People v. Herrera CA2/6

CourtListener 10809356Calctapp16 mar 2026

Testo completo

Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Herrera CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338970
(Super. Ct. No. BA517552)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

LORENZO HERRERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Lorenzo Herrera appeals after a jury convicted him of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count
1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (id., § 29800, subd.
(a)(1); count 2). The jury also found true the allegation that
appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of the
murder (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court sentenced appellant
to a total term of 29 years to life.
Appellant contends: (1) the court incorrectly instructed the
jury as to appellant’s buccal swab refusal; (2) evidence of multiple
prior detentions deprived him of a fair trial; and (3) trial counsel
was ineffective in multiple respects. Appellant also asserts
cumulative error. We will affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 16, 2021, at around 12:30 a.m., David
Robinson was in the area of 6th Street and Los Angeles Street
when a shooting occurred. Robinson called 911.
At the scene, Robinson told police he saw a Hispanic man
exit a dark gray Ford by a blue tent. The driver asked Juan
Jimenez and another man for somebody. The driver then fired
about eight shots at Jimenez as Jimenez was running. Robinson
described the suspect as about 5’8” or 5’9”, “[a]bout 185” pounds,
and “probably” 42 years old, with “[r]eceding in the top” hair and
a gray hoodie. Appellant’s DMV records indicated he was 41
years old in February 2021, 5’9”, and 185 pounds.
In a March 2021 interview, Robinson said the shooter drove
up in a car and asked for someone. A man walked up and looked
before running. The shooter subsequently “asked for Juan or
something like that . . . .” The shooter exited the car and chased
Jimenez, shooting him in the back. When shown an array of six
photographs that included both appellant and his brother, Mario
Herrera, Robinson said it “[l]ooks like . . . it’s number two
[appellant] to me.” Robinson did not identify appellant at trial.
Surveillance video showed a black Lexus arrive at the
shooting scene at around 12:30 a.m. Video captured Jimenez
running down the street before collapsing, and the Lexus driving
away. One of the Lexus’s rear taillights was out.
Law enforcement found 12 spent casings at the scene.
Jimenez died of multiple gunshot wounds.
After the shooting, law enforcement received a call from an
anonymous source that prompted them to research the nickname

2
“Speedy.” Two people in a police database went by that name—
appellant and another person. The other person did not match
Robinson’s description of the shooter.
On February 25, 2021, law enforcement went to a residence
associated with Robin Smedley, appellant’s girlfriend. There,
they saw the parked black Lexus. On March 2, 2021, law
enforcement viewed video from a camera covering that residence.
The video showed a black sedan matching the suspect vehicle
enter the residence’s driveway an hour after the shooting. The
sedan had an inoperative brake light.
After leaving the store that had this video, law enforcement
saw appellant sitting in the Lexus’s driver’s seat. Appellant and
Smedley appeared to be arguing. As law enforcement
approached, Smedley told appellant it was the police, and
appellant yelled at her, “Get in their way.” Smedley did so, and
appellant escaped.
On March 7, 2021, law enforcement impounded a Lexus
driven by Lorenzo Herrera, Jr., appellant’s son. In it they found
a light attachment for a firearm and two gray hoodies. According
to DMV records, Mario Herrera was the Lexus’s registered
owner, but he sold the vehicle to Lorenzo Herrera on January 30,
2021.
On July 23, 2021, law enforcement saw appellant in the
doorway of a residence. Appellant made eye contact and
immediately went inside. Law enforcement established a
perimeter and repeatedly called for appellant to exit. After more
than four hours elapsed, appellant did so and was arrested.
In July 2023, Officer Fernando Tenorio and Detective Louis
Garcia went to jail to obtain a buccal swab from appellant.
Officer Tenorio read appellant a court order for the sample, which

3
included the following language: “The defendant is advised that
a willful refusal to provide such court ordered sample can and
will be used against him in a court of law.” Appellant refused to
provide a sample. A copy of the court order was admitted into
evidence.
One week later, Detective Garcia collected two swabs from
appellant’s cheek.
According to an officer who listened to approximately 30 of
appellant’s jail calls, appellant did not deny committing the
charged murder in those calls.
The parties stipulated appellant had a prior felony
conviction.
DISCUSSION
Buccal Swab Jury Instruction
Appellant argues the instruction regarding his buccal swab
refusal “was legally erroneous [because it] told appellant’s jurors
that any refusal may support an inference of consciousness of
guilt, regardless of whether it was sought under a warrant.” We
conclude any error was harmless.1
“‘A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo.
[Citation.] An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury
instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction

1 Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 378, the court instructed: “If
the defendant refused to provide a buccal swab or tried to affect
the validity of the buccal swab, that conduct may show that he
was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant
refused to provide a buccal swab or tried to affect the validity of
the buccal swab, it is up to you to decide the meaning and
importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the
defendant refused to provide a buccal swab or tried to affect the
validity of the buccal swab cannot prove guilt by itself.”

4
accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim of
instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused
the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.
[Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed “in the context
of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the
instruction in an impermissible manner.”’” (People v. Lewis
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900.)
Appellant argues “the instruction permitted the jurors to
entertain an inference that appellant was guilty of murder in his
mind without finding he refused a court order.” However, based
on the evidence in this case, any reasonable juror would conclude
a court order authorized the sample. In addition to the testimony
of law enforcement regarding the order, a copy of the order was
admitted into evidence. Thus, the instruction’s silence as to the
necessity of a court order was of no consequence.
Moreover, an abundance of evidence identified appellant as
the perpetrator. Shortly after the shooting, an eyewitness gave
police a description of the shooter that very closely matched
appellant. That witness later selected appellant’s photograph in
an array. An hour after the shooting, surveillance video captured
a vehicle matching the shooter’s Lexus entering the driveway of a
residence associated with Smedley, appellant’s girlfriend. When
law enforcement saw appellant sitting in the Lexus’s driver’s seat
in that same area, he escaped with Smedley’s help. Once
apprehended, appellant did not deny committing the murder in
the jail calls a law enforcement officer reviewed.
In sum, there is no reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome absent any error in the instruction, and any

5
such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705] (Chapman).)
Admission of Appellant’s Prior Detentions
The trial court admitted five of appellant’s prior detentions.
Except for the most recent 2021 stop, all occurred within blocks of
the shooting scene. Appellant contends the two oldest detentions
and all instances of appellant in handcuffs were unduly
prejudicial. Assuming these contentions have not been forfeited,
we conclude all the detentions were properly admitted and any
error resulting from the admission of handcuff evidence was
harmless.
In August 2018, law enforcement conducted a pedestrian
stop of appellant. Appellant said they used to call him Little
Speedy. Appellant was handcuffed. The jury viewed video of the
stop.
In October 2018, Officer Christopher Tran detained
appellant, a pedestrian. Appellant said he went by the nickname
Speedy. Law enforcement arrested appellant. A still image
showed appellant standing with his hands behind his back.
In July 2019, Officer Tran conducted a pedestrian stop of
appellant. Appellant told Officer Tran they used to call him
Little Speedy. A pat-down of appellant revealed no firearm. The
jury viewed video of the stop.
In November 2020, law enforcement conducted a traffic
stop of appellant. Smedley was the passenger. A still image
showed appellant with his hands behind his back.
On January 18, 2021, law enforcement conducted a traffic
stop of appellant, who was driving the black Lexus. A still image

6
appeared to show appellant being handcuffed, and an officer
testified he was handcuffed but not arrested.
“‘“‘Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 350;
[citations]), and, except as otherwise provided by statute, all
relevant evidence is admissible[.] (Evid. Code, § 351; see also
Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d) . . .).’”’” (People v. Thompson
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 69, 102.) Under Evidence Code section
352, “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
“We review the trial court’s rulings regarding the
admissibility of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 413.)
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the two
2018 detentions. Besides constituting additional evidence of
appellant’s nickname, these detentions tied appellant to the area
of the shooting as early as 2018. Solidifying appellant’s repeated
presence in that area stretching back years provided further
circumstantial evidence of his identity as the shooter. The risk of
prejudice associated with the 2018 detentions did not
substantially outweigh their probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
As to the handcuff evidence, we conclude its admission does
not rise to the level of a due process violation rendering
appellant’s trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) The evidence was not of an inflammatory or
upsetting nature. Any state law error in admitting this evidence
was harmless. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The jury
knew appellant had a prior felony conviction. Especially given

7
the strong evidence of appellant’s guilt as detailed above, there is
no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a more
favorable result had the handcuff evidence been excluded.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on
the failure to object to (1) impeachment of Robinson’s trial
testimony regarding fear with his preliminary hearing testimony;
and (2) the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct achieved “by
suggesting . . . that appellant provided false information to the
DMV to hide his ownership of the Lexus.” (Bold and
capitalization omitted.)
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel entitling him
to relief, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel performed
deficiently under an objective standard of professional
reasonableness and thereby caused prejudice under a test of
reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome.” (People v.
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 239.) We “‘indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance . . . .’” (People v. Earp (1999)
20 Cal.4th 826, 896.) “A defendant must prove prejudice that is a
‘“demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation.’” (People v.
Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241.)
“On direct appeal, if the record ‘“sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,”’ we must
reject the claim ‘“unless counsel was asked for an explanation
and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.”’” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463,
488.)
First, appellant’s counsel did not object when the People
admitted a portion of Robinson’s preliminary hearing testimony

8
through the investigating officer. At that hearing, Robinson
testified he was concerned for his safety. But at trial, Robinson
testified he was not afraid of retaliation or intimidation.
Robinson claimed he had been worried about his arrest warrant
when he met with detectives. Defense counsel might have
reasonably determined exposing inconsistency in Robinson’s
account would undermine his credibility. Appellant has not
shown deficient performance.
Second, while he successfully objected after the
investigating officer testified the Lexus was registered to
appellant, defense counsel did not object to the following colloquy:
“Q: Let me ask you this: When you’re a patrol officer did
you make a [sic] traffic stops?
“A: Yes.
“Q: When you made traffic stops, would sometimes the
person who claimed to be the registered owner not be the
registered owner?
“A: Yes.
“Q: Do you – are you aware, given your experience, that
sometimes there is a delay in change of registration in terms of
who the owner of a vehicle is when there’s a transfer?
“A: Yes.”
Defense counsel’s silence was not deficient performance
because the prosecutor’s questions were not objectionable, much
less misconduct. The exchange helped establish that DMV
records regarding a registered owner do not always reflect a
recent vehicle transfer. The questions regarding traffic stops
were simply foundational to the officer’s knowledge of this fact.
In this case, DMV records did show a recent transfer of the Lexus
on January 30, 2021, about two weeks before the murder and less

9
than six months before appellant’s arrest. The prosecutor’s
questions exploring the impact of a vehicle transfer did not imply
malfeasance, including by appellant or his family.
Cumulative Error
We reject appellant’s cumulative error argument. To the
extent errors occurred, even when considered cumulatively, no
prejudice exists under either the Watson or Chapman standards.
Appellant received due process and a fair trial. (See People v.
Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

10
Mark S. Arnold, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan Kline, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

11

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.