Schmitt’s fingernails.
Surveillance video showed Schmitt entering the area
beyond the iron fence around 6:00 a.m. Around 8:18 a.m.,
defendant slowly walked toward the nightclub, dragging his feet.
He was holding a pair of white headphones with blue tape on the

3 The victim, Kenneth Schmitt, was a thin man with long
hair who was wearing makeup at the time of death.

4 Schmitt sustained blunt force trauma to the torso and
extremities. He had incision-type injuries on the upper torso,
collarbone, and shoulder. He sustained 101 stab wounds,
including 67 to the chest, nine to the neck, and one to the right
temple that penetrated through the temporal muscle and was
stopped by the temporal bone. The deepest wound was two and a
quarter inches.

4
headband portion. Defendant crossed over the low fence in front
of the nightclub and climbed into the area where Schmitt had
entered two hours prior. Six minutes later, defendant
reappeared at the front of the nightclub. He jumped over the low
fence and ran away but was no longer holding the white
headphones. A red stain was visible on his pants. As he ran
from the scene, defendant placed a scarf over his head. Another
six minutes passed before defendant reappeared in different
clothing. He ran back toward the nightclub covering his head
with a jacket. He ran toward the area where officers later found
Schmitt, retrieved his headphones, and fled.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant with two counts of murder in violation of Penal Code5
section 187, subdivision (a). The District Attorney alleged as to
both counts, that defendant used a deadly weapon in the
commission of the offenses within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1). The District Attorney also alleged a multiple-
murder special circumstance pursuant to section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(3).
The jury found defendant not guilty on both counts of
murder in the first degree. The jury found defendant guilty on
both counts of murder in the second degree and found the weapon

5 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

5
allegations true. The jury found the multiple-murder special
circumstance allegation not true.6
The trial court sentenced defendant to 32 years to life in
state prison, which consisted of two consecutive 15-year-to-life
terms for the murder counts, plus one year each for the two
weapon enhancements.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Unredacted Transcripts

The parties agree that the prosecutor erred when she
distributed unredacted jail call transcripts to the jury to use
while they listened to edited jail calls. Defendant argues that
this error violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury as well as his due process rights.

1. Background

At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence
four of defendant’s post-arrest telephone calls. The defense
objected to the introduction of the telephone calls and, following
argument, the court ordered the prosecution to excise portions of
two of the phone calls, namely, portions of defendant’s August 4,
2018, and August 6, 2018, telephone calls with his mother. We
set forth below the relevant portions of the unredacted
transcripts of the two telephone calls that were provided to the

6 Defendant was no longer eligible for the special
circumstance, which required at least one conviction for first
degree murder.

6
jury, italicize the portions of the calls that the court ordered the
prosecutor to excise from the recording, and include a footnote
where our review of the recording conflicts with the transcript:

August 4, 2018, telephone call

“[Defendant:] But I’m gonna tell you something real quick
. . . but you gotta understand the subliminals, okay?
“[Mother:] No.
“[Defendant:] Heh, heh, heh! I [unintelligible] just gonna
tell you real quick while they . . . .
“[Mother:] I—I’m—I’m scared I might not understand and
somebody else might understand.
“[Defendant:] Nah, ain’t nobody gonna know what I’m
saying.[7] Do you know the roaches—they say I have two roaches,
right?
“[Mother:] Yeah—
“[Defendant:] They—they say I got two roaches and I’m
going to court for two roaches. You understand me?
“[Mother:] Yes!
“[Defendant:] Mother! To be honest with you—
“[Mother:] . . . I know—
“[Defendant:] . . . to be honest—
“[Operator:] . . . this call is being recorded—
“[Defendant:] . . . to be honest with you, [m]other, it was
like nine roaches and they caught me for two roaches.
“[Mother:] I already knew that.
“[Defendant:] Oh, you did?

7 The recording reflects defendant stated, “Nah, ain’t nobody
gonna understand.”

7
“[Mother:] Yep.
“[Defendant:] Dang.
“[Mother:] I—I already knew. I—I know about—ahem—I
know about the extra roaches. I see everything through your eyes.
I already know—
“[Defendant:] . . . yeah . . . that’s why I say it’s a blessing to
do—be hav—just to have—be doing the—that’s why I be smiling
and laughing—like—man, it’s a blessing just to . . . hold—be held
down for two roaches. You know what I’m saying? You
understand me, [m]other?
“[Mother:] I do . . . [.]
“[Defendant:] Yeah, it’s a blessing ‘cause I’m still gotta
attempt to get out. This dude—this dude on the news just got
caught for seven roaches.
“[Mother:] That’s enough.”

August 6, 2018, telephone call

During their next conversation, mother said she “could only
imagine what you have on your shoulder” and “it’s something
beyond belief that [she] could ever believe.” Mother then told
defendant that she loved him for being honest but that she did
not want him to talk about the case anymore on the phone
because she knew it was being recorded and she did not want to
give the other side anything that could be used against him.
Defendant responded, “Yeah. It was a drug, though. That
crystal drug.” Later, defendant and mother had the following
exchange:
“[Defendant:] Yeah. I—I’m—once they—once they give me
my time—once I get my—once I figure out how much time I’m

8
getting this stuff and I can get my time started, I’d be so well
adjusted and cool. You know what I’m saying? Just—just the
waiting game is—is—is—is the problem, you know. Today—
“[Mother:] So, but Roy one question I do have to ask you.
So, what if you—what if you don’t get—what if you get to the point
where you don’t get the opportunity to get out?
“[Defendant:] I’m gonna have to do what I got to do.
“[Mother:] Right.
“[Defendant:] Yeah. You’re right.
“[Mother:] But you need to look at it, at all angles and quit
wishing and hoping on something that might be inevitable and
just face reality that shit has went down and some shit might
happen behind the shit that went down. And that’s the only way
I know how to put it nicely.
“[Defendant:] Yeah. You’re right. You’re right.”8
There was a bit more conversation and the recording ended
with this exchange:
“[Defendant:] . . . So, I just have to tell you the truth. I’m
like, man, let me tell her the truth, you know what I’m saying?
“[Mother:] Yeah. I understand, Roy, because we’ve always
had that connection. You guys have always been able to be open
and honest with me, but I wish that was something I would have
found out on a visit instead of on this line.
“[Defendant:] Yeah.
“[Mother:] I don’t want nothing the defense can use against
you to be recorded on this line. You know what I’m saying? The
two—the two is enough right now.
“[Defendant:] Yeah.

8 The recording reflects defendant stated, “Yeah. You’re
right.”

9
“[Mother:] The two is enough, you know, they don’t need
that extra.
“[Defendant:] Yeah.
“[Mother:] That’s why I don’t want you to ever speak of it
again. Never, ever, ever, ever.[9]
“[Defendant:] Yeah.”
During argument regarding the admissibility of the
telephone calls, the trial court offered to give an admonishment
that there was no evidence connecting the defendant with other
murders. Defense counsel considered the matter overnight and
declined the admonishment because “[nothing] the court could
say would eliminate the prejudice . . . .”
On November 14, 2023, the prosecutor played the jail calls,
which the parties agree were properly excised in accordance with
the trial court’s ruling, but the prosecutor provided unredacted
transcripts to the jury to use as an aid while they were listening
to the audio recording.10 The court admonished the jury that the
transcript was not evidence, only the recording was evidence. “So
if you’re listening to the audio recording and you hear something
that’s not consistent with the transcript, . . you decide what was
said. Okay? Not the person who transcribed for your ease. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . Don’t start reading it the minute it’s in your hand
because, again, that’s counter to what I’m saying that the
transcript is not evidence.” Defense counsel did not object to the

9 The recording reflects mother stated, “Never, ever, ever.”

10 The clerk marked as exhibit 29 the DVD labeled “Jail
Calls” and admitted it into evidence. The transcripts at issue on
appeal, marked 29b and 29c, were marked for reference and were
not admitted into evidence.

10
prosecutor providing the jury with the erroneous transcripts; and,
it appears, no one noticed the error until defendant appealed
from his conviction.

2. Forfeiture

To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal,
a defendant must raise a contemporaneous objection at trial and
seek a jury admonition or else forfeit the claim. (People v. Avila
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 710–711; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41
Cal.4th 313, 336.) “It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a
claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of
the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.”
(People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276; accord, People v.
Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.)
Defendant did not object to the jury being provided with the
unredacted transcripts. He argues, however, that counsel
“cannot be faulted for failing to object” because the record does
not demonstrate that he knew the transcripts provided to the
jury were not redacted and the error was so prejudicial that no
admonition would have cured the error. We reject defendant’s
contention that the “duty to object must be premised on
knowledge that the error is actually occurring” as it is not
supported by any case authority. Further, we reject his
contention that an objection would not have cured the error. Had
defendant timely brought the prosecutor’s error to the attention
of the trial court, it could have prevented the error by either
ensuring the jurors did not view the unredacted transcripts or
remedying the error after the fact by issuing an admonition. (See
People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839 [“a claim of

11
prosecutorial misconduct is not preserved for appeal if defendant
fails to object and seek an admonition if an objection and jury
admonition would have cured the injury”].) Further, the court
could have explained the inconsistency in the transcripts as an
error and told the jury to disregard it. Because we conclude the
court could have prevented or remedied the error if defendant
had objected during trial, we conclude that defendant forfeited
this claim of error.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant argues that, if we conclude he has forfeited his
claim regarding the unredacted jury transcripts, we should
reverse his convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
He maintains that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
failing to object to the publication of unredacted transcripts to the
jury.
A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
includes the right to effective legal assistance. (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) A defendant asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel must show (1) his counsel’s “performance
was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” and
(2) “resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.” (Ibid.) “‘[A] court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of
the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

12
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.’
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 688, 697.)” (People v.
Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 982.)11
We consider whether defendant can demonstrate prejudice,
assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient. The evidence
regarding defendant’s identity as the killer was overwhelming.
Indeed, as defendant concedes, his trial “counsel never argued
that [defendant] did not commit the killings in this case. Instead,
his successful defense strategy was to argue that his mental
disease negated any express malice and reduced the murders
from first degree down to second degree.” The jury agreed with

11 Defendant contends that we should presume prejudice by
analyzing the error as one of jury bias. (People v. Marshall (1990)
50 Cal.3d 907, 949.) We disagree. “When, as in this case, a jury
innocently considers evidence it was inadvertently given, there is
no misconduct. The situation is the same as any in which the
court erroneously admits evidence.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53
Cal.3d 771, 836 (Cooper); e.g., People v. Gamache (2010) 48
Cal.4th 347, 399 [court’s inadvertent submission of a videotape,
which was not in evidence, to the jury was ordinary error and not
juror misconduct] (Gamache); People v. Jordan (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 349, 364 [court’s inadvertent submission of parole
information to the jury was ordinary error]; People v. Jackson
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1213 [clerical error resulted in the jury
receiving an unredacted transcript of the defendant’s
statements].) In the absence of juror misconduct, the burden
remains with the defendant to demonstrate prejudice under the
usual standard for ordinary trial error. (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d
at p. 836; Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 397.) “Such error is
reversible only if it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the
absence of the error. [Citations.]” (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
p. 836.)

13
counsel and found that defendant lacked the intent necessary for
first degree murder and convicted him of second degree murder.
Further, because the jury acquitted defendant of both charges of
first degree murder, defendant was ineligible for the special
circumstance that carried a sentence of life without parole and
the jury accordingly returned a not true finding on that
allegation. Therefore, the erroneous inclusion of the redacted
language in the transcript, even if it was noticed and discussed
by the jury, did not prejudice defendant at trial.

B. Failure to Instruct on Involuntary Manslaughter

Defendant asserts the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary
manslaughter.

1. Background

In opening statement, defense counsel advised the jury that
the evidence would show defendant suffered from schizophrenia
and was using crystal methamphetamine at the time of the
crimes, both of which caused him paranoia and delusions.
Counsel told the jury: “If you find that [defendant], in fact, is
involved in these killings, I believe that you’re going to find based
upon the evidence that these murders are not of the first degree.
That these murders are, in fact, of the second degree for two
reasons: one, that you’ll find that he was under the influence at
the time, ingesting narcotics; and two, that he was suffering from
delusions and hallucinating.”

14
During trial, defendant presented testimony from four
psychiatrists and one psychiatric nurse who treated him both
before and after the murders. One clinical psychiatrist,
Dr. Markie, testified that he treated defendant as an inpatient
between November 28, 2017, and December 2, 2017, prior to the
charged murders. According to Dr. Markie, defendant admitted
himself to the hospital because he was suicidal and wanted to
detox from drug use. Defendant was paranoid and hearing
voices. Dr. Markie diagnosed defendant with “schizoaffective
disorder, depressed, polysubstance abuse and dependence” and
prescribed him an antipsychotic medication. The hospital
released defendant on December 2, 2017, after he showed
noticeable improvement.
Dr. Gessesse, a clinical psychiatrist, testified that he
treated defendant after the charged murders, between
January 23, 2018, and February 1, 2018, while defendant was
placed on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold
(5150 hold) for suicidal ideation. Dr. Gessesse had an initial
working diagnosis of “unspecified schizophrenic spectrum” which
“means that [defendant was] demonstrating symptoms of
psychosis [that were] not fully consistent with schizophrenia
until further investigation.”12 He prescribed antipsychotic
medication, but defendant sometimes refused to take it.
Defendant showed no improvement from his paranoid psychosis
and suicidal ideation until January 29, when he became

12 Dr. Gessesse explained that a proper diagnosis of
schizophrenia requires a six-month observation period during
which the patient must exhibit diagnostic symptoms for at least a
one-month period.

15
medication compliant. Defendant was released from the hospital
on February 1, 2018.
Two emergency room psychiatrists and one psychiatric
registered nurse testified that they treated defendant on
February 5, 2018, when he was again placed on a 5150 hold.
Dr. Jones observed defendant was paranoid and suicidal, a
danger to himself but not to others. Dr. Cobb observed defendant
was “‘guarded with rambling, nonsensical speech and limited
insights into his bizarre thought content’” consistent with a
“psychotic spectrum illness.” Defendant was hallucinating and
responding to internal stimuli. Dr. Cobb testified that his initial
diagnostic impression13 was schizophrenia and other psychotic
disorders rather than a substance induced psychotic disorder. A
psychiatric registered nurse testified that she observed defendant
on February 5, 2018, screaming, cursing, and talking
nonsensically; he appeared paranoid and delusional.
Defendant introduced a portion of the May 10, 2018, phone
conversation between the defendant and mother in which
defendant stated, “I don’t remember nothing the day or how it
happened but I know I snapped.”
During the jury instruction conference, the trial court
stated that it “[didn’t] see an avenue and based on what I have
read this morning, for an involuntary manslaughter.” The court
explained, “the reason why [defendant’s] not getting instructions
anything other than murder in this case is because obviously
there’s no evidence to support any kind of justification or excuse.”
The next day, the court repeated its conclusion that “in this
particular case, [defendant] really [had not] drawn any nexus

13 Like Dr. Gessesse, he acknowledged that it takes six
months of observation to diagnose schizophrenia.

16
whatsoever” between the observations and diagnoses of the
mental health experts and “any type of specific effect that that
would have [had]” on how defendant “behaved on the date in
question.”
At defendant’s request, however, the trial court instructed
the jury that mental impairment was a defense to specific intent
or mental state. The court instructed the jury to consider
evidence that defendant may have suffered from a mental
disorder “only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the
time of the charged crimes, . . . defendant acted with the intent or
mental state required for each crime. [¶] . . . specifically: malice
aforethought or if . . . defendant acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation as required for a finding of first degree
murder.” (See § 28, subd. (a).) The court instructed the jury that
it could consider evidence of hallucinations or delusions, but only
in deciding whether the defendant acted with deliberation and
premeditation, i.e., committed first degree murder, but not to
negate malice aforethought. The court also instructed the jury on
voluntary intoxication and its potential to negate express malice
and premeditation. The court instructed that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to implied malice murder. (See
§ 29.4, subd. (b).)

2. Legal Principles

“We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to
the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser
included offense.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218.)
Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing caused by a
defendant who committed an act that endangered human life

17
without realizing the risk or danger involved, i.e., with criminal
negligence. (People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 378.) A
trial court should instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense if there is sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to find the defendant acted without intent to kill
and without consciously realizing the risk to the victim’s life.
(People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 596 (Evers); People v.
Smith (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 298, 312.) However, “if the evidence
supporting the lesser included offense is ‘minimal and
insubstantial the court need not instruct on its effect.’
[Citation.]” (Evers, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.) Thus, if
“the defendant indisputably has deliberately engaged in a type of
aggravated assault the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to human life, thus satisfying the objective component
of implied malice as a matter of law, and no material issue is
presented as to whether the defendant subjectively appreciated
the danger to human life his or her conduct posed, there is no sua
sponte duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter.” (People v.
Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 35 (Brothers); cf. People v.
Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 597 [where the defendant “savagely
beat” the victim to death and “the evidence presented at trial did
not raise a material issue as to whether defendant acted without
malice” the involuntary manslaughter instruction was not
required] (Cook).)

3. Analysis

The manner in which one kills can be so severe that no
material issue is presented as to whether the defendant
subjectively appreciated the danger to human life his or her

18
conduct posed. In McGehee, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, the
court found no error when the trial court declined to give an
involuntary manslaughter instruction because there was
insufficient evidence that defendant lacked intent to kill, despite
evidence of his mental illness which included a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, because he stabbed his mother ten times in the
head, neck and abdomen in a manner described by the medical
examiner as “‘overkill.’” (Id. at p. 1208.) Eight of the wounds
were independently fatal. (Ibid.) The court explained, “There
can be no serious dispute defendant intended to kill when he did
this to his mother.” (Ibid.)
In Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 24, defendant beat the
victim repeatedly on the head and face with a large wooden
broom handle with great force, causing blunt force trauma,
stopping only after defendant had stopped moving. (Id. at p. 28.)
The court observed that “[t]here was no evidence of an accidental
killing, gross negligence or [the defendant’s] own lack of
subjective understanding of the risk to [the victim’s] life that her
and her confederates’ conduct posed. On this record, the trial
court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter.” (Cf. Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 597; People v.
Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 1027 [“the record is devoid of
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude appellants
were guilty of involuntary manslaughter on the theory they were
criminally negligent”].)
Here, there was insufficient evidence from which a
reasonable juror could entertain a reasonable doubt that
defendant lacked malice and had merely acted in conscious
disregard of the risk his conduct posed to the lives of Hautz and
Schmitt. The manner in which defendant killed Hautz and

19
Schmitt was more egregious than in McGehee, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th 1190 and Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 24 and
therefore clearly demonstrated his intent to kill. With respect to
Hautz, the evidence showed that defendant armed himself with a
pickax before entering the home. He used the pickax to strike
heavy blows to Hautz’s head and chest, locked the front door from
the inside with the chain, and exited through a back window to
avoid detection and delay discovery of the murder. He removed
the murder weapon from the scene and concealed it in the bushes
of the neighbor’s property. When he was apprehended, he
refused to give a palm print but willingly gave fingerprints,
indicating that he had the clarity of mind to recall he had left a
palm print at the crime scene.
As to Schmitt’s murder, the evidence showed defendant
killed him by stabbing him with a knife over 100 times, nine
times in the neck and 67 in the chest. Schmitt’s defensive
wounds demonstrated that he actively struggled with defendant.
Surveillance video showed defendant had the presence of mind to
run from the scene, cover his head, and change out of his bloody
clothes to avoid detection. He also had the presence of mind to
realize that he had left his headphones at the scene and return to
retrieve them.
As in McGehee, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, defendant’s
intent to kill both victims in this case was obvious from the
methods of attack and ensuing conduct. Although defendant
provided evidence of his mental illness, he presented no alternate
explanation for his goal-oriented behavior during the murders.
His recorded statements contained a reference to a “crystal drug,”

20
another similar reference that he was “on drugs,”14 and a later
claim that he did not remember what happened yet knew “he
snapped.” But no evidence was presented to explain the effect of
defendant’s alleged mental illness on his mental state at the time
of each murder, for example, whether he was responding to a
delusion as in McGehee or had not appreciated the danger of his
deadly acts. We therefore conclude there was insufficient
evidence to support an involuntary manslaughter theory, even
with the evidence of schizophrenia and voluntary intoxication.15

C. The Trial Court’s Ruling Limiting Defendant’s Argument
Regarding Mental Impairment

Defendant next contends the trial court improperly limited
the scope of his closing argument and prevented him from
arguing his theory of the case to the jury that mental illness
negates implied malice. Specifically, he contends that the court
“erred when it ruled that mental impairment evidence could only
be used to negate express malice and could not be used to negate
implied malice.” He continues, the “court further erred when it

14 Evidence that the defendant was under the influence of
drugs is irrelevant because voluntary intoxication is not
admissible to negate implied malice. (§ 29.4.)

15 Having concluded that the trial court did not err when it
did not instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, we reject
defendant’s contention that he should have been permitted to
argue to the jury that he “acted with mere criminal negligence”
and that “he should have been allowed to argue that he
committed involuntary manslaughter and not murder.” (People
v. Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1390.)

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ruled that [defendant] could not argue that ‘he had no intent to
kill’ due to his mental illness because that would be an insanity
defense.” We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the
court’s rulings.
We have reviewed defendant’s record citations that
purportedly include the trial court’s ruling prohibiting defendant
from arguing that his mental impairment negated implied
malice. Defendant’s citations do not support his assertion. To
the contrary, in the portions of the transcript cited by defendant,
the court discussed with defense counsel the propriety of
delivering CALCRIM No. 3428, the mental impairment
instruction upon which the parties later agreed. The court asked
defense counsel, “so you’re going to limit your arguments to this
jury then to only to actuality? Whether he actually formed the
specific intent or whether he premeditated it and deliberated it,
period; correct? Okay. And you’re shaking your head
affirmatively?” Defense counsel agreed, “I am.”
The trial court then made the comment, “I feel like in this
particular case this implied malice aspect of the instruction, it’s
inapplicable in many ways because the nature of the killing, but
I’m not suggesting that we take it out, but I want to know what
you’re going to do with regard to implied malice.” Defense
counsel replied that he had not yet fully formed his argument.
Consistent with section 28, subdivision (a), the trial court
ruled that defendant could not argue that due to mental illness
he lacked the capacity or capability to form specific intent,
stating “I will close that argument down, any suggestion that he
because he suffered from hallucinations and delusions, that he

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was incapable of forming specific intent.”16 The court did not,
however, rule that defense counsel could not argue that
defendant’s mental impairment impacted his ability to act with
malice during the killings. Instead, the court gave CALCRIM
No. 3428, as agreed to by defendant. We therefore find no error.

16 As noted above in Part IV.B.1, the court correctly
instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of
hallucinations or delusions, but only in deciding whether the
defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation, i.e.,
committed first degree murder, but not to negate malice
aforethought.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

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