People v. Delgado CA2/1

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Filed 3/24/26 P. v. Delgado CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340426

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA487278)
v.

VERONICA DELGADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Judith Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Veronica Delgado appeals from a judgment after a jury
convicted her of the first degree murder of Oscar Estrada and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The prosecution’s evidence
indicated that Delgado planned and executed a fatal shooting of
Estrada at his home in retaliation for his having committed
domestic violence against Delgado’s daughter (most recently
three days before the shooting) and having hit Delgado herself (at
least one month before). On appeal, Delgado contends that the
trial court prejudicially erred by (1) denying her request to
instruct the jury on the heat of passion theory of voluntary
manslaughter; (2) failing to instruct the jury, on the court’s own
motion, regarding how provocation may reduce murder from first
to second degree by precluding premeditation and deliberation;
and (3) admitting a video, taken by Delgado hours before the
murder, of Delgado receiving a neck tattoo from a prosecution
witness who testified about Delgado’s conduct before, during, and
after the shooting. Finding no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Delgado
by information with Estrada’s murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a))1 and possession of a firearm by a felon (count 3;
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and alleged that she personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). Codefendant Arturo Leon Nava was also charged with
Estrada’s murder (count 1). Codefendant Celia Villareal was
charged with being an accessory after the fact (count 4; § 32).
The charges against all three defendants proceeded to a
joint trial before two juries (one jury for Delgado and another for

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
her codefendants). Below, we summarize the proceedings before
Delgado’s jury.

A. Trial evidence
The prosecution presented the evidence summarized below.
Delgado and her codefendants waived their right to testify and
did not call any witness.

1. Three days before Estrada was fatally shot, he
assaulted Villareal. Delgado dissuaded Villareal
from giving Estrada’s name to the police and told
her it would be taken care of.
Before Estrada was fatally shot on the early morning of
April 17, 2020, he was in a relationship with Villareal (Delgado’s
daughter and codefendant). The couple had a child one month
before the shooting.
On April 14, 2020 (three days before the shooting), a
Monterey Park Police Department officer responded to a report of
a fight at a motel, where he spoke with Villareal and Delgado.
Villareal had a “fat lip” and a laceration (which was bleeding) to
her upper left arm. She reported that she argued with the father
of her child—i.e., Estrada, whom she falsely identified as Joshua
Hernandez—and that he threw a brick through the driver’s-side
window of her car when she was sitting in the driver’s seat,
before he took her car keys and left.
About one day later, Villareal sent the following Facebook
message to an unidentified recipient: “I know he did. I wanted
him arrested last night and I was so close if hugging [sic] up his

3
name and I wouldn’t care of what everyone was gonna say or do
but my mom [Delgado] said no that it’s gonna get taken care of.”2

2. Hours before the shooting, Delgado received a
tattoo from Juan Flores while socializing at a
motel with him, Nava, and “Termite.”
Juan Flores testified that he (nicknamed “Shady”), Delgado
(“Spooky”), codefendant Nava (“Lucky”), and victim Estrada
(“Guilty”) belonged to the same “group.” The trial court excluded
proffered evidence that the group was a gang.
Tattooing is Flores’s “side hustle.”3 On the evening of April
16, 2020 (hours before the shooting in the early morning of April
17), Flores met Delgado, Nava, and other members of their group,
including “Termite,” in a motel room, where Flores planned to
give Delgado a neck tattoo.4
Before the tattooing began, the group socialized and drank
beer. In the restroom, Nava showed Flores a gun wrapped in a
burgundy bandana. Flores and Nava left the gun there. Flores

2 Estrada’s mother testified that around two days before

the shooting, Villareal texted her about a domestic violence
incident. She did not otherwise remember whether Estrada had
a history of domestic violence against Villareal.
3 A “side hustle” is a “part-time job or occupation

undertaken in addition to one’s main job in order to earn extra
income.” (Oxford English Dict. (3d ed.)
<https://www.oed.com/dictionary/side-hustle_n?tl=true> [as of
Mar. 17, 2026].)

4 In a photograph of Delgado taken at the time of her

arrest, tattoos were visible on the front of her neck, above her
right eyebrow, and on her right cheek.

4
did not see the gun again until (as discussed below) he saw
Delgado holding it immediately before he heard the shooting.
Flores, Delgado, Nava, and Termite separated from the rest
of the group and entered a second motel room. While Flores
readied his tattooing equipment, they were drinking beer and
“just having a good time.”
A video of Flores tattooing Delgado’s neck, which Delgado
recorded with her phone, was played for the jury (without audio).
Flores confirmed that the video showed the four individuals in
the second motel room “cutting up” and “having a good time,” and
that the mood was “pretty light-hearted.”
The video also showed Flores and Nava making hand
gestures (which the parties characterized as “gang signs” only
outside the presence of the jury). Flores identified Delgado,
Nava, Termite, Estrada, and another member of their group
(“Suspect”) in a photograph, which showed all five individuals
making the same hand gestures. No evidence before the jury
identified the gestures as gang signs or Delgado’s neck tattoo as a
gang tattoo.

3. Delgado told Flores, Nava, and Termite that she
was angry at Estrada for having hit her and
Villareal, and said she wanted to “smoke” him.
She smoked meth and became calmer.
Flores testified that after he tattooed Delgado, she began
angrily discussing an incident when Villareal was pregnant (at
least one month before the shooting), during which Estrada hit
Villareal and also hit Delgado and took Delgado’s car. Delgado
said Estrada hit her (Delgado) “so bad that he could have killed
her.” Other members of their group were present during the

5
incident, but did not intervene. “[T]hat’s what got her even more
mad, that . . . none of that group stood up for her [Delgado].”
Delgado said she wanted to “smoke” Estrada. Flores
understood she meant she wanted to shoot and kill him. He did
not think she was serious, because she was drinking and he knew
that Estrada was the father of Delgado’s grandchild.
Flores tried to calm Delgado by telling her she was drunk
and needed to chill. However, she continued “talking out of
anger,” complaining “It’s not fair” and “How come the homies
didn’t jump in for me?” “She was feeling . . . basically
betrayed . . . because nobody has stood up for her . . . that time
that everybody seen that was going on.”
Eventually, Delgado said “she was just going to chill” and
left the room to change her clothes. When she returned, she
heard Nava talking to Flores about an incident when Estrada hit
Nava (separate from the incident when he hit Delgado and
Villareal). Flores told Nava that they should confront Estrada
about having hit Nava. Delgado became angry that Flores was
willing to stick up for Nava but not for her.
Flores again told Delgado that she was drunk and needed
to calm down. She went into a restroom and smoked meth.
When she returned from the restroom, she was “more calm.” She
was no longer talking about domestic violence.

6
4. Delgado agreed to drive Flores, Nava, and Termite
to Estrada’s house to confront him about having
hit Nava (not having hit Delgado and Villareal).
There, Delgado fired three shots into Estrada’s
head and one into his chest.
Flores testified that after Delgado smoked meth and
returned to the motel room, he and Nava told her that they were
going to go to Estrada’s house to confront him about having hit
Nava. Delgado suggested that she and Termite should go too,
and said that she would talk to Estrada after Nava confronted
him.
Delgado drove herself, Flores, Nava, and Termite to
Estrada’s house. She parked around the corner from the house.
Her decision to park there seemed “suspicious” to Flores and
made him think that something was wrong. Flores saw Delgado
wrap her neck with the burgundy bandana that he had seen
wrapped around a gun in the first motel room’s restroom.
The group entered Estrada’s property through a back alley.
As Flores walked through the alley in front of Delgado and
Termite, he heard Termite “saying just to shoot him in the legs.”
Nava called for Estrada to come out of his house. Estrada
came out, and Flores asked why Estrada had hit Nava. He
responded that Nava had lost a gun that belonged to Estrada.
Nava was supposed to “jump” Estrada, but did nothing.
Flores began walking away. As he passed Delgado, he saw
her showing a gun in her waistband. After he passed her, he
heard Delgado tell Estrada that he fucked up. He then heard
three or four gunshots.
Flores and the others ran back to the car, which Delgado
drove back to the motel. En route, Delgado said that she “got

7
him” and that she had dropped the burgundy bandana. A
burgundy bandana was found on the other side of a wall
adjoining Estrada’s property.
Surveillance video from a house neighboring Estrada’s was
played for the jury. It showed four people (three of whom Flores
identified as himself, Delgado, and Nava) interact with Estrada
before one of them (Delgado) shot Estrada. After the shooting,
the four individuals ran around a corner and out of view.
Estrada was dead when first responders arrived. He had
three gunshot wounds to his head and one to his chest.

5. Delgado told Flores that it was all planned. She
told Villareal that she killed Estrada.
Flores testified that after returning to the motel, Delgado
talked about how she had “got him.” Flores told her that “it was
wrong.” Delgado “said it was all planned.”5
As noted, Villareal was charged as an accessory after the
fact. When she was in custody, she made recorded statements to
an undercover informant posing as her cellmate. An audio
recording of her statements was played for the jury. Villareal
told the informant that her mother (Delgado) “caught him” (the
victim was unspecified), but that Villareal did not know that “she
did it” until Delgado told her. When Villareal was crying
“[be]cause of the shooting,” Delgado asked her if she “wanted to

5 Flores was charged with Estrada’s murder and testified

while in custody. The jury received an instruction—which
Delgado does not challenge on appeal—regarding how to evaluate
Flores’s testimony as a potential accomplice.

8
know,” and when she said yes, Delgado told her that she
(Delgado) killed him.

B. Jury instructions and closing arguments
The trial court denied Delgado’s request to instruct the jury
on the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter
(CALCRIM No. 570). Delgado argued that the instruction was
warranted by evidence that Estrada committed domestic violence
against her daughter, Villareal. The trial court concluded that
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Delgado
was acting under a heat of passion at the time she killed Estrada,
because Estrada’s most recent act of violence occurred three days
earlier, and because the evidence indicated that Delgado acted on
a desire for revenge rather than a heat of passion.
The trial court asked Delgado if she requested any other
instructions. Delgado said no. She did not request, and the trial
court did not deliver on its own motion, an instruction regarding
how provocation may reduce murder from first to second degree
(CALCRIM No. 522).
In closing, the prosecutor argued that Delgado, motivated
by anger at Estrada for having hit Villareal and Delgado herself,
premeditated and deliberated Estrada’s murder, as evidenced by
her telling Villareal days before the shooting that the situation
with Estrada would be taken care of, her statement to Flores that
she wanted to smoke Estrada, and her arming herself with a gun
before taking Flores, Nava, and Termite to execute a surprise
attack on Estrada. Delgado argued that the prosecution failed to
prove that she was the shooter. Although she did not expressly
address premeditation and deliberation, she argued that she was
“really upset” about Estrada’s domestic violence against Villareal,

9
and that a mother’s actions to protect her daughter are based on
instinct, not intent.

C. Verdicts and sentencing
The jury found Delgado guilty of first degree murder and
found true the allegation that she personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing death. The jury also found Delgado
guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Delgado moved for a new trial, arguing, as relevant to this
appeal, that the trial court erred by admitting the video of her
receiving a tattoo from Flores hours before the shooting. She
argued that because the tattoo was “gang related” and the video
showed “hand gestures which can only be interpreted as gang
signs,” the video’s admission violated an in-chambers ruling by
the trial court to exclude gang evidence, and served no purpose
other than to improperly suggest to the jury that the charges
were gang related.
At sentencing, the trial court denied Delgado’s new trial
motion, concluding that the challenged video was “highly
probative” because it supported Flores’s credibility by showing
Delgado interact with him and the other group members before
the shooting, and that the video was not unduly prejudicial.
The trial court also denied Delgado’s request to strike or
reduce the firearm enhancement, which request Delgado based
on her characterization of the shooting as a “crime of passion”
induced by Estrada’s domestic violence against Villareal. The
court concluded that the evidence showed, to the contrary, that
the shooting was a “very calculated act” motivated more by
Estrada’s having hit Delgado herself—thereby disrespecting her

10
in the presence of fellow members of their group—than by his
domestic violence against Villareal.
The trial court sentenced Delgado to 25 years to life on the
first degree murder conviction, plus 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement, and stayed an additional two-year term on
the conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon. Delgado filed a
timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. The trial court properly denied Delgado’s request to
instruct the jury on heat of passion.
Delgado argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by
denying her request to instruct the jury on the heat of passion
theory of voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 570).
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human
being “without malice” and “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion.” (§ 192, subd. (a).) “Voluntary manslaughter is
considered a lesser, necessarily included, offense of intentional
murder.” (People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 104.)
“ ‘ “To justify a lesser included offense instruction, the
evidence supporting the instruction must be substantial—that is,
it must be evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable
persons could conclude that the facts underlying the particular
instruction exist.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327,
385 (Thomas).) “ ‘Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence
is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included
offense.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Heat of passion has both objective and subjective
components. Objectively, the victim’s conduct must have been

11
sufficiently provocative to cause an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection.” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759; see also
People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1225 (Rangel) [“the
provocation must be one that would cause an emotion so intense
that an ordinary person would simply react, without reflection”].)
“Subjectively, ‘the accused must be shown to have killed while
under “the actual influence of a strong passion” induced by such
provocation.’ ” (Enraca, at p. 759; see also Rangel, at p. 1225 [“
‘[T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the
defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought process to such an
extent that judgment could not and did not intervene’ ”].) “ ‘A
heat of passion killing . . . is one caused by an unconsidered
reaction to provocation rather than the result of rational
thought.’ ” (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 386.)
Here, Delgado does not argue that Estrada engaged in any
provocation immediately before the shooting, when she, Flores,
Nava, and Termite confronted him at his house. Rather, she
argues that Estrada provoked her by committing acts of domestic
violence against her daughter, Villareal, including—most
recently—an act three days before the shooting.
We assume, arguendo, that Estrada’s domestic violence
against Delgado’s daughter was sufficient provocation to satisfy
the objective component of the heat of passion theory. However,
we conclude that no substantial evidence supported a finding in
Delgado’s favor on the theory’s subjective component, i.e., a
finding that her fatal shooting of Estrada was an “ ‘unconsidered
reaction’ ” to the domestic violence he committed days (and more)
earlier “ ‘rather than the result of rational thought.’ ” (Thomas,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 386.)

12
Because Delgado did not testify, she cites only Flores’s
testimony to support her argument that she killed Estrada in an
“impassioned state” brought about by Estrada’s domestic
violence. For two reasons, we conclude that Flores’s testimony
was not substantial evidence that at the time of the shooting,
provocation by Estrada “bypassed [Delgado’s] thought process to
such an extent that judgment could not and did not intervene.”
(Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)
First, Flores’s testimony and other uncontradicted evidence
indicated that Delgado premeditated and deliberated the fatal
shooting. Three days before the shooting, when Estrada
committed his most recent act of domestic violence, Delgado
dissuaded Villareal from giving Estrada’s name to the police and
told her it would be taken care of. At the motel on the night of
the shooting, Delgado said she wanted to smoke (kill) Estrada for
having hit Villareal and Delgado herself, armed herself with the
same gun that Flores and Nava had left in a separate room, and
concealed the gun in her waistband. After driving the other men
to Estrada’s house under the pretense that she would merely talk
to him, she made the “suspicious” (to Flores) decision to park
around the corner from the house. While she walked through the
alley to Estrada’s house, Termite told her “just to shoot him in
the legs.” Rather than shoot Estrada’s legs as Termite suggested,
which might have merely injured Estrada without killing him,
Delgado fired three shots into his head and one into his chest.
After returning to the motel, in response to Flores’s protest that
what she did was wrong, Delgado told him “it was all planned.”
The foregoing evidence that Delgado premeditated and
deliberated the fatal shooting, with a motive to exact revenge
against Estrada for having hit Villareal and Delgado herself, is

13
inconsistent with a finding that the killing was an
“ ‘unconsidered reaction’ ” to Estrada’s provocation “ ‘rather than
the result of rational thought.’ ” (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 386; see also People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306
[premeditation and deliberation are “evidenced by planning
activity, a motive to kill, or an exacting manner of death,” and
are “ ‘manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of
passion—even if that [premeditated and deliberate] state of mind
was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory
conduct’ ”]; Carasi, at p. 1308 [no substantial evidence supported
heat of passion instruction, where defendant “exacted the
ultimate revenge” by planning and executing fatal stabbing of his
mother and ex-girlfriend, motivated by “long-simmering
resentment towards them over family issues”].)
In other words, Delgado’s anger over Estrada’s earlier
domestic violence against her daughter, standing alone, is not
substantial evidence that she acted under a heat of passion when
she exacted revenge by planning and executing a fatal surprise
attack at Estrada’s home. (See Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp.
1200, 1225 [no substantial evidence supported heat of passion
instruction, where defendant made “ ‘a concerted effort to plan
and execute a surprise attack’ ” because he was angry that victim
had grazed defendant’s son’s head with a bullet two weeks
earlier]; People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 98-100, 115, 117
[same, where defendant planned and executed surprise attack
against group of victims because one victim had forcibly removed
defendant’s mother from a house party about one hour earlier].)
Moreover, Flores’s testimony and other evidence indicated
that Delgado shot Estrada after any impassioned state induced
by his provocation had subsided and her reason had returned.

14
(See Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1225.) As Flores testified—
and the video that Delgado recorded while receiving a tattoo from
Flores corroborated—Delgado was “having a good time” with
other members of their group when they first met at the motel,
two days after Estrada’s most recent act of domestic violence.
Although Delgado eventually became angry when recalling
Estrada’s violence against Villareal and Delgado herself (along
with the group’s failure to stand up for Delgado), she then
smoked meth, calmed down, and stopped talking about domestic
violence. It was after she calmed down that Flores informed
Delgado that he and Nava were going to Estrada’s house to
confront him about a different incident, and Delgado seized the
opportunity to drive them there under a false pretense and to
launch a surprise attack. Thus, the evidence indicated that
Delgado’s anger sufficiently subsided before the shooting for her
reason to return, and that the shooting was “ ‘the result of
rational thought,’ ” not a heat of passion killing. (Thomas, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 386.)
In short, we conclude that the trial court properly denied
Delgado’s request for an instruction on the heat of passion theory
because no substantial evidence supported such an instruction.
We need not address the Attorney General’s argument that the
instruction’s omission was harmless.

B. The trial court did not err by failing to deliver, on its
own motion, a pinpoint instruction on provocation.
Delgado argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by
failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 522, the pattern
instruction regarding how provocation may reduce the degree of
murder.

15
Evidence of provocation may reduce a murder from first to
second degree by raising a reasonable doubt regarding whether
the murder was premeditated and deliberate. (People v. Rivera
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 328 (Rivera).) “The issue is whether the
provocation precluded the defendant from deliberating.
[Citation.] This requires a determination of the defendant’s
subjective state.” (People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th
1285, 1295.)
“[A]n instruction that provocation may be sufficient to raise
reasonable doubt about premeditation or deliberation, such as . . .
CALCRIM No. 522, is a pinpoint instruction to which a defendant
is entitled only upon request where evidence supports the
theory.” (Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 328.) “The trial court is
not required to give such an instruction sua sponte.” (Ibid.)
Here, Delgado did not ask the trial court to deliver
CALCRIM No. 522. On appeal, she argues that her request for a
separate instruction on heat of passion (CALCRIM No. 570,
discussed above) should be deemed a request for CALCRIM No.
522 as well, because both instructions concern potential effects of
provocation. In the alternative, she argues that the omission of
CALCRIM No. 522 affected her substantial rights and that her
counsel’s failure to request the instruction rendered his
assistance ineffective.
Delgado cites no authority—and we are aware of none—
supporting her claim that her request for a heat of passion
instruction (an instruction on a lesser included offense of murder)
constituted an implicit request for CALCRIM No. 522 (a pinpoint
instruction regarding the degree of murder). We conclude that
because Delgado did not request a pinpoint instruction on
provocation, the trial court did not err by failing to deliver one.

16
(Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 385 [“the trial court here did not
err by failing to provide an instruction on provocation when one
was not requested by defendant at trial”]; Rivera, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 329 [“[defendant] did not make a request for an
instruction on provocation. The trial court did not err by failing
to so instruct the jury”].)
We further conclude that the omission of CALCRIM No.
522 neither affected Delgado’s substantial rights nor rendered
her conviction vulnerable to challenge for ineffective assistance of
counsel, because no substantial evidence supported a finding that
provocation by Estrada precluded Delgado from premeditating
and deliberating. On the contrary, as we have discussed in
concluding that no substantial evidence supported Delgado’s
request for a heat of passion instruction, uncontradicted evidence
indicated that Delgado did premeditate and deliberate the
murder, and committed it after any passion induced by Estrada’s
provocation had sufficiently subsided for her reason to return. In
the absence of substantial evidence supporting the instruction,
we conclude that Delgado’s counsel reasonably declined to
request it, and its omission did not affect Delgado’s substantial
rights. Thus, the instruction’s omission does not establish
reversible error under any of Delgado’s theories.

C. Delgado forfeited her objection to the admission of
the tattooing video by failing to object at trial. Her
counsel’s failure to preserve the objection did not
violate her right to effective assistance.
Delgado argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by
admitting a video, taken by Delgado hours before the shooting, of
Flores giving Delgado a “gang” tattoo (a description of the tattoo

17
that was never used in the jury’s presence). She argues that the
video was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352 because
its probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential
for undue prejudice. “The evidence barred by Evidence Code
section 352 is evidence that uniquely causes the jury to form an
emotion-based bias against a party and that has very little
bearing on the issues of the case.” (People v. Thornton (2007) 41
Cal.4th 391, 427 (Thornton).)
The Attorney General argues that Delgado forfeited her
evidentiary objection on appeal by failing to object to the video in
the trial court. We agree. Generally, “ ‘trial counsel’s failure to
object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground asserted
on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.’ ” (People
v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 674 (Jasso); see also Evid. Code,
§ 353, subd. (a).)
Delgado asserts that her trial counsel objected to the video,
and cites an objection made outside the presence of the jury.
However, the cited objection was directed to a proffered
photograph (which does not appear in the record), not to the
video. In response to the objection, the trial court said: “[L]et me
think about it, and I’ll get back to you guys.” The next day, the
prosecution withdrew its request to admit the objected-to
photograph, and proffered a different photograph, in which Flores
had identified Delgado, Nava, Termite, Estrada, and another
member of their group (“Suspect”) in writing. The trial court
then overruled Delgado’s counsel’s objection that the second
photograph was cumulative of the video.
Delgado’s counsel did not object to the video—either when
counsel objected to the photographs or when the prosecutor
subsequently played the video for the jury during Flores’s direct

18
examination. We conclude that by failing to object to the video
under Evidence Code section 352 in the trial court, Delgado
forfeited the objection on appeal. (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 674; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
Delgado argues, in the alternative, that her trial counsel’s
failure to preserve the objection for appeal violated her
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. “ ‘When
challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance, the
defendant must demonstrate counsel’s inadequacy. To satisfy
this burden, the defendant must first show counsel’s performance
was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, the
defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (Jasso,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 675.) “Where a sound legal basis exists for
the admission of evidence, an attorney is not ineffective for
failing to object to its introduction.” (People v. Seumanu (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1293, 1313 (Seumanu).)
We conclude that Delgado has failed to show that her
counsel’s performance was deficient, because an objection to the
video under Evidence Code section 352 would have lacked merit.
As the trial court indicated in denying Delgado’s motion for a new
trial, the video had substantial probative value because it
corroborated Flores’s testimony that Delgado socialized with him,
Nava (one of Delgado’s codefendants), and Termite in a motel
room shortly before Estrada was fatally shot. By corroborating a
portion of Flores’s testimony regarding the events leading up to
the shooting, the video bolstered the credibility of his testimony
generally, including his identification of Delgado as the shooter

19
and his testimony that after the shooting, Delgado returned to
the motel with Flores and told him it was all planned. Thus, the
video was probative regarding whether Delgado committed the
murder and whether she did so with premeditation and
deliberation.
As the trial court further indicated in denying the new trial
motion, the video had little potential to unduly prejudice the jury
against Delgado. The video did not show Delgado engaging in
any violent or offensive conduct. Although it showed her
receiving a neck tattoo, and further showed Flores and Nava
making hand gestures, neither the video itself nor any other
evidence before the jury identified the tattoo as a gang tattoo or
the gestures as gang signs. Indeed, the trial court excluded
proffered evidence of gang affiliation.
Moreover, the same neck tattoo that Delgado received in
the video was visible in her booking photo, and the same hand
gestures shown in the video were visible in the photograph in
which Flores identified Delgado and other group members.
Delgado’s appellate briefs do not challenge the admission of those
photographs—or any evidence other than the tattooing video.
She therefore forfeited any such challenge. (See, e.g., People v.
Flores (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 438, 451, fn. 3; People v. Stanley
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) In the context of the unchallenged
evidence before the jury, the video had no reasonable likelihood of
causing the jury to “form an emotion-based bias” against
Delgado. (Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 427.)
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the video’s
probative value was not substantially outweighed by the
potential for undue prejudice, and that Evidence Code section 352
therefore did not render the video inadmissible. Accordingly,

20
defense counsel’s failure to object to the video under that statute
did not render his assistance ineffective. (Seumanu, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 1313.)
Having rejected each of Delgado’s claims of error, we need
not address her claim that the cumulative effect of the asserted
errors was prejudicial.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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