CourtListener 10811993•Abioye v. Lee CA1/1
Testo completo
Filed 3/20/26 Abioye v. Lee CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
ADEDAYO ABIOYE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171356
v.
RAYMOND OCTAVUS LEE, et al., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 24CV064677)
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Adedayo Abioye, representing himself, appeals from the trial
court’s order sustaining without leave to amend demurrers brought by the
four defendants in this action and dismissing his complaint with prejudice.
Abioye challenges the court’s rulings on the demurrers. Additionally, Abioye
argues the court erred in vacating one of the defendant’s defaults, vacating
the hearings on his motions to strike, and declaring him a vexatious litigant.
We affirm.
1
I. BACKGROUND1
A. Facts
Defendant Raymond Lee has known Abioye’s family for 25 years. In
April 2015, Raymond gifted Abioye $180,000 to help him purchase property,
of which Abioye became the sole owner. In December 2015, unbeknownst to
Abioye, his father, Moses Abioye, and Raymond signed a loan agreement
establishing the terms of a loan commencing in April 2015. In the
agreement, Raymond loaned Moses $180,000 used as the down payment to
purchase the property. The loan accrued no interest for the first six months
then began to accrue interest if it was not repaid. In October 2019, Raymond
and his wife, Shanna Lee (collectively, Lees), went to one of Abioye’s
properties and through intimidation, extortion, and fraud, induced Moses to
sign an addendum to the loan agreement which increased the interest rate.
Abioye was unaware of the loan agreement and the addendum until October
2020.
At some point, a dispute arose regarding the $180,000. Raymond
claimed it was a loan, not a gift, and told people that Abioye was a party to,
and in default on, a loan. In March 2020, Raymond texted Abioye and
“represented/communicated that he was acting on behalf of” defendant
Corporation of the President of the Oakland California Stake, The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church). He did so “with several verbal
communications and by sending [Abioye] a picture of a scripture verse with
life and relationship advice.” Raymond demanded that Abioye cancel the
refinance of the property. In May 2020, Abioye hired Raymond and his
1 We take facts from the complaint and attached exhibits and matters
which have been judicially noticed. (See Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 488, 495.) We refer to some parties by their first
names for clarity and intend no disrespect.
2
company, defendant Visuals, Inc. (Visuals), as his financial advisor and made
Raymond a managing member of Pinnacle 24 Investments LLC and Abioye’s
properties. In October 2020, Raymond emailed Abioye the 2015 loan
agreement and the 2019 addendum.
B. Prior Lawsuits
In October 2020, Abioye’s father sued him (no. RG20078149; first
lawsuit). Abioye filed a first amended cross-complaint (FACC) against
numerous cross-defendants, including Raymond and Visuals.2 He alleged 13
causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty and slander. The facts
alleged in the FACC recite the same facts summarized above. Namely, that
Raymond gifted Abioye $180,000 to purchase a property and, subsequently
and unbeknownst to Abioye, Raymond and Moses signed the 2015 loan
agreement and 2019 addendum purporting to identify the gift to Abioye as a
loan to Moses. The breach of fiduciary duty cause of action alleged that
Raymond and Visuals, among others, acted as Abioye’s fiduciaries and
breached their fiduciary duty to him.
In March 2022, the trial court granted Raymond’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings as to each cause of action in the FACC except for slander.
As to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the court stated the FACC
failed to allege any underlying confidential or fiduciary relationship between
Abioye and Raymond that would give rise to such a claim. The court
concluded the allegations in the FACC were insufficient to establish a
fiduciary relationship with Raymond and, therefore, the court granted the
motion as to this cause of action.
In May 2022, Abioye dismissed his FACC as to Raymond. The trial
court subsequently granted Visuals’ motion to strike the FACC and entered
2 Shanna and the Church were not named as cross-defendants.
3
judgment dismissing Visuals from the action without prejudice. In June
2023, the court granted Abioye’s motion for leave to amend his cross-
complaint only insofar as Abioye sought to assert a claim for slander against
Raymond. It appears that Abioye never did so.
Instead, in July 2023, Abioye filed a new lawsuit against only Raymond
asserting a single cause of action for slander (no. 23CV037590; second
lawsuit). He alleged substantially similar facts as he had done in the first
lawsuit. In April 2024, the trial court sustained Raymond’s demurrer to
Abioye’s complaint without leave to amend on the ground that the slander
claim was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed the complaint
with prejudice.
C. The Present Litigation
In February 2024, while the second lawsuit was still pending, Abioye
filed the operative complaint alleging a single cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty (no. 24CV064677). He named as defendants Raymond,
Shanna, Visuals, and the Church.
The Lees and Visuals demurred to Abioye’s complaint arguing the
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and
the statute of limitations. Abioye opposed both demurrers.
In June 2024, the Church filed a demurrer to Abioye’s complaint on the
grounds that the breach of fiduciary duty claim failed to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. The Church argued there were no facts
alleged to properly demonstrate that the Church owed a fiduciary duty to
Abioye or that Raymond acted within the scope of any agency relationship
with the Church. Additionally, the Church purported to join in the Lees’
4
demurrer, arguing that it could only be liable, if at all, through Raymond’s
conduct.
In August 2024, the trial court heard the three demurrers together.
The court subsequently issued an order which, among other rulings,
sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed
Abioye’s complaint with prejudice. Abioye appealed.3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appellate Principles
It is “a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “ ‘In the
absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the
trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Id. at p. 609.)
“ ‘This means that an appellant must do more than assert error and leave it
to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test his claim.
The appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to
supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the record.’ ” (L.O. v.
Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620 (L.O.); see also Cahill v. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill) [“ ‘We are
not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.’ ”].) “When a point is
3 While the record does not include a formal judgment of dismissal, the
trial court’s order is an appealable final judgment as it sustained each
defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend and stated that Abioye’s
complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, it effectively terminated
the action. (See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 699;
TruConnect Communications, Inc. v. Maximus Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
497, 505, fn. 3.)
5
asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to
be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ”
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see also Cahill, at p. 956 [“ ‘The
absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to
treat the contention as waived.’ ”].)
In their brief, an “appellant must ‘[s]tate each point under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.’ [Citations.] Failure to
provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but
are not clearly identified by a heading.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) “Although we address the issues raised in the
headings, we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that
are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal
argument.” (Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294.)
Moreover, while demonstrating error is a prerequisite to a successful
appeal, it is not sufficient to warrant reversal. The California Constitution
“ ‘prohibits a reviewing court from setting aside a judgment due to trial court
error unless it finds the error prejudicial.’ ” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1099, 1108.) Error is prejudicial when “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.’ ” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780,
800.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice from the
error. (See Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.)
Self-represented litigants must comply with these rules. (Burnete v. La
Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [“ ‘ “the in propria
6
persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an
attorney” ’ ”]; see Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)
Various deficiencies in Abioye’s briefing make it difficult for us to
consider his claims. Nonetheless, to the extent we can, we address each
argument he identifies by a heading or subheading. These arguments
challenge orders: (1) vacating the Church’s entry of default, (2) sustaining
defendants’ demurrers, (3) vacating hearings on his motions to strike, and (4)
declaring him a vexatious litigant.4
B. Church’s Default
Abioye challenges the trial court’s order vacating the default entered
against the Church.
1. Additional Facts
Prior to the hearing on the Church’s demurrer, the trial court
requested supplemental briefing on whether default had been entered
against the Church and, if so, whether it should be set aside. The record
regarding whether the court had entered the Church’s default is anything but
4 There are five respondents, two of whom filed respondent’s briefs:
Raymond and the Church. Attorney Geva Baumer prepared and filed
Raymond’s brief. As he was in the trial court, though, Raymond is self-
represented on appeal. Baumer is counsel of record for Visuals, Raymond’s
company. Abioye accurately points out that there has not been filed a
substitution of attorney substituting Baumer as attorney for Raymond, and
he asserts we should construe the brief as being filed by Visuals. Based on
this, he contends Raymond and Shanna failed to file respondent’s briefs.
Whether we consider the brief as being submitted by Raymond or Visuals is
irrelevant to our determination of the issues raised on appeal, because even
when no respondent’s brief is filed we must still determine whether any of
the appellant’s claims of error are supported. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.220(a)(2); see also Griffin v. The Haunted Hotel, Inc. (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 490, 505 [“if a respondent in a civil case files no brief at all,
we still examine the record to see if it supports any claims of error made by
the appellant”].)
7
straightforward but, for purposes of this appeal, is not determinative of the
outcome.
In May 2024, Abioye submitted various requests for entry of the
Church’s default. While the trial court clerk rejected multiple requests,
explaining Abioye had failed to demonstrate proper service, the clerk also
appears to have entered the Church’s default twice after Abioye purported to
show the Church was properly served. Yet in some other requests submitted
by Abioye, the court clerk indicated that default was not entered and routed
the request to a judge.
The Church argued that any default entered against it should be set
aside because the initial attempted service of process on it was defective. But
if service was valid, the Church contended the default should be set aside
under either the discretionary relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure5
section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)), based on the Church’s excusable
neglect or the statute’s mandatory relief provision due to attorney mistake.
David Kimball, the Church’s Stake President, submitted a declaration
explaining the attempts of service of process on him. The documents were
first served on his wife on April 21, 2024, when he was not home. The next
day, some documents were personally served on him but they did not include
a copy of the complaint. On May 9, he received a copy of the complete service
documents in the mail. At various times, he forwarded these documents to
the Church’s attorneys.
Christopher Hill, the Church’s attorney, submitted a declaration
explaining that the Church’s counsel had interviewed Kimball regarding
when he first was served with the summons and complaint to determine the
deadline to respond. Based on the information provided by Kimball, service
5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
8
on his wife would be effective only when accompanied by mail delivery, which
Kimball received on May 9, 2024. They could not confirm the date of mailing
but determined the earliest date it could have been was April 22, making
June 3 the deadline to respond to the complaint. Based on the mail delivery,
counsel had no discussion with Kimball regarding the April 22 personal
service on him. During Hill’s meet and confer with Abioye in preparation for
filing the demurrer, Abioye advised the Church was in default, of which Hill
was unaware. The Church filed a motion to set aside the default. After the
trial court clerk indicated that the request for default had been rejected
because the court was not satisfied the Church had been properly served, the
Church proceeded by filing its demurrer on June 10.
The trial court considered the issue of the Church’s default in
conjunction with the hearing on defendants’ demurrers. The court explained
that the “record as to the status of the Church as a party in this case is
extremely mixed.” But assuming previous defaults were properly entered,
the court concluded that it “would be required” to vacate them pursuant to
the “mandatory relief” provision of section 473(b), based on the declaration
from attorney Hill. The court ordered that any default previously entered
against the Church be set aside and vacated.
2. Analysis
Section 473(b) provides for two distinct types of relief. (Luri v.
Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124.) The discretionary relief
provision provides, “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 473(b).) Section 473(b) also
contains a provision for mandatory relief, which states, “Notwithstanding any
9
other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application
for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in
proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to
the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any
(1) resulting default entered by the clerk against the attorney’s client, and
which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default
judgment or dismissal entered against the attorney’s client.” Section 473(b)
must be liberally construed and policy favors that actions be determined on
their merits. (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th
249, 256.) “ ‘ “[I]f the prerequisites for the application of the mandatory
provision of section 473, subdivision (b) exist, the trial court does not have
discretion to refuse relief.” ’ ” (Talbott v. Ghadimi (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
967, 977.)
Assuming a default was entered against the Church, Abioye did not
demonstrate the trial court prejudicially erred in vacating it. The Church
accurately observes that Abioye references only a court’s “discretion” to
vacate entry of default—the first provision of section 473(b). He does not
address the provision on which the trial court relied—the mandatory relief
provision. Abioye cites neither the mandatory relief provision of section
473(b) nor any legal authority regarding mandatory relief. He does not lay
out arguments why the prerequisites for the application of the mandatory
relief provision were not met. Therefore, we conclude that Abioye waived any
challenge to the trial court vacating entry of default. (See L.O., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 619–620; Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956; In re
S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Absent reasoned argument regarding
the mandatory relief provision of section 473(b) and citation to supporting
10
legal authorities from Abioye, we fall back on the presumption that the
judgment is correct.
C. Defendants’ Demurrers
Abioye challenges the trial court’s order sustaining defendants’
demurrers without leave to amend. The trial court determined, as relevant
here, that the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel as to all defendants.
1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The doctrine of res judicata—claim preclusion—prohibits a second suit
between the same parties on the same cause of action. (Robinson v. Southern
Counties Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476, 481.) Res judicata arises if a
second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties
or parties in privity with them (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the
first action. (Id. at p. 482.) If res judicata is established, it bars relitigation
of the claim altogether. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th
813, 824.) A “final judgment serves as a bar not only to the issues litigated
but to those that could have been litigated at the same time.” (Takahashi v.
Board of Education (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1481.)
We review the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer de novo and
determine whether the complaint states a cause of action on any available
legal theory. (Brown v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 275, 279 (Brown).) We treat the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.) A court may sustain a demurrer on res
judicata grounds if all facts necessary to show the action is barred are within
the complaint or subject to judicial notice. (Thompson v. Ioane (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1191.) When, as here, “ ‘the trial court sustains a
11
demurrer without leave to amend, we review the determination that no
amendment could cure the defect in the complaint for an abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] The trial court abuses its discretion if there is a reasonable
possibility that the plaintiff could cure the defect by amendment. [Citation.]
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that amendment would cure the legal
defect, and may meet this burden on appeal.’ ” (Brown, at p. 279.)
2. Analysis
Abioye’s challenge to the trial court’s rulings fails for the mere reason
that he fails to cite to legal authority and, in most instances, fails to cite to
the record. While the court relied, in part, on the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, Abioye does not cite any legal authority regarding
these topics. Therefore, he waived his challenge. (See L.O., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 619–620; Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956; In re
S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Complicating matters further, in his
argument section titled “Ruling/Order on Defendants’ Demurrers,” for the
most part Abioye does not distinguish between the different defendants,
other than focusing on Raymond when he does identify a specific defendant.
We also reject Abioye’s challenge on the merits because Abioye’s claim
is barred by res judicata. Abioye’s complaint alleges a single cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty. He does not appear to dispute that he previously
brought a virtually identical claim for breach of fiduciary duty against
Raymond and Visuals in the first lawsuit or that the other defendants here
are in privity to those named in the first lawsuit. Abioye’s only challenge to
the application of res judicata is his assertion that there was no final
determination in the first lawsuit because he voluntarily dismissed Raymond
without prejudice. We disagree.
12
In the first lawsuit, Abioye’s FACC alleged 13 causes of action,
including breach of fiduciary duty, against multiple cross-defendants. The
trial court granted Raymond’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without
leave to amend as to 12 causes of action—all except for the slander claim. As
to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the court determined the
FACC failed to properly allege a fiduciary relationship between Abioye and
Raymond. Subsequently, Abioye dismissed his FACC without prejudice as to
Raymond. But at the time, the only claim remaining against Raymond was
slander. Therefore, Abioye’s voluntary dismissal of the slander claim does
not affect the application of res judicata on the breach of fiduciary duty claim
in the present lawsuit. (See Paniagua v. Orange County Fire Authority
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 83, 89 [“ ‘A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of his action
has the effect of an absolute withdrawal of his claim and leaves the defendant
as though he had never been a party.’ ”].)
To further support his contention that there was no final determination
in the first lawsuit, Abioye points to a dismissal in a separate lawsuit he filed
and argues it demonstrates his complaint here is not barred. In case number
23CV031958, Abioye sued Crystal Linscombe and Investment Finance
Partners LLC (Linscombe case). In February 2024 in that action, the trial
court granted Abioye’s motion to dismiss four of his causes of action,
including breach of fiduciary duty.6 According to the complaint in the
Linscombe case, Abioye sued his mortgage broker for alleged conduct in 2021
6 On May 2, 2025, Abioye filed a request for judicial notice of February
2, 2024 court minutes in the Linscombe case. Respondents did not oppose the
request. The request for judicial notice is granted. (See Evid. Code, § 452.)
As Abioye points out, in the present lawsuit, Raymond filed a notice
identifying five related cases, including the Linscombe case. That lawsuit did
not involve the same parties as the present lawsuit.
13
related to their fiduciary relationship in handling his loan application.
Abioye fails to explain how voluntarily dismissing the breach of fiduciary
duty cause of action in the Linscombe case means that there was no final
determination in the first lawsuit such that res judicata does not apply here.
As to Shanna and Visuals, Abioye does not direct any argument
specifically to these defendants. Therefore, he waived any challenge to the
trial court’s rulings on Shanna’s and Visuals’ demurrers to the extent any
contentions would be different from those discussed above. (See L.O., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 619–620; Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956; In re
S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
As to the Church, the trial court sustained its demurrer on three
separate grounds: (1) the complaint failed to allege facts to impose a fiduciary
duty on the Church or facts demonstrating how the Church breached any
fiduciary duty; (2) the complaint’s allegations that Raymond was acting on
behalf of the Church were insufficient to establish an agency relationship or a
fiduciary duty owed by the Church to Abioye because there were no
allegations showing conduct by the Church that Raymond was acting as it
agent; and (3) the Church’s liability would be derivative of Raymond’s
liability and because the claims against Raymond were barred by res judicata
and collateral estoppel, so too were any claims based on the Church’s
derivative liability for Raymond’s acts. As best we can discern, Abioye only
challenges the trial court’s conclusion regarding res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Because Abioye does not challenge the two alternative bases for the
trial court’s ruling, reversal is unwarranted.
To the extent Abioye asserts that the complaint states facts sufficient
to establish a fiduciary relationship between him “and the [d]efendants” and
to “show that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties” to him, Abioye
14
again provides no reasoned argument or citations to legal authority. For
example, he fails to cite authority regarding what creates a fiduciary
relationship and fails to provide argument demonstrating how his complaint
sufficiently alleges facts demonstrating a fiduciary relationship between him
and the Church or its breach. (See, e.g., O’Neal v. Stanislaus County
Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1215 [“ ‘The elements
of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, (2) its breach, and (3) damage proximately caused by that
breach.’ ”].) Nor does Abioye provide reasoned argument or citation to
authority regarding whether Raymond acted as an agent of the Church.
Contrary to Abioye’s assertion, the Church has not “judicially admitted that
Raymond . . . was its agent.”7 Abioye’s conclusory statements that the
complaint is sufficient, without more, do not demonstrate trial court error. In
sum, Abioye failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the trial court
committed error in sustaining defendants’ demurrers.
Finally, the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave
to amend. Abioye does not raise this issue in a separate heading or
subheading and, therefore, he forfeited any challenge to this portion of the
court’s ruling. (See Pizarro v. Reynoso, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.)
Even were we to “consider all of the loose and disparate arguments” (Provost
7 Abioye quotes portions of the Church’s demurrer. The demurrer
included a heading titled, “Because the Church can only be liable to plaintiff
through Raymond’s conduct, if at all, the Church joins in Raymond’s
demurrer and incorporates herein all of the grounds for demurring asserted
therein.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) In arguing that the Church
was entitled to the benefit of Raymond’s exoneration, the Church stated,
“Either Raymond was the Church’s agent, in which case the Church is not
liable for Raymond’s inactionable conduct, or Raymond was not the Church’s
agent, in which case there is no fact pled against the Church for direct
fiduciary duty and breach.”
15
v. Regents of University of California, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1294)
scattered throughout his brief which could be construed as asserting that
leave to amend should be granted, we reject his contention.
Abioye suggests that there were new and different breaches of fiduciary
duties which occurred after he filed his FACC in the first lawsuit. (See Allied
Fire Protection v. Diede Construction, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 150, 155
[“Res judicata is not a bar to claims that arise after the initial complaint is
filed. . . . The general rule that a judgment is conclusive as to matters that
could have been litigated ‘does not apply to new rights acquired pending the
action which might have been, but which were not, required to be
litigated.’ ”].) For example, Abioye states: “There are plenty of witnesses who
can attest to the clergy/penitent relationship between me and the
[d]efendants;” “there are numerous incidents which make res judicata and
collateral estoppel inapplicable;” there were “breaches of fiduciary duties that
occurred subsequently to the filing of the cross-complaint;” Raymond
threatened “to sue me” for blackmail; and incidents from April 2024
demonstrated defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations claiming they did
not meet and confer even though they had, and claiming the loan agreement
was valid and enforceable. Overall, Abioye asserts there “is a strong
possibility that [he] can and, if relief is granted, will allege facts under which
recovery can be obtained.”
Abioye fails to provide legal authority and citations to the record
demonstrating how he can amend the complaint to sufficiently state a breach
of fiduciary duty cause of action which is not barred by res judicata and
which sufficiently alleges facts meeting the elements of such a claim,
including the existence of a fiduciary relationship(s). (See Rakestraw v.
California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44 [“Where the
16
appellant offers no allegations to support the possibility of amendment and
no legal authority showing the viability of new causes of action, there is no
basis for finding the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend.”].) Because Abioye failed to meet his
burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that he could cure the
defects in his complaint if given the opportunity to do so, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend.
(See Brown, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 279.)
D. Abioye’s Motions to Strike
Abioye filed seven motions to strike: three motions to strike the
demurrers filed by the Lees, Visuals, and the Church; three motions to strike
Raymond’s, Shanna’s, and Visuals’ declarations submitted in support of an
automatic extension to file responsive pleadings; and a motion to strike
Raymond’s motion to strike portions of the complaint. The motions were
brought on various grounds, including that the challenged demurrers,
motions, and declarations were irrelevant, false, or improper, were not drawn
in conformity with the law, and violated the rules of court. In its August
2024 challenged order, the trial court advanced the hearings on Abioye’s
motions to the same date as the defendants’ demurrers and vacated his
motions. The court determined Abioye’s motions to strike were “moot in light
of [its] order.” It also “observe[d] that the proper method of opposing a
demurrer is to file an opposition to the demurrer, which [Abioye] has done.
Filing seven collateral motions to strike creates unnecessary congestion on
the [c]ourt’s already congested calendars.” Abioye argues his motions to
strike “should have been heard and granted.”
17
Any party may move to strike a pleading, which means a demurrer,
answer, complaint, or cross-complaint. (§ 435, subds. (a)(2), (b)(1).)8 A court
may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter in any pleading, and
all or any part of a pleading not drawn in conformity with state laws or rules
of court. (§ 436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face
of the challenged pleading or from matters properly subject to judicial notice.
(§ 437.) We review a ruling on a motion to strike for abuse of discretion.
(Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.)
Abioye fails to provide reasoned argument supported by relevant legal
authority demonstrating why the trial court’s decision constituted a
prejudicial abuse of discretion. The court determined that Abioye’s motions
were moot given the rulings it made in the challenged order, that is, the
rulings on defendants’ demurrers. Abioye has not demonstrated why they
were not moot. Nor has he demonstrated that had the trial court considered
and ruled on his motions, it is reasonably probable that there would have
been a result more favorable to him. (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 800.) Instead, he merely offers conclusory statements
without support. For example, he asserts that his “motions to strike had
viable grounds on which the [d]efendants’ demurrers should have been
stricken.” And he “presented the court with just grounds and good cause to
strike the defendants’ pleadings or overrule the demurrer[s].” But he fails to
explain how. Accordingly, we reject his challenge.
8 While section 435 specifically contemplates a motion to strike a
demurrer, we observe that it does not provide for a motion to strike a motion
or a declaration. (See § 435, subds. (a)(2), (b)(1), (3).)
18
E. Vexatious Litigant Order
In July 2024, the trial court granted Raymond’s motion for an order
declaring Abioye a vexatious litigant and entered a prefiling order pursuant
to section 391.7 prohibiting Abioye from filing any new litigation in propria
persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge or justice.9 In his
opening brief, Abioye attempts to argue that the vexatious litigant order
should be reversed. We may not consider his contention because he did not
appeal from that order.
The trial court issued its order declaring Abioye a vexatious litigant on
July 26, 2024. This prefiling order pursuant to section 391.7 was
immediately appealable as an order granting an injunction. (See Luckett v.
Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85, 90; In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347.) Abioye’s notice of appeal specifically
identified, and attached, the August 30, 2024 order ruling on defendants’
demurrers, the Church’s entry of default, and Abioye’s motions to strike as
the order from which the appeal was taken. The notice of appeal did not
identify the vexatious litigant order, which was issued more than one month
earlier. “ ‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal
and the judgment or order appealed from.’ ” (Faunce v. Cate (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170; see also Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
963, 967 [“it is the notice of appeal that defines the scope of the appeal by
identifying the particular judgment or order being appealed”]; Cal. Rules of
9 In the trial court, Abioye represented himself. The notice of appeal
was prepared and signed by an attorney. This court ultimately determined
that the requirement of a prefiling order did not apply because Abioye was
represented by counsel when the appeal was initiated. Before briefing
commenced, Abioye filed a substitution of attorney form to substitute himself
in place of the attorney.
19
Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [notice of appeal “is sufficient if it identifies the
particular judgment or order being appealed”].) Abioye confirms this in his
opening brief, stating his “appeal is from the judgment/order filed on 8/30/24.”
Accordingly, because Abioye “specifically and clearly excluded the [order]
from the subject of the appeal” (Morton, at p. 967), we lack jurisdiction to
consider an appeal from the vexatious litigant order.
III. DISPOSITION
The August 30, 2024 order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
Abioye v. Lee / A171356
20
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