CourtListener 10814356•People v. Ramirez CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 3/24/26 P. v. Ramirez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085563
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN427319)
v.
JOSE ACEVEDO RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Saba Sheibani, Judge. Affirmed.
Annie Fraser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Jose Acevedo Ramirez appeals from his conviction of child abuse
arising from an incident in which a firework that Ramirez had provided
exploded in the hand of a minor, destroying most of the child’s hand and
ultimately requiring its amputation. He contends the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury as to the multiple causes of the victim’s injury.
For the reasons we discuss below, we agree that the trial court erred in its
instruction to the jury, but we conclude the error was harmless and
accordingly affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On a summer afternoon in 2021, Ramirez drove to a skatepark in Vista
and opened his trunk, which contained a number of fireworks. A group of
teens gathered. Ramirez lit one firework, which shot off into the air above
them. He then brought out a second firework. Some witnesses testified that
the second firework appeared to be “broken” because it didn’t have the same
stick attached as the first one did. There was conflicting testimony as to
whether Ramirez directly handed the second firework to 14-year-old Rafael
E., stating something to the effect, “if you want to die, light this firework,” or
whether it had been “passed around between a few other people” in the group
before it ended up in Rafael’s hands. Rafael testified that he wanted to light
it so Rafael took his lighter out of his pocket and put it to the short fuse on
the firework. As soon as his lighter sparked near the fuse, the firework
exploded in his hand After Rafael was airlifted to a hospital, his right hand
was amputated near the wrist.
The prosecution charged Ramirez with violations of Penal Code section
273a subdivision (a),1 child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm,
physical pain or mental suffering (count 1); Health and Safety Code section
12305, possession of an explosive (count 2), and Health and Safety Code
section 12689, subdivision (a), giving dangerous fireworks to a person under
18 years of age (count 3). Count 3 was dismissed prior to trial. Count 1 also
included two allegations, pursuant to sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), and
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), each of which alleged that Ramirez personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon Rafael.
In closing argument, defense counsel focused on causation:
“So the act that Mr. Ramirez, according to Rafael, did was
to offer something, to outstretch his hand, that’s the act.
That act did not cause the injury. Right? Just extending it
did not cause the injury. [¶] Rafael taking it, that wasn’t
the cause of the injury. [¶] He took it because he wanted
to light it. He had his own lighter. Didn’t get that from
Mr. Ramirez. [¶] Mr. Ramirez didn’t suggest to him, Hey,
go light this firework and go put it on a car. No. That was
all on his own.”
He further argued that:
Mr. Ramirez’s act “did not cause this. This was the direct
result of decisions Rafael made . . . .” “What’s the act?
Passing the firework over did not cause the injury. What
came after that did.”
The prosecutor also argued causation, stating that the relevant act was
Ramirez “providing the firework to Rafael” and Ramirez’s “criminal negligent
act of providing the firework to the child” caused Rafael’s injury.
The court instructed the jury as to the elements of child abuse using
CALCRIM No. 821.2 Further, the court instructed the jury as to causation,
using part, but not all of CALCRIM No. 240, as follows:
“An act causes injury if the injury is the direct, natural,
and probable consequence of the act and the injury would
not have happened without the act. [¶] A natural and
2 Specifically, the court instructed the jury: “The defendant is charged in
Count 1 with child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm in violation of
Penal Code section 273a(a). To prove the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that the defendant: [¶] Willfully caused or permitted a
child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering; the defendant
caused or permitted the child to suffer under circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm; and the defendant was criminally
negligent when he caused or permitted child to suffer.”
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probable consequence is one that a reasonable person
would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
intervenes. [¶] In deciding whether a consequence is
natural and probable, consider all the circumstances
established by the evidence.”
During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for the definition of
“personally inflicted great bodily injury” referenced in the allegations in
count 1, and the court responded that phrase meant that “the defendant must
be the direct rather than proximate cause” of Rafael’s injuries.
The jury convicted Ramirez of count 1–child abuse, and count 2–
possession of an explosive device. But it did not reach a verdict as to the
allegations that Ramirez personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim.
The court sentenced Ramirez to four years’ probation with one year in
custody stayed pending successful completion of probation.
Ramirez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ramirez argues that the trial court erred because it failed to instruct
the jury as to the second paragraph of CALCRIM No. 240, dealing with
multiple potential causes of an injury.
Specifically, CALCRIM No. 240 consists of two paragraphs. The first
paragraph provides that: “An act causes injury if the injury is the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury would not have
happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a
reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable,
consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.” As noted ante,
the court instructed the jury with this language.
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However, the court did not instruct the jury with the second, bracketed
paragraph of the instruction. The second paragraph continues, “There may
be more than one cause of injury. An act causes injury only if it is a
substantial factor in causing the injury. A substantial factor is more than a
trivial or remote factor. However, it does not have to be the only factor that
causes the injury.” (CALCRIM No. 240.) Ramirez contends in this appeal
that the trial court erred in omitting the second paragraph of the instruction.
At trial, Ramirez’s counsel did not object to the court’s decision to omit
the second paragraph. However, the failure to object before the trial court
does not preclude Ramirez from raising the instructional issue on appeal.
“ ‘ “[T]he trial court normally must, even in the absence of a request,
instruct on general principles of law that are closely and openly connected to
the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.”
[Citation.] In addition, “a defendant has a right to an instruction that
pinpoints the theory of the defense . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Bivert (2011)
52 Cal.4th 96, 120 (Bivert).) We independently review claims of instructional
error. (People v. Jones (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 83, 97.)
As an initial matter, we note that the Bench Notes for CALCRIM
No. 240 provide that, “If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the
court should also give” the second paragraph. (See People v. Sanchez (2001)
26 Cal.4th 834, 845 [jury was properly instructed that “[w]hen the conduct of
two or more persons contributes concurrently as a cause of the death, the
conduct of each is a cause of the death if that conduct was also a substantial
factor contributing to the death”].)
As Ramirez correctly notes, the case against Ramirez involved
“multiple potential causes” and the causation element “was strongly
disputed.” There was no dispute that Ramirez provided the firework or that
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the firework seriously injured Rafael. The primary disputes in the case
involved the various factors that contributed to explosion and injury. For
example, there was evidence that the firework that exploded in Rafael’s hand
was defective and that someone other than Ramirez handed Rafael the
firework. Rafael testified that he made the decision to light the firework and
used his own lighter to do so. Both counsel argued the significance of the
causation issue to the jury. Moreover, the jury’s note to the court as to the
meaning of personally inflicting injury suggests that the deliberating jury
was wrestling with the causation issue, and the court’s response to the jury
note highlighted causation when it distinguished direct cause from proximate
cause.
On this record, we conclude that the court erred in failing to instruct
the jury, sua sponte, as to the multiple potential causes of Rafael’s injuries.
The multiple causation issue was “ ‘ “closely and openly connected to the
facts,” ’ ” the instruction would have been “ ‘ “necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case” and Ramirez had “a right to an instruction that
pinpoints the theory of the defense . . . .” ’ ” (Bivert, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 120.)
Having found error, we consider whether the court’s omission of a
portion of the causation instruction constituted harmless error, i.e., whether
it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached
the same verdict had it received the bracketed second paragraph of
CALCRIM 240. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 838 (Oyler). To do so,
we have thoroughly reviewed the record. (See id., p. 839). Our review
persuades us, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict would have been
the same.
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Most of the relevant evidence was undisputed. The defense did not
attempt to show that Ramirez was not the person at the skatepark that day
or that he had not provided the firework that blew up in Rafael’s hand. (Cf.
Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 841 (“Although defendant did not expressly
concede that whoever started the Esperanza Fire killed the firefighters, the
issue was effectively uncontested.”) Here, the undisputed facts establish that
Ramirez’s act of providing a firework to a group of teens was a substantial
factor in causing the injury to Rafael. Even if the firework were not defective,
even if it had been passed around before ending up in Rafael’s possession,
and even if the injury would not have occurred if Rafael had refrained from
igniting it, the fact remains that Rafael would not have been injured that
afternoon if Ramirez had not brought the firework to the skatepark and
handed it off to the teens. Providing the explosive device was not trivial or
remote; and as the omitted instruction makes clear, Ramirez’s action did not
have to be the only factor that caused Rafael to lose his hand in the explosion
but simply a substantial factor. Interestingly, it appears that the jury was
able to recognize the “substantial factor” distinction when it convicted him of
child abuse (i.e. proximately causing Rafeal’s injury) but declined to find true
the allegations that Ramirez personally inflicted the injury.
On similar facts, our Supreme Court in Oyler concluded that an
omitted instructional element was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Oyler had been convicted of igniting a blaze that ultimately killed five
firefighters. In considering the omission of a portion of an instruction on
felony murder, the court noted that “[t]he prosecution's evidence that the
Esperanza Fire directly caused the firefighters’ deaths was overwhelming
and unchallenged.” (Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 841.) After summarizing
such evidence, it concluded beyond a reasonable doubt “that the victims’
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deaths were the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act of
intentionally setting the Esperanza Fire, and their deaths would not have
happened without that act.” (Ibid.)
So too here. Rafael’s serious injury was a direct, natural and probable
consequence of Ramirez’s action in handing off a firework to a group of teens,
and Rafael would not have been injured if Ramirez had not done so.
Accordingly, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the court’s error in
omitting the second paragraph of CALCRIM No. 240 was harmless error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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