People v. Herrera CA2/4

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Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Herrera CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B345157

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA251578)
v.

ROBERTO HERRERA,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a post-judgment order of the Superior Court
of the County of Los Angeles, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), we review an order denying Roberto Herrera’s
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 at the
prima facie stage. After reviewing Herrera’s supplemental brief
and the record of conviction, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
The following summary is drawn from the opinion in
Herrera’s direct appeal.2 (People v. Herrera (Oct. 6, 2005,
B177129) [nonpub. opn.] (Herrera I).) In 2004, a jury convicted
Herrera of the first degree murder of Stevie Jones. (Id. at p. 2.)
The jury found true the special allegations that he personally
used and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily
injury and death. (Ibid.; § 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d).) Herrera
was sentenced to 61 years to life in prison. (Ibid.)
On direct appeal, Herrera raised only two claims of error,
both pertaining to sentencing enhancements. (Herrera I, supra.
at p. 3.) The People conceded the errors, and the appellate court
modified the judgment by striking the enhancements. (Id. at
p. 4.)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We rely on Herrera I only for the purpose of summarizing the
case’s background and to the extent it is part of the record of
conviction. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 [direct
appeal opinions “are generally considered to be part of the record of
conviction”]; Delgadillo, supra,14 Cal.5th at p. 222, fn. 2 [court relied
on direct appeal opinion “for the purpose of summarizing the
background” of the case but based its determination of entitlement to
relief under section 1172.6 on its “independent review of the record of
conviction”].)

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B. Resentencing Petition
In August 2024, Herrera filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. He checked the boxes
indicating (1) the information filed in his case “allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime . . . ;” (2) he was convicted of
murder following a trial; and (3) he could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder “because of changes
made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
The People filed a response attaching a copy of Herrera I and the
jury instructions given at trial. The People argued Herrera was
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because the sole theory
pursued at trial was that he was the actual shooter and killer of
Jones. Herrera’s appointed counsel filed a reply that did not
address the jury instructions or jury findings.
At a hearing in March 2025, the resentencing court found
Herrera failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief under section 1172.6 and denied the petition. Its review of
the jury instructions revealed no instructions on felony murder,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, aiding and
abetting, or any theory permitting the imputation of malice.
Herrera timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
“In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), the Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the
felony-murder rule. It also created a path to relief for defendants

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who had previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder
theory but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under the new law if the defendant
neither killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision of [Penal
Code] Section 190.2.’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
703; § 189, subd. (e)(3); § 1172.6.)
Under section 1172.6, the process for seeking retroactive
relief begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration
that all requirements for eligibility are met, including that the
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder because of
the 2019 changes to sections 188 or 189. (People v. Krueger
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 431, 438.) “When the trial court receives
a petition containing the necessary declaration and other
required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.’” (Ibid., quoting § 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If the record
demonstrates the jury necessarily found the petitioner guilty of
murder under a still-valid theory . . . the petition fails at the
prima facie stage, and the petitioner is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law.” (Ibid.)

B. Herrera Was Ineligible for Relief Under Section
1172.6
After the resentencing court found Herrera ineligible for
relief as a matter of law, his appointed appellate counsel filed a
brief identifying no arguable issues on appeal and requesting we
independently review the record pursuant to Delgadillo. Herrera
was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, and he filed

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one. When an appellant files a supplemental brief, we are
“required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in” it.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
Turning to those arguments, Herrera raises issues relating
to his trial and argues he was not the actual killer. He contends
he has “new evidence of a surveillance” that law enforcement
withheld from his trial attorney and “could have proven that [he]
was not the actual perpertrater” (sic.) but instead handed the gun
to the real killer.
These arguments are beyond the scope of this appeal. The
filing “of a section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner
a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. . . . ‘The
purpose of section [1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of
amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not
previously determined, not to provide a do-over on factual
disputes that have already been resolved.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) Herrera therefore has
failed to demonstrate error with respect to the trial court’s ruling
on his section 1172.6 petition.
In addition to rejecting the arguments raised in Herrera’s
supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record. Our review reveals no jury
instructions on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting, or imputed malice.
Absent these instructions, the jury was not given the option of
finding Herrera guilty under an invalid theory. (See People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 59–60 [denial at prima facie
stage proper where the jury instructions and verdicts
demonstrated the jury necessarily found the petitioner was the

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actual killer]; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205
[petition properly denied at prima facie stage where jury was not
instructed on any theory of liability for murder or attempted
murder requiring malice to be imputed to defendant].) Herrera’s
conviction as the actual killer and sole perpetrator is reflected in
the jury’s findings, which found he personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun causing great and bodily injury and/or
death. No arguable issues exist.

DISPOSITION
The resentencing court’s order denying Herrera’s
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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