CourtListener 10809984•People v. Grossman CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 3/17/26 P. v. Grossman CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B338720
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA093990)
v.
REBECCA JUNE GROSSMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed.
Gressley & Donaldson and Lara Gressley, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Kristen J. Inberg,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The jury found Rebecca June Grossman guilty of two
counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a),
counts 1 & 2), two counts of vehicular manslaughter with gross
negligence (§ 192, subd. (c)(1), counts 3 & 4), and hit and run
driving resulting in death or serious injury (Veh. Code, § 20001,
subd. (b)(2), count 5). The jury found true in counts 3 and 4 the
allegations that Grossman fled the scene of the crimes. (Veh.
Code, § 20001, subd. (c).) The trial court sentenced Grossman to
a total term of 15 years to life in prison. The court sentenced
Grossman to 15 years to life in count 1 and a concurrent term of
15 years to life in count 2. The court imposed and stayed,
pursuant to section 654, a term of 11 years in count 3 (the upper
term of six years plus five years for the hit and run
enhancement), and a term of 16 months in count 4. In count 5,
the court imposed a concurrent term of three years.
On appeal, Grossman contends: (1) the court gave
erroneous instructions on implied malice; (2) the evidence was
insufficient to establish implied malice and hit and run; (3) the
court applied the wrong standard for subjective implied malice in
deciding the motion for new trial; (4) the court abused its
discretion by admitting character evidence and evidence that was
unduly prejudicial; (5) the prosecution improperly argued a
theory of guilt in Grossman’s trial that was inconsistent with its
theory in the prosecution of former codefendant Scott Erikson; (6)
the court erred by refusing to suppress statements Grossman
made to officers during a custodial interrogation in violation of
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
her Miranda2 rights; (7) the court erred in denying Grossman’s
request, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154
(Franks), for an evidentiary hearing on her motion to traverse the
warrant used to obtain a blood sample; (8) the court erred in
denying Grossman’s motion to suppress blood sample evidence
under the Fourth Amendment; (9) the court abused its discretion
by excluding evidence that Grossman sought to introduce in her
defense; (10) the court erred by finding true the aggravating
factor that the victims were particularly vulnerable; and (11) the
court abused its discretion by ordering destroyed all identifying
information obtained from jurors during voir dire.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTS
A. Events Before the Collision
1. Background
In September 2020, Grossman was in a romantic
relationship with Scott Erickson. Grossman’s husband, Dr. Peter
Grossman, was aware of the relationship. The Grossmans had
two residences. Grossman sometimes stayed in the house where
her husband resided in Hidden Hills. At other times Grossman
lived with Erickson in the Grossman’s Westlake Village home,
which was on Bowsprit Circle off of Triunfo Canyon Road on
Westlake Lake.
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
3
Between September 20, 2019, and September 29, 2020,
Grossman placed 7,533 calls and texts utilizing the cell towers in
the general area of the crime scene, which was less than a mile
from Grossman’s Bowsprit residence.
2. Mark Hair
On September 29, 2020, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Mark
Hair and his wife invited Grossman to come to their home in
Westlake Village. Grossman had called Hair’s wife and asked
her to meet Grossman and Erickson at Julio’s Agave Grill, but
the Hairs were already making dinner, so they asked Grossman
to come to their house and have a drink instead. When
Grossman arrived, Hair made her a margarita containing a shot
of tequila. Grossman drank at least half of the margarita before
she left the Hair’s house at approximately 5:35 p.m. Hair did not
know if Grossman finished her drink or not. Several months
after the collision, Grossman asked Hair and his wife not to tell
anyone that she had a drink at their house before going to Julio’s
Agave Grill. The Hairs had already provided the information to
the police.
3. Royce Clayton
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Royce Clayton met Erickson
and Grossman at Julio’s Agave Grill near Lakeview Canyon Road
and Agoura Road in Westlake Village. They all arrived at Julio’s
separately. Erickson was driving a black Mercedes SUV, and
Grossman was driving a white Mercedes SUV. Grossman drank
one margarita at the restaurant. Erickson had two margaritas.
4
Grossman, Clayton, and Erickson stayed for about 25 minutes.
When they left the restaurant, it was still light outside. They
planned to watch the presidential debate together at Grossman’s
house at 7:00 p.m. Grossman did not appear to be impaired by
alcohol when they left. Clayton went to pick up some fish for
tacos before going to Grossman’s. When he called Erickson to get
Grossman’s address, Erickson told him that Grossman had been
involved in an accident, so Clayton did not go to meet them.
B. The Collision
1. Nancy Iskander
In the afternoon on September 29, 2020, Nancy Iskander
and her husband Karim Iskander took their four children out to
get some fresh air after school. Their oldest child, Mark, was 11
years old, the next child, Jacob, was eight years old, Zachary was
five years old, and the youngest child, Violet, was one year old.
The Iskanders drove to Triunfo Canyon Road for their outing.
Once there, Nancy and Jacob rollerbladed, Mark rode his
skateboard, and Zachary rode a scooter. Mark and Zachary were
both wearing helmets. Karim pushed Violet in her stroller while
he jogged. Karim and Violet went ahead of Nancy and the three
boys. Nancy and the boys were all adept at using their respective
rollerblades, skateboard, and scooter, and used them often.
Triunfo Canyon Road is a four-lane road with two lanes
going in each direction (which we refer to in this opinion as
eastbound and westbound).3 There are bicycle lanes on both
3 Triunfo Canyon Road generally runs southeast and
northwest, although it runs north and south near the scene of the
5
sides of the road, and a center median. Westlake Lake is located
on the east side of Triunfo Canyon Road. In 2020, people in the
neighborhood commonly walked their dogs, biked, jogged, and
walked along Triunfo Canyon Road. People were always
recreating in the area. There were many people out in the
evening on September 29, 2020. The Iskanders traveled south
along Triunfo Canyon Road toward Saddle Mountain Drive.
They started out on the west side of the road, further away from
the lake. When the Iskanders got to the lake, they decided that
they would cross Triunfo Canyon Road at the Saddle Mountain
Drive crosswalk to take pictures and look at the water. Nancy
and the boys waited to use the crosswalk. When it was clear of
traffic, they entered the crosswalk and crossed the eastbound
lanes to the median. Nancy led them and kept the youngest boy,
Zachary, closest to her. Jacob was right behind them, and Mark
was right behind him. Nancy chose the crosswalk because she
thought it was the safest way to cross to the lake. The crosswalk
was well-marked and there were signs on the side of the road
showing that there was a crosswalk ahead. Pedestrians did not
have to step up onto a curb to cross the median. The crosswalk
interrupted the median so that the pavement was level all the
way across the road.
After they crossed most of the first westbound lane, Nancy
saw “racing cars.” Nancy had her eyes on the road, so she heard
and saw the cars approaching her at the same time. They were
extremely loud. Nancy testified “two cars [were] coming towards
crimes. We refer to the lane directions as eastbound and
westbound to differentiate Triunfo Canyon Road from Lindero
Canyon Road, which intersects Triunfo Canyon Road and
generally runs north-south.
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us at an insane, crazy speed . . . like you wouldn’t imagine on the
highway. Crazy speed. They were coming towards us and
changing lanes, switching lanes as if they were racing or
playing. . . . I freaked—I put my hand up in the air, but it was
two seconds until the black car made it to that crosswalk. Two
[SUV’s], one black and one white, and the black one was trying to
beat the white one or something, and it came towards the
crosswalk right—right at Zachary and I, towards Zachary and I
exactly. I was almost, I would say, maybe in the center of that
bumper coming towards me.” “They were playing. I could tell
with confidence they were playing. They were either trying to
bait each other to someplace. They were racing. I’m not sure
what they were doing. . . . [T]hese were not just two cars driving
on the road. So I can’t tell you, you know, which lane they were
[in at first] or anything like that. I’m not describing regular cars.
I’m describing a race track.”
Nancy saw the cars perform at least one “zigzag” before
reaching the crosswalk—i.e. they changed lanes and then
changed back to their original lane. At the crosswalk, the black
car was in the right lane in the lead, coming right at Nancy and
Zachary. Nancy grabbed Zachary off of his scooter and dove into
the bicycle lane by the sidewalk on the right (east) side of Triunfo
Canyon Road. The black car passed without hitting anyone. The
white car was in the left lane and went through the crosswalk
right after the black car. The white car crossed where Mark and
Jacob had been. As the white car passed, Nancy heard a loud
impact. Both cars continued driving west, and everything was
quiet.
Nancy started screaming. Bystanders had gathered. She
put Zachary in the arms of a young woman standing on the curb.
7
Initially, Nancy could not find Mark or Jacob. Nancy found Jacob
on the right side of the road first. He looked like he was sleeping.
She discovered Mark’s body much further down the road on the
left side with his head resting on the center median. Nancy knew
immediately that Mark was dead. She went to Jacob and put her
head on his chest. His heart was still beating. At that point
police began arriving. The police told her Mark was dead and
that the person who killed Mark left the scene. The drivers of the
white SUV and the black SUV never returned to the scene. Jacob
was transported to the hospital where he was later pronounced
dead.
2. Chris Morgeson
At approximately 7:10 p.m., Chris Morgeson was cycling
with friends in Westlake Village on Lindero Canyon Road,
heading south toward the intersection at Triunfo Canyon Road.
Morgeson lived nearby and cycled along the route at least three
times a week. The speed limit on Lindero Canyon Road, which
was clearly marked at the time, was 45 miles per hour. Three
cars “went flying by [Morgeson and his friends]. . . at an
incredibly high rate of speed.” There were two dark-colored
sedans in the lead and a white SUV behind them. Morgeson
believed that the white SUV was attempting to pass the other
two vehicles because it swerved into the bicycle lane and the
shoulder several times. Morgeson testified, “. . . I couldn’t believe
how fast they were going. And I just felt this vortex of the wind
kind of push me and my buddy as we turned.” “It felt as though
someone literally pushed me and my buddy into the sidewalk into
the driveway.” “And I couldn’t believe it. I turned to my friend,
8
and I said, ‘They’re going to kill someone.’ And I looked up. They
were gone. They were gone, out of sight.”
Morgeson described the driving as “Reckless. Excessive in
terms of speed.” Morgeson estimated that the cars were driving
at double the speed limit—i.e., 90 miles per hour. Morgeson and
the other cyclists stopped for about 15 minutes and discussed
what they had just seen. Then Morgeson started cycling home.
Morgeson continued south on Lindero Canyon Road and turned
right onto Triunfo Canyon Road (westbound). There were signs
indicating a speed limit of 45 miles per hour on Triunfo Canyon
Road. Near the intersection of Saddle Mountain Road and
Triunfo Canyon Road, police officers instructed Morgeson to cross
to the other side of the street. Morgeson heard screaming and
saw two areas where emergency personnel appeared to be
attending to people. Morgeson did not want to gawk, so he
continued cycling westbound on Triunfo Canyon Road. When he
was about a block from his home, he saw a police car and the
same white SUV that he had seen speeding earlier. He stopped,
but he did not see anyone in the car, so he cycled home. At home,
Morgeson wrote down everything he had heard and seen so that
he would have a clear record of events.
3. Donald and Shellie Pratt
Donald Pratt and his wife Shellie Pratt had lived in
Westlake Village for 30 years and knew the area well. On the
evening of the collision, the Pratts were on their boat on
Westlake Lake near the dam that abuts Lindero Canyon Road.
Donald estimated that the Pratts’ boat was about a football field’s
length away from the road. Lindero Canyon Road is elevated
9
where the dam begins, so Donald had a clear view of the road
from the lake. Donald heard an “extremely loud engine noise and
observed two vehicles traveling at [an] extremely high rate of
speed traveling southbound on Lindero [Canyon Road].” To
Donald, it “sounded like two vehicles racing.” Donald saw a dark
car in the lead and a lighter colored car trailing it. The vehicles
were “flying down the road.” Donald heard the cars decelerate at
the intersection of Triunfo Canyon Road and then accelerate
again. The engine noises stopped.
Shellie also heard and saw two cars at approximately 7:10
p.m. To Shellie, the cars “[s]ounded like they were racing.”
Shellie had been to a race track not long before that evening, and
the cars had sounded the same. When she looked over she saw
the headlights and observed that the cars “were traveling at an
excessive [rate of] speed and slowed down and then immediately
increased the speed again, [at a] very high rate [of speed].”
Shellie also observed that the lead car was dark-colored and the
car behind it was white. A few minutes later, the Pratts heard
sirens.
4. Susan Manners
On the night of the collision, Susan Manners was walking
westbound on the lake side of Triunfo Canyon Road toward the
intersection of Saddle Mountain Drive. She was taking
photographs, which she did as a hobby. The area was busy. “. . .
[I]t was the pandemic, and a lot of people were out, . . . walking,
family stuff . . .” Manners noticed a family on the far side of
Triunfo Canyon Road waiting to cross the road. The family
began crossing to the lake side (from left to right) and walking
10
toward the median. Manners then “realized that it sounded like
a train was coming. It was just an enormous noise of cars.”
Manners looked up and “saw cars coming way too fast.” The
family was continuing to cross the street, but one boy stopped in
the middle of the street and fiddled with something like a
skateboard or a scooter. Manners could see the cars coming
around the curve, and knew they were going to hit the family.
She jumped into the bicycle lane and waved at the cars to slow
down. The cars did not respond to her warning. Manners
estimated that the cars were driving at a speed of 90 miles per
hour—“[i]t was that scary and that fast.” “. . . [T]hey were upon
us and there was like no time.”
Manners turned as the cars passed. She was facing the
family when the collision occurred. Manners estimated that she
was about 12 feet away from them. She could not see everything
because there was a car in her direct line of sight. She heard an
impact in the right lane (closest to the lake) and then a second
impact when a car hit a boy who had been in the left lane
walking into the right lane. The car in the right lane was just
barely ahead of the car in the left lane. Manners estimated that
they were one to two seconds apart. The car in the left lane
definitely hit one of the children. The boy was in front of the
vehicle when he was hit, so Manners could not see the impact,
but she saw his body fly into the air. The boy did not go above
the roof of the car—he was propelled to the level of the roof or
lower. Manners attributed the collisions with the children to two
separate cars, but she only heard the collision on the right and
did not see it happen. Manners called 911. She then walked up
past the intersection and took photos because she was concerned
that the scene would not be preserved. Manners had to walk a
11
significant distance down the street to reach one of the bodies.
She took photos of debris from the collision as well.
5. Jake Sands
Jake Sands was a passenger in the front seat of Yasamin
Eftekhari’s car on the evening of the collision. Sands had lived in
Westlake Village his whole life and was familiar with it. It was
very common to see people out walking and biking in the area
where the collision occurred. He described Triunfo Canyon Road
as a “quiet” street that people usually used to get to their homes.
Eftekhari was driving southbound on Lindero Canyon Road at a
speed of approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour. Eftekhari turned
right on Triunfo Canyon Road and proceeded westbound on
Triunfo Canyon Road in the right lane. It was dusk, but not yet
dark. Sands heard the sound of a loud motor and saw headlights
in the car’s right-side mirror. Without signaling, two cars passed
Sands and Eftekhari using the left lane. They were driving
within two to three feet of each other. The cars were the same
model—Mercedes GLE A.M.G.—“sporty”—SUV’s. The lead car
was black and the car behind it was white. The cars passed them
very fast. Sands looked ahead and saw that there was a family in
the crosswalk. The cars were very close together—a distance of
only three to five feet. Sands estimated that the two cars were
traveling at about twice the speed limit. Sands identified the
people crossing Triunfo Canyon Road as a mother, a very young
girl, and two boys. They were in the crosswalk, walking from the
center median to the sidewalk on the right side of the street.
Sands was able to see the crosswalk, which was illuminated by a
street light. The mother was closest to the sidewalk on the right
12
with the smallest child, and the two bigger boys were a few feet
behind her crossing from the median into the street. Sands
testified, “As I looked forward, seeing the speed and force of the
cars and the fashion they were going in, I just instantly thought
it’s too late. There is not enough time to stop. . . .”
Sands and Eftekhari had the car windows rolled up, but
they heard the engines as the cars approached and the ensuing
crash above the sound of the car’s radio. The mother was able to
pull the smallest child out of the way, but there was no time for
her to reach the older boys. The family only walked forward a
few feet between the time that Sands saw them and the collision.
The black SUV was able to avoid hitting everyone, but the white
SUV was not. Sands saw one of the boys “go to the right side of
the road airborne.” After the impact Sands saw “a tap on the
brake lights [from both cars] but not really a decrease of speed.
And then I saw both cars just continue on and—poof—it was
gone.” Eftekhari pulled over immediately. She stopped 50 feet
before the crosswalk with only gradual braking and pulled over to
the right side of the road. Sands called 911, but he was unable to
get through. Sands got back into the car and drove to a local fire
station to alert them of the collision. The fire crew went to the
collision scene. Sands returned to the scene. At that point, he
realized a second boy had been hit. There was a skateboard on
the left side of the road and a boy’s body was lying further away
on the left side.
6. Yasamin Eftekhari
Yasamin Eftekhari testified that at approximately 7:10
p.m. on the evening of the collision she was driving on Lindero
13
Canyon Road towards Triunfo Canyon Road. Eftekhari was very
familiar with the area—she knew the speed limit was around 40
to 45 miles per hour, and she was familiar with the crosswalk at
Saddle Mountain Drive.
Eftekhari was driving at a speed of approximately 45 miles
per hour in the right lane. Jake Sands was riding in the
passenger seat. It was close to dusk. Right after Eftekhari
turned onto Triunfo Canyon Road she saw the headlights of two
cars in her mirror. The lights caught Eftekhari’s attention
because the cars were overtaking her so quickly. Both cars
moved into the left lane and passed Eftekhari’s car. When they
passed her, a white car was in the lead and a black car was
following it. The cars moved back into the right lane. Eftekhari
was not sure if the cars changed lanes again after that.
At trial, Eftekhari estimated that the cars were driving at a
speed of 70 to 75 miles per hour. When police interviewed her
right after the collision she estimated that the cars were
traveling 100 miles per hour. Eftekhari explained that she was a
new driver when she saw the collision and felt that she was
better at estimating speed by the time of the trial. Seeing the
cars come upon her so fast “spooked” Eftekhari. Eftekhari saw
pedestrians ahead of them in the crosswalk—three children and
an adult. The adult was closest to the sidewalk. The children
and the adult were all walking about a foot apart. It was dusk,
but the area was well-lit. The white car was moving straight
toward one of the children, who Eftekhari later learned was
Jacob. The white car, which was in the right lane, struck Jacob.
He came to rest on the right side of the road. At trial, Eftekhari
testified that the white car was the first car to pass through the
intersection, but at the preliminary hearing she testified that she
14
was unsure which of the two cars was in the lead. Eftekhari
heard two distinct impacts about five seconds apart. She did not
see the black car strike anyone.
Eftekhari pulled over and tried to help. She did not see
Mark get hit and only realized he had been struck later when she
saw people gathering farther down the road. Eftekhari recalled
seeing Mark’s body on the right side of the road.
7. Pamela Curry
At the time of the collision, Pamela Curry lived in Westlake
Village and walked around the lake often. It was a popular area
for people to ride bikes and walk with their dogs during the
pandemic. Curry was walking around the lake. As she turned
the corner from Lindero Canyon Road onto Triunfo Canyon Road
she heard “revving engines, racing cars.” Curry saw three cars.
The driver of the second car was a woman. “It seemed to be . . .
jovial, like there was some sort of a race going on between the
first car.” Curry listened for them to slow down, but they did not.
The cars were driving too fast for the road conditions. Curry
estimated that they were driving at least 50 miles per hour as
they rounded the corner. They were very close together. The
cars appeared to be accelerating.
Curry walked to her car, which was parked at a restaurant
on the corner. By the time she reached her car there were
paramedics and police arriving at the scene of the collision.
Curry was going to go to the scene to offer information, but the
area was blocked off, so she went home.
15
C. Events Following the Collision
1. Telephone Records
At trial, the parties stipulated that Grossman’s Mercedes
automatically initiated mbrace, an emergency phone system
similar to “OnStar” because the vehicle was involved in a
collision. The parties further stipulated that a recording played
for the jury was a true and accurate recording of Grossman’s
conversation with mbrace.
The mbrace operator verified with Grossman that she was
in her 2018 Mercedes Benz white AMG GLE43 Coup, and that
she had been involved in an accident at 32258 Triunfo Canyon
Road. Grossman stated that she did not know if someone hit her
or she hit them. She was driving down the road and her airbag
“exploded.” The operator kept Grossman on the line while they
contacted the Los Angeles County Fire Department. The fire
dispatcher asked if Grossman was near the tennis courts.
Grossman responded that she had just passed tennis courts. The
fire dispatcher said that two kids on rollerblades had been hit.
The dispatcher asked if that was the accident that Grossman was
involved in. Grossman said she did not know what she hit. She
told the fire dispatcher that she turned the corner at Triunfo
Canyon Road and the airbag deployed in her face. Grossman said
she was not injured. She did not speak again. Fire dispatch
instructed Grossman to remain where she was and then verified
vehicle and location details with the mbrace operator. The
mbrace operator terminated the call because Grossman was not
responding.
16
Grossman’s cell phone records show that she called
Erickson at 7:12 p.m. The call lasted 48 seconds.
2. Deputy Rafael Mejia
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Rafael
Mejia testified that at about 7:10 p.m. he responded to a collision
at the intersection of Triunfo Canyon Road and Saddle Mountain
Drive in Westlake Village. At the time of the collision, the speed
limit on Triunfo Canyon Road was 45 miles per hour, which was
reflected in a posted sign. There was a crosswalk at the
intersection at Saddle Mountain Drive, signage for the crosswalk,
and “PED XING” was painted in large letters on the roadway
approaching the crosswalk.
When Deputy Mejia arrived, the fire department and
paramedics were already on site attending to two victims. A
deputy on site directed Deputy Mejia to continue driving west
because a white vehicle with front end damage that was
responsible had left the scene and had continued driving down
the road.
Deputy Mejia encountered a woman later identified as
Grossman about three-tenths of a mile down the road. Grossman
was inspecting the front of a white Mercedes SUV, which was
stopped on the shoulder of the road with its hazard lights
flashing.4 Deputy Mejia parked behind the white SUV and
4 It was later determined Grossman’s home was also three-
tenths of a mile away from the location where the deputy
encountered her.
17
approached Grossman. The Mercedes had sustained front end
damage and the driver’s side air bags had deployed.
Grossman told Deputy Mejia that she pulled over because
her car had been disabled by Mercedes. The air bags had
deployed and she did not understand why or what was going on.
Grossman said she had hit something, but she did not know
what. Deputy Mejia noticed the smell of alcohol on Grossman’s
breath and person. He contacted another unit to conduct a
driving under the influence (DUI) investigation.
While waiting for the second unit to arrive, Deputy Mejia
walked around Grossman’s car and observed blood splatter on the
front end. He then went back to his patrol car and tried to calm
Grossman until Deputy Michael Kelley arrived to conduct the
DUI investigation.
After Deputy Kelley arrived, Deputy Mejia returned to
investigate the intersection where the collision took place.
Because of the nature of the collision there was a large debris
field. Deputy Mejia recorded the location of the point of impact,
the victims’ bodies, and debris. Based on the statements of
eyewitnesses, deputies had designated the area of the crosswalk
running across the left lane as the point of impact. Deputy Mejia
testified that when other vehicles have driven through a crime
scene before it can be contained, the point of impact is always
estimated. Both victims’ location of rest was measured from the
curb cut in the crosswalk. Jacob’s body came to rest between 50
and 60 feet from the curb cut, and Mark’s body was located over
250 feet from the curb cut. The debris included pieces of a
skateboard, a scooter, a child’s white sock, and pieces of a car
including a piece of a white plastic bumper and a Mercedes
emblem.
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Deputy Mejia ruled out the possibility that more than one
vehicle hit the children. All of the debris was consistent with
Grossman’s white Mercedes SUV. Deputy Mejia did not discover
any debris consistent with a black SUV. In Deputy Mejia’s
experience, there is always vehicle debris when a car is involved
in a collision. Given the great impact that must have occurred to
throw the children’s bodies so far, Deputy Mejia believed that if
there had been a second vehicle involved, it would also have been
disabled and would have been discovered. The deputy
determined that the cause of the collision was excessive speed.
3. Deputy Michael Kelley
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Michael
Kelley testified that he responded to a call to conduct a DUI
investigation on the night of the collision. When he arrived,
Deputy Kelley put on a body camera, which he turned on at
approximately 8:15 p.m.5 The first thing the deputy observed
was a white SUV with front end damage. Grossman was in the
rear passenger seat of Deputy Mejia’s patrol car. Deputy Kelley
opened Grossman’s door and noticed a faint smell of alcohol.
Deputy Kelley asked Grossman to exit the patrol car. He took
Grossman into an area where there was some light and
questioned her using a pre-investigative questionnaire. The
questionnaire is designed to rule out any injuries that would
require treatment and to get general information about the
subject and the vehicle. Deputy Kelley observed that Grossman’s
pupils were equal, which ruled out the possibility that she
5 The body camera footage was played for the jury. The
jury was provided transcripts of the recorded audio.
19
suffered a head injury. Deputy Kelley noticed that Grossman’s
eyes were watery and glassy and her eyelids were a little bit
droopy, which are signs of intoxication.
Grossman admitted that she was the driver of the white
Mercedes SUV. Grossman denied any illness or injury. She
stated that she was not diabetic or epileptic, was not under the
care of a doctor or dentist, and was not taking medication on a
regular basis. Grossman stated that she had one margarita at
Julio’s Agave Grill before driving. She said that she consumed
the margarita between approximately 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m.
Deputy Kelley conducted a Field Sobriety Test (FST or FST
test) to determine whether Grossman exhibited physical clues
associated with intoxication. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration sets guidelines for how many clues must
be present to indicate that a person is impaired. Deputy Kelley
testified that mental impairment from alcohol precedes physical
impairment. Grossman exhibited clues indicating impairment on
several of the tests, but on other tests she “did okay.” Grossman
was cooperative, her speech was normal, she had “fair”
coordination, and her clothes were orderly. Deputy Kelley
testified that he did not administer some of the FST tests
properly. Even taking this into account, Deputy Kelley did not
believe that Grossman demonstrated that she had “normal good
mental and physical faculties.” Grossman displayed several signs
of impairment during the FST’s.
After concluding the FST, Deputy Kelley asked Grossman if
she would consent to a Preliminary Alcohol Screening (PAS) test
to assist him in determining whether she was under the influence
of alcohol. Deputy Kelley advised Grossman that she could
refuse to take the PAS test, but if she was arrested she would be
20
required to give a sample of her blood or breath for purposes of
determining her blood alcohol content. Grossman consented to
take the PAS test. Deputy Kelley testified that the PAS test is
performed using a hand-held breathalyzer with either an
automatic or manual trap. An automatic trap requires a certain
amount of air to trigger a reading. If the subject does not provide
adequate air to get a reading on an automatic trap, the officer can
manually capture air by pressing a button. Grossman did not
provide an adequate breath sample for the automatic trap. She
told Deputy Kelley that she had asthma. Deputy Kelley made six
attempts before switching to a manual trap. Deputy Kelley
administered a second PAS test a few minutes later. Grossman
again failed to trigger the automatic trap, so he used a manual
trap. The deputy testified: “She wasn’t blowing, or gave . . . little
breath[.]” The manner in which Grossman performed the PAS
tests made Deputy Kelley question whether Grossman was
“trying to trick the system and . . . trying to get a lower reading.”
Based on the FST and the results of the PAS tests, Deputy Kelley
formed the opinion that Grossman was under the influence of
alcohol.
At approximately 8:42 p.m., Deputy Kelley directed his
partner to handcuff Grossman. The deputy handcuffed
Grossman, escorted her to a police vehicle, and placed her under
arrest. The deputy informed Grossman that she was being
arrested for driving under the influence and causing a fatal
traffic collision.
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4. Results of PAS Tests
The parties stipulated that Deputy Kelley performed the
PAS tests at 8:32 p.m. and 8:35 p.m., and that the results
reflected that Grossman had a blood alcohol content of .076 and
.075 percent, respectively.
5. Teryl Grasso
Grossman was transported to Los Robles Emergency Room,
where her blood was drawn at 10:17 p.m. pursuant to a warrant.
Emergency medical technician Teryl Grasso collected Grossman’s
vital information. Grasso testified that Grossman spontaneously
said to her, “ ‘If they didn’t disable my car, I would be at home in
my garage right now.’ ” Grasso delayed reporting Grossman’s
statement for three years. Grasso explained that she was
traumatized by her interaction with Grossman and had gone to
therapy, but that she still had difficulty talking about the night of
the accident. Once out of therapy, Grasso did not report the
statement because she was concerned that it would be a violation
of Grossman’s medical privacy rights. Grasso spoke to her
supervisor who encouraged her to come forward to police with the
information, so she did.
6. Dr. David Matero
Dr. David Matero performed a medical clearance
evaluation of Grossman to determine whether she suffered any
injuries, including whether she suffered injuries from the
deployment of her car’s airbags. Dr. Matero testified that people
22
who have been injured by airbags usually have burns on exposed
areas of skin. Grossman denied any pain or injury and Dr.
Matero did not observe any evidence of pain, injuries, or bruising.
Grossman had no difficulties walking, such as limping or signs of
discomfort. Dr. Matero testified that it was difficult to elicit
information from Grossman and that she continually told him he
would need to talk to her husband about her medical problems.
She denied taking any medication. Grossman’s demeanor was
“dismissive” and “maybe even slightly hostile.”
D. Toxicological Evidence
1. Sylors Chem
Sylors Chem, a criminalist with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department’s Forensic Alcohol Section, testified
regarding the effects of alcohol on mental and physical abilities.
Mental abilities that may be impaired include the ability to
process information, make decisions, and multi-task, as well as a
decrease in perception and reaction time. Peripheral vision may
be decreased resulting in tunnel vision. Physical abilities that
may be impaired include coordination, balance, and speech. A
person’s eyes may become red and watery. Mental impairment
occurs before physical impairment. The ability to operate a
vehicle is most impacted by mental impairment. The inability to
process information at a normal rate “is the difference between
driving safely and not driving safely.” A person is impaired for
the purposes of safe driving well before they appear “drunk” as
that term is commonly understood—i.e., stumbling, slurred
speech, etc. In Chem’s opinion “at 0.08 percent alcohol level
23
everyone is mentally impaired to operate a motor vehicle safely.”
“[A]t 0.07 percent most individuals will be impaired mentally to
operate a motor vehicle safely.” “[A]t a 0.04 percent some
individuals may be impaired to operate a motor vehicle safely.”
“[M]otor vehicle collisions start[] at . . . 0.04 [percent blood
alcohol content]. . . . [I]ncreased to a 0.06 percent, the chance of
you likely [sic] to have a motor vehicle collision related to alcohol
is twice. At a 0.08 it’s five times. At 0.15 percent it increases to
22 times likelihood.” Performing an FST is much less
complicated than driving a car. An impaired driver may still
perform relatively well on an FST. A person with a tolerance to
alcohol can mask their physical impairment. “[Y]ou can’t mask
the mental impairments due to alcohol. You can’t mask
judgment. You can’t mask the ability to process information.
You can’t mask reaction time.”
Chem conducted two forensic alcohol analysis tests on
Grossman’s blood and obtained a 0.08 percent average blood
alcohol content on the first test and a 0.081 percent average blood
alcohol content on the second, with an uncertainty level of 0.004
percent.
Chem testified that a hypothetical 130-pound female who
has a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent would have at least
two standard drinks in their bloodstream. If a 130-pound female
consumed one ounce of 80 proof alcohol between 4:30 p.m. and
5:30 p.m., the most alcohol they would have in their system
would be 0.028 percent because the alcohol was consumed over
an hour. Assuming they were drinking socially—approximately
one drink per half hour—the person would reach their peak
alcohol level at 6:00 p.m. By 7:00 p.m., they would have at most
a 0.01 percent alcohol level. By 10:15 p.m. that person would
24
have an alcohol level of zero percent. If the same person
consumed one-ounce of 88 proof alcohol between 4:30 p.m. and
5:30 p.m., and two ounces of 88 proof alcohol plus one ounce of 30
proof alcohol between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., they would have a
0.04 percent blood alcohol content at 10:15 p.m.
Chem testified that some of the alcohol in the blood will
evaporate if a blood sample is opened, and over time additional
alcohol will dissipate. If blood is refrigerated for between one and
three months, four to 14 percent of the alcohol may dissipate. If
blood tested at 0.08 percent and was opened and stored for a little
over a month, a subsequent test yielding a result of 0.074 percent
or 0.075 percent would be within the expected rate of dissipation.
2. Blake Byfuglin
Blake Byfuglin, a senior criminalist with the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department’s Toxicology Section, testified that
on October 5, 2020, Grossman’s blood sample was located in the
Downey Laboratory and assigned to Sylors Chem. Chem
returned the sample on October 6, 2020. On October 7, 2020,
Byfuglin performed a preliminary screening of Grossman’s blood
sample to test for the presence of drugs. The results were
positive for benzodiazepines, so Byfuglin sent the sample for
confirmation testing.
3. Christopher Lopez
Christopher Lopez, a criminalist with the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department’s Toxicology Section, testified that
he performed a qualitative analysis of Grossman’s blood sample
25
to confirm the presence or absence of benzodiazepines. The
results do not provide a quantity for present benzodiazepines—
they are either detected or not detected. Grossman’s blood tested
positive for diazepam (valium) and nordiazepam, which is both a
metabolite of valium and an independent drug.
4. Vanessa Meneses
Vanessa Meneses, a forensic scientist at the Orange County
Crime Laboratory, testified that the Orange County Crime
Laboratory performed a blood alcohol analysis and drug
toxicology analysis after the Los Angeles County laboratory
performed its analyses. Meneses was cross-trained to perform
both alcohol and drug analyses. Meneses confirmed that the
results from the Los Angeles County laboratory were appropriate.
Meneses determined that Grossman’s blood alcohol content was
0.074 percent weight by volume and 0.073 percent weight by
volume, with an uncertainty level of plus or minus 0.005.
Meneses testified that alcohol consumption impairs mental
abilities such as thinking, judgment, and decision-making before
impairing physical abilities including balance and coordination.
Meneses opined that at 0.08 percent blood alcohol content all
individuals are impaired for the purposes of driving, and most
people are impaired for the purposes of driving at 0.05 percent
blood alcohol content. Meneses participated in ride-alongs with
various agencies to observe FST’s. In her opinion the FST’s were
less complicated to perform than driving a vehicle. Meneses
opined that a person could perform fairly well on an FST and still
be mentally impaired by alcohol.
26
Meneses opined that a hypothetical 130-pound female with
a blood alcohol content of 0.074 percent blood alcohol content at
the time of testing would have 2.4 to 2.5 standard drinks in their
system. If the same individual consumed one standard drink of
80 proof alcohol between 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., they would
have a blood alcohol content of zero at 10:15 p.m. In that same
scenario, the maximum blood alcohol content that Meneses would
expect to see at 7:00 p.m. would be 0.0015 percent. If the same
person consumed one ounce of 88 proof alcohol between 4:30 p.m.
and 5:30 p.m., and two ounces of 88 proof alcohol plus one ounce
of 30 proof alcohol between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., they would
have a 0.015 percent blood alcohol content at 10:15 p.m. If the
same person consumed one ounce of 80 proof tequila and one
ounce of a 30 proof liqueur between 6:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.,
Meneses would expect their blood alcohol content to be zero at
10:15 p.m. If the same person consumed one ounce of 88 proof
alcohol between 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., and two ounces of 88
proof alcohol plus one ounce of 30 proof alcohol between 6:30 p.m.
and 7:00 p.m., they would have a 0.04 percent blood alcohol
content at 10:15 p.m.
Meneses testified that if a blood vial is opened a number of
times, alcohol may evaporate, which would decrease the testing
value. That the results from the Orange County lab were slightly
lower than the results from the Los Angeles County lab was
consistent with the vial being opened multiple times for testing
and not refrigerated during transportation.
The Orange County laboratory’s drug toxicology analysis
detected the presence of caffeine, fluoxetine (prozac),
norfluoxetine (a breakdown product of fluoxetine), and
nordiazepam. It was not surprising to Meneses that the Los
27
Angeles County laboratory detected diazepam, when Meneses
only detected nordiazepam, its metabolite. Diazepam is not
stable in the blood.
Nordiazepam is a depressant that can impact an
individual’s ability to drive by hampering the person’s ability to
think critically and make decisions. It can also cause drowsiness
and affect balance, coordination, and reaction time. Normally
when someone is prescribed a drug like valium, of which
nordiazepam is a metabolite, they are given warnings not to drive
a vehicle. When two or more drugs are taken together they can
have an additive effect. The combination of nordiazepam and
alcohol will have a greater effect than either would separately
because they are both central nervous system depressants.
Based on a hypothetical driver consistent with the evidence
in the case, including how the crimes occurred, the driver’s
performance on the field sobriety tests, the PAS results, and the
Orange County laboratory test results, Meneses opined that the
driver was consistent with someone impaired for the purposes of
driving.
5. Detective Michael Takacs
Detective Michael Takacs, a drug recognition expert with
the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office testified that a
person may be impaired to drive with a blood alcohol level of less
than 0.08 percent. A person who is impaired may be physically
able to drive, but mentally unable to do so safely. Diazepam and
nordiazepam are psychoactive drugs that depress the central
nervous system. Alcohol is also a central nervous system
28
depressant. When depressants are mixed together, it creates an
additive effect which increases impairment.
Detective Takacs testified that incorrect administration of
an FST does not necessarily invalidate the entire test. Only the
clues that resulted from the errors could not be taken into
consideration.
When Detective Takacs watched the video of Grossman’s
FST’s, he noticed that Grossman’s statements were evasive—she
said she took “some things” when asked about medication, that
she did not know what she hit, and that her car “stopped.”
Detective Takacs observed several clues of impairment.
Detective Takacs had successfully administered the PAS test
using an automatic trap to people who claimed to suffer from
asthma. Use of a manual trap will generally return lower blood
alcohol level results than use of an automatic trap. It appeared
that Grossman did not intend to blow into the PAS machine but
was instead “kind of playing with it.” Grossman “didn’t give two
legitimate readings [on the PAS test]. She was manually
trapped. It wasn’t a full breath.”
Based on a hypothetical tracking the facts of this case,
including the FST and PAS results, Detective Takacs opined that
such a person was impaired.
E. Coroner’s Report
Los Angeles County Department of Medical Examiner
coroner Dr. Matthew Miller performed Mark and Jacob’s
autopsies.
Dr. Miller concluded that Mark’s death was caused by an
automobile versus pedestrian collision. Mark died as a result of
29
blunt force traumatic injuries, including a fracture to the back of
his skull which caused significant bleeding around the brain,
blood in his chest, a broken arm, a broken femur, pelvic fractures,
and a fracture of the thoracic spine which resulted in a complete
separation of the spine and spinal cord just below the base of the
neck. The skull fracture alone would have been lethal.
Mark had a “hybrid sharp force injury/abrasion” pattern on
his rear thighs and lower buttocks. Dr. Miller examined the
grille of Grossman’s vehicle and concluded that the pattern of
these force injury/abrasions was “almost an exact match to the
pattern of that grille.” The hard plastic material of the grille
would produce this type of injury. Mark’s injuries were
inconsistent with tire marks or treads. Dr. Miller testified that,
given Mark’s injuries, he was likely knocked unconscious
immediately and killed within seconds or minutes. None of
Mark’s injuries suggested that he was run over. Mark had
“exactly the type of patterned injury when a pedestrian is struck
by an automobile at a high rate of speed, generally because they
end up being propelled.” In Dr. Miller’s opinion, Mark’s injuries
were consistent with a single-vehicle collision, but it was not
possible to discern from the autopsy whether Mark was hit by
one vehicle or two.
Dr. Miller concluded that Jacob also died as a result of
blunt force traumatic injuries caused by a vehicle versus
pedestrian collision. Jacob died shortly after he was transported
to the hospital, however. Jacob suffered complete dislocation
between the C-1 vertebra and the skull which resulted in instant
paralysis from the head down and hemorrhaging around the
spinal cord and base of the skull, blood in the chest, two broken
femurs, pelvic fractures, and multiple abrasions. Spinal cord
30
separation of the type Jacob suffered is usually quickly fatal, but
some people will survive with paralysis from the head down.
Jacob was likely unconscious almost immediately. In Dr. Miller’s
opinion, Jacob’s injuries were consistent with a high-speed single-
vehicle collision. As with Mark, there was no way to determine
whether Jacob was struck by more than one vehicle from the
autopsy.
Dr. Miller testified that blood spatter may or may not occur
in a vehicle/pedestrian collision depending on the type of injury
suffered. If two people are hit by a car, there may be two audible
impacts. Two impacts might be heard if the people being struck
are staggered or if they are hit at the same time but then one is
thrown onto a surface that makes an audible impact. Depending
on the velocity and distance a person is thrown and what they
strike, there may be multiple audible impacts. If someone is
struck while riding a skateboard, the skateboard could create an
audible impact. In a collision like the one Jacob and Mark
suffered, Dr. Miller would not expect the bodies to fly up very
high, but rather to be propelled forward.
F. Inspection of Grossman’s Vehicle and Collision
Reconstruction
1. Christopher Lee
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department senior criminalist
Christopher Lee was part of a team that inspected Grossman’s
vehicle on October 6, 2020. Lee was tasked with documentation
and collection of evidence. Lee documented extensive damage to
the Mercedes’ front grille area, hood, radiator, license plate
31
frame, front passenger side bumper, the headlight housing on the
front passenger side, the front passenger side quarter panel, and
the driver’s side mirror. Lee documented stains on the front end
and front passenger side of the hood that tested negative for
blood. He also documented stains on the grille, the hood, the
driver’s side of the front bumper, and the rear driver’s side
exterior door that tested positive for blood. Lee noted that the
airbags had deployed at the steering wheel and driver’s side knee
area.
2. Officer Garrett Smith
Garrett Smith was a highway patrol and verification officer
with the California Highway Patrol in September 2020. Smith
performed an inspection of Grossman’s Mercedes and determined
that there were no pre-existing mechanical defects that could
have caused the collision.
3. Michael Hale
Michael Hale, an investigator with the Orange County
District Attorney’s Office Vehicular Homicide Unit, investigated
the collision. Hale reviewed the Event Data Recorder (EDR)
download from Grossman’s vehicle. The EDR is housed in the
vehicle’s air bag control module. The EDR monitors speed,
throttle, and braking. When an air bag deploys, the airbag
control module records data for the five seconds before the airbag
deploys, counting down from negative five to zero, and creates a
report. Federal law requires that EDRs record and provide the
32
speed the vehicle was traveling prior to a collision with a margin
of error of plus or minus 0.62 miles per hour.
The report from Grossman’s vehicle included multiple data
samples. At five seconds prior to impact, the Mercedes was
traveling at 73 miles per hour. By two seconds prior to impact it
had accelerated to 81 miles per hour. At the time of the collision,
the vehicle had decreased its speed to 73 miles per hour. The
vehicle’s throttle was at 78 percent five seconds prior to impact
and then moved to 98 percent through three seconds before
impact. Hale opined that this was likely the highest the throttle
would go, meaning that Grossman had fully depressed the
accelerator. At two and a half seconds prior to impact the
throttle decreased to 83 percent. At two seconds prior to impact
the throttle went to zero percent—i.e. Grossman took her foot off
the accelerator. The throttle remained at zero percent through
the collision.
From the foregoing data, Hale could determine the distance
between the Mercedes and the point of impact over the five
seconds before the collision. The EDR reflects what actually
happened, and it also makes it possible to determine what would
have happened if the Mercedes had been traveling at the speed
limit. If calculations show there would have been a crash if the
car was traveling the speed limit, speed cannot have been the
primary collision factor. Conversely, if a collision would not have
occurred at the speed limit, speed is the primary collision factor.
Hale determined that at the posted speed limit of 45 miles
per hour, there would not have been a collision. At five seconds
before impact, Grossman’s vehicle was 559 feet away from the
children. Had she been driving at the speed limit, Grossman’s
car would have been 233 feet away from the point of impact when
33
the children were there, and by the time the car reached the area
of impact, the children would have been a minimum of 21 and a
half feet away, outside the lanes of vehicle travel and nearly on
the sidewalk. Hale used the children’s expected walking speed to
make the calculations, which is the speed estimate most
favorable to the driver. The EDR showed that Grossman braked
for one second. Hale described the force that Grossman applied
as “light braking” that resulted in only a six mile-per-hour
decrease in speed, from 81 miles per hour to 75 miles per hour.
Hale calculated that the force of the Mercedes hitting the
children while traveling 73 miles per hour as equivalent to the
force that would be applied if the Mercedes was dropped on the
children from the top of a 12-story building. The crash pulse data
on the EDR was consistent with the Mercedes striking both
children.
The Mercedes has several automatic safety features that
are activated in a crash. The fuel pump shuts off as well as the
engine. After the engine shuts off there is a vacuum reservoir
system to provide two or three more power brake applications.
After that, braking is still possible, just not power braking.
Following an accident/air bag deployment, the hazard lights and
emergency lighting are also activated. If the vehicle is equipped
with an mbrace system, as Grossman’s was, mbrace makes an
automatic emergency call to Mercedes-Benz to alert it of a
collision.
4. Deputy Robert Apodaca
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Robert
Apodaca conducted a speed analysis of the collision in February
34
of 2021. Deputy Apodaca testified that he visited the collision
site and reviewed the paint markings where the victims and
debris had been located. Jacob’s body had come to rest
approximately 70 feet from the crosswalk. Based on a photo of
Grossman’s car, Deputy Apodaca opined that Jacob was struck by
the passenger headlight area of the Mercedes and projected
sideways. The deputy could not use the resting position of
Jacob’s body to determine the speed that Grossman was traveling
because her car did not hit Jacob straight on; Jacob was pushed
to the side in a “fender vault.” Jacob’s body went over the side of
the car and did not absorb the full forward momentum of the
vehicle.
Deputy Apodaca testified that Mark’s body came to rest
approximately 254 feet (84 yards) from the crosswalk. Given
Mark’s resting position, Deputy Apodaca opined that Mark was
struck in the center of the left lane closest to the median, and
that his body absorbed the full impact of the car. This was
corroborated by the damage to the grille of Grossman’s car, which
was caused by a direct impact. The grille was pushed back
toward the engine and there was also direct damage to the hood
above the grille. The hood appeared to be folded and pushed
backwards.
Deputy Apodaca also examined photos of injuries to Mark’s
body. The deputy testified that Mark had “very thick distinct
bruising along his lower back which matches up with the
thickness of the hood where the direct damage is being pressed
into, the direct damage of the car, as well as he’s got grill[e]
marks along his upper thighs. The distance between the bruising
on the lower back and the bruising from the grill[e] on the thighs
matches what I’m seeing with the direct damage in the car.”
35
Based on the damage to Grossman’s car and the injuries to
Mark’s body, Deputy Apodaca opined that Mark was hit by the
center of the car, closer to the driver’s side and right above the
license plate. As a result, Mark’s resting place provided better
data for estimating Grossman’s speed. Deputy Apodaca used two
formulas to calculate the Mercedes’ speed based on Mark’s
position and other known factors. The more reliable calculation
showed Grossman’s car as moving at a speed between 71.3 and
70.89 miles per hour, which was consistent with the data from
the EDR download and witness statements. Using the less
accurate formula, Deputy Apodaca calculated the vehicle’s speed
as between 66 and 68 miles per hour at the point of impact.
5. John Grindey
Mechanica Scientific Services Corporation chief operating
officer and collision reconstructionist John Grindey testified
regarding reconstruction of the collision and EDR analysis. The
EDR download reflected that Grossman depressed the accelerator
98 percent. Grindey considered this to be “pretty much full
throttle” or “flooring it.” He had rarely seen a car reach 100
percent depression of the accelerator. Two seconds prior to the
airbags deploying, Grossman was driving at a speed of 81 miles
per hour. At the time of the collision she was traveling at 73
miles per hour. Her brakes were off at the time of impact. The
EDR showed a delta V of 1.2, which was consistent with hitting a
pedestrian. The EDR showed two “crash pulse” peaks consistent
with hitting two children with “a little bit of offset.”
Grindey reviewed Hale’s time-distance analysis and agreed
with it. Grindey concurred with Hale that if Grossman had been
36
traveling at the speed limit of 45 miles per hour the collision
would not have occurred because the children would have had
time to reach the sidewalk. Grossman would still have had the
ability to brake after her emergency system activated, just
without power assistance. If Grossman had applied her brakes
after the collision, she would have stopped sooner than she did.
Grindey viewed Grossman’s Mercedes in person. He
observed two areas of impact—one at the front center and a
second at the front passenger side headlight. The damage on the
front of the Mercedes was consistent with the injuries to Mark.
Grindey testified that “[W]hen you look at close up on the grill[e]
and the lower grill[e], there is a very specific scallop looking
[pattern]. . . . [The same] scallops . . . were located on Mark’s
buttocks and upper thigh on both his right and left leg.” Nothing
on Mark’s body or in the coroner’s report indicated that Mark was
run over or that he was hit by more than one vehicle. Mark’s
injuries were consistent with a direct high speed impact with a
single vehicle.
Grindey opined that the damage on the front passenger-
side headlight area was consistent with the impact to Jacob.
Jacob was “fender vaulted” and pushed to the right because he
was hit where the car curved. Mark and Jacob’s positions were
consistent with the types of impact each suffered. Grindey would
expect witnesses to hear multiple impacts.
Grindey concluded that Jacob did not absorb the full impact
of Grossman’s car, so Jacob’s resting place could not be used to
estimate Grossman’s speed. In contrast, Mark absorbed most or
all of the car’s speed. Based on Mark coming to rest 246 feet from
the point of impact, Grindey calculated that Grossman was
traveling at a speed between 68 and 71 miles per hour when she
37
struck Mark and Jacob. Grindey’s calculations were consistent
with the EDR download, witness statements, and the speed
analysis.
Grindey independently concluded that Mark and Jacob
were struck in the crosswalk. Jacob was almost at the line
marker between the left and right lanes and Mark was about two
feet behind Jacob in the left lane.
In Grindey’s opinion, Grossman’s car was the only car
involved in the collision. Mark and Jacob’s injuries were
consistent with one impact, not two, and all the debris at the
crime scene was from a single vehicle.
6. Jeffrey Muttart
Jeffrey Muttart, an expert on driver behavior and response
to hazards, reviewed the case to determine whether Grossman’s
response when faced with the collision was within the normal
range of drivers in a substantially similar situation. Muttart
evaluated the period from when the Iskanders first left the
median to the time when Grossman pressed her brakes. At 204
feet from the crosswalk, 85 percent of drivers traveling 45 miles
per hour would have been able to see the Iskanders, respond, and
completely stop. In this situation, it was not even necessary to
stop completely to allow the Iskanders to clear the intersection.
Muttart created photos to show the conditions at the scene. He
testified that looking at the photos “there is no reason to crash if
you’re traveling at 45 [miles per hour]. . . . [Y]ou see it wasn’t
really close. . . . [T]hese pedestrians were there to be seen.”
Grossman’s response time was in the normal range. Muttart
concluded that the cause of the crash was her speed. Although
38
Grossman’s response time when she pressed the brakes was in
the normal range, at 81 miles per hour, “100 percent of drivers
crash; at 45, near zero crash. And it boils down to speed.” If
Grossman had only been driving at a speed of 57 miles per hour
and had the same reaction, she would not have hit anyone
because the children would have been out of her path.
G. Evidence of Grossman’s Awareness of the Dangers of
Speeding
On August 3, 2020, Grossman texted Rene Villanueva
regarding an automobile accident in which two young men who
were speeding on Westlake Boulevard lost control of a vehicle, hit
a tree, and burned to death. She expressed concern for parents of
teenage drivers who must always have a fear that such tragedies
could occur.
On March 10, 2013, California Highway Patrol Officer
Robert Leffler issued a citation to Grossman for driving 92 miles
per hour on the 101 Freeway, where the posted speed limit was
65 miles per hour. Officer Leffler’s standard practice was to warn
that “speed in excess only contributes to a greater chance of
collision, and those collisions often result in injury and/or death
depending on how severe it is.” Officer Leffler told Grossman to
“mind her speed.” Officer Leffler testified that Grossman “made
a voluntary statement that she hopes I don’t need the use of the
[Grossman] burn center in the future.” Grossman’s comment was
not a common reaction to a speeding citation.
39
H. Video Evidence
Authorities obtained three surveillance videos that depicted
Grossman’s vehicle and other cars traveling westbound on
Triunfo Canyon Road following the collision. The videos did not
depict the collision or the collision site. They depicted a portion
of the road further northwest.
DISCUSSION
A. Implied Malice Murder Instructions
Grossman contends that the trial court made two errors
when the court instructed the jury on implied malice. First, she
alleges the court erred by failing to instruct, under CALCRIM No.
520, that an act is only “dangerous to human life” if there is a
high degree of probability that the act will result in death.
Second, Grossman complains that the court should have
instructed the jury that it must unanimously agree regarding
which acts she committed that endangered human life. Both
contentions lack merit.
1. The Trial Court Fully Instructed the Jury
Under CALCRIM No. 520
a. Legal Principles
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the
killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
40
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’ ” ’ (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143
(Knoller).)” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
“Implied malice has ‘ “both a physical and a mental
component. The physical component is satisfied by the
performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, to be culpable as a direct
aider and abettor of implied malice murder, the accomplice
‘ “must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-
endangering act, not the result of that act.” ’ [Citations.]” (People
v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1115.)
“The mental component of implied malice murder requires
that the defendant ‘ “ ‘knows that his conduct endangers the life
of another and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘ “[T]he aider and abettor of implied malice murder
need not intend the commission of the crime of murder. Rather
. . . he or she need only intend the commission of the perpetrator’s
act, the natural and probable consequences of which are
dangerous to human life, intentionally aid in the commission of
that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life.” ’
[Citations.] “The requisite intent is a subjective one—the
defendant must have “ ‘actually appreciated the risk involved.’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘ “In short, implied malice [murder] requires a
defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the
life of another.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Werntz, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 1116.)
“We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states
the law under the independent or de novo standard of review.
[Citation.] Review of the adequacy of instructions is based on
41
whether the trial court ‘fully and fairly instructed on the
applicable law.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.)
b. Proceedings
At trial, the court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No.
520 (March 2021 rev.) regarding second degree murder as follows:
“The defendant had implied malice if:
“1. She intentionally committed the act;
“2. The natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life;
“3. At the time that she acted, she knew her act was
dangerous to human life;
AND
“4. She deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.” (Italics added.)
c. Analysis
Grossman contends that her second degree murder
convictions in counts 1 and 2 must be reversed because the trial
court failed to fully instruct the jury regarding implied malice.
Specifically, Grossman argues that CALCRIM No. 520 (March
2021 rev.) did not state that the phrase “dangerous to human life”
means “ ‘a high degree of probability that [the act] will result in
death.’ ” Grossman claims that in Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981,
the Supreme Court “confirmed” that “ ‘a high degree of
probability that [the act] will result in death’ is the controlling
standard for implied malice murder.” Grossman asserts that the
42
formulations of the standard differ because an act may be
dangerous to human life but not have a high probability of
resulting in death. We reject the contention.6
The Supreme Court has long recognized that there are two
equivalent formulations of the standard for implied malice.
(Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152 [“the[] two definitions of
implied malice in essence articulate[] the same standard”]; see
also People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 (Watson) [the two
standards articulate the same concept “[p]hrased in a different
way”]; People v. Pierce (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 508, 525 [“the
requirement that an act carry a ‘high probability’ of death is not
new, and Reyes itself noted the equivalence of the Thomas and
Phillips formulations”].) The Thomas test or formulation
(originating in Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in People v.
Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480) states that “malice is implied
when ‘the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with
wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high
degree of probability that it will result in death.’ ” (Knoller,
6 The People argue that Grossman forfeited her challenge
by failing to object to the instruction in the trial court. Whether
the claim was forfeited turns upon whether the instruction was
legally correct. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1087 [challenge preserved despite lack of objection where
instruction is not legally correct]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 959, 1022–1023 [failure to request modification of
otherwise correct instruction forfeits claim on appeal]). Because
Grossman contends that the jury instruction did not clarify the
meaning of “dangerous to human life,” we could deem her
argument forfeited. But even assuming that Grossman’s
contention can properly be characterized as one that challenges
the legality of the instruction as delivered, we explain why we
disagree.
43
supra, at p. 152.) The Phillips test or formulation (originating in
People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 (Phillips)) states that
“[m]alice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by
‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows
that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (Knoller, supra, at p. 152.)
The version of CALCRIM No. 520 (March 2021 rev.) under
which the trial court instructed the jury solely included the
Phillips formulation of the standard. The Supreme Court has
upheld the use of the Phillips test’s “dangerous to human life”
formulation in jury instructions. In People v. Nieto Benitez (1992)
4 Cal.4th 91, 110–111 (Nieto Benitez), the defendant challenged a
revised version of CALJIC No. 8.31 for omitting the requirement
that the relevant act must involve a high probability of resulting
in death, which had been included in an earlier version of the
instruction. The defendant argued, as Grossman does here, that
the high-probability-of-resulting-in-death language articulated
“an elevated standard” compared to the requirement in then-
current CALJIC No. 8.31 of “an act whose ‘natural consequences’
are dangerous to life.” (Id. at p. 111.) Citing to the cases in
which it had confirmed that the two phrases articulated the same
standard, as well as other precedent discussing the elements of
implied malice, the Supreme Court held that CALJIC No. 8.31
“correctly distills the applicable case law.” (Ibid.)
Reyes did not impact the validity of this jurisprudence.
(People v. Pierce, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 526–529.) In
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981, the defendant petitioned for vacatur
of his murder conviction and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. In denying Reyes’s petition, the trial court “found that
44
‘the act in this case is the defendant, along with several other
gang members, one of which [was] armed, traveled to rival gang
territory,’ that the natural and probable consequence of their
doing so was dangerous to human life, that Reyes was aware the
act was dangerous to human life, and that he deliberately acted
with conscious disregard for that danger.’ ” (Id. at p. 987.) On
appeal, Reyes argued that he could not now be convicted under a
valid theory of murder because the prosecution could not show
that he committed “ ‘an act that actually . . . help[ed],
encourage[d], [or] facilitate[d] [the shooter] in the shooting.’ ”
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s order.
(Ibid.)
The Supreme Court granted review and reversed. (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) With respect to direct perpetrator
implied malice murder, the Supreme Court concluded that the
victim’s death was not a natural and probable consequence of
Reyes’s act of bicycling into rival gang territory and chasing a car
with an armed compatriot. (Id. at p. 989.) The court stated that
“[t]o suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must
not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative
sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) In so stating, the court
quoted Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th 139, and included a
parenthetical stating that the Thomas and Phillips tests
articulate the same standard. (Ibid.) The court held that there
was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Reyes was a
direct perpetrator who acted with implied malice. (Ibid.)
Reyes did not hold that CALCRIM No. 520 incorrectly
stated the law with respect to direct perpetrator implied malice
murder or hold that a “high degree of probability that death will
45
result” was the controlling standard. Reyes provides no basis for
departing from Nieto Benitez.
Grossman’s argument that Justice Evans’s statement
concurring in the Supreme Court’s denial of review in People v.
Doaifi (June 25, 2024, G062098) (nonpub. opn.), review denied
October 16, 2024, S286155 (conc. stmt. of Evans, J.) (Doaifi), and
Justice Liu’s concurring opinion in People v. Cravens (2012) 53
Cal.4th 500, support her position is unpersuasive in the face of
this clear, binding Supreme Court precedent. (See People v.
Pierce, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 527–529 [rejecting
Grossman’s Doaifi argument].)
Grossman’s contention that CALCRIM No. 520 incorrectly
stated the law is without merit.7
7 On November 20, 2025, Grossman filed a letter
purporting to advise this court of new authority. In the letter,
Grossman informs the court of revisions to CALCRIM No. 520.
Rules of Court, 8.254(a) provides: “If a party learns of significant
new authority, including new legislation, that was not available
in time to be included in the last brief that the party filed or
could have filed, the party may inform the Court of Appeal of this
authority by letter.” Counsel is advised that “ ‘jury instructions,
whether published or not, are not themselves the law, and are
not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent. They
should not be cited as authority for legal principles.’ ” (People v.
Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1157, fn. 7; see also People v.
Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.) The revisions to
CALCRIM No. 520 are not the proper subject matter for a letter
advising this court of new authority.
46
2. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Give a
Unanimity Instruction
a. Legal Principles
“In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous.
[Citations.] . . . Additionally, the jury must agree unanimously
the defendant is guilty of a specific crime. [Citation.] Therefore,
cases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the
crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same
criminal act.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132
(Russo).)
“This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is
intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be
convicted even though there is no single offense which all the
jurors agree the defendant committed.’ [Citation.] For example,
in People v. Diedrich[ (1982)] 31 Cal.3d 263, the defendant was
convicted of a single count of bribery, but the evidence showed
two discrete bribes. [The Supreme Court] found the absence of a
unanimity instruction reversible error because without it, some of
the jurors may have believed the defendant guilty of one of the
acts of bribery while other jurors believed him guilty of the other,
resulting in no unanimous verdict that he was guilty of any
specific bribe. (Id. at pp. 280–283.) ‘The [unanimity] instruction
is designed in part to prevent the jury from amalgamating
evidence of multiple offenses, no one of which has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant must have done something
47
sufficient to convict on one count.’ [Citation.]” (Russo, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
In contrast to the situation where evidence of two discrete
crimes is presented, “where the evidence shows only a single
discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how
that crime was committed or what the defendant’s precise role
was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the
cases often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty.
[Citation.]” (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
b. Analysis
Grossman contends that the trial court should have
instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree on the
act that established liability for implied malice murder.
Grossman complains that the prosecution relied on “a
hodgepodge of conduct from which the jurors could pick and
choose in order to convict [her,]” including speeding, engaging in
a speed contest, committing a crosswalk violation, and driving
while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs.
Grossman’s argument ignores the distinction between an
act that constitutes a crime and conduct (whether or not the
conduct is criminal) that constitutes evidence supporting the
prosecution’s theory of the manner in which a crime was
committed. As Reyes stated, in the context of implied malice,
“ ‘[t]he relevant act is the act that proximately causes death.’ ”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992, quoting People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713, fn. 27.) The relevant act in each
of counts 1 and 2 was Grossman’s driving, which resulted in the
death of a child. The jury did not have to agree which aspects of
48
Grossman’s driving made it dangerous to human life; they needed
only to unanimously agree that Grossman’s driving did endanger
human life. The trial court did not err by not instructing the jury
that it had to unanimously agree that Grossman’s driving
included specific conduct.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Grossman next contends that her convictions for murder
(counts 1 and 2) must be reversed because there was insufficient
evidence that she acted with implied malice—specifically, that
there was insufficient evidence that her actions had a high
probability of resulting in death and that she knew her conduct
endangered human life. Grossman further contends that her
conviction for hit and run (count 5) must be reversed, and the
jury’s findings that she fled the scene of the collision (counts 3
and 4) must be vacated because there is insufficient evidence that
she failed to stop immediately, and that she knew she had caused
injury. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s
verdicts and findings and therefore reject these contentions.
1. Legal Principles
“In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] We review the entire record to determine
whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible and of solid value—supporting the decision
49
and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] Our application of this standard of review does
not permit reweighing the evidence or reevaluating the
credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] Instead, we presume the
existence of every fact the jury reasonably could have deduced
from the evidence in support of the judgment. [Citation.] We
discard evidence that does not support the judgment as having
been rejected by the trier of fact for lack of sufficient verity.
[Citation.] And if the circumstances reasonably justify the
findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citations.]
Consequently, ‘[a] reversal for insufficient evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the
jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Murphy (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 713, 725.)
2. Analysis
a. Implied Malice
i. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s
Finding that there was a High Probability Grossman’s Actions
would Result in Death
Grossman contends that the murder convictions in counts 1
and 2 must be reversed because the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence that there was a high probability her actions
would result in death. The contention lacks merit.
50
Grossman cites to numerous cases in which courts have
held that substantial evidence supported a conviction of implied
malice murder in a vehicular manslaughter case. (Watson, supra,
30 Cal.3d 290 [defendant’s blood alcohol content significantly
above legal limit, defendant demonstrated pre-drinking intent to
drive, nearly caused a collision, skidded to a halt in an
intersection, and drove at a speed of 84 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h.
zone]; People v. Young (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1299 [defendant led
police in high-speed chase and ran four red lights]; People v.
Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944 [defendant drove with a
suspended license and suffered nine reckless driving citations in
the year prior to the offense; disregarded warnings that the
vehicle’s brakes were faulty and that it should not be driven at a
speed of over 15 m.p.h.; and raced another vehicle at 60 to 70
m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone]; People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
104 [defendant with seven prior reckless driving incidents chased
estranged wife at a speed of 100 m.p.h., tailgated, and crossed
double yellow lines]; People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937
(Moore) [defendant with recent drunk driving conviction crossed a
double yellow line, ran a red light, and drove at a speed of 80 to
90 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone]; People v. Autry (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 351 [defendant’s blood alcohol content significantly
above legal limit, defendant drove dangerously by swerving,
speeding, and running a red light]; People v. Olivas (1985) 172
Cal.App.3d 984 [defendant led police on a high-speed chase,
driving at speeds of 50 to 100 m.p.h., ran four stop signs and
three red lights, hit a car prior to the fatal collision, and caused
the fatal collision after running a stop sign at 57 m.p.h. in a 25
m.p.h. zone]; People v. Talamantes (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 968
[defendant was significantly above the legal limit for blood
51
alcohol, speeded with headlights turned off, went “airborne” over
railroad tracks, and drove on the wrong side of the road].)
Grossman argues that the facts of the above-cited cases
were more egregious than the facts in this case, and she claims
that the circumstances present in those cases were absent in
hers. Accordingly, she believes that the evidence in her case
cannot be sufficient to sustain her convictions.
Grossman misapprehends the substantial evidence
inquiry—“[o]ur role in a sufficiency of the evidence review is not
to engage in a comparative analysis of various cases, but rather
to carefully scrutinize the record in the instant case for
substantial evidence. . . .” (People v. Lagunas (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 996, 1007.) While the precedent Grossman cites may
be useful in ascertaining what types of behavior may contribute
to a finding of implied malice, none were reversals—they do not
set a threshold of egregiousness that subsequent cases must meet
or exceed. “ ‘[T]here is no particular formula for analysis of
vehicular homicide cases, instead [these cases] require[e] a case-
by-case approach.’ ([People v. Superior Court] (Costa) [(2010)]
183 Cal.App.4th [690,] 698 [citing cases].) [In particular], lack of
intoxication or the absence of driving at a high rate of speed to
evade police ‘ “does not preclude a finding of [implied] malice.” ’
(Ibid., quoting People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944,
955.)” (People v. Murphy, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 727.)
Here, the evidence demonstrated that Grossman was near
or above the legal limit for blood alcohol content8 at the time of
8 Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) provides:“It
is unlawful for a person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.”
52
the collision—a blood test showed her blood alcohol content
several hours after the crash at the legal limit, and the two PAS
breath tests administered in the field showed her hovering just
below the legal limit right after the fatal collision.9 As the
prosecution’s experts testified, having a blood alcohol content
below the legal limit does not preclude intoxication or
impairment.10 “Driving is one of the most complex and
9 The evidence suggested that Grossman’s PAS tests may
not have accurately reflected her level of intoxication. During the
PAS test, Deputy Kelley had to repeatedly admonish Grossman
to blow into the device. At trial, Deputy Kelley testified: “In a
way she wasn’t providing an adequate sample; so I don’t know if
she was trying to trick the system and trying to get like a lower
reading because the system knows it needs a full breath of air to
get an accurate reading. So by blowing more air through, you’re
getting air from your deep lungs, you’re getting the most alcohol
for or exchanges from your blood vessels to the air, and that’s
what we’re trying to look for in that. By providing a little small
breath like that, it also triggers the machine, but you’re not
getting an actual reading of her blood-alcohol content.” The
jurors were free to determine whether the PAS results accurately
reflected Grossman’s true blood alcohol content. Other evidence,
including expert testimony regarding how much alcohol a person
of Grossman’s size would have to consume to have a blood alcohol
content of 0.08 percent over three hours after the collision,
suggests that the PAS tests were not an accurate reflection of her
blood alcohol content and that her statements to authorities
regarding how many drinks she consumed (which were already
undermined by the testimony of eyewitnesses) were false.
10 Moreover, whether someone is unlawfully driving under
the influence is not determined by blood alcohol content.
“[Vehicle Code] [s]ection 23152[, subdivision] (a) makes it
unlawful for ‘a person who is under the influence of any alcoholic
53
potentially dangerous tasks that individuals undertake on a
regular basis.” (People v. Saucedo (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 505, 514
(Saucedo).) A lesser blood alcohol content may cause impairment
of the ability to drive and the ability to make sound decisions.
Although Deputy Michael Kelley characterized Grossman’s
coordination as “fair” when he administered the FST an hour
after the collision, Grossman exhibited multiple signs of
intoxication while performing the test. Several expert witnesses
testified that a person may perform fairly well during FST’s, but
still be mentally impaired to drive. Deputy Kelley also observed
that Grossman’s eyes were watery and droopy, her speech was
mumbled, and a smell of alcohol emanated from her person.
Grossman admitted to drinking a margarita prior to driving, and
other evidence indicated that she drank a greater amount of
alcohol. The evidence demonstrated that Grossman fully
depressed the Mercedes’s accelerator as she entered an
intersection with a crosswalk in a populated residential area.
Four witnesses specifically described her as “racing” Erickson,
who was just ahead of her. All of the witnesses described the two
SUV’s as driving at excessive speeds very close together.
Grossman reached a speed of 81 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-
beverage to drive a vehicle.’ Under this provision, the People
must prove that: ‘(1) a person, (2) while under the influence of
alcohol, (3) drove a vehicle.’ (People v. McNorton (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5; see CALCRIM No. 2110.) A person is
‘under the influence’ of alcohol when he or she ‘ “no longer has the
ability to drive a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober
person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar
circumstances.” ’ (People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d
69, 78.)” (People v. Grabham (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 549, 553.)
54
hour zone. The evidence that Grossman drove in a highly
dangerous manner while impaired was more than sufficient to
sustain the jury’s finding that it was highly probable Grossman’s
conduct would result in death.
We are not otherwise persuaded by Grossman’s citation to
the 1981 dissent of Chief Justice Bird in Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d
290, that “[d]eath or injury is not the probable result of driving
while under the influence of alcohol. ‘Thousands, perhaps
hundreds of thousands, of Californians each week reach home
without accident despite their driving intoxicated.’ ” (Id. at p.
305 (dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.), quoting Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 907 (dis. opn. of Clark, J.).) Dissenting
opinions are not authority. Moreover, the Chief Justice’s
remarks refer solely to driving while intoxicated, and not to
driving at excessive speeds in a residential neighborhood while
intoxicated as Grossman did.
We also reject Grossman’s assertion that the evidence
showed speeding along Triunfo Canyon Road was common, but
that the prosecution presented no evidence that fatalities had
occurred—“undoubtedly because [fatalities were] statistically
improbable.” The portion of the trial transcript to which
Grossman refers as evidence is Pamela Curry’s testimony that
she saw Grossman and two other cars racing along Lindero
Canyon Road as they turned onto Triunfo Canyon Road. Curry
testified that she initially thought “it was younger people racing.
Because that’s quite common out in the canyons during the
pandemic.” Curry’s isolated anecdotal comment that she believed
it was common to race “out in the canyons” provides no evidence
of the level of danger posed by someone driving impaired at
excessive speeds at the particular residential intersection where
55
the collision occurred, and does not demonstrate that fatalities
were “undoubtedly . . . statistically improbable.”
ii. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s
Finding that Grossman Knew her Conduct Endangered Human
Life
We also reject Grossman’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support the finding that she knew her
conduct was dangerous to human life.
“ ‘Implied malice is determined by examining the
defendant’s subjective mental state to see if he or she actually
appreciated the risk of his or her actions.’ [Citation.] ‘It is not
enough that a reasonable person would have been aware of the
risk.’ (Moore[, supra,] 187 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 941. . . .) . . . ‘It is
unnecessary that implied malice be proven by an admission or
other direct evidence of the defendant’s mental state; like all
other elements of a crime, implied malice may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Jimenez (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1358.) Moreover, “ ‘a finding of implied
malice in the context of vehicular murder does not require ‘a
“predicate act” ’ such as a prior driving under the influence (DUI)
conviction, a DUI-related accident, or a judicial or drug
rehabilitation-related admonition of the dangers of driving while
intoxicated. (People v. Johnigan (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1084,
1091–1092.)” (People v. Murphy, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p.
728.)
In Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at page 939, the
defendant drove 70 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone,
ran a red light, and struck and killed another motorist. Moore
56
was not intoxicated. (Id., at p. 940.) He told the police he did not
intend to kill anyone. (Ibid.) The jury convicted Moore of second
degree murder, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Ibid.) The
appellate court held that Moore’s conduct “went well beyond
gross negligence. . . . [¶] Whether Moore was subjectively aware
of the risk is best answered by the question: how could he not be?
It takes no leap of logic for the jury to conclude that because
anyone would be aware of the risk, Moore was aware of the risk.”
(Id. at p. 941.)
The facts of this case are similar, but more egregious.
Grossman drank enough to achieve a blood alcohol content at or
just below the legal limit of 0.08 over an hour after the collision.
There is evidence that her blood alcohol content may have been
significantly higher than her PAS tests reflected. After drinking,
Grossman got into her car and raced Erickson through
residential streets. She was in her own neighborhood, less than a
mile from her home. From that fact, the jury could readily infer
that Grossman knew the area would be populated and knew that
she was approaching a crosswalk where pedestrians could be
present. Despite this, she depressed the gas pedal to the floor
and accelerated to speeds of up to 81 miles per hour. As was the
case in Moore, “Whether [Grossman] was subjectively aware of
the risk is best answered by the question: how could [s]he not be?
It takes no leap of logic for the jury to conclude that because
anyone would be aware of the risk, [Grossman] was aware of the
risk.” (Id. at p. 941.)
Finally, substantial evidence shows that Grossman acted
with conscious disregard for human life. “[I]mplied malice may
be inferred from a defendant’s conduct before, during, and after”
the killing. (People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 139; see
57
also People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 511 [“defendant’s
behavior before and after the fight further . . . bolstered the
finding of implied malice”].) Grossman appreciated the risk her
conduct posed but chose to race through the intersection. She
briefly tapped her brakes before the collision and did not attempt
to stop her vehicle even after her airbags deployed and she knew
she had struck something. Three-tenths of a mile from the
intersection (and approximately halfway to back to Grossman’s
home), Mercedes disabled Grossman’s vehicle and she was forced
to pull over. In the hospital, after Grossman had been arrested
for driving under the influence and causing a fatal accident,
Grossman told emergency medical technician Teryl Grasso that if
her car had not been rendered inoperable she would be at home
in her garage. The clear implication of her statement was that
she was not concerned about the consequences of her life-
endangering actions, even when she knew that she had killed at
least one human being.
b. Hit and Run/Fleeing the Scene
Grossman next contends that the evidence was insufficient
to prove the charge that she failed to immediately stop at the
scene of the accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2), count 5),
as well as the allegations that she fled the scene (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (c), counts 3 & 4).
Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) provides: “The
driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a
person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of a person
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident
and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004[,]”
58
which include rendering aid, providing certain information to
others involved and to law enforcement, and reporting the
accident to law enforcement if authorities are not on the scene.
(Italics added.)
i. Failure to Immediately Stop
Grossman primarily contends that there is insufficient
evidence that she failed to immediately stop. The jury was
instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2140 that “[t]he duty to
immediately stop means that the driver must stop his or her
vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.”
(Italics in original.)
Grossman argues that it was not reasonably possible for
her to pull her car over until she had driven three-tenths of a
mile beyond the scene of the collision. She asserts that the car’s
airbags deployed, hitting her in the face and legs and causing her
to become confused. Grossman argues that when Mercedes
contacted Fire Dispatch, the dispatcher directed Grossman to
stay where she was. Grossman complied and cooperated with
law enforcement. Grossman claims that although there was
evidence that her vehicle was still operable, she “did not attempt
to drive her vehicle away, or flee on foot, even after she learned
that children might have been hit.”
Grossman’s arguments rely on evidence that the jury gave
no weight, and ignore the substantial evidence that supports the
verdict and findings: The evidence shows that before hitting the
boys, Grossman tapped her brakes briefly, and that she was still
traveling at a speed of 73 miles per hour with her foot off the
brakes when she struck them. This occurred on a residential
59
street where the speed limit was 45 miles per hour. Grossman
pulled over only after Mercedes rendered her car inoperable. By
that time, Grossman had driven well beyond the scene of the
collision and approximately half of the distance to her home.
There is no evidence that she attempted to stop her Mercedes at
any point before it was rendered inoperable. Experts for the
prosecution testified that Grossman had the ability to apply her
brakes after her car’s emergency procedures initiated, and that if
she had done so, she would have stopped sooner. Finally, at the
hospital, after learning that she had hit someone at excessive
speed and killed them, Grossman stated that if Mercedes had not
disabled her car she would be at home in her garage, from which
the jury could reasonably infer that Grossman had not intended
to stop, let alone attempted to do so.
ii. Knowledge of Injury
Grossman suggests there was insufficient evidence that she
knew she hit and injured a person based on her statements to the
fire dispatcher that she did not know what she hit.11 This
assertion, too, ignores the substantial evidence in the record that
supports the jury’s verdict and findings.
“[K]nowledge of injury is an essential element of the crime
proscribed by [Vehicle Code section 20001]. [Citations.] Usually,
however, such knowledge must be derived from the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the accident. [Citation.] Yet the
driver who leaves the scene of the accident seldom possesses
11 Grossman does not develop this argument in the opening
brief, but because the People make the counterargument we
address it in the interest of completeness.
60
actual knowledge of injury; by leaving the scene he forecloses any
opportunity to acquire such actual knowledge. Hence a
requirement of actual knowledge of injury would realistically
render the statute useless. . . . [T]herefore . . . criminal liability
attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an
accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the
accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably
anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.” (People v.
Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 79–80, fn. omitted.)
There is ample evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the collision to support the jury’s finding that, at the very least,
Grossman knew the nature of the collision was such that she
would have reasonably anticipated that someone had been
severely injured or killed as a result. Grossman was traveling a
very short distance from her home in a residential area
frequented by pedestrians and cyclists. It could be readily
inferred that Grossman was familiar with these conditions, knew
that people would be out recreating, and that she was aware her
air bags deployed as she drove through a crosswalk where people
were likely to be present. She struck two children at a very high
rate of speed. The impact was such that Jacob was thrown 70
feet and Mark came to rest 254 feet from the crosswalk. The
damage to Grossman’s car was extensive. Grossman knew that
her car’s safety system alerted Mercedes and disabled the vehicle.
There was overwhelming circumstantial evidence from which the
jury could conclude that Grossman knew she struck a person.
61
C. Motion for New Trial (Subjective Implied Malice)
Grossman next contends that the court abused its
discretion by denying her motion for new trial because the trial
court relied on Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 937, when it found
there was substantial evidence that Grossman was subjectively
aware that her conduct endangered human life. We have already
held that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding and
will not revisit the issue here.
As is clear from our discussion of the sufficiency of the
evidence of Grossman’s subjective awareness in Section
(B)(2)(a)(i), supra, we find Moore persuasive, and thus do not
believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely
on Moore’s reasoning. Moore does not misstate the law. The
Moore court expressly stated that it was not sufficient to apply an
objective standard. (Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 [“It
is not enough that a reasonable person would have been aware of
the risk”].) Moore held that the facts before it were so egregious
that any human being—not only the reasonable, objective
person—would know that their conduct endangered human life,
and if any person would know this from the circumstances, it
could be inferred that the defendant subjectively knew he was
endangering human life as well. (Id. at p. 941.) There are no
published cases that question Moore’s holding, and multiple cases
that cite Moore for this exact proposition. (Carpenter v. Superior
Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1279, 1309; Saucedo, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 513; People v. Murphy, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 728; People v. Latham (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 319, 332; People
v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 843.) As we have
discussed, the facts of Grossman’s case are more egregious than
62
the facts in Moore. The trial court did not err in relying on Moore
in denying the motion for new trial.
D. Admission of Evidence
Grossman contends that the trial court improperly
admitted evidence of a speeding citation that she received in
2013, evidence of her drug and alcohol impairment, and a
statement that Grossman made to emergency medical technician
Teryl Grasso in the hospital following the collision. We find no
abuse of discretion.
1. 2013 Speeding Citation
a. Legal Principles
“Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) generally
prohibits the admission of evidence of specific instances of a
person’s conduct ‘to prove his or her conduct on a specified
occasion.’ Section 1101, subdivision (b), however, clarifies this
rule by allowing ‘admission of evidence that a person committed a
crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact
(such as . . . intent, . . . knowledge, . . . absence of mistake or
accident . . .) other than his or her [pre]disposition to commit
such an act.’ ‘Although a prior criminal act may be relevant for a
noncharacter purpose to prove some fact other than the
defendant’s criminal disposition, the probative value of that
evidence may nevertheless be counterbalanced by [an Evidence
Code] section 352 concern. Evidence may be excluded under
[Evidence Code] section 352 if its probative value is
63
“substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
[would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Saucedo, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 515–516.) “We review for
an abuse of discretion a trial court’s admission of evidence.”
(People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 170.)
b. Proceedings
Before trial, Grossman moved to exclude evidence of her
prior citations for speeding. The parties disagreed as to whether
the evidence should be excluded pursuant to Saucedo, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th 505, or admitted pursuant to People v. Ortiz, supra,
109 Cal.App.4th 104.12 At a hearing on the matter, the trial
court stated that it did not view the two cases as conflicting. The
court explained: “I think the main issue is—and this is I think
quoting both Ortiz and Saucedo, whether the prior incidents tend
to establish a subjective awareness on the part of the defendant
of the disastrous consequences that can follow from recklessly
operating a motor vehicle on a public highway” . . . “Do they, you
know, establish knowledge basically gained in the course of the
prior misconduct of the natural consequences, dangerous to
human life, of the reckless operation of a motor vehicle and the
defendant’s persistence in that behavior? So that’s basically
showing a conscious disregard for the lives of others on the road.”
The court cited the general rule that, under Evidence Code
section 1101, subdivision (a), evidence of conduct on an earlier
occasion is not admissible to prove that the defendant would have
12 We discuss Saucedo in the Analysis section below.
64
engaged in that conduct on a later occasion. The court noted that
the exception to that general rule is that the evidence may be
used to establish knowledge, and knowledge relating to implied
malice, as discussed in Ortiz. Saucedo held that the
circumstances must actually impart knowledge of the
consequences.
With respect to the evidence before it, the court excluded
the speeding citations in which there was no evidence that
Grossman was warned regarding the potential consequences of
her conduct. The court also excluded several of the citations as
remote in time pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The court
admitted evidence of a 2013 citation for speeding, because in that
instance the officer advised Grossman that if she continued
speeding she could kill someone. Grossman responded to this
warning by telling the officer that she hoped he never needed the
services of the Grossman Burn Center.
The court stated that its admission of evidence of the 2013
citation was distinguishable from the admission of evidence in
Saucedo because the citation was accompanied by a warning of
the life-threatening consequences of speeding. There was no
evidence that the defendant in Saucedo received similar
warnings. That the evidence may be remote went to its weight,
not its relevance. The court stated it would instruct the jury that
the evidence was to be considered only for knowledge and implied
malice. The court stated, “As for [Grossman’s] response to the
officer, I think it arguably shows indifference to the warning
which in this court’s view is highly relevant to conscious
disregard. So I think it outweighs any risk of undue prejudice
caused by the nature of the remark.”
65
At trial, Officer Leffler testified that Grossman was driving
92 miles per hour on the highway when he issued the citation—
27 miles per hour above the posted 65 mile per hour speed limit.
Officer Leffler’s standard practice was to warn that “speed in
excess only contributes to a greater chance of collision, and those
collisions often result in injury and/or death depending on how
severe it is.” He also testified that Grossman became “frustrated
to a degree and made a voluntary statement that she hopes I
don’t need the use of the [Grossman] Burn Center in the future.”
c. Analysis
On appeal, Grossman relies on Saucedo, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th 505, to support her argument that the evidence of
her 2013 speeding citation was admitted in error. In Saucedo,
the prosecution sought to admit nine prior driving and
methamphetamine offenses that the defendant had committed in
the five years prior to the offense. (Id. at pp. 510–511.) “The
prosecution argued the incidents were relevant ‘to the subjective
knowledge of implied malice as it tends to show that the
defendant’s arrests, prosecutions, convictions, probations, and
license suspensions would clearly demonstrate the dangerousness
of drunk [sic] driving given the consequences the defendant faced
on the prior occasions.’ ” (Id. at p. 516, fn. omitted.) The Court of
Appeal held that the trial court’s admission of these arrests and
citations, none of which resulted in “ ‘prosecutions, convictions,
probations’ or other ‘consequences’ ” was error. (Ibid., fn. 6.) The
court reasoned that the incidents were much less serious than the
incident that resulted in death, that there were no injuries or
serious consequences, and that the defendant was not required to
66
participate in any educational programs regarding his driving.
(Id. at p. 518.) The court concluded: “In sum, none of the
incidents admitted at trial were ‘encounters with the
consequences of recklessness on the highway’ from which jurors
could reasonably infer appellant was ‘sensitize[d] . . . to the
dangerousness of such life-threatening conduct.’ (Ortiz, supra,
109 Cal.App.4th at p. 112.)” (Ibid.) However, the court held that
the error was harmless because “the evidence supports the
finding of implied malice without consideration of any of [the
defendant’s] prior driving conduct.” (Ibid.)
The evidence in Grossman’s case is qualitatively different
from that in Saucedo. In Saucedo, there was no evidence that
law enforcement warned the defendant that excessive speed leads
to collisions that often result in injury and/or death. One of the
factors that the Saucedo court relied on in finding error was that
there was no evidence that the defendant had been educated that
death is a consequence of speeding. (Saucedo, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) Here, Grossman was explicitly warned
that speeding increased the incidence of collisions resulting in
death. Moreover, the degree of dangerousness of the prior
incident functions differently in this case than it did in Saucedo.
There, the conduct was less dangerous and the appellate court
concluded that there was no evidence of serious consequences or
education that serious consequences could result that would
serve as a warning. In contrast, here the prior conduct was less
dangerous and there was evidence that Grossman was warned
death could result. The jury could reasonably infer that because
Grossman knew death could occur in a less dangerous situation,
Grossman also knew death was even more likely to occur under
the very dangerous circumstances she created.
67
Grossman’s argument that she was not warned that driving
while intoxicated could also result in death fails for similar
reasons. Knowing that excessive speeding alone could cause
death, Grossman must have understood that excessive speeding
while intoxicated could also cause death. Additionally, there was
evidence that after Officer Leffler advised Grossman of the
deadly consequences of speeding, Grossman threatened the
officer in a manner that suggested she believed the deadly
consequences of speeding were something she could disregard.
Officer Leffler’s warning was evidence that Grossman was aware
that speeding could result in death. Grossman’s response
evidenced her conscious disregard that her actions endangered
human life. Both were highly relevant.
Finally, even if error, admission of the evidence of
Grossman’s 2013 speeding citation was harmless. As in Saucedo,
“the evidence supports the finding of implied malice without
consideration of any of [Grossman’s] prior driving conduct.”
(Saucedo, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) We have discussed
the substantial evidence of Grossman’s knowledge that her
driving endangered human life. Grossman demonstrated
conscious disregard by driving in a manner that endangered
human life despite that knowledge. Additionally, Grossman left
the scene without attempting to stop. She pulled over only after
her car was disabled by Mercedes. At the hospital, after
Grossman was told that she had killed someone, she complained
that if her car had not been disabled she would be at home in her
garage. Her actions and statements following the collision
provide substantial evidence of her conscious disregard for
human life, even absent evidence of her encounter with Officer
Leffler.
68
Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed with regard
to the 2013 citation that it could only consider the evidence for
the limited purpose of determining whether Grossman knew her
actions were dangerous to human life when she acted. The jury
was admonished, “Do not conclude from this evidence that the
defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit a crime.”
The jury is presumed to have understood and followed the court’s
instructions. (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670.)
2. Evidence of Alcohol and Drug Impairment
a. Legal Principles
i. Vehicle Code Section 23152
Vehicle Code section 23152 describes two separate offenses
relating to driving and alcohol consumption. Vehicle Code
section 23152, subdivision (a) makes it “unlawful for a person
who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to drive a
vehicle.” “Under [Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a)],
the People must prove that: ‘(1) a person, (2) while under the
influence of alcohol, (3) drove a vehicle.’ [Citation.] A person is
‘under the influence’ of alcohol when he or she ‘ “no longer has the
ability to drive a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober
person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar
circumstances.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Grabham (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 549, 553.)
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) makes it
“unlawful for a person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.” “In contrast [to
69
subdivision (a)], the ‘per se’ DUI statute under Vehicle Code
section 23152, subdivision (b), requires proof that a defendant
has been driving with a blood-alcohol level over the legal limit. If
the limit is exceeded, the statute is violated, and no additional
proof of the defendant’s impairment is required.” (People v.
Randolph (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 602, 620, fn.15.)
ii. People v. Watson
In Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290, the defendant was
charged with second degree implied malice murder and vehicular
manslaughter. (Id. at p. 293.) Following a preliminary hearing,
the magistrate determined that the facts were insufficient to
establish implied malice, and dismissed the second degree
murder charges. (Id. at p. 294.) The People appealed the
magistrate’s dismissal order, and the Supreme Court reversed.
(Ibid.)
As pertinent here, the Supreme Court held that the facts
were sufficient to sustain a murder charge: “Defendant had
consumed enough alcohol to raise his blood alcohol content to a
level which would support a finding that he was legally
intoxicated. He had driven his car to the establishment where he
had been drinking, and he must have known that he would have
to drive it later. It also may be presumed that defendant was
aware of the hazards of driving while intoxicated. As we stated
in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 897: ‘One who
willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of
intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor
vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental
faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed,
70
reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the
safety of others.’ Defendant drove at highly excessive speeds
through city streets, an act presenting a great risk of harm or
death. Defendant nearly collided with a vehicle after running a
red light; he avoided the accident only by skidding to a stop. He
thereafter resumed his excessive speed before colliding with the
victims’ car, and then belatedly again attempted to brake his car
before the collision (as evidenced by the extensive skid marks
before and after impact) suggesting an actual awareness of the
great risk of harm which he had created. In combination, these
facts reasonably and readily support a conclusion that defendant
acted wantonly and with a conscious disregard for human life.”
(Id. at pp. 300–301.)
iii. Admission of Evidence
Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” “ ‘Evidence is substantially more
prejudicial than probative . . . [citation] [only] if, broadly stated, it
poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the
reliability of the outcome” [citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “The prejudice
which . . . Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not
the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from
relevant, highly probative evidence.” [Citations.] “Rather, the
statute uses the word in its etymological sense of ‘prejudging’ a
person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.” ’ [Citations.]”
71
(People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 144.) “ ‘Trial courts
enjoy “ ‘broad discretion’ ” in deciding whether the probability of a
substantial danger of prejudice substantially outweighs probative
value. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snyder (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 622, 632.)
b. Proceedings
Prior to trial, Grossman filed a motion in limine to exclude
evidence relating to benzodiazepines, evidence of her blood
alcohol content, and evidence of her consumption of alcohol or
drugs. The prosecution opposed the exclusion of this evidence.
At the hearing, defense counsel argued that evidence
relating to benzodiazepines should be excluded as speculative
and highly prejudicial pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.
Counsel argued that the prosecution’s confirmatory tests
provided no evidence of the quantity of diazepam or
benzodiazepines found in Grossman’s blood. The prosecution’s
expert could testify that these substances may cause impairment,
but the expert could not render an opinion as to whether
Grossman was impaired, and could not tell if Grossman ingested
both drugs or if one drug was a metabolite of the other. Counsel
also argued that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s
laboratory was unable to confirm the quantity of drugs in
Grossman’s blood. A Sheriff’s Department employee could testify
there was the potential for an additive effect when drugs and
alcohol were both present in the blood, but could not specify
which drug Grossman took. There was no evidence that
72
Grossman ingested benzodiazepines apart from the blood test
results.13
In response, the prosecutor explained that drug
impairment as defined by law is determined by the totality of the
circumstances—field sobriety tests, the defendant’s answers to
questions, and observations—not drug content percentage in the
blood. If an officer has reason to believe that a person is
impaired based on the totality of the circumstances, the person’s
blood is tested for the absence or presence of a substance, but not
for quantity. This is due to the wide variation in the effect of
drugs on individuals.
The court ruled the benzodiazepines evidence admissible
under Evidence Code section 352. The court explained that the
People had a qualified expert who could testify that a
combination of drugs and alcohol can increase impairment.
Defense counsel would have the opportunity to cross-examine
that expert.
With respect to blood alcohol content results, defense
counsel highlighted that the People had not charged Grossman
with driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)),
driving with excessive blood alcohol content (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (b)), or gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(§ 191.5, subd. (a)). The prosecution was instead using
13 Defense counsel also argued that the police exceeded the
scope of the warrant and tested for drugs without giving a drug
admonition. The court stated that counsel should file a separate
motion to raise the issue of defects in the warrant pursuant to
Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154 if counsel wished to argue the issue.
Grossman filed a motion to traverse, which we address in Section
G.
73
impairment evidence to prove malice and reckless disregard in
counts 1 through 4 (implied malice murder (counts 1 & 2); gross
vehicular manslaughter (counts 3 & 4)). Counsel argued that to
meet the requirements for implied malice under Watson, supra,
30 Cal.3d 290, the prosecution had to demonstrate more than
possible impairment—the defendant had to be legally intoxicated,
either because she had been driving under the influence (Veh.
Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) or had a blood alcohol content of 0.08
percent or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). Counsel
accused the prosecution of trying to “inject evidence [into the
trial] of ‘D.U.I. light,’ like, ‘Well, no, it’s not impairment to the
degree where its illegal. There is no illegality about it, but the
jury can take this and run with it.’ And under Watson . . . that’s
not proper. Their evidence doesn’t clear the hurdle that Watson
establishes of showing intoxication. [¶] And if you look at the
Watson cases, there are cases where people were intoxicated over
one or both of those legal limits. There are cases where people
had prior D.U.I.’s. But to my knowledge there is no case where a
court admitted evidence in a Watson prosecution of social
drinking not rising to the level of illegality.”
The court disagreed with counsel that evidence of alcohol
impairment was irrelevant to malice or gross negligence unless a
defendant was intoxicated beyond the legal limit: “. . . I disagree
with one fundamental assertion that you make, which is . . . that
evidence of illegal intoxication is, like you said, a .08, or, you
know, within D.U.I. laws—might tend to prove malice or gross
negligence but evidence of potential impairment or alcohol
consumption within legal limits would not. And I disagree with
that. I think it’s—the standards for malice or gross negligence
doesn’t necessarily require intoxication over the legal limits or for
74
the defendant to be—to have violated any of the D.U.I. statutes.
[¶] If there is any impairment, if there is any drinking that could
potentially lead to impairment, that in my view would be
relevant to malice. Is it as serious as a situation where the
defendant has a high [blood alcohol content]? No. But the People
are entitled to make that argument as one of the maybe many
factors that they are going to argue lead to malice or at least
gross negligence. [¶] So I do think it’s relevant whether or not it
reaches the standard for charging her with a separate offense.”
Defense counsel argued that Watson required evidence that
the defendant was legally intoxicated—either because the
defendant was unable to drive a car safely or was driving with an
excessive blood alcohol level. Additionally, the defendant had to
subjectively appreciate the risk that the defendant was creating,
and to drive anyway. Counsel argued that without evidence of
both, the threshold for proving implied malice is not met, and the
jury is invited to speculate whether it is possible that there was
impairment. Counsel emphasized that Grossman had no prior
convictions for driving under the influence and had not
participated in any drinking and driving education.
Counsel warned that admitting the impairment evidence
would be “a slippery slope, inviting the jury to maybe become
confused and misled, when we talk about things like
‘intoxication,’ ‘impairment,’ ‘under the influence,’ ‘per se
violation.’ . . . [W]hat do those things mean and what’s their
significance? [¶] And it’s something that it is a very significant
threat to due process in a fair trial in this case when that
evidence comes in and it doesn’t meet the legal standards and the
jury is sort of supposed to take it and run with it. And again, I
urge the court to look at it through the lens of [Evidence Code
75
section] 352, and this is minimally probative value, arguably
toward malice that it has, again, if they can show the subjective
element of appreciating the person was unfit to get behind the
wheel and again the jury thinking ‘oh, there is alcohol on board,
you know, that’s horrible’ when that’s not really the situation
here.”
The court reiterated that it disagreed with counsel that
Watson required legal intoxication to show implied malice. The
court explained that many factors can contribute to malice and
gross negligence, and that here impairment was one of several
factors that supported the prosecution’s theory of guilt. The court
ruled that the prosecution was prohibited from presenting
evidence that Grossman could have been charged with driving
under the influence or that her blood alcohol content was over the
legal limit for driving. However, the court permitted the
prosecution to introduce evidence of the quantity of Grossman’s
blood alcohol content, impairment evidence, and evidence of
Grossman’s consumption of alcohol and/or drugs. The court
assured defense counsel: “[T]he court will be very careful to
make sure counsel don’t talk about issues that are irrelevant,
including legal standards for D.U.I. and driving under the
influence when those are not charged.” “We’re not going to turn
this into a DUI trial.”
c. Analysis
Grossman contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence that she was impaired by
76
alcohol and benzodiazepines.14 The trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
At the hearing, Grossman primarily argued that the
impairment evidence had little probative value because “some”
impairment evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for
implied malice murder. Grossman claimed that under Watson,
supra, 30 Cal.3d 290, the prosecution had to show she was legally
intoxicated—either because she was driving “under the influence”
as that phrase is legally defined or that she had a blood alcohol
content of 0.08 percent or higher. Grossman does not mention
Watson in the opening brief, and does not challenge the trial
court’s legal conclusion that, when combined with evidence of
other contributing factors, evidence of “some” impairment may be
sufficient to establish implied malice, and is therefore relevant.
Grossman intimates that it was improper for the trial court to
admit impairment evidence not rising to the level of legal
14 In her opening brief, Grossman provides only an
abbreviated summary of the hearing and the court’s rulings. We
decline to address arguments related to proceedings that are not
included in the opening brief. This includes, but is not limited to,
retrograde extrapolation of blood alcohol content evidence. (See
LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community
Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1071[appellants who “barely
discuss[ed]” proceedings and did not reference the trial court’s
ruling did not meet their burden on appeal].) We also decline to
address the issues that Grossman raises for the first time on
appeal, including, but not limited to, her argument that the jury
was not instructed on the legal definition of impairment. (People
v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1208 [defendant must
make a timely and specific objection to preserve an issue for
appellate review].)
77
impairment because the prosecution had not charged her with
offenses involving driving under the influence, but she has
waived any challenge by failing to offer substantive arguments or
citation to authority supporting her position. (Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684
[this court will not develop an appellant’s arguments;
undeveloped, unsupported arguments are waived]; see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].)
Grossman contends that the impairment evidence was
problematic because it was not accompanied by evidence
demonstrating that she subjectively knew the acts of drinking
and driving or drinking and driving with Valium in her system
were dangerous to human life. As we have discussed, there was
substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Grossman
knew her driving was dangerous to human life. Regardless, we
reject the contention. Under Evidence Code section 352, the
inquiry is whether the evidence in dispute has probative value
that is greater than its potential for prejudice. Grossman argues
only that the impairment evidence was contradicted by other
evidence in the record. This argument concerns the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility. Moreover, Grossman fails to
demonstrate that she was prejudiced. Undue prejudice does not
result from the admission of relevant contradictory evidence. A
defendant is only prejudiced by evidence that “ ‘uniquely tends to
evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual
and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying
[Evidence Code] section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with
“damaging.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612,
638.)
78
Finally, we reject Grossman’s assertion that the trial court
permitted the proceedings to turn into a DUI trial because the
court allowed the prosecution to call numerous witnesses who
testified regarding Grossman’s consumption of alcohol, field
sobriety tests, and/or about drug and alcohol impairment. The
court’s ruling did not prohibit admission of any and all evidence
that would have also been relevant in a DUI trial; it prohibited
evidence that Grossman’s impairment was illegal, which it
determined was not relevant in the absence of DUI charges.
Grossman does not contend that the prosecution introduced
evidence that her impairment was illegal, either because she was
driving under the influence as legally defined or because her
blood alcohol content was above the legal limit. There is no merit
to her claim that the court allowed proceedings to turn into a DUI
trial.
3. Teryl Grasso’s Testimony
a. Proceedings
i. Grasso Interview
Detective Michael Takacs and two District Attorneys
conducted a recorded telephonic interview with Teryl Grasso, the
emergency medical technician who processed Grossman’s intake
to the emergency room following the collision. Grasso stated that
she was taking Grossman’s vital information when Grossman
suddenly started telling Grasso that OnStar disabled her vehicle
and that she would be in her garage right now if her car had not
been disabled. Grasso recounted to the officers the events in the
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emergency room that night, including statements relayed to her
by co-workers. Grasso said that she was traumatized by her
interaction with Grossman and had to seek therapy for six to
nine months to be able to speak about the night of the collision
without crying. Grasso had delayed reporting Grossman’s
statements and behavior because Grasso was not sure if she
would be violating laws that protect the privacy of patients
seeking medical care, and because the events were very hard for
Grasso to speak about. Grasso said that before therapy, she felt
compelled to “stalk the news” to see if Grossman had been
charged. Soon after she finished therapy, Grasso felt able to
speak to her manager about her experience. Grasso’s manager
urged her to come forward and make a statement, so she did.
ii. Motion to Exclude Evidence and Hearing
During trial, Grossman moved to exclude as irrelevant all
of Grasso’s testimony relating to Grossman’s statements and
behavior on the night of the collision. In the motion, Grossman
argued that her post-incident conduct was not probative of her
subjective awareness that her conduct was dangerous to life
before the collision. In the event that the trial court refused to
exclude Grasso’s testimony entirely, Grossman requested that
the trial court exclude testimony relating to ten statements
Grasso made in the interview, including statements that Grasso
sought therapy to process her feelings about her interaction with
Grossman.
At a hearing on the matter, the court found the statement
that Grossman would be in her garage if her car had not been
disabled by OnStar to be highly relevant to the hit and run
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charge and enhancements. The court noted that Grossman made
the statement soon after the collision. The court excluded
testimony regarding all statements that defense counsel
specifically objected to (other than Grossman’s comment to
Grasso that she would be in her garage if her car had not been
disabled), as well as all speculation and hearsay about the events
of that night, but permitted the prosecution to elicit any of
Grasso’s direct observations of Grossman’s “visual signs of
impairment[,]” including her observation that Grossman was
laughing in the emergency room.
The prosecutor stated that she did not intend to elicit on
direct examination testimony that Grasso sought therapy
following the encounter, but if defense counsel elicited that
Grasso waited three years to come forward with the information,
the prosecutor believed Grasso should have the opportunity to
explain her delay. The court excluded the therapy testimony but
agreed to revisit the issue if the defense raised the issue of
Grasso’s delay in reporting.
iii. Trial
At trial, Grasso testified that she collected Grossman’s vital
information on the night of the collision. When Grossman was
first brought in, Grasso did not know Grossman was the driver in
the fatal collision. Grasso realized Grossman was involved when
Grossman spontaneously said to her, “ ‘If they didn’t disable my
car, I would be at home in my garage right now.’ ”
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Grasso if she
had been “stalking the news about this case.” Grasso responded,
“I was stalking the news at the beginning, and—had to go to
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therapy to—” Defense counsel objected to Grasso’s response and
the trial court struck the portion of Grasso’s testimony relating to
therapy. The court instructed the jury to disregard the stricken
testimony.
Defense counsel asked Grasso if she “looked [Grossman]
up” and learned that Grossman was wealthy. Grasso explained
that she did not look Grossman up. She saw Grossman’s name
and realized that she was connected to the Grossman Burn
Institute.
Defense counsel then resumed questioning Grasso about
“stalking the news”:
“[Defense Counsel:] Okay. So when you say you were
stalking the news, can you explain to me what that means? Since
those are your words. I mean, you were reading all the news
articles about this case?
“[Grasso:] I was. Yes, I was. I was traumatized.
“[Defense Counsel:] Sure. . . . But you—you claim she
made this comment is what you claim. But you also admit that
you don’t know what her exact words were; isn’t it true?
“[Grasso:] She made a comment saying ‘I would be in my
garage right now if they did not disable my vehicle.’ ”
Defense counsel asked Grasso if it was true that she waited
three years to come forward “about some comment you think you
heard; right?” After Grasso answered “yes,” defense counsel
persisted, “And that’s why you came in here, for that comment;
right?” Defense counsel then accused Grasso of suggesting that
Grossman did not care about the children she had killed. He
ceased questioning Grasso soon thereafter.
The prosecutor requested a sidebar conference. Outside the
presence of the jury, the prosecutor stated the defense had
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attempted to imply bias by eliciting Grasso’s testimony that she
delayed reporting Grossman’s statement for three years. The
prosecutor requested that she be permitted to ask Grasso why
she delayed. The court inquired as to what the prosecutor
anticipated Grasso would testify. The prosecutor stated that she
expected Grasso to say she was concerned that telling the
authorities what Grossman said to her would violate medical
privacy laws. She also anticipated Grasso would testify that the
events were difficult to talk about. The prosecutor noted that the
defense had already elicited that Grasso went to therapy.
The trial court ruled that because defense counsel elicited
the testimony that Grasso had waited for three years to report
Grossman’s comments, the prosecution was entitled to ask
Grasso why she waited three years. The court stated, “I don’t
have a problem with therapy. If therapy is the reason why she
waited three years, then she can state that. What I don’t want
her getting into is the opinions and speculation about the
defendant.”
On rebuttal, Grasso confirmed that she hesitated to reach
out to authorities because of her concerns about privacy laws, and
that she ultimately sought permission from her supervisor.
Grasso briefly testified that she was “very traumatized” by the
incident, went to therapy for nine months, and “still can’t talk
about that night without crying.”
b. Analysis
Grossman concludes that her comment that she would be in
her garage if OnStar had not disabled her vehicle had little
probative value and a high risk of prejudice, but she provides no
83
support for her conclusion.15 The closest thing to reasoning in
the opening brief is Grossman’s statement that the probative
value of her statement to Grasso was somehow lessened because
Grossman “pulled over even though her vehicle was drivable and
did not attempt to flee.” Grossman again confuses the probative
value of evidence with its weight. Weight is for the jury to decide
and does not lessen the relevance of evidence.
Additionally, Grossman’s assertion that her car was
drivable is not supported by a citation to the record. Presumably,
Grossman is relying on the testimony of Officer Garrett Smith
who inspected her vehicle three months after the collision. In the
facts section of the opening brief—56 pages earlier—based on
Officer Smith’s testimony, Grossman concludes that her
Mercedes was drivable after it was disabled. The officer testified
that when he inspected the car the battery was dead, but that he
was able to jump start and drive it. This is not evidence that the
car was operable after Grossman pulled over on the night of the
collision. Grossman’s assertion is pure speculation. The
15 The following is the entirety of Grossman’s contention as
set forth in the opening brief:
“b. Grasso’s testimony was more prejudicial than probative.
There were several problems with Grasso’s testimony. The
statement’s relevance was minimal (especially given the fact that
appellant pulled over even though her vehicle was drivable and
did not attempt to flee), but the danger of prejudice was
extremely high. Another issue with the statement was that
Grasso had not come forward for three years. Further
complicating the matter, after Grasso testified that she did not
come forward for three years, the trial court permitted her to
testify, over appellant’s objection, that she was traumatized by
the event and went to therapy for nine months. This testimony
should not have survived an Evidence Code section 352 analysis.”
84
prosecution presented evidence that Grossman told Deputy Mejia
that Mercedes had disabled her vehicle. That evidence
demonstrates that either the car was not drivable, or, if
Grossman was incorrect and the car was drivable, that Grossman
was not aware that the Mercedes was drivable and did not know
that she could flee the scene in her car. The rest of the argument
in the opening brief consists of a recitation of the proceedings at
trial and facts elicited in testimony. Grossman does not explain
how she was unduly prejudiced.
The evidence that Grossman told Grasso she would be at
home in her garage if her car had not been disabled suggests that
Grossman did not intend to remain at the scene of the crash or
intend to render aid to the people that she had hit. It is highly
relevant to the hit and run charge and the enhancements. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence
of Grossman’s statement to Grasso.
E. Engaging in a Speed Contest
Grossman contends that the prosecution violated her
constitutional right to due process by presenting a theory of
liability in her case that conflicted with its theory in former
codefendant Scott Erickson’s prosecution. This contention also
lacks merit.
1. Proceedings
Prior to trial, Grossman filed a motion in limine to prevent
the prosecution from presenting inconsistent theories in
Grossman’s and Erickson’s prosecutions. At a hearing on the
85
matter, the prosecutor explained that the People had different
evidence in the two cases. The People had the “black box” from
Grossman’s vehicle, but not from Erickson’s. Additionally,
Grossman’s car was behind Erickson’s, so it was clear that she
could see him and was racing him, but there was no proof that he
could see Grossman and was racing her. There were also
additional witnesses who came forward and stated that the cars
appeared to be racing only after charges were dropped in
Erickson’s case.
The defense contended that the prosecutor’s position in the
two cases was inconsistent—in Grossman’s case the prosecutor
claimed Grossman was engaging in a speed contest and in
Erickson’s case the same prosecutor stated that Erickson had not
participated in a speed contest. Defense counsel argued that
racing requires more than one person.
The trial court stated that even if Erickson had been
racing, he would not be liable for murder. The People had never
changed their position that Grossman committed the murders.
Whether the two cars were racing was subject to interpretation.
The court distinguished In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th
140, 146 (Sakarias), on which Grossman had relied. In Sakarias,
the prosecutor acted in bad faith and intentionally manipulated
evidence. There was no evidence of bad faith or manipulation of
evidence in the present case. Here, the different evidence in
Grossman and Erickson’s cases justified the variation in theories.
The court ruled that the People could make any arguments that
were consistent with the evidence, including racing if there was a
basis for it. The court found that the theories in Grossman and
Erickson’s case were not inconsistent—the theory had always
86
been that Grossman perpetrated the murders. Sakarias was not
analogous.
2. Legal Principles
In Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 146, defendants
Sakarias and Waidla “bludgeoned [the victim] with the blunt end
of the hatchet, stabbed her with [a] knife, and chopped at her
with [a] hatchet blade. Overall, the medical examiner found five
blunt force impacts to [the victim’s] head . . . four stab wounds to
her chest . . . and three chopping wounds to her upper head. One
of this last group of injuries, inflicted before death, was struck
with ‘tremendous’ force, penetrating [the victim’s] skull
completely. The other two chopping wounds were inflicted with
somewhat less force, after or around the time of death.” Other
evidence strongly suggested that Waidla struck the hatchet blow
that preceded the victim’s death and Sakarias inflicted the two
post-mortem hatchet blows. (Id. at p. 147.)
The defendants were tried separately. (Sakarias, supra, 35
Cal.4th at p. 160.) The acts each defendant committed were
sufficient to establish their respective guilt for murder, but only
one of the defendants could have inflicted the first antemortem
hatchet blow that was the basis for establishing a special
circumstance carrying a death sentence. (Ibid.) In both trials,
the prosecutor argued that the defendant had inflicted all three
hatchet wounds. (Ibid.) Both defendants were sentenced to
death. (Id. at p. 144.)
In consolidated petitions for habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court held that “fundamental fairness does not permit the
People, without a good faith justification, to attribute to two
87
defendants, in separate trials, a criminal act only one defendant
could have committed. By doing so, the state necessarily urges
conviction or an increase in culpability in one of the cases on a
false factual basis, a result inconsistent with the goal of the
criminal trial as a search for truth.” (Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at pp. 155–156.)
3. Analysis
In the opening brief, Grossman argues that the prosecution
violated her due process rights by arguing that Grossman and
Erikson engaged in a speed contest, because in Erikson’s case the
prosecutor had stated he did not believe there was sufficient
evidence of racing to support the theory. Although Grossman
lumps her due process argument in with her arguments relating
to admission of evidence, it is not an exclusion of evidence
argument; it is an argument that the prosecution should have
been precluded from arguing inconsistent theories of guilt. The
Rules of Court require that the appellant present each
substantive argument in a separate section with an appropriate
heading. Grossman’s failure to do so waives her argument.
(Heavenly Valley v. El Dorado County Bd. of Equalization (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1345; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “[s]tate each point under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point”].)
Additionally, the opening brief does not adequately set
forth the legal principles that govern this issue. Grossman cites
Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th 140, a prosecutorial misconduct case,
to assert that, absent a good faith justification, due process
prohibits the People from prosecuting a case under a theory that
88
is inconsistent with its theory in the prosecution of a separately-
tried codefendant. Grossman states, without explanation, that
the theories in her and Erickson’s cases contradicted one another.
She does not discuss Sakarias or explain why it should apply
here. These deficiencies are ample basis for this court to
disregard her argument altogether. (Meridian Financial
Services, Inc. v. Phan, supra,67 Cal.App.5th at p. 684 [review
limited to issues adequately raised and briefed]; see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].)
Regardless, Grossman’s claim fails on the merits.
Unlike Sakarias, here the prosecutor did not manipulate
the evidence to ensure that two defendants were found guilty
based on an act that could only have been committed by one
person. Only Grossman was charged with and convicted of
murder. The theories in the two cases were not inconsistent.
The prosecutor never stated that the evidence showed Erickson
was not racing; he stated that there was not sufficient evidence to
prove Erickson was racing. This was because Erickson’s case
lacked evidence present in Grossman’s case. The prosecution had
the EDR or “black box” for Grossman’s vehicle, and eyewitnesses
stated that Erickson’s car was in the lead. Because Grossman
was behind Erickson, she had to have known how closely she was
following him. The EDR download showed that Grossman was
speeding excessively and flooring her car’s accelerator. There
was no evidence that Erickson looked back and observed
Grossman’s vehicle’s position, and there was no EDR evidence of
Erickson’s speed or acceleration. After charges were dropped in
Erickson’s case, additional witnesses who described the cars’
movements as racing came forward. As the trial court observed,
89
the prosecution never wavered in its theory that Grossman, and
not Erickson, perpetrated the murders. Grossman’s due process
rights were not violated.
F. Custodial Interrogation
Grossman contends that the trial court erred by refusing to
suppress statements that she made to Deputy Kelley prior to
being advised of her Miranda rights during a custodial
interrogation. This contention also fails, as we conclude that
Grossman was not in custody at the time that she made the
contested statements.
1. Legal Principles
Before any custodial interrogation, suspects must be told
they have a right to remain silent, anything they say may be used
as evidence against them in court, and they are entitled to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the
interrogation. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; Thompson v.
Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 107.) “An interrogation is custodial
when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ [Citation.]
Whether a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent
inquiry is whether there was ‘ “ ‘a “formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.)
The California Supreme Court has held that “the term
‘custody’ generally does not include ‘a temporary detention for
investigation’ where an officer detains a person to ask a moderate
90
number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain
information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.”
(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180; see also Berkemer
v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [temporary questioning of a
detained driver suspected of being intoxicated is not necessarily
custodial where the officer asks “a modest number of questions”
and requests him to perform “a simple balancing test at a
location visible to passing motorists”].) “General on-the-scene
questioning may take place of persons temporarily detained by
officers who do not have probable cause to arrest. Questioning
under these circumstances is designed to bring out the person’s
explanation or lack of explanation of the circumstances which
aroused the suspicion of the police, and thus enable the police to
quickly ascertain whether such person should be permitted to go
about his business or held to answer charges.” (People v. Milham
(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 500.)
“All objective circumstances of the interrogation are
relevant to this inquiry, including the site of the interrogation,
the length and form of questioning, and whether the officers have
conveyed to the subject that their investigation has focused on
him or her.” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491–492.)
Factors additionally relevant to this determination include the
ratio of police officers to suspects, whether the suspect was told
he or she could terminate the questioning, the demeanor of the
officers and whether they dominated or controlled the
interrogation or were aggressive, confrontational, or accusatory,
whether the officers pressured the suspect, whether the suspect
was arrested at the end of the interrogation, and whether the
suspect’s freedom of movement was restricted during the
91
interrogation. (People v. Bejasa (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 26, 35–
36.)
However, even in instances where one’s freedom of
movement is curtailed, the question becomes “ ‘whether the
relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in
Miranda.’ ” (People v. Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 491.) The
determination of whether a defendant is in custody at the time of
questioning is objective and therefore “does not depend on ‘the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or
the person being questioned.’ ” (Id. at p. 492.)
To determine whether a trial court admitted a statement in
violation of Miranda, we independently review the application of
law to facts. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918.) We
generally accept the “trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th
926, 992.) However, where “an interview is recorded, the facts
surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and
[courts] may apply independent review.” (People v. Duff (2014)
58 Cal.4th 527, 551.)
2. Evidence and Proceedings
a. Evidence
At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Mejia testified that he
responded to the collision at about 7:10 p.m. Other deputies
directed Deputy Mejia to continue driving west because the
suspect had left the scene traveling in that direction.
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Deputy Mejia encountered Grossman three-tenths of a mile
down the road. No other deputies were present. Grossman had
pulled over and stopped her white Mercedes SUV in the bicycle
lane. She was standing outside the vehicle, inspecting it. The
Mercedes’ hazard lights were flashing. The Mercedes had front
end damage and the air bags had deployed.
Deputy Mejia asked Grossman if she would sit in his patrol
car because it was dark and it would be safer for her to do so.
She agreed and voluntarily went to sit in the back seat of the
vehicle. Deputy Mejia testified that Grossman was not free to
leave the scene at the time that she elected to get into the patrol
car because Deputy Mejia “had not determined at that time what
had occurred at the traffic collision because it was still so fresh.”
There is no evidence that he relayed this information to
Grossman, however.
Grossman told Deputy Mejia that she pulled over because
her car had been disabled by Mercedes. Grossman also said she
had hit something, but that she did not know what she had hit.
Deputy Mejia did not ask Grossman any further questions. The
deputy noticed the smell of alcohol on Grossman’s breath and
person, and observed that her eyes were bloodshot and watery.
He contacted dispatch and requested to have a qualified deputy
come to perform a DUI investigation.
Grossman asked Deputy Mejia what happened in the
collision involving her vehicle. The deputy did not give Grossman
any information regarding the accident or tell her that children
were involved. Deputy Mejia did not ask for Grossman’s
identification, “run her address,” ask why her airbags deployed,
or “anything.” Grossman waited in the back of the patrol car for
93
the deputy who would perform the DUI investigation to arrive.
She was in the vehicle for a maximum of 45 minutes.
At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Kelley testified that he
responded to conduct the DUI investigation. When he arrived at
about 8:15 p.m., Grossman was in the rear passenger seat of
Deputy Mejia’s patrol car. Deputy Kelley opened Grossman’s
door and noticed a faint smell of alcohol. Deputy Kelley had
Grossman exit the patrol car. He began questioning her using a
pre-investigative questionnaire. Deputy Mejia left to assist in
the investigation at the accident site.
Deputy Kelley asked Grossman for general identifying
information and information about any health conditions she
had. After a few questions, Grossman asked the deputy, “Can
you please tell me what’s going on here?” Deputy Kelley
responded, “I’m doing an investigation real quick here.”
Grossman said she had been told about an accident involving
children. Deputy Kelley did not respond to Grossman’s
statement. He continued asking questions from the pre-
investigative questionnaire, asking Grossman if the airbag had
hit her head. The deputy did not mention that an accident
involving children had occurred nearby. Deputy Kelley asked
Grossman if she had anything alcoholic to drink, the quantity of
alcohol that she had consumed, how long ago she had finished
drinking, and other basic, related questions. Grossman
responded that she drank one margarita around 5:00 p.m. and
finished her drink by approximately 5:30 p.m. At one point,
Deputy Kelley asked Grossman what city they were in,
explaining: “Just [a] question[] I gotta ask you.” Grossman said
she understood. The questioning lasted approximately seven
minutes before Deputy Kelley administered an FST test.
94
After concluding the FST, Deputy Kelley asked Grossman if
she would consent to a PAS test to assist him in determining
whether she was under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Kelley
advised Grossman that she could refuse to take the PAS test, but
if she was arrested she would be required to give a sample of her
blood or breath for purposes of determining her blood alcohol
content. Grossman consented to take the PAS test.
After Deputy Kelley finished administering the PAS test,
he directed his partner to handcuff Grossman. The deputy
handcuffed Grossman, escorted her to a police vehicle, and placed
her under arrest. The deputy informed Grossman that she was
being arrested for driving under the influence and causing a fatal
traffic collision.
b. Motion to Exclude Grossman’s Statements to
Deputy Kelley
Prior to trial, Grossman filed a motion in limine, objecting
to the admission of statements she made before she was informed
of her Miranda rights. The motion expressly limited her
objections as follows: “Defendant hereby objects to the admission
in this trial of any and all evidence related to admissions of the
Defendant made prior to being advised of her Miranda rights
after she was detained. Objection is made to the introduction of
any statements made prior to the field sobriety tests being
administered. The questions asked are per a pre-printed form
making many detailed (not general) inquiries amounting to at
least 23 questions relating to drinking, eating, sleeping, etc.”
Grossman argued that these questions amounted to an
interrogation and that she was in custody when interrogated.
95
Grossman asserted that the number and detail of the questions
asked distinguished them from permissible investigatory
questions.
The People filed a response noting that the statements
Grossman objected to appeared to be limited to those made to
Deputy Kelley prior to his administration of the FST and did not
include any statements Grossman made to Deputy Mejia. The
People argued that these “ ‘general on-the-scene’ questions
‘present in the facts’ ” were separate from any detention or
interrogation and did not violate Miranda. Additionally, under
established law the deputies were not required to give a Miranda
advisement before preliminary questioning of persons suspected
of driving under the influence. (Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468
U.S. at pp. 435–442; People v. Carter (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 127,
130–131.) Moreover, neither an FST test nor a person’s refusal to
perform an FST test is subject to Miranda. Grossman was not in
custody and was not interrogated. Her statements were
admissible.
In her reply, Grossman objected generally to evidence
“pertaining to defendant’s sobriety, consisting of the driving
under the influence investigation in this case, including field
sobriety testing, chemical tests and other evidence.” Her
arguments primarily focused on her contention that the evidence
was not relevant to a prosecution that did not include alcohol-
related charges and was unduly prejudicial pursuant to Evidence
Code section 352. Grossman did not make specific arguments
relating to the admission of her statements pursuant to Miranda.
At the hearing on the motion in limine, the court asked
defense counsel if Grossman was challenging the statements she
made during the FST test. Defense counsel informed the court
96
that Grossman only objected to statements made prior to
administration of the FST. Counsel broke these down into two
categories: “[t]he initial on-scene questions and responses and
then the pre-standard field sobriety tests battery of investigative
questions asked by the deputy on [the] scene [by] the name of
Kelley.”
Defense counsel argued that Grossman was in custody
while she waited in Deputy Mejia’s patrol car. The trial court
disagreed, stating that in many cases defendants had been placed
in patrol cars and brought out before questioning and/or FST
tests and courts had held there was no Miranda violation.
The court stated that this was not a traffic stop. Grossman
was outside of her car, standing on a public road when Deputy
Mejia encountered her. Grossman told Deputy Mejia that
Mercedes had disabled her car and that she had hit something,
but she did not know what she had hit. The deputy was trying to
ascertain what happened. He asked Grossman to move to his car
for safety, and Grossman agreed. Deputy Mejia did not handcuff
Grossman. The deputy was not confrontational or accusatory.
There was no custodial interrogation, just investigatory
questioning. No Miranda violation had occurred.
The court stated that, with respect to statements made to
Deputy Mejia, Grossman was asked to wait in the patrol car and
she agreed to do so, she was not handcuffed, and she did not have
to wait for an excessive amount of time. Only Deputy Kelley
questioned Grossman. The deputy asked her standard questions
that were necessary to the FST test. Asking Grossman to
perform the FST test was lawful. The FST test was not
interrogation. The court ruled it would admit any statements
Grossman made during the FST test.
97
3. Analysis
a. Forfeiture
On appeal, Grossman contends that the trial court’s
admission of all statements she made to Deputy Kelley—both
before and during his administration of the FST test—violated
Miranda.16 As is plain from the foregoing, Grossman not only
failed to challenge admission of the statements she made to
Deputy Kelley during the FST test, counsel expressly disavowed
any challenge statements made during the FST test when the
trial court expressly asked if Grossman contested admission of
those statements. In a footnote in the opening brief, Grossman
asserts, without explanation or citation to authority that
“[appellant’s] motion to suppress statements made to Deputy
Kelley is reasonably construed to include a challenge to
appellant’s statements during the [FST] test.” We disagree.
Grossman did not challenge or even mention any statements she
made during the FST in her briefing in the trial court or at the
hearing on the motion. She did not object when the trial court
ruled that Deputy Kelley’s questions during the FST’s were
lawful and that the statements she made during the FST were
admissible. Grossman has forfeited her objections to the
admission of statements she made to Deputy Kelley during the
FST test. (People v. Viray, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208
[defendant must make a timely and specific objection to preserve
an issue for appellate review].)
16 Grossman does not challenge admission of any
statements she made to Deputy Mejia.
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b. Grossman’s Miranda Rights Were Not Violated
We conclude that Grossman was not in custody for
Miranda purposes. Deputy Mejia made contact with Grossman
in a public area. The deputy did not initiate a traffic stop or
direct Grossman to exit her vehicle. Grossman was standing on
the side of the road looking at her car when the deputy arrived.
Deputy Mejia had reason to suspect that Grossman was the
driver of the car involved in a hit and run collision that had
occurred three-tenths of a mile up the road: Grossman had
pulled into the bicycle lane and her car’s hazard lights were
flashing. Her vehicle had sustained front-end damage and the
air bags had deployed.
Deputy Mejia did not impinge Grossman’s freedom of
movement. He asked Grossman if she would sit in his patrol car
for her safety, as it was getting dark. Grossman agreed and got
into the vehicle voluntarily. She was not handcuffed. There is no
evidence that Deputy Mejia advised Grossman that she was not
free to leave.
Before she entered the patrol car, Grossman told the
deputy she hit something and that Mercedes had disabled her
car. Deputy Mejia did not ask Grossman any follow-up questions.
Deputy Mejia did not convey to Grossman his suspicion that she
was the driver in the collision involving fatalities. When
Grossman asked Deputy Mejia what happened, he did not
provide any information. Deputy Mejia gave Grossman no reason
to believe that she was under investigation or that she might be
arrested.
Grossman was detained for a reasonable period of time
under the circumstances. Deputy Mejia quickly determined that
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a DUI investigation was necessary from the smell of alcohol on
Grossman’s person and breath, and the watery, bloodshot
appearance of her eyes. He immediately sought assistance from
Deputy Kelley to conduct the DUI investigation. Deputy Kelley
drove to the scene in less than 45 minutes. Once he arrived,
Deputy Kelley completed the pre-FST questioning of Grossman in
under seven minutes. A detention of less than an hour was not
excessive in light of the duties that the deputies needed to
perform to determine what had occurred. (See People v. Tully
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 980 [officer may temporarily detain a
suspect for the time necessary for the officer to discharge his or
her duties]; People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753–
1754 [“rationally explainable” detention of more than one hour is
not “custody” for Miranda purposes].)
Deputy Kelley questioned Grossman outside of the patrol
car in public view. Although other deputies were present, Deputy
Kelley was the only person who questioned Grossman. Deputy
Kelley did not handcuff Grossman or otherwise restrain her
movement, and he did not advise her that she was required to
answer his questions.
Deputy Kelley asked Grossman questions from a standard
questionnaire used for DUI investigations. “ ‘When
circumstances demand immediate investigation by the police, the
most useful, most available tool for such investigation is general
on-the-scene questioning, designed to bring out the person’s
explanation . . . and enable the police to quickly determine
whether they should allow the suspect to go about [her] business
or hold [her] to answer charges.’ ” (People v. Davidson (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 966, 968.) Deputy Kelley’s questions were basic and
designed to determine whether a driver was operating a vehicle
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under the influence. He asked about factors that could impair a
driver who was not intoxicated—including health conditions,
prescription medication, and sight impairment. He also asked
alcohol-related questions, including whether Grossman had
anything to drink, when she drank, and the quantity. These are
all facts that assist officers in determining whether a person may
have been driving under the influence. When Grossman told
Deputy Kelley she had heard there was an accident involving
children, the deputy re-directed her attention to the standard
questions. Deputy Kelley never talked to Grossman about the
collision involving children and, in fact, steered her away from
making statements unrelated to the standard FST test questions.
Deputy Kelley did not indicate that police suspected
Grossman caused the fatal collision. His manner was friendly
and non-threatening. The deputy explained to Grossman that he
just needed to do an investigation “real quick” and that there
were standard questions “I gotta ask.” Grossman told him she
understood. The deputy did not dominate the investigation. He
asked Grossman questions and acknowledged her answers.
When Grossman expressed a desire to call her husband, the
deputy politely reminded her that they needed to conclude the
investigation first.
Finally, Grossman was not placed under arrest
immediately after answering the questions on the DUI
questionnaire. Deputy Kelley conducted the FST test. He then
asked Grossman if she would submit to a PAS test to assist him
in determining if she was under the influence of alcohol. Deputy
Kelley advised Grossman that she was not required to take the
PAS test, but that if she was arrested she would be required to
take a breath or blood test. Grossman was not arrested until
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after she completed two PAS tests that indicated she had alcohol
in her bloodstream. Under the circumstances, we cannot
conclude that Deputy Kelley’s questioning of Grossman was
custodial or that Grossman’s Miranda rights were violated by the
trial court’s admission of Grossman’s statements.
G. Motion to Traverse Search Warrant
Grossman contends that she was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154, because she
made a substantial showing that (1) the warrant to obtain her
blood sample contained deliberately false statements and omitted
favorable facts; and (2) if the true facts had been fully presented
there would not have been sufficient probable cause for a
magistrate to grant the warrant. We disagree.
1. Legal Principles
Under Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154, “[a] defendant has a
limited right to challenge the veracity of statements contained in
an affidavit of probable cause made in support of the issuance of
a search warrant. The trial court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing [(Franks hearing)] only if a defendant makes a
substantial showing that (1) the affidavit contains statements
that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of
the truth, and (2) the affidavit’s remaining contents, after the
false statements are excised, are insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause. Innocent or negligent misrepresentations will
not support a motion to traverse. ([Id., at pp.] 154–156; People v.
Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 988–989.) A defendant
102
who challenges a search warrant based on omissions in the
affidavit bears the burden of showing an intentional or reckless
omission of material information that, when added to the
affidavit, renders it insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. (See People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1581–
1582; People v. Sousa (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 549, 562–563.) In
either setting, the defendant must make his showing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and the affidavit is presumed
valid.” (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 484.) “Because of
the difficulty of meeting the ‘substantial preliminary showing’
standard, Franks hearings are rarely held.” (People v. Estrada
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 783, 790.) We review the denial of a
request for a Franks hearing de novo. (People v. Sandoval (2015)
62 Cal.4th 394, 410.)
Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), the
implied consent statute, provides that: “[a] person who drives a
motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to
chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully
arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section
23140, 23152, or 23153.” “The testing shall be incidental to a
lawful arrest and administered at the direction of a peace officer
having reasonable cause to believe the person was driving a
motor vehicle in violation of [one of the foregoing Vehicle Code
sections].” (Id., subd. (a)(1)(C).) Failure to submit to chemical
testing following arrest subjects the arrestee to various penalties
ranging from administrative revocation or suspension of the
person’s driver’s license to fines and mandatory imprisonment if
the person is convicted. (Id., subd. (a)(1)(D).) Persons arrested
must be advised of these consequences. (Ibid.) With certain
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exceptions, a driver lawfully arrested for one of the listed
violations has the choice of which form of chemical testing they
wish to consent to—blood or breath. (Id., subd. (a)(2).) An officer
“shall advise the person that he or she has that choice.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(2)(A).)
“A [PAS] test that indicates the presence or concentration
of alcohol based on a breath sample in order to establish
reasonable cause to believe the person was driving a vehicle in
violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 is a field sobriety test
and may be used by an officer as a further investigative tool.”
(Veh. Code, § 23612, subd. (h).) “If the officer decides to use a
[PAS] test, the officer shall advise the person that he or she is
requesting that person to take a [PAS] test to assist the officer in
determining if that person is under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs. The person’s
obligation to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test, as required
by this section, for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug
content of that person’s blood, is not satisfied by the person
submitting to a [PAS] test. The officer shall advise the person of
that fact and of the person’s right to refuse to take the [PAS]
test.” (Id., subd. (i).)
2. Facts and Proceedings
a. Warrant for Blood Sample
On the night of the collision, Deputy Davis Huelsen sought
a warrant to extract a blood sample from Grossman. The deputy
attested that, 15 minutes after a fatal collision in which two
people were killed, Deputy Mejia encountered Grossman
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approximately a quarter of a mile away, standing outside of her
vehicle. Deputy Huelsen checked a box indicating that Grossman
was believed to be the driver of the vehicle because there was a
seatbelt mark across Grossman’s chest and/or injuries present.
Deputy Mejia and Deputy Kelley observed that Grossman
smelled of alcohol; Grossman admitted to having consumed a
Margarita. Deputy Huelsen attested that Grossman’s blood
alcohol content measured 0.075 on a PAS test, but did not check
the box indicating that this symptom was observed. Deputy
Huelsen also checked a box indicating that after Deputy Kelley
administered the chemical test admonition per CVC 23612-
Implied Consent, Grossman refused to submit to a breath or
blood test. Based on his 25 years of training and experience in
investigating impaired driving and collisions, Deputy Huelsen
opined that Grossman was operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol and/or drugs and that unless a blood sample
was obtained promptly, dissipation of blood alcohol and/or drug
content would occur.
The warrant was executed and Grossman submitted to a
blood test. An analysis of Grossman’s blood showed that she had
a blood alcohol content of 0.080 percent approximately three and
a half hours after the collision. Grossman’s blood also contained
an unquantified amount of Valium and a Valium metabolite.
b. Motion, Opposition, and Reply
i. Motion
Prior to trial, Grossman moved to quash the warrant and
suppress the blood sample evidence based on alleged false
105
statements and material omissions of fact in the warrant.
Grossman asserted that Deputy Huelsen knowingly and
intentionally made material false statements and omissions in
the warrant. She requested that the court hold a hearing
pursuant to Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154. Grossman contended
Deputy Huelsen’s statement that she refused to take a blood or
breath test was false. She asserted that she was never asked
whether she would submit to a post-arrest breath test and that
she did not refuse to take a post-arrest breath test. Grossman
further complained that although Deputy Kelley’s report
reflected that her coordination was “fair,” she was “cooperative,”
and the odor of alcohol on her person was “weak,” these favorable
facts were omitted from the warrant. Grossman argued that
even absent the false statement, the warrant lacked probable
cause because it did not indicate that she displayed all of the
common symptoms of driving under the influence. Additionally,
the box next to Deputy Huelsen’s statement that “[Blood alcohol
content] measured .075% on a [PAS] test” was not checked, “so
one is left to speculate as to what it means.”
ii. Opposition
The People opposed the motion on the basis that
Grossman’s blood was drawn pursuant to a lawful warrant.
Grossman could not meet the standard for a Franks hearing to
traverse the warrant because she could not show that Deputy
Huelsen knowingly, intentionally, and with reckless disregard for
the truth made false statements and omitted material facts or
that the false/omitted facts were necessary to the finding of
probable cause.
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iii. Reply
Grossman filed a reply arguing that the PAS tests she took
qualified as chemical testing pursuant to Vehicle Code section
23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), and that requiring her to take a
post-arrest blood test was unreasonable in light of the fact that
she had already provided pre-arrest breath tests. Grossman also
argued that the prosecutor wrongly stated that to obtain a
Franks hearing she had to show that any falsehoods in the
warrant were intentional. Grossman asserted that she was only
required to show the affiant made false statements with reckless
disregard for the truth. The fact that the affidavit stated
Grossman refused a blood or breath test although she was not
asked to submit to a post-arrest breath test was material,
because refusal to take a chemical test is an indicator of
consciousness of guilt and weighs heavily in favor of issuance of a
warrant.
c. Trial Court’s Ruling
At a hearing on the matter, the parties argued their
positions. The trial court found that Deputy Kelley properly
advised Grossman of the implied consent law, and if anything in
the warrant was incorrect, it was that “technically she didn’t
refuse to take a blood or breath test. She just refused to take a
blood test.” Although authorities obtained PAS test results that
agreed within 0.02 percent and were therefore admissible at trial,
that did not obviate the need for a blood sample or make issuance
of a warrant unreasonable.
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The trial court agreed with the defense that the warrant
was “sloppy,” but found that even if Deputy Huelsen acted
negligently, he did not act recklessly. The affidavit did not
convey that Grossman refused to take the PAS test. A
magistrate would understand that Grossman’s blood alcohol
content was 0.075 percent and know that fact was case-specific.
At most, the affidavit conveyed that Grossman submitted to a
PAS test but did not consent to a post-arrest breath test after
being advised under the implied consent law.
The court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
support holding a Franks hearing. Even assuming the defense
met the burden of showing recklessness, the misstatement and
omissions were not material. A magistrate would consider and
give weight to the fact that Grossman refused a blood test even if
she was not asked to submit to a breath test. Even absent that
fact, the remaining information—that there was a collision about
a quarter of a mile away with two fatalities, Grossman was found
outside her vehicle, she smelled of alcohol, she admitted to
drinking, she had a blood alcohol content of 0.075 percent, and a
deputy with 25 years of experience believed she was driving
under the influence—constituted probable cause to obtain a blood
sample. The omissions did not contribute significantly to
issuance of the warrant. The court denied the motion to traverse
and request for a Franks hearing.
3. Analysis
Grossman contends that the trial court erred by denying
her request for a Franks hearing. She claims that the affidavit in
support of the search warrant falsely states that (1) she was
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“given the choice” to take a post-arrest breath test, and (2) she
refused to take a breath test.
The first part of Grossman’s claim is a mischaracterization
of the affidavit, which Grossman compounds with a misstatement
of the law. The affidavit contains a checked box indicating that
“After being read verbatim the Chemical Test Admonition per CV
23612-Implied Consent, suspect . . . refused to submit to breath
or blood test.” (Italics added.) As pertinent here, the Chemical
Test Admonition that Deputy Kelley read to Grossman states,
“You are required by state law to submit to and complete a
chemical test to determine the alcohol and/or drug content of your
blood. Because I believe you are under the influence of alcohol or
a combination of alcohol and drugs, you have a choice of taking a
breath or blood test.” As defense counsel acknowledged at the
hearing in the trial court, Deputy Kelley properly advised
Grossman under the Chemical Test Admonition that she had a
choice of whether to take a breath test or a blood test. The
affidavit accurately states that she was so advised. Grossman
conflates being asked if she wanted to take a specific test after
being advised of her options with being advised that she had a
choice of tests. The two are not the same. Officers only have a
legal duty to advise suspects of their choice. (Veh. Code, § 23612,
subd. (a)(2).)
Grossman’s second claim—that the affidavit inaccurately
states she refused a breath test—has some merit. Although read
literally, “refused to submit to breath or blood test” indicates that
Grossman refused one or more of the tests without specifying
which test(s) she refused, in the context of the law the phrase is
ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean that Grossman
expressly refused both chemical tests. (Italics added.) Grossman
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argued for the latter interpretation at the hearing, but defense
counsel did not elicit any evidence regarding how Deputy Kelley
or Deputy Huelsen interpreted the statement in the affidavit. In
the absence of any evidence of the deputies’ understanding of the
phrase it is impossible to attribute deliberate falsity or
recklessness to either of the deputies. Moreover, even if Deputy
Huelsen had intentionally or recklessly supplied false
information, the corrected affidavit would contain sufficient facts
to support probable cause to issue a warrant, as we discuss
below.
Grossman also asserts that the affidavit omits that she was
cooperative, that the odor of alcohol emanating from her person
was “weak,” and that her coordination was “fair,” as included in
Deputy Kelley’s DUI Complaint Report. Given that Deputy
Huelsen filled out a standard form that did not include space for
this level of detail, we cannot say that the omissions were
deliberate or made with reckless disregard for the truth.
Regardless, if the affidavit was amended to exclude any
implication that Grossman refused to take a post-arrest breath
test and to include all of the details known to the deputies, it
would include the following: Deputy Mejia discovered Grossman
about three-tenths of a mile from the site of a hit and run
collision that resulted in the death of two pedestrians. Grossman
had pulled over to the side of the road and was looking at the
damage to her car. She admitted to being the driver of the
vehicle, admitted to hitting something, and told the deputy that
Mercedes had disabled her car. Her eyes were watery and droopy
and a weak smell of alcohol was emanating from her person.
Grossman was generally cooperative and displayed “fair”
coordination in the FST tests that Deputy Kelley administered
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about an hour after the collision. Grossman admitted to drinking
a margarita. Deputy Kelley asked Grossman if she would be
willing to take a PAS breath test and advised her that submitting
to the PAS test would not excuse her from the obligation to
submit to a blood or breath test if she was arrested. Grossman
agreed to take the PAS breath test. During the PAS test,
Grossman did not provide sufficient breath for the automatic trap
to operate properly, despite being told multiple times that she
needed to blow harder to provide an adequate sample. The
deputy had to utilize a manual trap instead. Grossman’s two
PAS test results showed that she had a blood alcohol content of
0.075 and 0.076 percent approximately one hour after the
collision. After Grossman’s arrest, Deputy Kelley properly
advised Grossman that she had a choice of submitting to a blood
or breath test. Deputy Kelley asked Grossman if she would
provide a blood sample and Grossman refused. The deputy
informed Grossman that he would seek a warrant for a blood
draw. Grossman did not state that she would submit to a breath
test and Deputy Kelley did not ask Grossman if she preferred to
take a breath test.
The foregoing facts support a finding of probable cause. It
can be readily inferred that Grossman was the driver of the car
that had hit and killed two pedestrians from Grossman’s location,
the condition of her car, and her admission that she had hit
something, although she did not know what. Grossman had
consumed alcohol, her blood alcohol content was very close to the
legal limit, and she was still exhibiting signs of impairment an
hour after the collision. A deputy with 25 years of experience
stated that it was his opinion that she was driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs and that unless a blood sample was
111
obtained promptly, dissipation of blood alcohol and/or drug
content would result in destruction of evidence. We reject
Grossman’s assertion that “had she not refused [a post-arrest
breath test], she would have necessarily consented and no
warrant would be needed.” Regardless of whether Grossman
would have been cooperative and submitted to a post-arrest
breath test (a conclusion that the evidence does not compel), at
best Grossman had difficulty providing a sufficient breath sample
during the PAS test, and she refused to provide a blood sample.
A warrant was reasonably necessary to preserve accurate
evidence of her blood alcohol content.
H. Motion to Suppress Blood Evidence
Grossman contends that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department’s deliberate and systematic policy of compelling
blood tests following a fatality where the driver is suspected of
driving under the influence violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.
1. Proceedings
a. Motion to Suppress, Opposition, and Reply
Grossman moved to suppress the blood sample evidence.
She contended that it was obtained in violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights because she had already submitted to pre-
arrest breath tests. Grossman further argued that Deputy Kelley
violated California’s implied consent statute by not offering her a
choice of chemical tests. She asserted that suppression of the
112
blood sample was the appropriate remedy because the Sheriff’s
Department had a deliberate and systematic policy of compelling
blood tests following a fatality where the driver is suspected of
driving under the influence.
The People opposed the motion to suppress on the basis
that the officers who obtained the blood sample relied on the
warrant in good faith. The People argued that the cases
Grossman cited in support of her argument that suppression was
an appropriate remedy were distinguishable because they
involved warrantless searches or instances in which authorities
had already obtained a chemical breath test and the prosecution
sought additional punishment. The People further argued that
failure to advise a suspect in compliance with the implied consent
statute does not run afoul of any constitutional constraint or
mandate suppression of the evidence.
Grossman filed a reply arguing that the People failed to
produce evidence to support their argument that the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
b. Hearing on Motion to Suppress and Trial
Court’s Ruling
At a hearing on the matter, the defense called Deputy
Kelley, who testified that he was assigned to Malibu traffic patrol
at the time of the collision. He was contacted to report to
Westlake Village to conduct a DUI investigation of Grossman.
He administered two PAS tests to Grossman. The results were
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0.076 and 0.075 percent, and agreed within 0.02 percent.17 The
deputy administered the PAS breath tests at 8:32 p.m. and 8:35
p.m. Using the Chemical Test Admonition on a DSM-367 form,
Deputy Kelley admonished Grossman that she had a choice of
taking a blood test or a breath test. The deputy then asked
Grossman if she would submit to a blood test, and she refused.
Deputy Kelley intentionally refrained from asking Grossman if
she would take a breath test because the case involved a fatal
collision, and it was practice to take a blood draw in cases
involving a fatal collision. After Grossman refused the blood test,
Deputy Kelley advised Grossman that he would obtain a search
warrant for a blood test. Deputy Kelley did not write the warrant
affidavit; Deputy Huelsen wrote the warrant based on the
information that Deputy Kelley provided verbally. Deputy Kelley
did not tell Deputy Huelsen that he did not offer Grossman a
breath test.
Deputy Kelley testified that when he conducted Grossman’s
PAS test, he first used an automatic trap. After several
unsuccessful attempts he switched to the manual trap. The
machine kept “erroring out” because Grossman was not blowing
hard enough. Deputy Kelley was not aware of any Sheriff’s
Department policy of only taking blood tests for collisions
involving fatalities. Deputy Kelley was unsure whether it was a
Sheriff’s Department practice to only take blood tests or if that
was just his personal practice. The deputy was not sure if he had
ever had a case where a defendant refused to take a blood test
but later stated that they were willing to take a breath test.
17 The court took judicial notice that the device used for
Grossman’s PAS test was listed on the conforming products list
for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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Deputy Kelley testified that he did not offer a breath test
because it was his practice and the practice of the Sheriff’s
Department to get a blood draw on all fatal collisions. Deputy
Kelley testified that, as he understood the definitions, a policy is
something that must be adhered to, whereas a practice is
something that is “just do[ne].” He offered only blood tests
because blood tests are more accurate and provide physical
evidence, whereas breath tests dissipate.
Defense counsel acknowledged that if an officer simply
bungles an admonition and fails to give a choice of test it is only a
statutory violation and the remedy is not suppression of the blood
evidence. However, counsel argued that under In re Garinger
(1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1149 (Garinger), if the failure to give the
choice is deliberate and systematic, it may rise to the level of an
equal protection violation. Here, Deputy Kelley testified that it
was the practice of the Sheriff’s Department to seek a blood test
and not offer a breath test in accidents involving alcohol that
result in fatalities. The Sheriff’s Department’s choice to ignore
the law was a violation of equal protection and due process. The
remedy should be suppression of the blood evidence.
The court accepted that it was Deputy Kelley’s practice not
to ask if a suspect wanted a breath test, and possibly the practice
of deputies that he worked with, but not the formal policy of the
entire department. The court also found that the issues Deputy
Kelley encountered with the PAS test implicated the
reasonableness of asking for blood only and for seeking a
warrant. The officers needed an accurate sample and had
probable cause for a warrant. Alternatively, the court found that
the officers objectively acted in good faith and reasonably relied
on the warrant. None of the exceptions to the good faith doctrine
115
applied. The court ruled that the blood test was not obtained in
violation of the constitution. There was a significant difference
between a blood sample taken by force and a blood sample taken
with a warrant. That difference distinguished this case from the
cases that the defense relied on. Here, Grossman was properly
advised of her options. Violation of the implied consent statute
was not equivalent to a constitutional violation. Even assuming
that the Sheriff’s Department had a policy of only asking a driver
to take a blood test, that was not a violation of the statute or of
constitutional rights. No case law indicated that suppression of
the blood sample would be the appropriate remedy. There was no
basis for suppression even if Grossman established a statutory
violation because the deputy obtained a warrant. The court
denied the motion for suppression.
2. Analysis
On appeal, Grossman contends that the blood sample
evidence should have been suppressed because the Sheriff’s
Department failed to follow the law in DUI cases involving a
fatality by deliberately and systematically not offering a breath
test and always demanding a blood test.
“The Fourth Amendment protects the ‘right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches’ and
provides that ‘no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.’
A blood draw is a search of the person. (Birchfield v. North
Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160.)” (People v. Lopez
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 317, 323–324.) “In reviewing a trial court’s
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s
factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by
116
substantial evidence. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876,
924.) We exercise our independent judgment in determining
whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.)” (People v.
Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.)
Grossman relies on Garinger, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1149,
to support her argument that the Sheriff’s Department violated
her equal protection rights by failing to advise her as Vehicle
Code section 23612 requires, and that the blood sample evidence
should therefore be suppressed. In Garinger, the Court of Appeal
issued an order to show cause based on the defendant’s allegation
that the Riverside Police Department had a “deliberate,
systematic and persistent policy” of not giving advisements
mandated by the implied consent statute—a claim that the
District Attorney made no effort to deny. (Id. at pp. 1152–1153.)
The court appointed a referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine the truth of the defendant’s allegation. (Id. at p.
1155.) The referee’s findings included that the police department
had no deliberate, systematic, and persistent policy of failing to
advise under the implied consent statute persons arrested on
suspicion of drunk driving, and that the officer’s failure to advise
the defendant was therefore not the result of such a policy.
(Ibid.) The appellate court held that the officer’s failure to give
the statutorily-mandated advisements did not warrant
suppressing blood alcohol evidence under the constitution. (Id. at
p. 1156.)
In this case, Deputy Kelley properly advised Grossman that
she had a choice between a blood test and a breath test. The
deputy also advised Grossman that taking the PAS test did not
relieve her of the obligation to take a chemical test. Grossman
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never expressed a desire to take a post-arrest breath test.
Deputy Kelley did not violate the implied consent statute or
Grossman’s constitutional rights. Moreover, even if the deputy
had been required to ask Grossman whether she wanted to take a
breath test after fully advising her of her choice of tests, there is
no evidence that his failure was the result of a “deliberate,
systematic and persistent policy” of the Sheriff’s Department.
Deputy Kelley stated that he was not aware of any Sheriff’s
Department policy. It was his practice not to ask a person
suspected of driving under the influence and causing a fatal
collision whether they wanted to take a breath test. The deputy
understood that other deputies in the Sheriff’s Department also
followed this practice, but, as the trial court found, the deputy
was not in a position to speak for the entire Sheriff’s Department
and no other evidence of a Sheriff’s Department policy was
presented in the trial court. The contention lacks merit.
I. Exclusion of Evidence
Grossman contends that the trial court abused its
discretion and violated her due process rights by excluding
exculpatory evidence, including: (1) audio of an officer speaking
as he recorded a surveillance video on his iPhone; (2) expert
testimony on police practices; and (3) expert testimony regarding
flawed road design that may have contributed to the collision.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
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1. Legal Principles
“The rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are well
established. Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code,
§ 350.) Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 210.) ‘The test of
relevance is whether the evidence tends “logically, naturally, and
by reasonable inference” to establish material facts such as
identity, intent, or motive. [Citations.] The trial court retains
broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 995.)
“In general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of
evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s
right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] We have
recognized, however, that Evidence Code section 352 must yield
to a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and to the right to
present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his
or her defense. [Citation.]” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 998–999.) “Although the complete exclusion of
evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair
his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense
evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with
that constitutional right. [Citation.] Accordingly such a ruling, if
erroneous, is ‘an error of law merely,’ which is governed by the
standard of review announced in People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 999.)
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2. iPhone Audio
a. Proceedings
During the investigation of the collision, officers obtained
surveillance video from a boathouse close to the collision site (the
boathouse video). The boathouse video depicted cars driving on
Triunfo Canyon Road soon after the collision occurred. It did not
depict the collision or the collision site. During the investigation,
Sheriff’s deputies recorded part of the boathouse video on an
iPhone (the iPhone video). The iPhone video included audio of
deputies talking in the background (the iPhone audio) as the
iPhone recorded the boathouse video.
Prior to trial, the People moved to exclude the iPhone
audio, arguing that any statements made in the iPhone audio
were hearsay. The People asserted that the defense should be
precluded from mentioning those statements in opening or
closing arguments unless defense counsel could make a proffer to
explain the basis for the iPhone audio’s admissibility.
Grossman filed a response in which she opposed exclusion
of the iPhone audio on the basis that comments made by one of
the deputies could be relevant to explain the footage, prove the
investigators’ state of mind, and impeach the deputies.
At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel argued that the
prosecution should be required to object to specific statements if
they wished to exclude the iPhone audio. Counsel argued that
the iPhone audio was relevant to the “presence and impressions
of the investigating officers[,]” and that the audio demonstrated
the investigators’ state of mind and the “lackluster” character of
the investigation.
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The prosecutor replied that the People did not seek to
admit any of the iPhone audio and were asserting that all
statements in it were hearsay. It was incumbent upon defense
counsel to identify statements that the defense believed to be
admissible.
The trial court agreed with the People and instructed the
defense to identify any statements it wished to have admitted for
the court to review prior to the next hearing.
Defense counsel did not identify any statements for
admission, and the issue was not revisited until the defense’s
accident reconstruction expert, Justin Schorr, testified. Schorr
observed that although it was difficult to see, he believed the
boathouse video showed that a car travelling behind Grossman
swerved to avoid Mark. The car behind the car that swerved
then struck Mark, pushing his body to the left side of the road.
Schorr opined that anyone using Mark’s final resting place to
calculate Grossman’s speed at the time of impact would be
“absolutely off.” Schorr testified that “the fact of somebody
watching this video was important to [his own] analysis[,]” which
depended on the location of Mark’s body after he was first hit.
The prosecutor objected that the deputy’s statements were
the subject of an earlier evidentiary hearing. The trial court held
a sidebar with counsel to discuss the matter. The court asked
defense counsel what he was attempting to establish. Counsel
responded that the original boathouse video had been deleted.
The deputies who were recording that video had the best vantage
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point. One of the deputies said: “ ‘That car swerved to miss that
kid and the car right behind it went right over the kid.’ ”18
The court found that the deputy’s statement was hearsay
and not relevant. The defense had not identified the basis for the
deputy’s statement. The court invited counsel to bring the
deputy in as a witness and question him.
Defense counsel argued that the deputy was watching the
boathouse video, so the iPhone audio was admissible as a
“present sense impression.”
The court stated that the deputy was not watching a video
of the collision. The boathouse video showed cars traveling on
the roadway after the collision took place. Additionally, there
was no evidence that the deputy was an expert. The statement
was complete speculation.
Defense counsel argued that Mark’s final resting place
formed the basis for all the estimates of Grossman’s speed at the
time of the collision, so anything that caused Mark’s body to move
after Grossman struck him impacted that calculation. Schorr
had relied on the deputy’s statement. Experts could rely on
hearsay.
The prosecutor responded that the statement was
inadmissible case-specific hearsay. Regardless, Schorr was
relying on the hearsay statements of a non-expert. Pursuant to
the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63
Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), experts could not testify regarding case-
specific hearsay. The deputy’s statements were speculative and
unfounded.
18 Because the defense never filed a motion seeking to have
the iPhone audio admitted, the deputy’s statements are not
contained in the record.
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Defense counsel asserted that the loss of the original
boathouse video had placed the defense in a bad position.
The trial court responded that the defense had elicited
testimony about the loss of the original boathouse video many
times during the trial. The basis for the deputy’s statement was
unknown; the statement was therefore inadmissible.
b. Legal Principles
“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of its content.” (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818,
831; see Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “Hearsay is generally
inadmissible unless it falls under an exception.” (Sanchez, supra,
63 Cal.4th 665, 674; see Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).) We review
a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including “its determination of
issues concerning the hearsay rule,” for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590.)
As pertinent here, “[e]vidence of a statement is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a)
Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or
event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made
spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by such perception.” (Evid. Code, § 1240.)
c. Analysis
On appeal, Grossman argues that the deputy’s statement
should have been admitted as a spontaneous statement pursuant
to Evidence Code section 1240. The People respond that
Grossman failed to preserve this argument by not objecting
123
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1240 in the trial court.
Alternatively, the People argue the claim must be rejected
because the iPhone audio is not contained in the record.
Moreover, no witness testified regarding the iPhone audio to
create a foundation for its admission. The deputy’s statement
was unsupported and speculative. Finally, the People assert that
Schorr was prohibited from referring to the deputy’s statement
under Sanchez, because it was case-specific hearsay.
We agree with the People. Grossman failed to preserve this
argument by not objecting on the specific ground in the trial
court. (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 892 [“ ‘questions
relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on
appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the
trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal’ ”].)
Regardless, the contention lacks merit.
Grossman failed to meet the foundational requirements of
Evidence Code section 1240. We cannot review the statement
because it is not contained in the record. Even if we could review
it, we would have no basis to believe the person speaking was
responding to the surveillance video rather than some other
event or evidence, absent testimony to that effect. There is
simply no foundation for admitting the audio recording.
Finally, we agree with the People that Schorr was not
permitted to testify regarding the deputy’s statement even if he
did rely on it. In Sanchez, our Supreme Court held that “[w]hen
any expert relates to the [trier of fact] case-specific out-of-court
statements, and treats the content of those statements as true
and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are
hearsay.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) The defense
sought to admit the deputy’s statement and/or elicit Schorr’s
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testimony regarding the statement for the purpose of establishing
that Mark’s body was moved further away from the point of
impact when he was struck by a second car, and for establishing
that Schorr’s speed calculations took that later movement into
account—it was case-specific hearsay that the defense sought to
admit for its truth and therefore inadmissible.
3. Expert Testimony on Police Practices
Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a motion seeking to
exclude the testimony of defense expert Scott DeFoe regarding
law enforcement practices when conducting criminal
investigations. The People argued that the testimony would not
negate an element of the charges against Grossman, and that
Grossman was on trial, not the Sheriff’s Department. The
testimony would only serve to inflame the jury. Finally, the
prosecution could only speculate as to what DeFoe’s testimony
would be, as the defense had not furnished his report to the
prosecution.
Grossman filed an opposition to the motion to exclude
DeFoe’s testimony. The motion stated: “This case will rely
heavily on the testimony of investigating officers, including
testimony from Deputy McGee on the light conditions, Deputy
Curry on his analysis of crash-data retrieval data, Officer Smith
on his inspection of Mrs. Grossman’s car, Deputy Mejia on his
observations at the accident scene, Deputy Kelley on the DUI
investigation, Deputy Apodaca on his ‘speed analysis,’ and
Deputy Shean on the process and results of his investigation.”
Grossman intended to offer DeFoe’s testimony as impeachment of
each the aforementioned officers on these subjects. The defense
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stated that it planned to show the deputies’ motives and biases
by exposing their “unreasonable investigative decisions” and
explaining “why those decisions undermine the results of the
investigation[.]”
At a hearing on the matter, the trial court questioned
defense counsel regarding counsel’s failure to provide a report to
the prosecution. Counsel stated that he had given the prosecutor
a paragraph describing the substance of DeFoe’s anticipated
testimony, and would furnish a report if the court ordered him to
do so. Counsel articulated the substance of DeFoe’s anticipated
testimony to the court as follows: “[E]vidence was moved, the
entire investigation was terribly done, according to Mr. DeFoe,
the worst that he’s seen in more than 35 years of being an
individual who is involved in these types of matters.”
The court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code
section 352. The court found that police practices generally were
not a proper subject of expert testimony—whether an expert
thought an investigation was reasonable was irrelevant and had
the potential to cause confusion and undue prejudice. Defense
counsel could expose problems in the investigation through cross-
examination of the deputies regarding how they conducted their
investigation, and could argue to the jury that the investigation
was flawed.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The “police
practices” that the defense stated DeFoe would testify to in the
opposition to the People’s motion covered a broad range of subject
matter, including light conditions, analysis of crash-data
retrieval data, inspection of Grossman’s car, observations at the
accident scene, the DUI investigation, and “ ‘speed analysis.’ ”
Defense counsel presented DeFoe as “an individual who is
126
involved in these types of matters [for 35 years].” The trial
court’s decision that the Sheriff Department’s conduct of the
investigation as a whole was not an appropriate subject of expert
testimony was not arbitrary or capricious. (See People v. Brown
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 165, fn.9 [“there is no such ‘field’ as
‘police policies and practices.’ . . . [a phrase that] is so broad as to
be devoid of meaning. It is like declaring an attorney an expert
in the ‘law’ ”].) Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that introduction of such evidence would
confuse the issues and cause undue prejudice by turning the trial
into an inquiry regarding every aspect of the investigation—
issues upon which both parties would likely offer extensive
evidence.
Grossman was not deprived of the opportunity to
demonstrate the flaws in the Sheriff’s Department’s
investigation. Counsel cross-examined all of the prosecution’s
witnesses vigorously. For example, counsel elicited Deputy
Mejia’s testimony that: the deputy was unaware that a
bystander had moved evidence at the scene, which undermined
the accuracy of his report; multiple cars drove through the scene
of the collision but were never investigated; no one photographed
the evidence for at least an hour following the collision; and the
only photo of Zachary’s scooter in the crosswalk was taken by a
bystander. Deputy Mejia testified “[T]hings are delegated, and
mistakes are made. I can’t explain why.” Counsel also elicited
Deputy Kelley’s testimony that he “inadequately administered”
Grossman’s FST test. Prosecution expert John Grindey testified
that the Sheriff’s Department failed to preserve the raw footage
of the boathouse video and failed to preserve four of the eight
pieces of debris found at the collision site. In closing argument
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defense counsel emphasized many flaws that undermined the
integrity of the Sheriff’s Department’s investigation, and argued
that the deputies were unfairly and inappropriately focused on
Grossman as a suspect. This was simply not a situation in which
Evidence Code section 352 “must yield” in order to preserve a
defendant’s right to due process. (People v. Cunningham, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 998–999.)
4. Expert Testimony on Road Design
Grossman contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to admit the testimony of road design
expert William Kunzman that the intersection where the collision
occurred was “extremely dangerous, poorly engineered, and ill
advised” as well as evidence that, after the collision, a traffic light
was installed at the intersection where the collision occurred.
The argument is without merit.
a. Legal Principles
“It has been repeatedly held that contributory negligence is
not available as a defense or excuse for crime.” (People v. Rodgers
(1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 167.) “[A] defendant whose conduct
was a proximate cause of harm is not absolved of responsibility
because another person’s conduct, negligent or otherwise, is also
a substantial or contributing factor in causing the harm.” (People
v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1328.) “In criminal
prosecutions, the contributing negligence of the victim or a third
party does not relieve the criminal actor of liability, unless the
victim’s or third party’s conduct was the sole or superseding cause
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of the death. [Citations.]” (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
351, 360.)
“ ‘ “A defendant may be criminally liable for a result
directly caused by his act even if there is another contributing
cause. If an intervening cause is a normal and reasonably
foreseeable result of defendant’s original act the intervening act
is ‘dependent’ and not a superseding cause, and will not relieve
defendant of liability.” [Citations.] Thus, it is only an
unforeseeable intervening cause, an extraordinary and abnormal
occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating,
superseding cause.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Morse (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 620, 639; People v. Brady, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1335–1336; People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38, 49–
58.) Moreover, “[a]n ‘intervening’ or ‘superseding’ cause which
relieves the criminal actor of responsibility is one which ‘breaks
the chain of causation’ after the defendant’s original act,” and
defendant’s act is no longer a substantial factor in producing the
injury. (People v. Autry, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 361; People
v. Wattier (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948, 953.)
b. Proceedings
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of
contributory negligence, including testimony of the proposed
defense expert William Kunzman regarding road design, because
evidence of contributory negligence is not admissible in criminal
prosecutions. Grossman filed an opposition to the motion in
which she argued that she sought to present evidence and expert
testimony on the issue of proximate causation, not contributory
negligence. Grossman asserted that the road where the collision
129
occurred was dangerously designed, and the crosswalk was dimly
lit and placed behind a blind curve on an arterial road where the
speed limit was 45 miles per hour. Grossman argued that these
factors played a role in causing Mark and Jacob’s deaths.
At a hearing on the matter, the trial court stated that the
defense could present evidence on the road conditions on the day
of the collision, but not expert testimony that the road was poorly
designed, that the city of Westlake knew of the road’s poor
design, or that Westlake took remedial measures after the
collision. The trial court ruled that it would permit evidence of
characteristics like visibility and signage, but the defense could
not present evidence comparing those conditions to the conditions
on other roadways. The court ruled Kunzman’s testimony
regarding road design inadmissible. The court stated that it
would reconsider whether Kunzman could testify if the defense
made a proffer consistent with the court’s ruling.
c. Analysis
Although Grossman asserts evidence that the intersection
where the collision took place was “extremely dangerous, poorly
engineered, and ill advised” is admissible, she offers no
substantive argument to support her assertion. She has
therefore waived these challenges. (Meridian Financial Services,
Inc. v. Phan, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 684 [this court will not
develop an appellant’s arguments; undeveloped, unsupported
arguments are waived]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “support each point by argument and,
if possible, by citation of authority”].)
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Grossman’s sole remaining argument is that California
courts have held admissible evidence of remedial measures
because the measures were relevant to causation. Fundamental
features of the cases Grossman cites undermine her argument
that case law supports admission of evidence of remedial
measures in this case. First, all of the cases Grossman relies
upon concerned civil liability, not criminal liability—comparative
negligence is relevant in the civil context, but not in criminal
cases. (Alpert v. Villa Romano Homeowners Assn. (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 1320, 1326 (Alpert); Baldwin Contracting Co. v.
Winston Steel Works, Inc. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 565, 573
(Baldwin Contracting Co.); Dow v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph
Co. (1910) 157 Cal. 182, 188 (Dow).) Second, the evidence in the
cited cases was of remedial measures taken by the parties, and
not a third party, such as the city of Westlake as Grossman
proposed here. (Alpert, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326
[evidence of measures taken to remediate sidewalk defect were
admissible as evidence of defendant’s knowledge of the defect,
control over the property, and causation in trip and fall action];
Baldwin Contracting Co., supra, 236 Cal.App.2d at p. 573
[evidence that protective barricade was installed after the
accident was admissible as evidence of plaintiff’s duty on the job
and the feasibility of eliminating the cause of the accident]; Dow,
supra, 157 Cal. at p. 188 [witness’s testimony that he separated
telephone wire and electrical wire that had come into contact was
admissible to show defendant telephone company’s wire was a
dangerous condition that existed prior to and during accident,
and was the cause of accident].) The situations are not
analogous. Moreover, Grossman was not deprived of the
opportunity to present evidence of the conditions present at the
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intersection when the collision occurred, including lighting,
curves in the road, signage, and features of the crosswalk.
J. Victims’ Vulnerability as an Aggravating Factor
Grossman contends that the trial court incorrectly applied
the aggravating factor that the victims were particularly
vulnerable because there was no evidence that she deliberately
took advantage of the victims’ vulnerability. We disagree. A
victim may be particularly vulnerable based on the circumstances
or their own characteristics, regardless of whether the
perpetrator deliberately took advantage of the victim’s
vulnerability. In this case, Mark and Jacob were particularly
vulnerable due to their youth.
1. Proceedings
The information included the aggravating factor that, as to
all counts, pursuant to Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subdivision
(a)(3), the victims were particularly vulnerable.
Prior to a bench trial on the aggravating factors, Grossman
filed an objection to application of Rules of Court, rule 4.421,
subdivision (a)(3). Grossman argued that, within the meaning of
Rules of Court, rule 4.42l, subdivision (a)(3), “ ‘a “particularly
vulnerable” victim is one who is vulnerable “in a special or
unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.”
[Citation.]’ ” (People v. Esquibel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 539,
558.) In People v. Piceno (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1353,1358
(Piceno), the court held that, by definition, all victims of vehicular
homicides are particularly vulnerable. The vulnerability of a
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victim of vehicular homicide must be distinctly worse than the
ordinary particular vulnerability before the court can apply the
aggravating factor. (Ibid.)
At a bifurcated bench trial, the prosecutor argued that
Mark and Jacob were particularly vulnerable as young children.
Their mother was leading them across the street inside a
crosswalk—an area that they believed to be safe. Children have
a reduced awareness and ability to perceive danger compared to
adults. Nancy was able to grab her youngest child and carry him
to safety. In contrast, Mark and Jacob had no advance warning
and were unable to get out of the way of Grossman’s car, which
was moving at great speed.
Defense counsel argued that no evidence was presented at
trial to demonstrate that the children felt safe in the crosswalk.
Counsel further argued that, pursuant to Piceno, all victims of
vehicular homicide are particularly vulnerable, so the finding
cannot be based on the fact that a victim was killed by a car.
Counsel claimed there was nothing particularly vulnerable about
a child in a vehicular homicide case.
The trial court ruled: “I agree with the defense, that the
case law suggests that vehicular manslaughter and murder
involving a pedestrian collision, the fact that a pedestrian victim
was in the crosswalk alone does not make them particularly
vulnerable and the [Piceno] case cited by the defense and other
cases recognize that.
“They recognize that by definition victims of vehicular
homicides are vulnerable; however, the cases recognize that
additional [f]acts may support a finding that the victims were
particularly vulnerable; so emphasis on the record [sic]
‘particularly vulnerable.’ And as defined in vulnerable and a
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special or unusual degree to an extent greater than other cases,
and the court does believe such facts exist on this case as the
People pointed out.
“This is what I relied upon. The victims were minors. They
were on skateboards and roller blades, and they had no advance
warning or ability to attempt to avoid the defendant’s vehicle.
“So there were facts on this case that are aggravating with
respect to this allegation that [are] above and beyond just the
victims being on the crosswalk.”
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the
upper term of six years in count 3, based on its finding that the
victims were particularly vulnerable pursuant to Rules of Court,
rule 4.421, subdivision (a)(3).
2. Analysis
Grossman relies on Piceno, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1353, to
support her argument that there were no circumstances in this
case that made Mark and Jacob more vulnerable than any other
victim of vehicular homicide. In Piceno, a pedestrian who was
standing 20 feet away from the road against a concrete wall was
killed when the inebriated defendant drove off the road and hit
him. (Id. at p. 1355.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial
court erred in applying the particularly vulnerable factor. (Id. at
p. 1357.) Although there could be no doubt that the victim was
vulnerable “if vulnerability is defined as a defenselessness
against the crushing power of an out-of-control and speeding
car[,]” for the aggravating factor to apply “[his] vulnerability
[must] be distinguished from that of all other victims killed by
drunk drivers.” (Ibid.) The Piceno court held that “ ‘[f]elony
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drunk driving presupposes an entirely innocent and unsuspecting
victim . . . . [Citation.] The element of vulnerability is inherent
in the very crime of vehicular manslaughter caused by a driver
under the influence of alcohol, and to use that factor to aggravate
the term is improper, absent ‘extraordinary’ circumstances.
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1358.) The court also observed that “the
drunk driver does not seek to take deliberate advantage of the
vulnerability of victims, unlike the situation in other criminal
cases.” (Ibid.)
Since Piceno, courts have upheld application of the
particularly vulnerable aggravating factor in vehicular homicide
cases. In People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1308
(Weaver), the court upheld application of the particularly
vulnerable aggravating factor where the victims were hit head on
by a drunk driver speeding down the highway in the wrong
direction with her headlights off. The appellate court reasoned
that “one can envision many situations involving gross vehicular
manslaughter . . . in which the victim has at least some advance
notice or warning of the imminent risk posed by the defendant’s
car, thereby allowing him or her at least some opportunity to
attempt to avoid the collision.” (Id. at p. 1316.) The court held
the victims “were particularly vulnerable because they,
apparently unlike ‘usual’ victims of gross vehicular
manslaughter, had absolutely no advance warning or ability to
attempt to avoid the oncoming car.” (Ibid.)
More recently, in People v. Mendez-Torres (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 1007, 1022 (Mendez-Torres), the Court of Appeal
found the victim—who had parked his truck upon hearing sirens
and was exiting his vehicle when the defendant crossed over the
lane and hit him at high speed—particularly vulnerable. The
135
court reasoned that the victim “had no realistic opportunity to
avoid the collision.” (Ibid.) Although the defendant did not take
a “ ‘cheap shot’ like the defendants in other criminal cases with
particularly vulnerable victims, [the victim] was still particularly
vulnerable because he was more unguarded and defenseless than
the typical victim of a DUI at the time of the collision.” (Ibid.)
“We review an aggravating factor finding for substantial
evidence.” (Mendez-Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1020.)
This case is analogous to Weaver and Mendez-Torres, but here the
victims were even more vulnerable because of their personal
characteristics. Mark and Jacob were 11 years old and eight
years old, respectively. They were not yet of an age to have the
awareness and vigilance of an adult. Their mother, the only
adult who was in the intersection right before the collision took
place, was able to pull their three-year-old brother Zachary to
safety. Mark and Jacob did not have any warning to permit them
to escape. Grossman drove through the crosswalk at a speed of
73 miles per hour, killing them both. It was not necessary for
Grossman to deliberately take advantage of the boys’
vulnerability for the aggravating factor to apply. Their youth and
the associated reduced ability to perceive danger in comparison to
an adult is substantial evidence of their particular vulnerability
in comparison to other victims of vehicular homicide.
K. Juror Identifying Information
Finally, Grossman contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering the defense not to make use of confidential
juror information to attempt to contact jurors without following
the procedures for release of juror personal identifying
136
information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237, and
to destroy any such information already in their possession or the
possession of their agents. This contention also lacks merit.
1. Legal Principles
“Upon the recording of a jury’s verdict in a criminal jury
proceeding, the court’s record of personal juror identifying
information of trial jurors, . . . consisting of names, addresses,
and telephone numbers, shall be sealed until further order of the
court as provided by [Code of Civil Procedure] section [237].”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2).) “Pursuant to Section 237, a
defendant or defendant’s counsel may, following the recording of
a jury’s verdict in a criminal proceeding, petition the court for
access to personal juror identifying information within the court’s
records necessary for the defendant to communicate with jurors
for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other
lawful purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).)
“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 206, jurors have the
prerogative of agreeing or declining to discuss the case after trial
with the parties. ‘Nothing in section 206 compels a reluctant
juror to speak with any of the parties, their counsel, or
investigators. “If any juror refuses to consent, that is the end of
the matter.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Russell (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
1050, 1057.) “Jurors often wish to keep their contact information
confidential. ‘ “Discovery of juror names, addresses and
telephone numbers is a sensitive issue which involves significant,
competing public-policy interests.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“Sections 237 and 206 were enacted ‘to balance the
interests of providing access to records of juror identifying
137
information for a particular, identifiable purpose against the
interests in protecting the jurors’ privacy, safety, and well-being,
as well as the interest in maintaining public confidence and
willingness to participate in the jury system.’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Russell, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1057.) “ ‘Trial
courts have broad discretion to manage these competing interests
by allowing, limiting, or denying access to jurors’ contact
information. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
2. Proceedings
About two weeks after the jury rendered its verdict, the
trial court informed the parties that two jurors had contacted the
court’s judicial assistant to report that private investigator Paul
Stuckey had attempted to contact three jurors at their homes.
The court reminded the parties of their obligations with respect
to jurors’ personal identifying information pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure sections 206 and 237.
The prosecution filed a motion with the court alleging that
the defense contacted jurors in violation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 206 and requesting that the court order the
defense to relinquish all personal identifying information of
jurors. When Stuckey contacted jurors, he had identified himself
as “a private investigator for the family.” However, it appeared
that the defense, and not the family, had employed Stuckey, and
that Stuckey had not properly identified himself in compliance
with the statute.
Additionally, it appeared that Stuckey utilized improperly
obtained juror identifying information to attempt to contact the
jurors. The court had ordered juror identifying information
138
sealed following the verdict pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 237, subdivision (a)(2), and the defense had not moved for
access to the information as required. The People argued that
the only way the defense could have obtained the information
was by either photographing the list of jurors’ names that had
been provided to the parties by the court for use during voir dire
or by writing down the information on that list. The court
specifically advised the parties that the list of jurors’ names was
confidential and was not to be removed from the courtroom or
disseminated. The defense had contravened the court’s orders in
violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 237. The People
sought an order of the court requiring the defense to relinquish
all juror personal identifying information and to delete any stored
information immediately, as well as an admonishment and
sanctions. Three days later, the prosecution filed a supplemental
motion informing the court that a juror sent an email to the
prosecutor stating that he had been contacted at his home by an
investigator who said that he was working for the Grossman
family.
At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel informed the
court that the defense had retained Stuckey to contact jurors and
determine whether there was a basis for a motion for new trial.
Counsel had advised the attorney handling the motion for new
trial of the court’s email regarding juror contact, and the attorney
stated that she went over Code of Civil Procedure section 206
with Stuckey. After that, counsel decided not to contact jurors
further. There had been no attempted contact with jurors since
the court’s email.
The court stated that the defense could seek release of juror
personal information for purposes of developing a motion for new
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trial following the procedures in Code of Civil Procedure sections
206, subdivision (g), and 237. Absent a grant of a petition made
to the court, however, the court prohibited any use of the jurors’
names that the court provided in voir dire. The court made it
very clear that the jurors’ names provided in voir dire were
confidential, and that they were not to be removed from the
courtroom or copied. The court’s judicial assistant collected the
lists at every recess and adjournment. The court also clearly
advised the parties that jurors’ names were provided for the
purpose of jury selection and for no other use. Following the
verdict, the court ordered sealed all juror identifying information,
including names. The investigator’s use of that information was
a violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 206.
Additionally, the investigator had not properly identified
himself, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure sections 206,
subdivision (c). Stuckey should have disclosed that he
represented the defendant or the defense, as well as the subject of
the interview, and the jurors’ option to decline to speak with him.
The court emphasized that it had informed the jurors that they
would have a chance to be heard by the court if there was a
request for release of their personal information, and that
protecting juror privacy was an important issue of public policy.
When approached by Stuckey at their homes, the jurors’ “sense of
privacy [was] upended” and “they weren’t pleased.”
The trial court took into account that the investigator did
not harass any jurors and left when they declined to speak with
him, but the court still considered the defense’s use of the juror
information to be a potential violation of important policies. The
court believed it had discretion to impose monetary sanctions, but
declined to do so. Rather, the court ordered the defense and their
140
agents to destroy any records of juror personal identifying
information, and to inform anyone to whom they had
disseminated the information that they had done so in violation
of a court order and that the information must be destroyed and
not disseminated further. The court observed that, although the
matter appeared to be moot in light of the defense’s decision not
to initiate further contact with jurors, the court would order the
defense not to contact jurors going forward unless they made a
motion in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 237.
3. Analysis
Grossman argues that the defense was not required to
follow the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 237 to
obtain lawful release of juror identifying information before
contacting jurors because the defense used “juror information
[already] in counsel’s possession.” Grossman does not deny that
counsel used information obtained from the confidential list of
jurors’ names that the court provided for purposes of voir dire.
Instead, she claims that she may utilize the information because
counsel committed the confidential information to memory.
Grossman’s argument that she may use confidential juror
information because “counsel’s memories cannot be deleted” is
preposterous. There is no “memorization” exception to an order
of the court that information is confidential, not to be
disseminated, and for use for purposes of voir dire only. As
counsel well knew, the court’s order concerned both the document
that the court provided to counsel and the information contained
therein. Counsel was obligated to comply. We likewise find
extraordinary the “dilemma” Grossman proposes in the opening
141
brief—that if counsel became aware of potential juror misconduct
the court’s order would prevent counsel from further
investigating and/or filing a petition to unseal juror information
because counsel could not use a juror’s name. As the People
observe, it is not necessary that a juror’s name be used in a
petition to unseal juror information. The defense need only
inform the court of its concern that a juror committed misconduct
during trial. A juror may be identified by number in the petition
to unseal, if necessary. A trial court is able to determine without
reference to a specific name whether the potential misconduct
constitutes good cause sufficient to warrant release of juror
personal identifying information.
We also reject Grossman’s contention that Code of Civil
Procedure section 237, subdivision (a)(2) is intended to prevent
the public from accessing the juror personal identifying
information, and not the defense team. Grossman did not make
this argument in the trial court, and has therefore forfeited it on
appeal. (People v. Viray, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208
[defendant must make a timely and specific objection to preserve
an issue for appellate review].) Regardless, the argument does
not aid Grossman. Here, the court provided defense counsel a
confidential list of jurors’ names and clearly ordered counsel not
to disseminate it or to utilize the information for any purpose
other than voir dire. The order was not lifted after trial ended.
Counsel’s dissemination and use of juror personal identifying
information obtained from the court’s confidential list of jurors’
names violated the court’s order. The court did not abuse its
discretion by ordering the destruction of confidential information
wrongly in the possession of the defense or its agents, or in
142
prohibiting contact with jurors absent a petition, filed in
conformance with Code of Civil Procedure section 237.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KIM (D.), J.
KUMAR, J.*
Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
143
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