CourtListener 10814353•People v. Whiteside CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 3/24/26 P. v. Whiteside CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B343062
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA066850)
v.
TANAZA SHAWNTEE
WHITESIDE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson and Diane E. Berley, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J.
Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________
In 2008, Tanaza Shawntee Whiteside pleaded no contest to
second degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. The
trial court sentenced her to a prison term of 15 years to life and
two concurrent 7-year terms for the attempted murders.
Fourteen years later, in 2022, Whiteside filed a petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The superior
court summarily denied the petition, but we reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Following remand,
the trial court ruled that Whiteside made a prima facie showing
of eligibility for relief. The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing at which the People presented evidence of statements
Whiteside made at her parole hearing in 2019. The superior
court once again denied the petition.
Whiteside argues the superior court erred in relying on
statements she made at her parole hearing to deny her petition.
Whiteside also argues that remand is necessary because the
superior court failed to expressly mention its findings as to the
attempted murders. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Whiteside Pleads No Contest to Second Degree
Murder and Two Counts of Attempted Murder
In 2008, Whiteside pleaded no contest to second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of attempted murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Whiteside to a
prison term of 15 years to life (with the sentence on the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
attempted murders to run concurrently) pursuant to the plea
agreement.
B. Whiteside Admits She Shot the Murder Victim in the
Face and Shot at the Two Attempted Murder Victims
In 2019, Whiteside testified before a panel of
commissioners of the Board of Parole Hearings. Whiteside
explained the difficult circumstances of her upbringing and
reflected on why she joined a gang. Whiteside admitted to
shooting at two people in November 2006: “So I just wind up
chasing them down the street. I pulled out my gun and I started
chasing him down the street and I started shooting at them.”
Whiteside also admitted to shooting and killing someone else a
few days later: “I shoot [victim] in the face and once he shot in
the face, um, he on the floor and I’m looking to see if he going to
get back up or not, to see if he’s dying. Once I realized that he’s
dying, um, I drive off. . . .”
C. The Superior Court Denies Whiteside’s Petition for
Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
In 2022, Whiteside filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel. At the hearing
to determine whether appellant had established a prima facie
showing for relief, the trial court summarily denied the petition.
We reversed and remanded, and the trial court subsequently set
an evidentiary hearing. The People’s evidentiary hearing brief
included the transcript from appellant’s 2019 Board of Parole
hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Whiteside argued
the parole hearing was a “coercive environment” and thus the
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court should not consider the statements. The trial court stated,
“In reading the transcript . . . I didn’t see anything unduly
coercive. Your client is very free flowing and very apologetic,
frankly, somewhat apologetic for her actions. She suggests her
motivations as being gang lifestyle. . . . She also clearly admits to
having a firearm and shooting somebody in the face; does she
not? As well as other actions. So I have to say from the totality
of the evidence I think the People have been able to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was acting with malice
aforethought when she killed the victim in this case. . . . So I will
deny the motion. I think it is properly considered, the transcripts
that were presented as evidence. I don’t see anything in the
cases that say I should not consider them.” The superior court
denied the petition in its entirety. Whiteside timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Whiteside contends the superior court erred in relying on
statements she made at her parole hearing because, according to
Whiteside, those statements “should not be admissible as
substantive evidence of guilt at a subsequent criminal
proceeding, including an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).” She relies on People v.
Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), where the Supreme
Court held testimony by a probationer at a probation revocation
hearing “is inadmissible against the probationer during
subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges” (id. at
p. 889), a rule known as the “Coleman use-immunity rule.”2
2 The term “use immunity” refers to “ ‘immunity from the
use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly
4
(People v. Weaver (1985) 39 Cal.3d 654, 658; see People v.
Rodriguez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 458, 467 (Rodriguez).)
Whiteside seeks to extend “use immunity grounded in
California’s constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination”
to evidentiary hearings under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
As Whiteside acknowledges, however, the weight of the authority
does not support her argument. We follow that authority.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder by eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and significantly narrowing the
felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder.
(People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 835 (Oyler); People v.
Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558 (Patton); People v. Arellano
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 467-468; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 448-449; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708
[felony murder]; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843
[natural and probable consequences].) Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
a person’s participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to
and indirectly therefrom.’ ” (People v. Cooke (1993) 16
Cal.App.4th 1361, 1366; see People v. Knight (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [“ ‘Use immunity rules apply where there is a
compulsive sanction against exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination and where the policy of law favors full disclosure or
discussion by the accused’ ”].) Use immunity “prevents a
prosecutor from using the immunized testimony against the
witness” and “provides sufficient protection to overcome a Fifth
Amendment claim of privilege.” (Cooke, at p. 1366.)
5
convict a defendant of murder, except under the revised felony-
murder rule. (§ 189, subd. (e); Patton, at p. 558; Arellano, at
pp. 467-468; Curiel, at pp. 448-449.) Effective 2022, the
Legislature amended section 1172.6 to apply to persons convicted
of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Patton, at p. 558;
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3; People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts
if he or she could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of the legislative changes to the definitions of
murder. (See Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 835; People v.
Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 468-469; Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450.) If a section 1172.6 petition contains
all the required information, the court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A),
(b)(3); Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 562; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 962-963.) The People must file a response to the
petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c);
People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724; Patton, at p. 556.)
At that hearing the court may consider evidence
“previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 836;
6
Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 465.) The petitioner and
the prosecutor may also offer new or additional evidence “to meet
their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see People v.
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-854; People v. Zavala (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373 (Zavala).)
“The admission of evidence is usually reviewed for an abuse
of discretion [citation], but a court abuses its discretion when it
misapprehends the pertinent law [citation]. Whether use
immunity exists” is a question of law “we review de novo.”
(People v. Duran (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 927-928 (Duran);
accord, Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Admitting
Statements Whiteside Made to the Parole Board
As discussed, section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), authorizes
the parties to introduce “new or additional evidence” at the
evidentiary hearing. “It is well settled that a defendant’s
statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a
parole hearing fall within the ambit of ‘ “new or additional
evidence.” ’ ” (Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; see
Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 466; Duran, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
575, 586 (Mitchell); People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81,
93; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 703 (Myles).)
Whiteside argues that using statements she made at her
parole hearing against her at the evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), “implicates substantially the
same set of concerns identified by the California Supreme Court
in Coleman.” Whiteside urges us to follow the dissenting opinion
in Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 575, which concluded
7
admitting the defendant’s testimony before the parole board was
“fundamentally unfair” under Coleman. (Mitchell, at p. 604 (dis.
opn. of Stratton, P. J.).) We agree with the majority opinion in
Mitchell, and every court that has addressed the issue, that
Coleman does not apply to evidentiary hearings under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
In Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d 867 the defendant was on
probation when he committed a crime that justified revoking his
probation and filing independent criminal charges. (Id. at pp.
871-872.) After moving unsuccessfully to continue the probation
revocation hearing until after the criminal proceedings (on the
new case) had concluded, the defendant argued “the revocation of
his probation in advance of trial denied him procedural due
process because he was forced to forego his opportunity to testify
in his own behalf at his revocation hearing in order to avoid
incriminating himself at his pending trial.” (Id. at p. 871.) The
Supreme Court held “permitting a probationer’s testimony at his
revocation hearing to be used against him at the subsequent
criminal trial for the very misconduct at issue in the revocation
proceeding” would “adversely affect[ ]” at least two of “the many
and varied policies underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination.” (Id. at p. 875.) First, the prosecution’s heavy
burden in a criminal trial “to prove through its own investigation
the guilt of the defendant may be substantially lightened if the
prosecution is allowed to take advantage of the defendant’s
testimony at a prior probation revocation hearing.” (Id. at
p. 876.) Second, “when an alleged probation violation also
constitutes a criminal offense for which the probationer might
subsequently be prosecuted,” the probationer may be forced “to
choose between the privilege [against self-incrimination] and his
8
opportunity to be heard at his revocation hearing.” (Id. at
p. 878.) The Supreme Court in Coleman declared “a judicial rule
of evidence” that, upon a timely objection, “the testimony of a
probationer at a probation revocation hearing held prior to the
disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation
of the conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from
such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during
subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges,” except
for limited impeachment or rebuttal purposes. (Id. at p. 889.)
The concerns in Coleman are not present in proceedings
under section 1172.6 because the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply at the evidentiary
hearing. (See Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 466
[defendant “was not protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination during his section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)
evidentiary hearing, and incriminating statements he made
during his parole proceedings were therefore admissible”];
Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 376 [same]; Duran, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 930 [same]; Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 589 [same]; Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 706 [same].)
“The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
protects persons from being compelled by ‘ “governmental
coercion” ’ to serve as witnesses against themselves in ‘ “any
criminal case.” ’ [Citation.] A section [1172.6] hearing, however,
‘ “is not a trial de novo on all the original charges.” [Citation.]
Rather, it is a postconviction proceeding “due to the Legislature’s
inclusion of section [1172.6] in Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . , [as] an
‘act of lenity’ [citation], allowing for the retroactive application of
the new law governing accomplice liability for felony murder
[citation] for defendants already serving valid sentences for
9
murder.” ’ ” (Myles, at pp. 705-706; accord, Rodriguez, at p. 467;
Zavala, at p. 376; Mitchell, at p. 588; see Duran, at p. 930 [“the
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing where [the] defendant’s . . .
parole risk assessment statement was used is . . . neither a
subsequent retrial nor a new sentencing”].)
In addition, as several courts have pointed out, “the Fifth
Amendment protects individuals from government coercion.”
(Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 706.) But Whiteside herself,
not the government, initiated the petition process under
section 1172.6. (See Rodriguez, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 467
[section 1172.6 requires defendants “seeking its ‘ “ameliorative
benefits” ’ to initiate the process by filing a petition”]; Mitchell,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 589 [the resentencing process under
section 1172.6 “could not even begin until [the defendant] gave
the court his statement, under oath, about his role in the crime to
which he pleaded guilty”]; Myles, at p. 706 [defendant “was not
compelled to file a section [1172.6] petition”].)
Whiteside also argues that, even if the privilege against
self-incrimination “is not implicated” here, “basic principles of
procedural fairness surely are.” Whiteside asserts it would be
“unfair” to require the defendant to choose between “ ‘self-
accusation, perjury or injurious silence.’ ” We do not see how it is
unfair to preclude Whiteside from, on the one hand, encouraging
the parole board to grant her parole by fully accepting
responsibility for her crimes while, on the other hand, seeking a
reduction in her sentence by minimizing her role in the crimes.
(See Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590 [“It would be
unjust for [the defendant] to gain an advantage his sworn
description shows he does not merit”].)
10
Whiteside’s parole hearing testimony was properly
admitted.
C. A Remand for the Trial Court to Specifically Address
Whiteside’s Two Attempted Murder Convictions is
Unnecessary
Whiteside contends that the matter should be remanded
because the trial court did not expressly address her two
attempted murder convictions when finding her ineligible for
resentencing. Respondent argues that remand is inappropriate
because it would be an “idle act.” Whiteside does not rebut this
argument in her reply brief.
At the evidentiary hearing, the court acknowledged
receiving the People’s opposition to appellant’s motion, and
appellant’s reply brief, each of which expressly and repeatedly
refer to appellant’s “murder and attempted murder convictions[.]”
In denying appellant’s petition, the court relied on appellant’s
statements in her parole hearing, which included her description
of the two attempted murders. The trial court observed,
“[Whiteside] also clearly admits to having a firearm and shooting
somebody in the face; does she not? As well as other actions.”
(Italics added.) The other actions to which Whiteside admitted
included the attempted murders. In her parole hearing
testimony, Whiteside unequivocally explained that she armed
herself with a gun and then chased and shot at two people.
Whiteside does not dispute that she was the sole and actual
shooter in the attempted murders. Instead, she contends that
she is eligible for resentencing because the trial court “simply
made no mention of appellant’s two attempted murder
convictions.” While the trial court’s ruling did not specifically
11
address the attempted murders beyond its reference to “other
actions,” the trial court’s summary of Whiteside’s statements
show that the court considered the entirety of Whiteside’s
testimony, which includes Whiteside’s unequivocal admission
that she was the actual shooter in the attempted murders. As
discussed above, the parole hearing testimony was properly
admitted. It is apparent from that testimony that the superior
court correctly denied the section 1172.6 petition as to the
attempted murder convictions, and there is no need to remand
the matter for a more detailed denial. (People v. Jefferson (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 399, 409 [“remand is not appropriate when it
would be an idle act”]; People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
922, 929 [“If a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief, we
shall affirm the court’s denial of a petition regardless of its
reasoning”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Whiteside’s petition under section
1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
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