People v. Delgado CA2/4

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Testo completo

Filed 3/10/26 P. v. Delgado CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337967

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA148234
v.

IVAN DELGADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stacy Schwartz and Colleen M.
Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
After a preliminary hearing, appellant Ivan Delgado
pleaded no contest to attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187
subd. (a)) and admitted that he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Delgado
subsequently filed a petition in the trial court under section
1172.6, which provides relief for certain individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. The trial court denied the petition based on testimony
at the preliminary hearing.
On appeal, Delgado argues that the trial court erroneously
relied on hearsay testimony at the preliminary hearing in
determining that he is prima facie ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c). We reject this argument and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
At Delgado’s preliminary hearing, the victim of the
attempted murder did not testify, but an investigating officer
testified that he interviewed the victim, who informed him that
Delgado asked him “where are you from,” then fired several
gunshots at him, and one shot hit him in the arm.2 In 2019, after
the preliminary hearing, Delgado pled no contest to the
attempted murder charge. The trial court then convicted
Delgado and sentenced him to 12 years in state prison.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 The officer testified that “where are you from?” is a typical
challenge issued by gang members before shooting at someone to
place rival gang members or the general community in fear.

2
In 2023, Delgado filed a petition in the trial court under
section 1172.6, seeking to vacate his attempted murder conviction
on the ground it was based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) When a
defendant files a petition pursuant to section 1172.6, the trial
court determines whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). If the court
determines that such a showing has been made, the court holds
an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d).
In 2024, the trial court denied Delgado section 1172.6
relief, explaining the preliminary hearing transcript supported
the finding that, as a matter of law, Delgado pleaded no contest
to attempted murder under the still-valid theory that he was the
direct perpetrator. The court thus concluded that Delgado’s
record of conviction made him prima facie ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), obviating the need for an
evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d).
When the trial court issued its ruling denying Delgado
relief, our Supreme Court had not yet decided People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton). Patton holds that a trial court
may properly rely on uncontroverted evidence in a preliminary
hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations in determining
whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie entitlement to relief
under section 1172.6. (Patton, at p. 564.)
DISCUSSION
The investigating officer’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing was admissible under section 872, subdivision (b) which
provides, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding Section 1200 of the
Evidence Code, the finding of probable cause may be based in

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whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement
officer or honorably retired law enforcement officer relating the
statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of
the matter asserted . . . .” Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3),
however, provides that at a subdivision (d) hearing, “hearsay
evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing
as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another
exception to the hearsay rule.”
Delgado’s appeal raises the following issue of law: In
deciding whether a defendant is prima facie ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), can the trial court rely on
hearsay testimony that was admitted at the defendant’s
preliminary hearing pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b)?
Our Supreme Court recognized this issue in Patton but
determined it was unnecessary to address it in that case. (See
Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557, fn. 2.) It does not appear that
the parties below or the trial court addressed the question of
whether any of the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing
constituted inadmissible hearsay that the trial court could not
properly rely on to deny Delgado relief under section 1172.6,
subdivision (c).
Shortly after this appeal was submitted, our colleagues in
Division Eight squarely addressed the legal issue presented here
when they decided People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th
1179 (Rodriguez).3 Applying Patton, Rodriguez held that hearsay

3 Immediately after Division Eight filed Rodriguez, we
vacated submission of this appeal and asked the parties to
submit letter briefs addressing the applicability of Rodriguez. We
have considered those briefs.

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testimony by a police officer at a preliminary hearing could
support a trial court’s finding that the petitioner did not make a
prima facie case under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (See
Rodriguez, supra, at p. 1193.)
The Rodriguez court reasoned that “[u]sing preliminary
hearing transcripts at the prima facie stage of the resentencing
process to determine the theory under which the petitioner was
convicted is not impermissible judicial factfinding because the
court is not ‘resolving a contested factual dispute’ but looking to
statements within the transcript for ‘specific factual assertions
about his conviction—namely, that it was premised on him being
the sole shooter.’ [Citing Patton.].” (Rodriguez, supra, 117
Cal.App.5th at p. 1193.) According to Rodriguez, the trial court
may consult the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie
stage, including hearsay statements made by police officers, “as
an issue-framing device.” (Ibid.)
We agree with the reasoning of Rodriguez and its
application of Patton. Applying Rodriguez, we discern no error in
the trial court’s denial of Delgado’s petition. At the preliminary
hearing, although the victim did not testify, investigating officer
Steven Velasquez testified that he interviewed the victim, who
identified Delgado as the sole person who shot at him. Nothing
in the preliminary hearing suggests that anyone other than
Delgado shot at the victim.
Delgado argues that his case is factually distinguishable
from Rodriguez and Patton because “there were two perpetrators
and it cannot be determined, as a matter of law, that [Delgado]
was the shooter.” We are unpersuaded. Although it is true the
preliminary hearing testimony indicates Delgado was
accompanied by a fellow gang member, nothing in the record

5
suggests that other individual shot at the victim or that Delgado
claimed the other individual was the shooter. In other words,
Delgado’s case is analogous to Rodriguez and Patton in that the
preliminary hearing, when used as an issue-framing device,
demonstrates as a matter of law that Delgado pleaded no contest
to attempted murder based on the theory that he was the sole
shooter. (Rodriguez, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193; Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) Accordingly, following Rodriguez,
we affirm the trial court’s order denying Delgado relief.
Citing Patton in his reply brief, Delgado argues that if this
court were to affirm the order denying him relief, the appropriate
disposition would be to remand the case to the trial court with
directions to consider an amended petition should he seek to file
one. We agree with Delgado that a limited remand is
appropriate. In Patton, the petitioner asked for leave at oral
argument to be able to plead additional facts on remand in
support of his petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.)
“[O]ut of an abundance of caution” the Supreme Court ordered a
remand to the superior court with directions for the superior
court to consider an amended petition if the petitioner asked
leave to file one. (Id. at pp. 569-570.) Consistent with Patton,
and in an abundance of caution, we remand the matter to the
trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended
petition should Delgado, within 30 days of that remand, seek to
file one. We express no opinion on the viability of any additional
facts Delgado might allege in his amended petition. We
otherwise affirm the trial court’s order.

DISPOSITION

We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
consider an amended petition should Delgado seek to file one

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within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. We otherwise
affirm the trial court’s order denying Delgado’s petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.

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