CourtListener 10813791•In re J.S. CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 3/23/26 In re J.S. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re J.S., A Person Coming B346004
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 22CCJP00635
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
Anne E. Fragaso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant J.R. (mother) raises one argument: the case must
be remanded to the juvenile court for a compliance hearing under
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In response to an inquiry
by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), the
Cherokee Nation stated in an email that mother’s child was not
an Indian child.1 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred
by not waiting for a formal letter from that tribe before
concluding ICWA did not apply. As DCFS points out, however,
the Cherokee Nation eventually sent DCFS a formal letter
confirming that the contents of its email were accurate. That
letter is fatal to mother’s sole argument. We therefore affirm the
juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights.
BACKGROUND2
I. Mother’s first appeal
This is mother’s second appeal. In her first appeal, mother
likewise solely argued that remand for an ICWA compliance
hearing was warranted. (In re J.S. (Jul. 9, 2024, B330027)
1 An “Indian child” is a child who is either a member of an
Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and
is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 224.1, subds. (a), (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) Apart
from ICWA, future statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
background that gave rise to the termination of parental rights,
so we do not restate those details. We simply provide context for
our resolution of the narrow ICWA issue presented. (People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2
[nonpub. opn.] (J.S.).)3 A different panel of this court affirmed
the order terminating mother’s parental rights, concluding that
any purported ICWA deficiencies were harmless, in part because
both parents clearly denied Indian ancestry. (J.S., supra,
B330027.)
Six weeks after this court filed its opinion deciding
mother’s first appeal, our Supreme Court issued In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112 (Dezi C). Dezi C. states: “When there is
an inadequate inquiry and the record is underdeveloped, it is
impossible for reviewing courts to assess prejudice because we
simply do not know what additional information will be revealed
from an adequate inquiry. We therefore hold that an inadequate
Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile
court’s order terminating parental rights with directions to the
agency to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by record
documentation.” (Dezi C., at p. 1125.) Dezi C. “reverse[d] the
judgment of the Court of Appeal with direction to conditionally
reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for
further proceedings” under ICWA. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1125, 1152.)
Shortly after deciding Dezi C., our Supreme Court issued
an order granting review in mother’s first appeal, transferring
the matter back to this court, and directing us to vacate our
decision and reconsider the cause in light of Dezi C. The parties
then stipulated to a conditional reversal and remand to the
juvenile court for compliance with ICWA inquiry requirements in
light of Dezi C. This court ordered the case conditionally reversed
3 In J.S., father likewise argued that remand under ICWA
was required, though father is not a party to this current appeal.
3
and remanded to the juvenile court for further ICWA
proceedings.
II. Proceedings after remand
The juvenile court re-appointed counsel for the parents and
held a progress hearing on December 10, 2024. The DCFS
provided a report on its updated ICWA inquiry, documenting the
following: (1) in March 2022, both parents denied having any
Native American ancestry; (2) in July 2022 and May 2023, the
maternal step-grandfather, R.D., denied the family had Native
American ancestry; he reported having no other contact
information for family members and that the maternal
grandmother was deceased; (3) in November 2024, mother again
denied having Native American ancestry and provided contact
information for a maternal great-aunt, whom mother stated was
very ill and might not be responsive; the great-aunt did not
return the social worker’s voice message; (4) in October and
November 2024, the DCFS social worker met with father at his
place of incarceration; father reiterated there was no Native
American heritage in the family; he reported that his parents,
J.J.S. and F.S. died; he also disclosed the full names of his three
siblings but stated he was not in contact with them and did not
have contact information for them, nor was he aware of any other
family members; (5) in November 2024, the DCFS social worker
was able to contact the paternal aunt who reported the paternal
side of the family indeed had Native American ancestry through
the Cherokee tribe.
The paternal aunt stated that the paternal great-
grandfather (F.P., deceased) was Cherokee Indian but his
registration was uncertain. The paternal great-great-
4
grandfather (name unknown) was registered with the tribe, and
the paternal aunt believed that he had lived in Michigan.
Neither the paternal aunt nor other family members had
documentation regarding the family’s Native American ancestry,
and no one else in the family had further information. The only
other persons aware of the family’s Native American ancestry
were the two paternal uncles, but they had no additional
information, did not want to be involved, and were not located
despite DCFS conducting due diligence searches for them.
In November 2024, the social worker provided ICWA-030
notice, including the above information provided by paternal
aunt, to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, and
Cherokee Nation. The social worker attached J.S.’s dependency
petitions and birth certificate along with the notices.
At the December 10, 2024 hearing, the court found notice to
the parents was proper. The parents did not appear, but their
appointed attorneys were present. The court, after finding
DCFS’s ICWA inquiry sufficient, continued the matter for receipt
of responses from the tribes.
At the continued hearing on February 4, 2025, DCFS
reported that in December 2024, the United Keetoowah Band and
Eastern Band responded that J.S. was neither a member nor
eligible for membership in their respective tribes.
The court again continued the matter to receive a response
from the Cherokee Nation and ordered DCFS to “document as of
today, its efforts by phone, fax, and email to contact the Cherokee
Nation, and obtain the certified green receipts, as well as a
response as to whether or not [J.S.] is eligible for enrollment. [¶]
DCFS is to find a way to speak with whoever it can to explain
5
that the court is waiting to proceed to permanent plan that the
delay is having a negative impact on [J.S.]”
After repeated email and facsimile contacts, the Cherokee
Nation’s Eligibility Supervisor, Traci Willie, responded by email:
“The child (or children) is not an ‘Indian child (or children)’ in
relation to the Cherokee Nation as defined in the Federal ICWA.
Cherokee Nation will not be involved based on the information
exactly as provided. Any incorrect or omitted information could
invalidate this determination. An official response letter will be
generated once the information has been processed. Our current
response time is approximately 90 days based on when we
received the inquiry.” Return receipts indicated all the tribes,
including the Cherokee Nation, received the ICWA-030 notice on
December 9, 2024.
Meanwhile, J.S. remained with his prospective adoptive
parents, who stated, “We are eager to adopt [J.S.] and this is
causing him to experience stress and emotional dysregulation
from the delay in permanency.” J.S., who by now had been a
dependent of the court for three years, asked, “When am I getting
adopted? It’s been a long time and I just want this to end and be
adopted.”
The court convened on March 11, 2025, over 90 days after
the Cherokee Nation received ICWA-030 notice. J.S.’s attorney
asked the court to find ICWA did not apply and reinstate the
order terminating parental rights, noting DCFS’s efforts, the
email response from the Cherokee Nation Indian Child Welfare
Eligibility Supervisor, and emphasizing that the delay in
finalizing the adoption was causing the child distress.
The parents’ attorneys argued the email response from the
Cherokee Nation was insufficient and requested the court wait
6
for a formal letter. The court, noting that Traci Willie from the
Cherokee Nation was someone known to DCFS and the court,
that communication with tribes may be by email, and finding
that DCFS made diligent inquiry efforts, concluded the ICWA did
not apply and reinstated the order terminating parental rights.
On March 14, 2025, the Cherokee Nation sent DCFS a
letter confirming the contents of its prior email—that J.S. is not
an Indian child, and that the tribe had no legal standing to
intervene in this matter.4
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Congress enacted ICWA “to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum
standards for removal of Indian children from their families and
placement of such children ‘in foster or adoptive homes which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’ ” (In re Levi U.
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1902.)
“ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to follow
before removing Indian children from their families and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes. [Citations.].” (In re D.S.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) “ICWA also describes a
preference for placement of Indian children with their extended
families, members of their tribe, or other Indian families.
[Citations.]” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1098
4 We granted DCFS’s request for judicial notice of the
Cherokee Nation’s letter.
7
(Kenneth D.).) In 2006, California adopted various procedural
and substantive provisions of ICWA. (In re D.S., at p. 1048.)
Under California law, the juvenile court and DCFS have
“an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child
for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been
filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11-12.) “The continuing duty to
inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child ‘can be
divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of
further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’ ”
(In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.)
The duty of initial inquiry includes, but is not limited to,
“asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,
extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
Mother does not complain about the adequacy of DCFS’s
ICWA inquiry or urge that the notice requirements of ICWA
applied. Rather, she claims that the Cherokee Nation’s email
response was insufficient to support a finding that the ICWA did
not apply, and that the juvenile court should have waited for a
formal letter from the tribe before terminating parental rights.
We need not, however, decide whether the juvenile court’s
decision to rely on the email was error under ICWA. This is
because shortly after the juvenile court concluded ICWA did not
apply and terminated parental rights, the Cherokee Nation sent
DCFS a letter confirming the contents of its email—that J.S. was
not an Indian child. Because mother raises no other arguments,
she has not met her burden on appeal of showing the juvenile
court erred.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating parental
rights.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
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