People v. Toca CA2/2

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Filed 3/11/26 P. v. Toca CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B336579
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. XEAKA089833)

GERALDO TOLEDO TOCA,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Reversed.
Gordon B. Scott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Geraldo Toledo Toca appeals the trial court’s order
resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He
argues the court abused its discretion in deciding he was
ineligible to be resentenced to a determinate term. (See
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) The People agree the Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025)
18 Cal.5th 838, 877–878 (Guevara), resolves this appeal and
requires remand for a full resentencing. We agree with the
parties, and we reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, Toca was charged with felony failure to provide
true registration information as a sex offender (§ 290.015,
subd. (a); count 1), felony failure to update registration annually
as a sex offender (§ 290.012, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor
providing false information to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a);
count 3). It was further alleged Toca had previously been
convicted of robbery and sexual assault with use of a deadly
weapon in Nevada in 1981.
As to counts 1 and 2, his Nevada convictions were alleged
to be two serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the
“Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), § 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d)).
In addition, as to counts 1 and 2, it was alleged Toca had
two prior prison commitments resulting from convictions in 2003
and 2007 for taking a vehicle without consent and failure to
register as a sex offender. (Veh. Code, § 10851; Pen. Code, § 290,
subds. (a), (d)(1); see also Pen. Code, § 667.5, former subd. (b).)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Toca was convicted by a jury on all counts. The trial court
later found his prior convictions true and denied Toca’s motion to
dismiss the prior strike allegations. In January 2011, the court
sentenced Toca to 27 years to life on count 1, comprising 25 years
to life for his third strike and two 1-year enhancements for his
prior prison terms (see § 667.5, former subd. (b)). The court also
sentenced Toca to 25 years to life and six months on counts 2 and
3, respectively, all to run concurrently with count 1.
This court reversed Toca’s count 1 conviction on appeal.
(People v. Toca (Sept. 19, 2012, B230396) [nonpub. opn.].) Upon
remand, the trial court dismissed count 1 and modified Toca’s
sentence on count 2 to 27 years to life by imposing the two 1-year
enhancements previously imposed in count 1.
In 2022, Toca was identified by the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation as potentially eligible for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a).
(See id., subd. (b).) Toca was represented by counsel and moved
to dismiss his prior prison enhancements under the auspices of
section 1172.75. According to Toca, section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(2) entitled him to take advantage of other
ameliorative legislative changes enacted since his conviction,
including section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1), (2)(C). He argued
because his underlying third felony conviction for failure to
register was not serious or violent, he should be resentenced to a
determinate term pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of
2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)
(Reform Act). Toca further argued he did not pose an
unreasonable risk to public safety and thus qualified for Reform
Act relief. (See §§ 1170.126, subd. (f), 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
In opposition, the People relied upon two opinions from the
Courts of Appeal to argue Toca could not obtain Reform Act

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resentencing relief via a section 1172.75 resentencing motion,
and he instead must seek that relief pursuant to the Reform Act’s
separate resentencing procedure. (See § 1170.126, subd. (b).)
At a hearing on March 28, 2024, the trial court recalled
Toca’s sentence and struck the two section 667.5 one-year
enhancements. (See § 1172.75, subd. (a).) The trial court
expressly “agree[d] with the reasoning” of the two appellate
opinions relied upon by the People to conclude Toca was ineligible
for Reform Act relief, and thus it did “not need to deal with
dangerousness.” The trial court resentenced Toca to 25 years to
life on count 2 (his third strike) and to 180 days on count 3 to run
concurrently.
Toca timely appealed. (§ 1237, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.308(a).)
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Should Have Considered Toca’s Full
Resentencing Eligibility
After Toca’s resentencing, our Supreme Court disapproved
both opinions the trial court had relied upon in denying Toca’s
motion as to Reform Act relief: one was reversed and the other
was vacated. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 878; People v.
Kimble (Kimble II) S284259, Supreme Ct. Mins., Dec. 17, 2025.)
The People now concede Toca is entitled to a full resentencing
hearing, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Guevara. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874;
see also People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th
737, 742 [an error of law is an abuse of discretion].) In that
context, we review the trial court’s “statutory interpretation,

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[including] the scope of a statutory scheme, . . . de novo.” (People
v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 323; see also Guevara,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 856 [interpretation of § 1172.75].)
B. Statutory Background
After Toca’s original sentencing in 2011, three pieces of
legislation limited indeterminate sentences for third strike
offenders and enhancements for prior prison terms.
First, in 2012, voters enacted the Reform Act, which
restricted “indeterminate third strike life sentences” to
defendants whose “third felony conviction is ‘serious or violent,’
subject to enumerated disqualifying factors.” (Guevara, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 851; see also id. at p. 849.) The legislation
provided that defendants whose third felony conviction was for a
“nonserious, nonviolent felony . . . be sentenced to ‘twice the term
otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony
conviction.’ ” (Id. at p. 851.) The Reform Act also included a
resentencing mechanism for those “ ‘persons presently serving an
indeterminate term of imprisonment’ ” under certain former
provisions of law “ ‘whose sentence under this act would not have
been an indeterminate life sentence.’ ” (Ibid., quoting § 1170.126,
subd. (a).)
Second, in 2020, “Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1) prospectively limited the
application of one-year prior prison term enhancements to
individuals convicted of sexually violent felonies.” (Guevara,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 852; see also § 667.5, subd. (b).)
Third, the following year, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3),
which “ ‘retroactively appli[ed]’ Senate Bill No. 136 to persons
‘currently serving a term for a judgment that include[d]’ ” a one-

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year prior prison term enhancement. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 852; see also § 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Senate Bill No. 483 also established a resentencing
mechanism for defendants (like Toca) with a now-invalid one-
year enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) In such cases, “the court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant” (ibid.),
and the defendant shall receive “ ‘a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed . . . unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety’ ” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 852,
quoting § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)). During the resentencing
proceeding, the “ ‘court shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.’ ”
(Guevara, at pp. 852–853, quoting § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Guevara
When the trial court resentenced Toca, some Courts of
Appeal held that nonviolent third strike offenders seeking
resentencing via a section 1172.75 proceeding—like Toca—could
not avail themselves of Reform Act resentencing relief. (See
Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 854.) The Supreme Court has
since explained in Guevara those decisions were mistaken, and
its reasoning is determinative of this appeal.
The defendant in Guevara was originally sentenced in 2009
under the three strikes law. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 853.) He admitted two prior strikes and three prior prison
terms, and he was sentenced to 25 years to life for his third strike
plus three 1-year prior prison term enhancements. (Ibid.)
In 2023, Guevara was identified as potentially eligible for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (b),

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because he was serving a sentence with prior prison
enhancements. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 853; see also
§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(b).) Guevara argued he should also be
resentenced to a determinate term, pursuant to the ameliorative
changes made by the Reform Act, because his third strike was
not violent or serious. (Guevara, at p. 853; see also § 1170.12,
subd. (c)(2)(C).) The trial court agreed and “held that
notwithstanding concerns about public safety, it was required by
section 1172.75 to . . . resentence [Guevara] under current law,
including section 1170.12, subdivision (c).” (Guevara, at p. 853.)
The Court of Appeal reversed. It “concluded . . . the trial
court’s interpretation of section 1172.75 unconstitutionally
amended the Reform Act” by “ ‘eliminat[ing] [its] public safety’
element,” and Guevara could not obtain relief from his
indeterminate third strike sentence via a section 1172.75
resentencing proceeding. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 854.)
Our Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.
(Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 878.) It reasoned “the voters did
not intend for the [Reform Act] petition process to be the sole
avenue for defendants sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment under the original Three Strikes law to seek
resentencing relief.” (Id. at p. 858; see also § 1170.126, subd. (k).)
Rather, third strike defendants can also seek relief through the
separate vehicle of section 1172.75 resentencing. (See Guevara, at
pp. 861, 865.) Those defendants are nonetheless subject to “the
substantive requirements of section 1170.126” (id. at p. 861),
including its “discretionary public safety override” (id. at p. 862;
see also § 1170.126, subd. (f)), but need not comply with “the
ancillary procedural requirements” of that statute (Guevara, at
p. 869). They must instead fulfill the “separate procedural

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requirements” of the section 1172.75 resentencing mechanism.
(Guevara, at p. 870.)
The Supreme Court thus concluded Guevara was “entitled
to a full resentencing provided that he can satisfy the substantive
eligibility criteria established [by] the Reform Act” (Guevara,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 877; see also § 1170.126), and it remanded
for resentencing (Guevara, at p. 878 & fn. 16).
D. Toca Is Entitled to Full Resentencing
The Supreme Court’s guidance in Guevara makes clear the
trial court erred in refusing to consider Toca’s eligibility for
resentencing relief pursuant to the Reform Act when it
considered his section 1172.75 resentencing motion. (See
Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 878; see also § 1170.126,
subd. (f).) Thus, we agree with the People this case should be
remanded to the trial court for a full resentencing hearing
consistent with Guevara. (See Guevara, at pp. 877–878.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

RICHARDSON, J.
I CONCUR:

GILBERT, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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People v. Toca
B336579
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J., Concurring.

I concur in the judgment only.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

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